Railway accident in Esslingen

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The railway accident in Esslingen was a head-on collision between two passenger trains in the western entrance to the station Esslingen (Neckar) on June 13, 1961. 35 people died.

Starting position

Infrastructure

The section of the Stuttgart – Ulm railway line near Esslingen am Neckar has been expanded to four tracks. One pair of tracks is used for long-distance traffic , one for suburban traffic in Stuttgart , the forerunner of the Stuttgart S-Bahn . The tracks of the suburban traffic were in need of renovation in the superstructure and substructure . Therefore, track construction work took place between the Esslingen and Stuttgart-Obertürkheim stations and the line was only passable on a single track . All train traffic was routed over the Stuttgart – Esslingen track, while the Esslingen – Stuttgart track was closed for construction work west of the exit from Esslingen station.

Because of the dense occupancy of the track with train rides, the decided German Federal Railways , the trains do not have the Weichenverbindung that existed immediately at the end of the platform to alternate on the track the opposite direction, but to leave this only happen next west over a Bauweiche. This transition was secured with an additional signal that could not be seen from the platform . Between the exit signal on the platform and the signal that secured the construction site switch, an additional block section was created , known as the "advance section". This procedure resulted from the dense route and saved one to two minutes of delays, thus helping to reduce the delays caused by the construction site. There were neither regulations nor a precedent for this, and the term “advance section” had also been newly created for this particular case.

Trains

The first train - Nt 3902 - which was operated by the two three-part multiple units ET 55 07 and 03, was on its way to Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof . It was made available on the platform in Esslingen at 4:47 p.m. He had completed the brake test . The driver had to change the driver's cab to continue the journey . As planned , he only had two minutes to do this and was so quick that he forgot his briefcase and hat in the driver's cab that was now at the rear. However - neither the train driver nor the train driver was aware of this - the departure was postponed to 4:52 p.m. due to the construction site. Used on other routes in the last few days, it was not informed of the structural changes on the route. He had probably not taken note of the list of speed restrictions : The notebook was - obviously unused - in his briefcase.

The second train - Nt 3885 - was made up of the three-part railcar units ET 65 012 and 002 and was on the way from Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof (from: 16:32) to Süßen .

the accident

The train driver gave the order to leave when the signal that was newly installed on the platform finally showed "Drive free" and got on the train, where he immediately started filling out the wagon forms, which he had not been able to do because of the hurry on the platform . The driver took the driver's order to leave and set the train in motion. In doing so, he completely relied on the issued departure order, without paying any further attention to the signals, in particular he did not perceive the distant signal for the main signal , which secured the entrance to the single-track section. In the subsequent investigation, it was suspected that this happened because he was driving out of pure habit and did not expect a distant signal. So he accelerated way too fast. This was noticed by the officer in signal box 2, who immediately called signal box 1. However, the railcar passed this at a speed that no longer made it possible to brake in time before the signal. The officer in signal box 1 tried to induce the driver to brake by hand signals. At the same time he took back the entrance for Nt 3885, whose Zugspitze had already passed the signal. Track workers also tried to use hand signals to draw the driver's attention to his mistake, but this did not succeed. Only at the level of the signal showing "Halt", which secured the entrance to the single-track section, did he start to brake at almost 80 km / h.

The driver of the Nt 3902 could only see the oncoming train at the last second, as it was previously covered by a parked construction train. He shouted another warning in the front passenger compartment. At 4:54 p.m., the two suburban trains collided head-on. The collision took place immediately behind the construction switch installed for single-track operation. The Nt 3902 was still about 50 km / h fast.

consequences

35 people died, including both train drivers, and another 36 people were seriously injured. The property damage amounted to just under DM 334,000 .

The Red Cross , Bundeswehr soldiers and a US medical unit , which had arrived with 30 ambulances, tried to help the injured.

Initially, the investigative authorities' suspicions were directed against locomotive and train drivers. The latter was accused of failing to observe the signals. In the course of the investigation, however, it turned out that insufficient instruction, sometimes contradicting regulations and insufficient safety measures had contributed to the accident. It was therefore difficult for the judiciary to determine individual guilt, be it with the train driver or with other responsible parties. After almost seven years of proceedings before the public prosecutor and the Stuttgart regional court , the court closed the proceedings .

literature

  • Hans Joachim Ritzau: From Siegelsdorf to Aitrang. The railway disaster as a symptom - a study of the history of traffic . Landsberg 1972.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Ritzau, p. 122f.
  2. ↑ a b NN: The accident .
  3. ↑ a b Ritzau, p. 126.
  4. ↑ Ritzau, p. 137.
  5. ^ NN: Schmid .
  6. ↑ a b Ritzau, p. 122.

Coordinates: 48 ° 44 ′ 28.7 "  N , 9 ° 17 ′ 14.2"  E