Deliberative democracy

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Call for the establishment of deliberative democracy

The deliberative democracy emphasizes public discourse, public consultation, the participation of citizens in public communication and the interaction of deliberation and decision-making process. The term deliberative democracy describes both theoretical democratic concepts in which public consultation is central, as well as their practical implementation. An essential characteristic of a deliberative democracy is the public discourse on all political issues, which is also known as “deliberation”. As an input-oriented model of democracy that attaches great importance to the political will-formation of the citizens, Manfred G. Schmidt's deliberative democracy, together with participatory democracy , is assigned to participation- centered democracy theories . On the other hand, there are also efforts to differentiate between participatory and deliberative democracy.

The term deliberative democracy was coined by Joseph M. Bessette in the 1980 book Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government and further elaborated in the 1994 book The Mild Voice of Reason . Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls are also important theorists of deliberative democracy . Furthermore have u. a. Seyla Benhabib , James Bohman , Joshua Cohen , John Dryzek , Jon Elster , Amy Gutmann , Amartya Sen and Dennis Thompson took up this theory of democracy. Guy Standing , who campaigns for an unconditional basic income , is also in favor of this form of democracy.

Basics and legitimation

The core idea of ​​deliberative democracy is that through the exchange of arguments in a (power-free) discourse, understanding or consensus can be achieved and solutions found in this way meet the demands of reason in objective and moral terms. Carole Pateman describes it as a central demand of the advocates of deliberative democratic theory that individuals should always be ready to defend their moral and political arguments and demands with reasons and to discuss these reasons with others. If the better argument is successful, then, according to the argumentation of deliberative democracy theory, the decision made has a higher legitimacy than a decision brought about by election or plebiscite alone. At the center of the theory of deliberative democracy is the legitimation ideal of public deliberation on political questions. According to the argumentation of deliberative democrats, adequate deliberation procedures can be used to achieve “forms of consent” that meet the demands of reason as well as democratic legitimacy.

Theoretical approaches

There are numerous versions of deliberative democracy, but basically two schools can be roughly distinguished: one more influenced by John Rawls and the other more strongly influenced by Jürgen Habermas. Differences between the approaches of Rawls and Habermas consist among others in the conceptualization of public consultation ( public deliberation , public reason ): While the concept of Jurgen Habermas unofficial arenas outside of institutional settings, such as social movements involving, characterized Rawls a closer image of public consultation by referring more to official institutions. Representatives of the deliberative democracy influenced by Habermas therefore rely more on a critical public, while the tradition influenced by Rawls emphasizes the aspect of reason in deliberative decisions and assumes the possibility of objectively correct and just solutions in politics. Accordingly, the school, which is more strongly influenced by Rawls, can also be described as a liberal variant, whose representatives have a more epistemic understanding of democracy; the school, which is more influenced by Habermas, is also judged as a critical variant, which refers more strongly to the participation of citizens in deliberation and the inclusion of all those affected.

Furthermore, in addition to clearly normative-theoretical approaches, there are now empirical studies on deliberative democracy; James S. Fishkin is considered to be the pioneer .

Habermas approach

Habermas claims to be able to "unite the model of liberal and republican democracy without having the disadvantages of these types of democracy" by forming a synthesis of liberal and republican democracy.

discourse

"For Habermas, deliberative politics is a policy of argumentative weighing, joint deliberation and understanding on public matters."

This presupposes "ideal procedures for consultation and decision-making", which in turn are linked to the following requirements:

  • "The argumentative form of the exchange of information and reasons,
  • the public consultation including all parties entitled to participate, at least the same chance of access to and participation in the consultation,
  • the lack of external and internal constraints on counseling ("ideal speaking situation"),
  • the maxim that the deliberations can in principle be continued indefinitely or, in the event of an interruption, be resumed at any time,
  • the principle that the discussions can extend to all matters that are to be regulated in the interests of all,
  • the opportunity to advise on the interpretation of needs and pre-political attitudes and preferences,
  • Constitutional political decisions that underpin the discourse, safeguarding fundamental rights and
  • the qualifying interaction of deliberation and the decision-making process, with the participation of as many as possible ”.

Publicity

Discourses take place in public or in public :

“The public can best be described as a network for the communication of content and statements, that is, of opinions” (Habermas 1992: 436). The public is therefore not an existing space, but must first be created by an interested audience and participants who act in a communicative manner. The public has three functions at Habermas:

  • Recognizing and perceiving problems in society as a whole
  • Addressing these issues and bringing them up to the decision-makers in the political center
  • Control of the political center.

The non-state as well as non-economic actors of civil society (or: the “civil society public”) as “[...] the substrate of that general public of citizens emerging from the private sphere, who seek public interpretations for their social interests and experiences and rely on institutionalized opinion - and influencing the will-building process ”(Habermas 1992: 444) should take over these functions (the so-called“ depraved public ”, in which financially strong lobby groups would find themselves , is not to be discussed here ).

Center / periphery: legitimacy of democratic decisions

Legitimacy of political decisions is based on their connection to publicly articulated opinions that have come about in discourse:

According to Habermas' theory of two-pronged politics, a strong civil society is the link between the political periphery and the political center. The political center, a specific system of action separated from the living environment, makes binding administrative decisions. Typical actors are members of a government. At the same time, they are dependent on inputs from the periphery and are also linked to this via the mechanism of choice. The political periphery leads only informal by opinion in public spheres and civil society, has no decision competence . Nevertheless, as the backbone of deliberative politics, it and especially the civil society public has an extremely important task. It functions "[...] as the most important lock for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of a government and administration that is bound by law and order". In it a democratic will-formation takes place, "[...] which not only controls the exercise of political power retrospectively, but also more or less programs it" (Habermas 1992: 364). Only when decisions of the political system are appropriately linked to public opinions articulated in civil society can they claim democratic legitimacy .

In 2007 Habermas put it this way: "Democratic legitimacy cannot only be established through deliberation and the public sphere, but requires the combination of sensible communication with the participation of all those potentially affected in the decision-making process."

Opposing positions

One point of criticism is "the problem of the very high expenditure of time and resources". This is countered by the fact that in a rational discourse the frictional losses that arise when following new or old rules or laws are reduced “through the increased quality of public deliberations, through improved informal, intellectual and moral capacities of the citizens, and through fairer and more autonomous ones Troubleshooting".

It is criticized that it cannot be implemented in social reality. For example, 80 million people in Germany would have to take part in a discourse. However, if this discourse is made public via the media , the communication is systematically distorted. On the one hand, because the media would have to sell their goods and not publish what normally has to be published. On the other hand, because the media are close to economic or political power . In the opinion of the critics, deliberation is only possible in a community or at district level.

In this context there is also the criticism that the citizens are manipulated by the media and are therefore not even able to make an objective judgment. This would be countered by the fact that an explanation is taking place in the discourse.

It is also objected that one cannot please everyone. But an attempt should be made to convince everyone of the regulations as far as possible or at least to initiate a discourse so that they understand and accept the regulation.

An important problem area is that the motto “Only the arguments count!” Can only be seen as an ideal for forming an opinion: due to power imbalances between the participants in the discourse, a neutral weighing of the arguments is often not achievable in reality. This problem, as well as the negative influence of the media on the discourse, is treated in theory as a spiral of silence .

See also

literature

  • Hubertus Buchstein : Jürgen Habermas. In: Peter Massing / Gotthard Breit (ed.): Democracy Theories. From antiquity to the present , Bonn 2003.
  • James S. Fishkin: When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.
  • Daniel Göler: Deliberation - A future model for European decision-making? Analysis of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention 2002-2003. Baden-Baden 2006.
  • Jürgen Habermas: factuality and validity. Contributions to the discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state , Frankfurt a. M. 1992.
  • Jürgen Habermas: Three normative models of democracy: On the concept of deliberative democracy . In: Herfried Münkler (Ed.): The chances of freedom. Basic problems of democracy . Munich and Zurich 1992. pp. 11-24. [Reprinted in: Jürgen Habermas: The inclusion of the other . Frankfurt a. M. 1996, pp. 277-292.]
  • Ralf Heming: Public, Discourse and Society - On the analytical potential and criticism of the concept of the public at Habermas. Wiesbaden, 1997.
  • Claudia Landwehr: Democratic legitimation through rational communication. Theories of Deliberative Democracy. In: Oliver W. Lembcke / Claudia Ritz / Gary S. Schaal (Eds.): Contemporary Democratic Theory, Volume 1. Normative Democratic Theories. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 2012, 355-285.
  • Bettina Lösch: Deliberative Politics. Modern conceptions of the public, democracy and political participation. Westfälisches Dampfboot Verlag, Münster 2005.
  • Peter Niesen, Benjamin Herborth (HG.): Anarchy of communicative freedom: Jürgen Habermas and the theory of international politics. Frankfurt, 2007, ISBN 3-518-29420-2 .
  • Martin Scheyli: Political public sphere and deliberative democracy according to Habermas: Institutional design through direct democratic forms of participation? Baden-Baden 2000.
  • Rainer Schmalz-Bruns : Deliberative Supranationalism. Democratic governance beyond the nation state. In: ZIB 1999, pp. 185 to 244. ( online ; PDF; 1.2 MB)
  • Juan Carlos Velasco: Deliberation / deliberative democracy. In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy. 2nd ed., Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 2010, pp. 360–363. ( online )

Web links

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Cf. Manfred G. Schmidt: Democracy Theories. An introduction. 5th edition, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 236ff.
  2. ^ For example, Carole Pateman: Participatory Democracy Revisited. In: Perspectives on Politics. 2012, Vol. 10, No. 01, pp. 7–19, here p. 8.
  3. ↑ Guy Standing: The Precariat: Why It Needs Deliberative Democracy. Open Democracy, 2012.
  4. ↑ See Claudia Landwehr: Democratic legitimation through rational communication. Theories of Deliberative Democracy. In: Oliver W. Lembcke , Claudia Ritzi and Gary S. Schaal (eds.): Contemporary Democratic Theory . Vol. 1: Normative Theories of Democracy. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012. pp. 355–385, here p. 355.
  5. ^ Carole Pateman: Participatory Democracy Revisited. In: Perspectives on Politics , 2012, Vol. 10, No. 01, pp. 7–19, here p. 8.
  6. ↑ Chantal Mouffe: The Democratic Paradox. Turia + Kant, Vienna 2008, p. 88.
  7. ↑ See Robert Cavalier and Charles Ess: Notes on the contrast between Habermas and Rawls. Retrieved February 14, 2015.
  8. ↑ See Claudia Landwehr: Democratic legitimation through rational communication. Theories of Deliberative Democracy. In: Oliver W. Lembcke, Claudia Ritzi and Gary S. Schaal (eds.): Contemporary Democratic Theory . Vol. 1: Normative Theories of Democracy. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012. pp. 355-385, here pp. 358 f.
  9. ↑ See Claudia Landwehr: Democratic legitimation through rational communication. Theories of Deliberative Democracy. In: Oliver W. Lembcke, Claudia Ritzi and Gary S. Schaal (eds.): Contemporary Democratic Theory . Vol. 1: Normative Theories of Democracy. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012. pp. 355–385, here p. 359.
  10. ^ Henning Ottmann: Liberal, republican, deliberative democracy. In. Synthesis philosophica. 2006, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 315-325, here p. 315, p. 317.
  11. ^ A b Manfred G. Schmidt: Theories of Democracy. An introduction. 5th edition, Wiesbaden 2008, p. 242.
  12. ^ Manfred G. Schmidt: Theories of democracy. An introduction. 5th edition, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 242f; Schmidt cites: Jürgen Habermas: Communicative Rationality and Cross-Border Politics: a Replica , in: Peter Niesen, Benjamin Herborth (HG.): Anarchy of communicative freedom. Jürgen Habermas and the theory of international politics , 2007, pp. 406–459.
  13. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Communicative rationality and cross-border politics: a replica , in: Peter Niesen, Benjamin Herborth (HG.): Anarchy of communicative freedom. Jürgen Habermas and the theory of international politics , 2007, p. 431.
  14. ^ A b Manfred G. Schmidt: Theories of Democracy. An introduction. 5th edition, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 238.