De magistro
De magistro is a text written in 388 or a little later by the doctor of the church Augustine of Hippo . The fictional dialogue with his son Adeodatus , who died shortly before, deals with linguistic-philosophical topics. The two dialogue partners discuss the value or disqualification of linguistic signs with regard to instruction and the promotion of knowledge for the addressee.
The meaning and purpose of the dialogue
“Preliminary skirmish” is what Augustine calls his son Adeodatus with what they both deal with in the first half of the joint discussion, and adds explanatory: “... but it is not for pleasure, but solely for the purpose of our spiritual eyesight To train and sharpen the eye, ... "
This evaluation of the dialogue, made by Augustine himself, determines the path and the goal on which and towards which the conversation about the meaning of speaking develops in many individual steps, not without a detour into the surroundings and considerations of the path already covered or achieved . A meaningful whole results from the synopsis of the individual steps. This whole does not resemble a system in which the individual parts are assigned very specific places and tasks that complement other parts to form a complete unit, as we are used to from theoretical systems of philosophical thought. This whole is more comparable to the archaeological excavation site, for example a palace, which gradually releases its individual parts in accordance with the efforts of the excavators in order to gradually become a whole, probably with the knowledge that what has not been excavated or only partially exposed There are still gaps, but the essential context and the shape of the whole is taking on an increasingly clear form. In all its complexity, this whole thing can never be represented completely and systematically in detail, just as it is not possible to draw an exact image of a coastline.
Augustine therefore does not present a system, but wants the reader and his interlocutor to participate in his thinking by leading the paths that he himself has already trodden, and to find out whether someone else can come to similar results as he or whether there are things that he has overlooked that should lead him to revise his judgment. Comparable to an experienced mountain guide who single-mindedly and cautiously leads an as yet less experienced mountain companion to a long-awaited summit, Augustine takes his talented and thirsty for knowledge son Adeodatus with him in this fictional dialogue. Augustine leads him securely through questions, whereby his companion should be brought to the hoped-for goal as safely as possible, but strengthened by many new experiences, along them as if walking on the rope of the mountain guide.
It is no coincidence that the path of dialogue leads through philological terrain. Augustine, a trained rhetorician , knows the meaning of the spoken and written word. As a long-time teacher, the language is a familiar tool for him, which cannot be used sensibly without careful and conscientious consideration of its meaning and purpose. In order to recognize the value of language, its grammatical, but above all its intellectual rules according to which it is used, many a seemingly detour is taken, many questions discussed and considered, without which one otherwise cannot get a comprehensive picture of this set of instruments. The common progress of father and son, teacher and student, serves as an invitation to the reader to imitate Adeodatus and to join this spiritual rope team in order to check the train of thought, which runs back and forth through question and answer, and thus distance oneself from the Either let the matter convince or refute it through the matter itself.
content
About the character of language (1.1–8.21)
On the purpose of speaking and the need to use signs (1,1-4,7)
With the question “What do we want to achieve when we speak?” The conversation begins in the middle of the matter. After father and son have agreed that speaking serves either for instruction or the memory of others or for one's own memory, while words give signals to the ability to remember to put the thing they denote in the light of consciousness, Augustine gives Adeodatus one schoolmaster's task.
On the basis of a sentence, Adeodatus should show the respective things that the words of this sentence denote. Since he does not succeed in doing this and has discovered for himself that one can only talk about things with the help of words, they mutually determine the following: It is possible to explain certain words using other words or gestures and facial expressions and thus also to shed light on the matter, but it should at least be very difficult, if not impossible, to represent a matter without words or other signs (gestures, facial expressions). Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are activities (e.g. walking) that can be performed with but also without any kind of sign, a point that will be taken up again later and will be revised in detail .
Understanding of certain word meanings and pitfalls in grammar (4,8-5,14)
In their dialogue, father and son agree on the meaning and use of certain words. Written words are signs of spoken words; Names are signs; that which is denoted by signs is denoted by the term “denotable”; the spoken word is an audible sign for the audible sign name. The grammatical difference between word and name is that all articulated characters are words, but not all of these words are names. This grammatical distinction is viewed as philosophically worthless. (4.8–9)
The varying size of the grammatical scope is confusing. In the event that a word is a name, the following applies: this name is also a word. But what do words denote that are grammatically not supposed to be names? In the introduction it was shown that verbs and prepositions also denote something. Actually, one should be able to assume that all words are names. Because presumably it is so that every word (sound event) stimulates the hearing, while the name (sign) stimulates the memory of the person to remember what it is called. This is probably the case with all words, continues Augustine. He could show that basically all words are always names. The skeptical Adeodatus will only agree to this if his father can demonstrate it to him. (4.10-5.13)
Augustine succeeds most easily with examples of the use of the parts of speech pronouns and conjunctions . When Adeodatus is not ready to extend this admitted extension to all types of words, Augustine finally uses a Pauline quotation from the Bible to make it clear to him that even the word "yes" denotes something and can thus be understood as a name. Adeodatus now fully agrees and admits that he can imagine that the paternal judgment applies to every part of speech. (5.14)
Small argumentation exercise (6.17-18)
When, following this amicable result, Augustine challenges his son to consider how to argue against someone who doubts the latter because Paul - according to his own information - was a linguistic bungler, the latter suggests consulting a specialist to pull. Augustine, on the other hand, shows him how he can find solid arguments without these experts. On the one hand, based on what has been developed in the area of comparability and translatability of words between different languages, on the other hand, for stubborn believers in authority, a quote from Cicero as the author of linguistic questions in the Roman world, and finally a convincing example from grammar, including Adeodats To satisfy need for an authorized philological voice. (5.16)
In the following Chapter 6, for the sake of completeness, Augustine deals with the question: Whether all words are names or all names are words. Some Latin grammarians made a distinction between “ nomina ” and “ vocabula ” at the time. With nomina "living things" and appearing with vocabula "inanimate objects". But this problem has already been solved for Augustine, because he uses the term “nomen” to denote both living and lifeless things. (6.17-18)
Summary of what has been worked out so far (7.19–8.21)
In the tradition of ancient school lessons, which had to do without worksheets, copies, and electronic memories in order to record teaching results, Augustinus asks Adeodatus to use his own "memory" and to memorize what has been examined so far . He earns paternal praise for his portrayal and also provides a point of contact for the continuation of the conversation when Augustine asks him to continue walking on winding paths with him as before, so that afterwards she will all the more confidently to the desired goal, namely the answer the question of the knowledge of eternal and happy life can come.
About the priority of the matter over the word and about an insecure Adeodatus (8.22-10.32)
Since Adeodatus has consented to follow his father's path of thought as before, a further test of his spiritual steadfastness takes place in what has been acquired so far. Augustine uses a joking question to check whether Adeodatus is capable of recognizing the knowledge he has acquired about the double function of the sign name or word , which can now be used as desired. Nowadays this process would be called evaluation . Adeodatus gets tangled up in the pitfalls that have been laid out, but the father calms him down and explains to him that the cause of this lapse is not his lack of attention, but the power of a law inherent in the human mind. This inner spiritual force of law, and this is the result of the first part of this interlude, causes every person to pay attention first to what is indicated by words and not to the sound of the words. However, you have to take both into account when you are asked about something so as not to be ridiculed by a mischievous questioner. (8.22-24)
With regard to this regularity, Augustine now hopes his son will agree that what is designated should always be valued higher than the sign. When the latter does not want to agree in principle with the reference to the drastic example of “feces”, another discourse develops in the course of which they succeed in achieving an evaluation according to criteria other than the internal regularity established above. Augustine does not stick to his own words, but keeps Adeodat's progress in view. At Adeodat's suggestion, two further aspects are added to the two aspects of name and thing , namely recognition of the name and recognition of the thing , and these four aspects are considered in terms of their value among one another. Using the example of “ vice ” - a thing that, like feces, is not desirable - it is mutually discovered how these aspects are to be assessed in terms of their value to one another. As with feces, in this case the name is preferable to the thing, but the knowledge of the thing is superior to the thing itself, because it serves the happiness of the person to recognize what makes him unhappy. The answer to the question whether the knowledge of the name or the knowledge of the matter is the more superior in each case is postponed because this is difficult to decide at the moment, but the result obtained is sufficient for the joint investigation to proceed. (9.25-28)
When Augustine returns to the question of whether one can clearly and error-free demonstrate activities such as walking, lying, speaking and teaching without signs without signs, Adeodatus revises his earlier insight, differentiates his assessment of certain activities and finally, stimulated by the questions, takes it his father, quite a distance from it. (10.29-30)
When Augustine, after a brief review of the last results, asks him again to tell him whether he can really unequivocally agree with the results that have been worked out together, Adeodatus refuses. The very fact that the father asks him makes him suspect that he has overlooked something, and besides that everything is so confusing and confused that he is afraid of not seeing any possible counter-arguments or the real thing at all. Augustine, however, calms him down and thinks that this is only due to the back and forth of the whole course of the conversation. He shouldn't allow himself to be so unsettled by it, so as not to cast doubt on the most obvious. (10.31)
Because, as Augustine shows him using a straightforward example, it also depends on the insight ability of those who want to learn whether something can also be taught without signs, or whether every detail of a thing to be taught is not covered by appropriate signs must to see the matter for yourself. And finally, as if the view had widened again, they discover that there are a number of things that undoubtedly reveal themselves without any signs: the sun, moon and stars, for example. (10.32)
Signs teach us nothing (10.33-14.45)
Augustine now turns the tables: Can signs teach anything at all? With the help of the word “sarabaren”, of which it cannot be clearly stated to this day whether it denoted footwear or headgear, it is illustrated that a word is meaningless without knowing the thing it denotes. H. nothing can be taught. It is the same with words as it is with gestures : they only designate the object, point to it, but the thing itself can ultimately only be taught through the thing. Strictly speaking, words cannot be understood as such until the matter is known. (10.33-11.36).
For the same reason, it is therefore wrong to assume that the unknown content of a story, even if we should be familiar with all the words in the story, is conveyed as knowledge. Knowledge, so Augustine continues, according to his experience, can only be acquired spiritually through contemplation of the known thing, be it sensual or spiritual, in the inner light of truth, namely the teacher Jesus Christ . A listener always has only three options: Either to agree with what is alleged because he has recognized something as true himself, or to disapprove of it because he recognizes the alleged as false based on his own knowledge, or - if he does not know - himself limited to belief, opinion, doubt. (11.37-12.40)
There are various indications that his assessment of the value of the words is correct, says Augustine. Everyone experiences that words do not necessarily reveal the speaker's thoughts. So z. For example, someone who does not understand much about a thing can say the truth, so that the listener who understands something knows the thing for himself. We could also think of something else while speaking without the other noticing. If it weren't for that, we couldn't be lied to. Misunderstandings and often long disputes are often not based on a different knowledge of the matter, but are based on the different use of the words, i.e. ultimately based on the ignorance of the thoughts of the other. Finally, the teacher's activity is a clear indication of the correctness of his assertion. Teachers did not want to use their words to refer to their own thoughts, but to the learning content accessible to everyone, which the pupil had to check for himself in the inner light of truth in order to acquire knowledge. (13.41-14.45)
Closing remarks (14.46)
With that he came to a certain end for the time being, continues Augustine. It was not his intention at this point to discuss the full usefulness of the words, he was only concerned with not ascribing more credit to the words than they deserve. (14.46)
expenditure
- Augustine: The Teacher - De Magistro . Latin / German. Trans. U. ed. by Carl Johann Perl. Paderborn 1974, ISBN 3-506-70468-0 .
- Augustine: De magistro. About the teacher . Latin / German. Trans. U. ed. by B. Mojsisch. Stuttgart 1998, ISBN 3-15-002793-4 .
- Augustine: Opera / Works: De magisto. Philosophical and Anti-Pagan Writings: The Teacher . Vol. 11th ed. by Therese Fuhrer . Paderborn 2002, ISBN 3-506-71021-4 .
literature
- Albrecht Locher: The idea of language in Augustine and Wittgenstein. In: Hochland , Vol. 57 (1964/1965), pp. 438-446.
- Ulrich Wienbruch : "Signum", "Significatio" and "Illuminatio" with Augustin . In: Albert Zimmermann (ed.): The concept of representation in the Middle Ages. Representation, symbol, sign, image (= Miscellanea Mediaevalia , Vol. 8). de Gruyter, Berlin 1971, pp. 76-93.
- Eugenio Coseriu : The History of Philosophy of Language from Antiquity to the Present. Part 1: Lecture given in the winter semester 1968/69 at the University of Tübingen (= Tübingen Contributions to Linguistics, Vol. 11). Tübingen, 2nd edition 1975, ISBN 3-87808-011-5 .
- Tilman Borsche : Power and Impotence of Words. Comments on Augustin's “De magistro” . In: Burkhard Mojsisch (ed.): Philosophy of language in antiquity and the Middle Ages . Grüner, Amsterdam 1986, pp. 121-161.
- Klaus Kahnert: Disempowerment of the characters? Augustine on language . Grüner, Amsterdam 1999, ISBN 90-6032-356-4 .
- Matthias Trautmann: Sign language. Show as a symbol of the teaching-learning situation with Augustine . Leske and Budrich, Opladen 2000, ISBN 3-8100-2919-X .
- Florian Bruckmann: The script as a witness of analogous Gottrede. Studies on Lyotard, Derrida and Augustine . Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau 2008, ISBN 978-3-451-29811-0 .
Web links
- Augustine. "De magistro" in the Bibliotheca Augustana. Latin text from the edition by Burkhard Mojsisch, Stuttgart 1998
Individual evidence
- ↑ The "sarabarae" to which Augustine is referring here ( Non enim mihi rem, quam significat, ostendit verbum, cum lego "et sarabarae eorum non sunt commutatae". De magistro ) are apparently either wide trousers / harem pants that were common in the East (see: loose , in 'latin-dictionary.net', or the entry sarabara and the entry saraballa in Karl Ernst Georges: Detailed Latin-German dictionary from 1913), or a kind of coat ( Dan 3:21 or Dan 3:94 : "τοῖς σαραβάροις αὐτῶν - their coats" or καὶ τὰ σαράβαρα αὐτῶν - et sarabala eorum). Augustine refers here to the passage in the Latin Vulgate of Hieronymus ( Dan 3 ), where it can be read: "et sarabala eorum non fuissent immutata".