Emser dispatch

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Copy of the first of three letters with which the text of the Emser Depesche, edited by Bismarck , was distributed. This so-called 1st expedition of July 13, 1870, 11:15 p.m., was addressed to the Prussian ambassadors at the royal courts within the North German Confederation and the South German states.

The Emser Depesche is an internal telegram from the North German Federal Government dated July 13, 1870. In it, the diplomat Heinrich Abeken informed the North German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in Berlin about the events in Bad Ems . The Chancellor then informed the press about the events. This press release is sometimes confused with the actual dispatch, because Bismarck largely reused the wording of the dispatch. The press release caused outrage in France and is considered to have triggered the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71.

In 1867 the North German Confederation was founded , a federal state under Prussian leadership. France under its emperor Napoleon III. saw in the new state a competitor for supremacy in Europe. This situation led to several diplomatic crises , such as the question of succession to the throne in Spain .

Napoleon III and his government vehemently rejected Leopold , a prince of the Hohenzollern family . The head of this dynasty was the Prussian king. Because of the sharp reaction from France, Leopold renounced the candidacy. That was not enough for the French government: their ambassador Vincent Benedetti traveled to the spa town of Bad Ems and spoke there several times with King Wilhelm I. The king was supposed to rule out any new candidacy from Hohenzollern for all future. Wilhelm politely refused to accept this.

Abeken, Bismarck's employee at the König in Bad Ems, informed the Chancellor in distant Berlin about it. His Emser dispatch also contained Wilhelm's wish to inform the press about the contact with the French ambassador. In his press release, Bismarck described the contact as particularly harsh. This was seen as a provocation in the French public, but in Germany it led to enthusiasm. The question of succession to the throne and diplomatic pinpricks had become a question of national honor.

background

Queen Isabella II was overthrown in Spain in 1868 ; the throne was thus initially vacant. Isabella took refuge in France. Right from the start, Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1835–1905) was one of the publicly discussed candidates for her successor. However, Juan Prim , Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Spain and one of the leaders of the uprising, first turned to other candidates. Napoleon III thwarted these candidacies, however, because he wanted to bring Alfonso , Isabella's son, to the Spanish throne. This would have retained the throne of the House of Bourbon .

After informal contact had been made with the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family in September 1869, the special ambassador Salazar y Mazaredo offered the Spanish crown to Leopold on a confidential mission in February 1870. As Leopold's father, Karl Anton , had previously suggested, Salazar turned to King Wilhelm I of Prussia , head of the entire House of Hohenzollern, and Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister, in this matter . Bismarck strove for a war against France, without which, as he later wrote in his memoir, "we could never establish a German Empire in the middle of Europe". So he did everything in his power to change Prince Leopold's mind. This then declared on June 19, 1870 his readiness to run for candidacy; Wilhelm, who was not inclined to the plan and had always viewed it as Leopold's private affair, raised no objections in a communication two days later.

The electoral assembly of the Spanish Cortes was set for July 20, 1870. The candidacy was announced in Madrid on July 1 at the latest , the following day the French press reported, and on July 3 Prim briefed the French ambassador in Madrid. Emperor Napoleon III. and his cabinet under Prime Minister Émile Ollivier feared in this situation a foreign policy embrace and a German diplomatic triumph. Antoine Alfred Agénor de Gramont , who only became French Foreign Minister in mid-May, played a particularly important role . As a diplomat he had distinguished himself by a strict anti-Prussian line, so that his appointment gave rise to the assumption that Emperor Napoleon would from now on lead French foreign policy accordingly.

France allowed itself to be provoked, also because the war party in Paris was domestically strong. They wanted to prevent the unification of Germany and take revenge pour Sadowa (the popular catchphrase). Emperor Louis Napoléon did not want to grant the Germans the much-invoked right to national self-determination at any price. He and his foreign minister, Gramont, relied on confrontation because of their domestic political weakness: diverting internal difficulties outwards had long been a tried and tested technique of Bonapartism .

Leopold was loyal to King Wilhelm at the family level, which is evident from the fact that Leopold followed King Wilhelm's decisions when he ended his candidacy (see below) . However, there was nothing to suggest that Leopold, as King of Spain, would also display political loyalty to Prussia. Such loyalty was only expected in circles of the French government, while the then Prussian Prime Minister v. Bismarck later stated quite conclusively that at the time he had not for a moment hoped for such political loyalty. Bismarck expected from a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne above all that the influence that France exercised especially on the southern German states would decrease.

The Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen line was very friendly with the Paris court, which is shown by the fact that Napoleon III. In 1866 Leopold's brother Karl was brought to the throne of Romania against the opposition of the great powers and had chosen Leopold himself as King of Greece. On the family side, Prince Leopold was closer to France than to the Hohenzollerns: One grandmother was Stéphanie de Beauharnais , an adopted daughter of Napoleon I, the other grandmother was Antoinette Murat .

In assessing a foreign policy crisis and managing it, priority should be given to the diplomatic customs of the time. A prudent and resourceful diplomacy could have consisted in the fact that Emperor Napoleon turned to King Wilhelm "from house to house" and the Foreign Ministry to the Prussian state government and asked Leopold to reconsider his decision. Instead, Gramont sought the public from the start with sharp anti-Prussian statements. The first thing he did was launch a corresponding article in the semi-official Constitutionnel newspaper , which brought about a change in the previously balanced reporting. On the same day he shared the French view of things with the European capitals. On July 6, 1870, he read a sharp declaration, approved by Emperor Napoleon and unanimously approved by the government, before the Chambre législative , according to which France would not accept such a development and, should it come to that, would do its duty without hesitation - one that was hardly veiled War threat:

"La France ne tolérerait pas l'établissement du prince de Hohenzollern ni d'aucun prince prussien sur le trône espagnol. Pour empêcher cette éventualité, il [le government] comptait à la fois sur la sagesse du peuple allemand et sur l'amitié du peuple espagnol. S'il en était autrement, fort de votre appui et de celui de la Nation, nous saurions remplir notre devoir sans hésitation et sans faiblesse. »

“France would not allow the Prince of Hohenzollern or any other Prussian prince to ascend the Spanish throne. In order to prevent this possible fall, the government counted on the cleverness of the German people and on the friendship of the Spanish people. Should it turn out differently, however, thanks to your [the MP's] support and that of the nation, we would know to do our duty without hesitation or weakness. "

The French historian Albert Sorel called this declaration an ultimatum, which was all the more difficult as France tried to intervene in the internal affairs of Spain. However, the real thrust was aimed at King Wilhelm of Prussia, who was then staying in Bad Ems for a cure. The French foreign minister sent his ambassador to the Prussian court, Count Vincent de Benedetti , to the king on July 7, the day after the speech quoted .

De Benedetti was commissioned to persuade King Wilhelm to influence Prince Leopold, who should then abandon his candidacy for Spain. Sinon, c'est la guerre (translated: “Otherwise there will be war”), it said in a telegram from the Foreign Minister on July 7th. King Wilhelm granted the ambassador audiences for the first time on July 9th and several times thereafter, during which the ambassador repeatedly presented the French demand to the king. King Wilhelm had serious reservations, but then made sure that the candidacy was canceled. This happened on July 12th, when Prince Karl Anton von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen , Leopold's father, declared in his name the renunciation of the Spanish royal dignity.

On the Emser Kurpromenade

Depiction of the so-called Ems audience of De Benedetti with King Wilhelm on the spa promenade in Bad Ems.

News of the resignation reached the French Foreign Minister earlier than King Wilhelm. That same evening, Foreign Minister de Gramont telegraphed the ambassador to come to the king again and to demand that the king confirm the resignation and prevent a renewed candidacy.

De Benedetti therefore wanted to ask the king for a further audience on the morning of July 13, but learned that Wilhelm had gone out. The ambassador looked for and found the king on the spa promenade in Bad Ems, spoke to him directly and told him the further demands of the French government. Later that day, Wilhelm confirmed the prince's declaration of renunciation after being notified of it; However, the king rejected the further guarantee declaration in clear terms:

“Le Roi a terminé notre entretien en me disant qu'il ne pouvait ni ne voulait prendre un pareil engagement, et qu'il devait, pour cette éventualité comme pour toute autre, se réserver la faculté de consulter les circonstances. »

"The King ended our conversation by saying that he could neither nor would he enter into such a bond and that for this possibility, as for any other, he reserved the right to be guided by the circumstances."

Later that day, the king confirmed his refusal through his adjutant, Prince Radziwill, and refused a further audience. De Benedetti telegraphed the events to Paris and left. He was in Paris on July 15th.

Emser dispatch to Berlin

On the same day, Bismarck's close colleague Heinrich Abeken , who accompanied the king in Bad Ems, made a note of Wilhelm's oral report on the events and telegraphed it to the Prime Minister. Abeken's report was the actual Ems dispatch. It had the following wording:

"His Majesty the King writes to me:

Count Benedetti intercepted me on the promenade in order, in the end, in a very intrusive way, to demand of me that I should authorize him to telegraph at once, that I undertook never to give my consent again if the Hohenzollerns responded to their candidacy come back.

In the end I rejected him, somewhat seriously, because à tout jamais such commitments should not be accepted.

Of course I told him that I had not received anything yet and that since he had been informed about Paris and Madrid earlier than I would, he probably understood that my government was again out of play.

His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince.

Since His Majesty told Count Benedetti that he was expecting news from the Prince, the very highest one, with due regard to the above imposition, to Count Eulenburg and my lecture, decided not to receive Count Benedetti any more, but only to tell him through an adjutant to let His Majesty receive confirmation from the Prince of the news that Benedetti had already had from Paris and that he had nothing more to say to the ambassador.

His Majesty will leave your Excellency to decide whether Benedetti's new demand and its rejection should not be communicated immediately, both to our ambassadors and in the press. "

A comparison with the account of the course of events given by de Benedetti (see above) shows that the descriptions essentially corresponded to one another.

Events in Berlin

This telegram reached Bismarck on July 13th. He edited and shortened it greatly so that the tenor was completely different. The text now read:

"After the news of the renunciation of the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern to the Imperial French Government was officially communicated by the Royal Spanish, the French Ambassador in Ems asked S. Maj. The King to authorize him to go to Paris telegraph that S. Maj. the King undertakes for all future never to give his consent again if the Hohenzollern should return to their candidacy.

His Maj. The King refused to receive the French Ambassador again and had the Adjutant from the service tell him that His Majesty had nothing more to say to the Ambassador. "

The first thing that strikes you about Bismarck's text is that it is significantly shorter than Abeken's version. Bismarck had omitted, among other things, two expressions from Wilhelm that were directed against Benedetti ("in [...] a very intrusive way" and "impertinence"). It would have been undiplomatic to publish this. The main difference, however, lies in the omission of Abeken's description, according to which King William had had a conversation with the French ambassador and explained his refusal to him. Bismarck only accepted the French demand and the refusal of a (further) audience in brief words. The exchange between Benedetti and Wilhelm seemed much shorter and therefore more harsh. Benedetti had therefore appeared improperly in Bad Ems and the king immediately refused further diplomatic contacts.

In his memoirs , Bismarck says that the original telegram arrived during a meal to which he had invited Roon and Moltke . He read it to his two guests, "whose dejection became so deep that they spurned food and drink," until his spontaneous abbreviation lifted their spirits again. This version is referred to the realm of fable by the historian Michael Stürmer . In fact, the day before, Bismarck had already taken steps that left France only with a choice between war and political defeat.

Before releasing the text to the press, Bismarck asked General Moltke about the state of armament. He wanted to know how much time it would take to prepare for a successful war. Moltke considered the rapid outbreak of war as a whole more advantageous than a delay. Bismarck released his account to the press for publication, which was published on July 13 by the government-affiliated Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in a special issue and on July 14 in the official Royal Prussian State Gazette .

French reaction

Memorial stone, which reminds of the Emser Depesche in Bad Ems

In its translation, the French news agency Havas has weakened the ambassador's demand for the mere question ( il a exigé ) and also literally translates the word adjutant as aide de camp , the term for the correspondingly high-ranking assistant to a head of state Adopted adjutant , which, however, only designates a lower-ranking sergeant major in French .

The French public reacted to the publication of the dispatch with the indignation calculated by Bismarck. On the other hand, Benedetti and his portrayal were hostile. In any case, Bismarck's account could give the impression that Wilhelm found France's demand, which could appear fair to the French public, to be outrageous and had brusquely rejected it.

Nevertheless, caution is advised before identifying the (only) trigger for war in Bismarck's move, for example to the effect that France “according to the honorary presentations at the time” could not have responded otherwise than by declaring war in order not to lose face. Napoleon's will to wage war was already established. Since the French public did not yet know anything about the new demand, there would initially have been the possibility of quietly accepting Wilhelm's rejection. However, this path was blocked by Bismarck's press release, as was the possibility of somehow enhancing the presentation.

On July 16, the French legislature approved funding for a war with just six votes against. On July 19, 1870, the French Foreign Minister informed the North German ambassador in Paris that France considered itself to be at war with Prussia .

literature

  • Wilhelm Langewiesche-Brandt (ed.): Bismarck - letters, speeches, memories, reports and anecdotes . Fifty-first to sixtieth thousand, Ebenhausen near Munich, 1915.
  • Jan Ganschow, Olaf Haselhorst, Maik without time (eds.): The Franco-German War 1870/71. Prehistory - course - consequences . Ares-Verlag , Graz 2009, ISBN 978-3-902475-69-5 .
  • Eberhard Kolb : The outbreak of war in 1870: Political decision-making processes and responsibilities in the July crisis in 1870 . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1970.
  • Ludwig Reiners: Bismarck founds the empire. Beck, Munich 1957.
  • David Wetzel: A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War . University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisc. 2001.
  • Albert Sorel: Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande . Paris 1875.
  • Ernst Walder (Ed.): The Emser Depesche , Sources for Modern History 27–29, 2nd edition, Lang, Bern 1972
  • Wilhelm Liebknecht : The Emser Depesche or how wars are made . Nürnberg, Wörlein 1891 (numerous new editions and reprints until 2018, digitized ).

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Heinrich August Winkler : The long way to the west . Vol. 1: German history from the end of the Old Reich to the fall of the Weimar Republic. CH Beck, Munich 2000, p. 202.
  2. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. Vol. 1: German history from the end of the Old Reich to the fall of the Weimar Republic. CH Beck, Munich 2000, p. 202 f.
  3. Otto von Bismarck: Thoughts and Memories , Second Volume, 1905, 23rd chapter.
  4. Reiners: Bismarck founds the Reich , 1957, p. 376.
  5. Vincent Benedetti, Vincent Le Comte: Ma Mission en Prusse. Henri Plon, Paris 1871, p. 315 ff.
  6. Vincent Benedetti, Vincent Le Comte: Ma Mission en Prusse. Henri Plon, Paris 1871, p. 372 ff.
  7. Otto von Bismarck: Thoughts and Memories , Vol. 2, Stuttgart 1898, p. 92.
  8. Michael Stürmer: The restless realm. Germany 1866-1918. Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 164.
  9. ^ François Roth: La Guerre De 70 , Fayard 1998, ISBN 2-01-279236-7 .
  10. David Bellos : Is That a Fish in Your Ear ?: Translation and the Meaning of Everything , 2011, p. 315.

Web links

Commons : Emser Depesche  - Collection of images, videos and audio files