Railway accident in Munich-Allach
The Munich-Allach railway accident occurred on March 7, 1975 on the Munich – Ingolstadt railway line . Due to open barriers , a passenger train collided with a bus . Twelve people died and five others were injured.
Starting position
The level crossing on Krauss-Maffei-Straße in Munich-Allach stretched over almost 50 meters, as it comprised eight tracks : tracks for the S-Bahn , long-distance trains and other shunting and stabling tracks. The crossing was secured at that time by a gatekeeper , whose guard building was designated as "Post 5". Due to the heavy train traffic, all guard posts in this area were equipped with a approach notification system. The tracks leading to the level crossing were shown schematically on a panel in the keeper's house and provided with lights. When a train approached the crossing, the corresponding light on the track in the tableau began to glow red and at the same time an alarm clock rang until the gatekeeper turned it off. Once the train had passed, the light changed back to white. Only in the first field of the fourth section from the direction of Munich was there no red illumination due to several points in the route, which was not a defect, but a construction-related one. Thus, a train traveling on this track was only displayed when it was close to the level crossing.
In addition, the trains were announced via telephone , as is common practice in the barrier service . The gatekeeper then had to report and confirm to the dispatcher that he had been informed of the arrival of the train. In addition, the train had to be entered in a list with its number and expected transit time. When several trains were announced, a cap with the inscription “ Warning: Two trains ” had to be attached to the opening button of the barrier. The weak point of the system was that the barriers were not signal-dependent, i.e. the signals could also be set to drive when the barriers were not properly closed. Nevertheless, there had been no more accidents here since the end of the war.
The 35-year-old Federal Railway Operations Supervisor, who had been employed as a gatekeeper at this point since January 1975, had health problems. In previous years he had caused several minor damage as a shunter and as a small train driver through inattention and also had a high level of sick leave. The company medical service of the Deutsche Bundesbahn had urgently recommended its use in a less dangerous place. It should not have been used at this point.
the accident
On the morning of March 7, 1975, at 7:07 a.m., the gatekeeper received a report from a S-Bahn from Dachau and closed the barriers. He then received the message that a passenger train was coming from Munich. He forgot to put on the "Two Trains" cap and, after the S-Bahn had passed, the passenger train that was still coming. So he opened the barriers. The dispatcher of the nearby signal box saw this and shouted into the train alarm system “ Post 5, Post 5, what are you doing? Close, close, the passenger train is coming! “But it was too late, a 78 bus was already at the level crossing.
The local passenger train N 4208 coming from Munich consisted of a pushed set. The electric locomotive was at the end, in front of it a row of silver coins and at the top an older design push-pull control car with a square front (type BDnf 738). The engine driver only recognized the danger immediately before the crossing and could no longer prevent the collision despite the emergency braking . At 111 km / h he caught the bus, which was dragged along for about 450 meters and completely torn to pieces. Of the 14 bus occupants, only two survived seriously injured after being thrown out. Three cars derailed from the train, knocked down a signal and two catenary masts, but remained upright. Due to the following short circuit, the traction current failed in the area . Three people were slightly injured on the train.
consequences
After the accident, the signal dependency of the barriers was established, which excludes opening of the barrier when the signal shows "drive free" as well as permission to drive when the barrier is still open.
The criminal case against the gatekeeper was discontinued because of minor guilt. As it turned out, the officer himself had asked for a less dangerous use, e.g. B. in baggage handling . Due to various omissions, this and the recommendation of the company doctor were not taken into account. For this, three senior federal railway officials were sentenced to suspended sentences of 8 months each for negligent homicide and negligent bodily harm .
The gatekeeper was transferred to the ticket office at Munich Central Station after the accident . He later retired from rail service.
The level crossing no longer exists today.
literature
- Hans-Joachim Ritzau: Catastrophes of the German Railways 1: 1945 - 1992 = Shadow of the Railway History Vol. 2. Pürgen 1992, S. 215ff.
Individual evidence
Coordinates: 48 ° 11 ′ 32.3 " N , 11 ° 28 ′ 1.6" E