Braathens SAFE Flight 239
| Braathens SAFE Flight 239 | |
|---|---|
 A structurally identical Fokker F-28 from the Braathens SAFE |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Controlled flight into terrain due to navigation errors |
| place | near Vestmarka , Asker , Norway
|
| date | December 23, 1972 |
| Fatalities | 40 |
| Survivors | 5 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
 Fokker F-28-1000
|
| operator |
Braathens SAFE
|
| Mark |
LN-SUY
|
| Surname | Sverre Sigurdsson |
| Departure airport |
Ålesund Airport , Vigra , Norway
|
| Destination airport |
Oslo Fornebu Airport , Norway
|
| Passengers | 42 |
| crew | 3 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On December 23, 1972, a Fokker F28-1000 Fellowship crashed near Vestmarka , Asker on Braathens SAFE flight 239 (flight number: BU239 ) . 40 out of 45 people on board were killed in the accident, and another died a few years later from the long-term effects of the accident.
plane
The machine was a Fokker F28 Fellowship 1000 , which had completed its maiden flight on April 14, 1969 before it was delivered to the Braathens SAFE on April 29, 1969 . It had the serial number 11011 and the aircraft registration LN-SUY and was christened Sverre Sigurdsson . Braathens SAFE was the first customer of the Fokker F28 and the Sverre Sigurdsson was the first machine of this type to go into operation. In 1972 the airline operated six machines of this type, but also had to accept breakdowns due to some teething problems of this newly introduced aircraft type. The machine was equipped with 65 seats and insured with Norsk Flyforsikringspool . The twin- engine, short - haul aircraft was equipped with two Rolls-Royce Spey 555-15 engines and by the time of the accident had completed 16,710 operating hours with 8228 take-offs and landings.
crew
The three-person crew consisted of two pilots in the functions of flight captain and first officer as well as a flight attendant.
The flight captain was trained as a pilot with the Norwegian Air Force in 1951 and has been flying for Braathens SAFE since May 15, 1956. He held type ratings for the Douglas DC-4 , Douglas DC-6 , Fokker F-27 and Fokker F-28 aircraft types . By the time of the accident, the captain had completed 12,960 flight hours in military and civil aircraft. His flight experience with the Fokker F-28 amounted to 2163 flight hours.
The first officer was trained as a pilot in 1963. Braathens SAFE hired him on March 1, 1970. He had type ratings for the Douglas DC-3 , Fokker F-27 and Fokker F-28 aircraft . By the time of the accident, the first officer had completed 5150 flight hours, of which 3250 flight hours were in military and commercial passenger aircraft. His flight experience with the Fokker F-28 amounted to 910 flight hours.
Passengers and flight schedule
For the Norwegian domestic scheduled flight BU239 from Ålesund-Vigra to Oslo-Fornebu, 42 passengers were seated in the plane. The flight time should be around 45 minutes. There were four infants among the 42 passengers . Since the flight was carried out one day before Christmas Eve , there were mostly people on board who were on their way home, to Christmas family visits or on holidays abroad over the Christmas holidays. Since it was a short-haul domestic flight, only soft drinks and beer were served on the flight, but no coffee.
Flight history
 
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Overview map of flight route and crash site |
The plane took off from Vigra at 4 p.m. with a slight delay. The flight was otherwise without any special incidents. During standard approaches to Oslo, the plan was to fly over the "Rumba" radio beacon , after which a left turn of 15 degrees was to be flown for half a minute in order to be aligned for a landing on runway 06 in instrument flight . The maneuver was typically performed at an altitude of 3500 feet (about 1100 meters). When the weather was good, pilots often took a shortcut to make the approach faster. Due to the nature of the terrain, the ILS signals could deviate by up to 25 degrees, which would cause pilots to enter the curve prematurely. In this way machines would be put on a faulty course, on which they would fly over a range of hills. The problem was well known, which is why pilots checked the position of the rotary radio beacon in Asker on approach to make sure they were on the correct course.
On that day, the aircraft flew this abbreviation when approaching in the dark and in fog. The pilots misjudged their flight position and flew the turn 10 nautical miles (19 kilometers) too early. In this critical phase, the pilots had irrelevant discussions with the air traffic controller, specifically about Christmas parties. In the meantime, the machine sank below the safety altitude while the pilots operated the lift devices and the landing gear as if the machine were on the correct course. At 16:33 the machine hit a hill near Asdøltjern Lake in Vestmarka . The machine was 4 nautical miles (7 kilometers) off the prescribed course.
Search and rescue operation
Seven inmates initially survived the impact, but they were all injured and shocked. One of the survivors helped two others escape from the burning wreck. The survivors gathered some distance from the wreck. They later told the press that they were all in such shock that none of them thought about getting help, but none of the survivors knew where they were either. Two of the original survivors later died, bringing the death toll to 40.
Although the rescue operation was initiated promptly, it took almost six and a half hours for the rescue teams to find the scene of the accident. Air traffic control in Fornebu noticed that the aircraft had disappeared from their radar and informed the Asker and Bærum Police Inspectors at 4:36 p.m. of a possible crash. At 4:57 p.m., air traffic control contacted the police station in Drammen and asked for a search in the area around a farm near Solli, where they suspected the machine was. Although their information about the possible crash site was accurate, air traffic control gave the police incorrect topographical information. At 5 p.m., the Asker and Bærum police station dispatched two search parties, one from Asker to Solli and one from Sandvika to Nikebatteriet. The Asker search party passed almost immediately at the crash site and stopped to search for the machine, but found no evidence of a nearby machine. At 5:13 p.m., this search party was called to Nikebatteriet to continue the search.
At 6:30 p.m. a mobile operations center was set up again in Solli and 30 people started looking for the machine. At this point in time, the accident site was outside the defined search area. Finding the machine was also made more difficult by the fact that the search teams preferred to search mountain peaks and heights while the machine was on a wooded, slightly sloping slope. Due to the Christmas holiday season, many employees were already on vacation, which meant that the police needed some time before they could mobilize enough personnel for the search. At 7:00 p.m., a second operations center was set up on a farm in Rustand. Another 30 people were dispatched to search for the wreck and additional units were called in. At 8:30 p.m., the police and air traffic control began to doubt whether the search area was correctly specified and therefore decided to expand it. As a result, the crash site was just included in the search area. A second expansion of the search area took place at 10:00 p.m. At that time, more than a thousand people, including rescue workers and volunteers, took part in the search.
The wreck was found at 10:50 p.m. by a group of volunteers who had walked the aircraft's estimated route. Five minutes later, the search and rescue service of the Norwegian Red Cross arrived from Sylling. At this time, the operations center was informed of the find. At 11:24 p.m. a helicopter took off from Fornebu Airport and first landed in Solli at 11:41 p.m. to pick up an emergency doctor . He then flew on to the scene of the accident, the pilot orienting himself on the headlights of the search teams' cars that showed him the way. The helicopter picked up the seriously injured and carried them on two flights to Solli, from where they were transported to the hospital by ambulance. Two more wounded were taken away in an ambulance that had driven up to the scene of the accident. The rescue operation was officially completed at 11:59 p.m.
Accident investigation
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission concluded that the likely cause of the accident was a navigation error that must have occurred before the aircraft had sunk to 1,100 meters. No technical errors were found on the machine. The report found that there were some shortcomings in the crewing procedures: a radio compass was tuned on the wrong frequency so that it was getting bearings from Lahti . The flight captain had a private conversation with the air traffic controller about Christmas topics and had not observed the statutory rest periods before the flight. The commission could not determine that the weather or wind had contributed to the accident, although it was noted that the darkness and fog may have prevented the crew from being able to use visual fiducial points to indicate their location.
Most of the report was devoted to navigation aids in Fornebu. The report emphasized that false signals from the rotary radio beacon played an important role. It was found that the radio beacon for runway 01 interfered with that for runway 06 and that up to three false signals could be transmitted. The Commission recommended that airlines put in place procedures to ensure that multiple systems are always used to determine position and bearing, as a single system can never be reliable. It was also recommended that an additional radio beacon be installed in Drammen to facilitate the approach to runway 06, and that in the meantime the airlines do not rely solely on radio beacons for approaches to runway 06. The report also looked at the air traffic control workflow. A radar system was installed at the airport, but it was only used to monitor traffic and was not seen as a navigation aid. The Commission stated that air traffic control could have prevented the accident if they had recognized that the aircraft was on the wrong path and the air traffic controller had informed the pilots.
Commemoration
The deceased were flown to their home communities for burial. Of the fatalities, 25 people came from the area around Ålesund and were flown out to Vigra by Braathens SAFE on a chartered Boeing 737-200 flight on December 29. A memorial service was held at the airport, after which the coffins were handed over to the respective parishes. A memorial for the victims was erected near the scene of the accident, this is located on a popular ski slope between Myggheim and Sandungen.
meaning
It was the first fatal incident involving a Fokker F28. Up until the accident on Vnukovo Airlines flight 2801 in 1996, it was the most casualty aircraft accident in Norwegian history, and since then the accident has been the most casualty on mainland Norway.
swell
- Final instruction of the Aircraft Accident Commission (PDF, Norwegian)
- Accident report F28-1000, LN-SUY in the Aviation Safety Network
- Operational history of the machine on planelogger.com
- Machine operating history on jetphotos.com
Coordinates: 59 ° 51 ′ 57 ″ N , 10 ° 20 ′ 21 ″ E