Bloody April
Bloody April ( English Bloody April ) is the name given in the English-speaking region of an approximately five-week period during the aerial warfare on the Western Front of the First World War , in which the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) supported the ground forces in the Battle of Arras suffered exorbitant losses against the German air forces . The losses were so great that the morale of entire squadrons collapsed. The cause was technological advances on the German side, which, coupled with a training advantage and a focus on the German air superiority , as it had last been at the time of the " Fokker Plage " in the second half of 1915. Despite this air superiority, the RFC was able to essentially fulfill its tasks during this period and compensate for its disadvantage with the early introduction of new types of aircraft.
background
At the beginning of April 1917, more precisely on Easter Monday, April 9th, the British Army opened a meticulously planned offensive near Arras with the aim of breaking through the Douai plain, which a week later led to a French offensive on Chemin des Dames ( Battle of the Aisne ) should follow. The RFC should support this in advance with aerial reconnaissance , close air support and bomber operations against strategic targets. The commander of the RFC in the field, Hugh Trenchard , was an advocate of the offensive use of his units behind the German front line. He expected that the large majority of aircraft that he was able to deploy over the front in the spring of 1917 would be able to fulfill this task. However, these aircraft were largely inferior to the most modern German types at the time.
It was also crucial that the chronic compulsion to shorten the duration of pilot training, which was also poorly organized and inconsistent in order to keep these aircraft operational, perpetuated itself as young pilots were shot down in large numbers.
"[...] the worst bloodbath befell the new pilots, many of whom only survived a day or two [on the front lines] [...]"
At the same time, the German pilot training was more thorough and took place less under time pressure than the British. After heavy losses in 1916 in the fighting near Verdun and on the Somme , the German side reacted and in October the field aviation was thoroughly reorganized and specialized fighter squadrons ( Jastas ) were set up. These units were guided only by the most experienced pilots and equipped with the most modern materials, including the first mass-produced models with two instead of a forward-firing machine gun were equipped, including the Albatros DI and D-II . Of these two types, almost 350 machines were available for front-line use in the spring of 1917.
In addition, due to their numerical inferiority, the German squadrons preferred to operate only on their own side of the front and await the enemy here. On the one hand, this reduced the risk of capture and, on the other hand, allowed them to stay longer in the combat zone. In addition, the German pilots were free to choose where and when to attack the enemy, while the British had to stick to the mission objectives set.
Course and loss comparison
With the start of the offensive in the Arras area, the RFC was able to deploy 25 squadrons, which brought it to around 365 operational aircraft. Of these, however, only about a third were fighter planes that were only suitable for offensive air combat . The rest were rather cumbersome, two- or more-seated reconnaissance or bombing aircraft that only had defensive armament. In contrast, the air force in the same area initially had five, later eight squadrons of fighters with up to 80 operational aircraft.
The British machines at that time were inferior to the modern albatross hunters. Some of them were outdated types equipped with push propellers such as the Airco DH.2 and Royal Aircraft Factory FE8 , as well as more modern types such as the Nieuport 17 and Sopwith Pup , which only had one machine gun. Their job was to protect the BE2 , FE2 and Sopwith 1½ Strutter scouts and bombers . Only the most modern models on the British side such as the SPAD S.VII and the Sopwith Triplane were able to hold their own against the German models in terms of maneuverability and speed, but these were only used in small numbers and distributed over the front. A truly equal aircraft, the Royal Aircraft Factory SE5 , was still in the testing status and the Bristol F.2 suffered heavy losses against the German elite - Jasta 11 on its first use at Arras . The new, more stable RE8 bomber also shared this fate.
In April, the RFC lost 245 aircraft, with 211 crew members counted as killed or missing and another 108 captured. The German air force recorded losses of 66 aircraft in the same period, with correspondingly lower pilot losses. For comparison: in the five-month Battle of the Somme in 1916, the RFC lost 576 men. The Jasta 11 under Manfred von Richthofen alone achieved 89 victories in April 1917 , more than a third of the British planes shot down.
Based on the relative loss rate, this month marks the all-time low in the history of the RFC. Nevertheless, it can be stated that, despite these heavy losses, the primary tasks of the RFC were essentially fulfilled. These included current aerial photographs of the German positions, reports of troop movements, instructions for artillery targets and bombing attacks. The German units remained largely defensive and achieved only a local and temporary air superiority, but certainly no air supremacy .
overcoming
In the months that followed, the RFC was able to compensate for its technological disadvantages by introducing new machines. These include primarily the above-mentioned SE5, the Sopwith Camel and the SPAD S.XIII , which were soon available in numbers and began to add to the Jastas, who were in constant use. As their material became more effective, British losses fell and Germans rose. Tactical and organizational errors on the British side were also addressed and corrected, especially those in the training area. In the late summer of 1917, the RFC enjoyed greater aerial superiority than it had for about a year. This continued essentially until the end of the war; the Germans were never able to achieve a similar dominance, although towards the end of the war they sometimes shot down more planes per month than in April 1917 according to absolute figures.
literature
- Norman Franks, Russell Guest, Frank W. Bailey: Bloody April… Black September. Grub Street Publishing, London 1995, ISBN 1-898697-08-6 . Expanded edition: Bloody April 1917 , Grub Street, London 2017, ISBN 978-1-910690-41-3 .
- Peter Hart: Bloody April: Slaughter in the Skies over Arras, 1917. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, ISBN 0-297-84621-3 .
- Alan Morris: Bloody April. Arrow Books 1968.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Translated from Peter Hart: Bloody April: Slaughter in the Skies over Arras, 1917. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, ISBN 0-297-84621-3 , p. 11.