Ethnic democracy

Ethnic Democracy ( English Ethnic Democracy ) is a model introduced by the Israeli sociologist Sammy Smooha to describe political systems that work according to the democratic principle , but give particular preference to a certain ethnic group .

Origin of the term

The Israeli sociologist Sammy Smooha coined the term "ethnic democracy" in his publications on the political system of Israel, especially with regard to its dealings with the Arab minority . Although Smooha only describes it in English and Hebrew, the term can easily be translated into German as ethnic democracy. The first draft appeared in Smooha's monograph Arabs and Jews in Israel in 1989, and in 1999 the expanded theoretical version of the model presented by Smooha at the conference on multiculturalism and democracy in divided societies was published. Israel serves as an archetype of ethnic democracy in the development of the model. Smooha notices that a large number of comparative political science studies treat Israel as a special case, as its political order does not fit into any known framework. After this observation, Smooha recognizes that there are also other states that cannot be described with the analytical models currently in use. This realization prompts Smooha to develop a new model of political order. According to Smooha, two opposing processes can be observed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. On the one hand, according to Smooha are in the West as traditionally respected and the most common types of democracy - liberal democracy and the concordance democracy conceived through various ongoing global developments in transition -. Through globalization , simultaneous regionalization and the universalization of minority rights, the western nation-states are changing more and more into multicultural democracies . On the other hand, the opposite development is taking place, especially in the Eastern European post-Soviet states. Nation-states are emerging that have a stronger ethnic character than the well-known Western examples, such as Serbia , Estonia and Latvia , Georgia or Slovakia . Most of these young states are recognized democracies, some are now members of the EU and NATO , but there is a clear predominance of a certain ethnic group. In his model of ethnic democracy, Sammy Smooha describes why one can still speak of democracy.

The model

The model of ethnic democracy is composed of three essential components: characteristics of ethnic democracy, circumstances (conditions) that lead to ethnic democracy, and conditions that contribute to the stability of ethnic democracy. Smooha also differentiates the detailed model from a compact mini model, which allows a clear application in different cases.

Comprehensive model

The comprehensive model of ethnic democracy serves primarily to distinguish between civil democratic types and non-democracies. However, it also describes the circumstances and conditions that contribute to the emergence of ethnic democracy. In general, it can be said that if a democracy is preceded by an ethnic sense of togetherness, it is more likely to develop into an ethnic democracy. A democracy with no strong ethnicity is more likely to develop into a civil democracy because it defines its members by nationality rather than ethnic origin.

Characteristics of an ethnic democracy

Ethnic democracy is a diminished form of democracy. Although all residents have the same individual rights, there are certain restrictions for ethnic minorities :

“The political system is democratic. All permanent residents who so wish are granted citizenship, including human, civil, political, cultural and social rights. In addition to individual rights, the minority is accorded some collective rights and sometimes even granted autonomy with certain limitations. Minority citizens are allowed to conduct an intense struggle for equal rights without facing repression by the state or the majority. They are also permitted to join coalitions with majority groups. Democracy is, however, diminished by the lack of equality of rights. Non-members of the ethnic nation enjoy rights that are in some way inferior to the rights of members and endure discrimination by the state. Rule of law and quality of democracy are reduced by state measures intended to avert the perceived threat attributed to nonmembers. "

- Smooha : 2002: 478

In an ethnic democracy, membership in the community is not defined by nationality, but by membership of the core ethnic group. Ethnic minorities receive citizenship and enjoy the right to vote, as well as individual and group rights , but these groups are systematically disadvantaged. The ethnic majority, on the other hand, is given preferential treatment by the state, its interests take precedence and its members achieve political importance and political power much more easily. An ethnic democracy follows two contradicting principles: the democratic and the ethnic principle. According to the democratic principle, all citizens are given the same rights, while the ethnic principle clearly prefers one ethnic group to the other and gives them preferential treatment. In an ethnic democracy, a balance must always be found and maintained between the contradicting principles so that the political order can continue to exist. In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, Smooha lists eight characteristics of ethnic democracies, which, depending on the case, do not all have to be pronounced to the same degree. In some cases, according to Smooha, some characteristics can be missing entirely, although one can still speak of an ethnic democracy. The following characteristics of an ethnic democracy are described in detail by Smooha in his working paper for the European Center for Minority Issues:

• Dominant ethnic nationalism states that an ethnic people have sole right to land. The presence of ethnic nationalism means that the core ethnicity becomes the linchpin of everything that happens in a state. All political and non-political actions are based on the interests of the ethnic group, so that a dichotomy arises that leads to the separation between the core ethnic group and all others: “ Ethnic nationalism makes the ethnic nation a center of gravity for the society as a Whole - a prime concern, a world interest and a precious asset for most members and leaders of the ethnic nation. ”
• The state differentiates between membership of the core ethnic group and citizenship . Due to the strong focus on ethnicity, citizenship takes a back seat. Belonging to the state (including the core ethnic group) can only be innate and is otherwise very difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the state also actively tries to limit citizenship to the core ethnic group, for example through strict naturalization tests or difficult-to-meet conditions for naturalization . However, even with obtaining citizenship, full rights in an ethnic democracy are not guaranteed if one does not belong to the core ethnic group.
• The core ethnic group dominates and leads the state. It is not the citizens but the core ethnic group that leads and dominates the state and occupies the most important positions of power. Dominance in the state apparatus allows the core ethnic group to protect and support its members, as well as to secure the collective goals of the core ethnic group.

“The state's official language, religion, culture, institutions, flag, anthem, emblems, stamps, calendar, names of places, heroes, days and sites of collective commemoration, laws (especially those regulating naturalization, immigration and ownership of land and businesses) and policies are biased in favor of the core ethnic nation, and members of the core ethnic nation expect and receive a favored status ”

- Smooha : 2001: 31

• The state mobilizes the core ethnic group. He maintains and maintains the national identity and calls on the members of the core ethnic group to pursue common national goals. Constant reconstruction of ethnic and national identity prevents the members of the core ethnic group from assimilating . The state receives its legitimation through preferential treatment of the core ethnic group and the cultivation of national ideas . This is also achieved through demarcation and protection against a (perceived) danger from outside.
• The state grants ethnic minorities incomplete collective and individual rights. The core ethnic group enjoys a higher status, but the individual rights of ethnic minorities can be restricted in certain areas. Nevertheless, all citizens are granted the basic rights of democracy. In addition, the ethnic minorities receive collective rights, so they can use their own language to run their own religious and educational institutions and to set up cultural institutions:

"Human rights (such as dignity, physical safety and equality), social rights (including entitlement to housing, health, employment, income and education), civil liberties (including freedom of assembly and association, freedom of the press and independent judiciary) and political rights (including the right to vote and to stand for election, a multi-party system, change of governments through fair elections and lack of military or foreign intervention in the political process) ”

- Smooha : 2001: 32

• The state allows ethnic minorities to fight for their own rights in parliament and outside parliament. In an ethnic democracy, ethnic minorities have a number of legal democratic means at their disposal to fight for their rights: “ They are allowed to use the vote, petitions, mass media, courts, political pressures, interest groups, lobbies, demonstrations, strikes , sit-ins and other legal means to advance their status without having to face repression by the state and violence by the core ethnic nation. ”
• The state perceives the ethnic minorities (the citizens who do not belong to the core ethnic group) as a danger. The danger can be real or only suspected and can take various forms. The state can fear that the ethnic minorities will exceed the population of the core ethnic group, that the ethnic minorities will gain too much political power, that they could endanger the national culture or the like.
• The state controls the ethnic minorities to some extent. It is assumed that the members of the ethnic minorities cannot fully identify with the state, its goals and the core ethnic group and are therefore not entirely loyal to the state. They pose a potential threat to the state and therefore need to be controlled to a certain extent. The constant discrimination against ethnic minorities can endanger the social order of a state, since it can lead to conflicts between the groups. On the one hand, the state grants ethnic minorities the right to political struggle; on the other hand, it also subjects these groups to increased control.

Circumstances that contribute to the development of ethnic democracy

According to Smooha, there are four factors that can favor the emergence of ethnic democracy:

• Ethnic dominance precedes the emergence of democracy. If an ethnic group was dominant before democracy was established, ethnic democracy ensures consistency with the past. It is therefore likely that an ethnic democracy will develop in a territory that is predominantly dominated by one ethnic group.
• Ethnic nationalism precedes the emergence of democracy. "Ethnic democracy emerges where the ethnic nation rose prior to the formation of the state and founded the state to ensure its survival, well-being and interests". Ethnic nationalism sets as its highest goal the persistence of the ethnicity and the defense of its interests. For this reason, in the course of democratization, such states are more likely to develop towards ethnic democracy.
• There is a real danger that requires sustained and widespread mobilization. The mobilization through the feeling of togetherness of the core ethnic group can protect the state from danger. The physical, demographic, economic or cultural existence of the core ethnic group can be threatened. So if a state emerges in a hostile environment, it is more likely that ethnic democracy will develop.
• Surrender to democracy. The core ethnic group feels committed to democratic principles and voluntarily adheres to them. However, this obligation is subject to some restrictions, as it competes with the goals of the ethnic principle. Without this voluntary commitment, ethnic democracy would be at risk.

Conditions that contribute to the stability of ethnic democracy

The following are some of the conditions that contribute to the stability of an ethnic democracy. According to Smooha, these are neither necessary nor sufficient for the stability of an ethnic democracy.

• The core ethnic group represents a majority of the population. If the dominant group also makes up the majority of the population, it can legitimize itself democratically and is not so susceptible to counter-movements. According to Smooha, the core ethnic group should make up around 80 percent of the population.
• The ethnic minorities (fringe groups) represent a significant minority. If the fringe groups make up less than 10 percent of the population, an ethnic democracy is not necessary to enforce the dominance of the core ethnic group. However, if the number of ethnic minorities exceeds 25 percent of the population, they can undermine the dominance of the core ethnic group through their electoral power. Smooha speaks of guide values, which can vary depending on the application.
• The core ethnic group feels committed to democratic principles. As described under the conditions for the formation, the core ethnic group must voluntarily obey the democratic principle, otherwise an ethnic democracy will transform into a non-democratic order.
• The core ethnic group is indigenous. The claim to the national territory can be justified historically or through centuries of residency on the territory.
• The marginalized groups (ethnic minorities) are immigrants. Even if the ethnic minorities immigrated several generations ago, they cannot make the same claim to the territory as the indigenous core ethnic group.
• There are several marginalized groups (more than one ethnic minority). Several unorganized minority groups are easier to control than a large, uniform group.
• The core ethnic group has a large diaspora. The protection and naturalization of the diaspora can provide a basis for preferring the core ethnic group over the ethnic minorities.
• Type of inclusion of the countries of origin. If the countries of origin from which the ethnic minorities immigrated do not actively support the minorities, ethnic democracy is more likely to remain stable.
• International entanglement. If ethnic democracy is recognized and legitimized by the international community, ethnic democracy is more likely to remain stable.

Mini model

Since the comprehensive model is too detailed to be suitable for a compact and pointed analysis, Smooha summarizes the characteristics and the conditions for an ethnic democracy in a compact mini-model. The three most important characteristics of an ethnic democracy remain: ethnic predominance, perceived danger and diminished democracy. In order to be characterized as an ethnic democracy, a state should correspond to these three essential characteristics. In an ethnic democracy, according to Smooha's mini-model, one ethnic group is clearly preferred and given preferential treatment to all other ethnic groups. In addition, the core ethnic group feels an alleged (perceived) danger from outside or from the ethnic minorities in the state. The third characteristic of an ethnic democracy is the restriction of some democratic rights to the core ethnic group, whereby the marginal groups are deliberately disadvantaged. Nevertheless, fundamental rights such as human, political, social and civil rights must be given to all nationals. Smooha also summarizes the factors that favor the emergence of an ethnic democracy in four points (for a detailed list see Chapter 2.1.2): State formation must follow the ethnic group in time, i.e. build on an already existing ethnic group, the core -Ethny must be endangered or perceive itself as such, the majority of the population must feel obliged to democracy for ideological or practical reasons, and the percentage of marginalized groups must be low enough so that both democracy and the ethnic predominance of the core ethnic group are preserved can be. In his mini-model, Smooha shortens the stability factors of an ethnic democracy to four main aspects: The majority of the core ethnic group must be preserved permanently, the supposed (perceived) danger must always be present, the countries of origin of the ethnic minorities (fringe groups) must not be in Interfere with state affairs and the international community must legitimize the state order or, better still, support it.

Differentiation from other political models

Smooha develops the model of ethnic democracy mainly in contrast to the civil democracy models widespread in the West - liberal democracy and concordance democracy - and to the non-democratic models such as ethnocracy or the people 's democracy . According to Smooha, ethnic democracy can be located somewhere between liberal democracy and ethnocracy, but with clear proximity to democracy. The theoretical models differ significantly in dealing with ethnic minorities, group and individual rights.

Civil democracies

Civil democracies define their members by the jus soli principle - the birthplace principle. Citizenship is available to everyone who was born on the territory of the country, descent plays no role or only a subordinate role. Liberal democracy and concordance democracy are the most widespread and best known types of civil democracy. Classic representatives of a liberal democracy are the USA : the focus is on the individual, ethnic origin is a private matter, the state does not interfere in ethnic conflicts, but requires citizens to assimilate into the prevailing culture, including learning the national language and the Use of state institutions. In a concordance democracy, on the other hand, of which Belgium is a good example, the state recognizes the various ethnic groups and tries to mediate between them. The state remains neutral. Ethnic affiliation is institutionalized, and all ethnicities are treated equally. The neutrality of the state distinguishes concordance democracy from ethnic democracy. Another important distinction between civil democracy types and ethnic democracy is that the latter clearly separates citizenship from membership of the core ethnic group. It follows the principle of jus sanguinis - the principle of descent. Even if you can acquire citizenship as a non-member of the core ethnic group, the core ethnic group enjoys a special status. In contrast to a liberal democracy, citizens of an ethnic democracy experience restrictions in their individual rights based on their ethnicity. On the other hand, an ethnic democracy grants the representatives of ethnic minorities group rights so that they can set up their own cultural, social and educational institutions and fight for their rights with the help of democratic means. Recognition of group rights brings ethnic democracy closer to concordance democracy, the main difference being the preferential treatment of an ethnic group. While the state retains a neutral position in a concordance democracy, in an ethnic democracy the state is clearly on the side of the core ethnic group.

Non-democratic models

The political model that is often mentioned in the same breath as ethnic democracy is master people's democracy. Although it has the term democracy in its title, it is not a democracy in the usual understanding. In a master people's democracy, individual political, civil, cultural and basic rights are limited to one ethnic group. Other ethnic groups are actively prevented from obtaining these rights. Even if democratic structures exist and are available to the majority of the population, one cannot speak of a democracy in the case of a master people's democracy. A well-known example of this type of political order is the apartheid regime in South Africa . On the continuum between concordance democracy and master people’s democracy, ethnic democracy is to be located close to the former. In contrast to non-democratic political models, all residents of an ethnic democracy enjoy wide individual and collective rights as well as legal means to fight for their group rights.

use cases

The model of ethnic democracy applies not only to the case of Israel, which is considered an archetype for this type of democracy, but also to the analysis of many other states. It is often applied to the post-Soviet states, for example Estonia or Latvia, which gained their independence after 1990 and (re) founded their states mainly according to the ethnic principle. However, it remains debatable whether one can speak of ethnic democracies in relation to these political systems, since they do not correspond to Smooha's model in all respects. In the case of Malaysia, too, one can speak of an ethnic democracy. The following overview views Israel as the archetype of the model, Estonia and Latvia as controversial research cases, and Malaysia as an example of a clear use case of ethnic democracy.

Israel as an archetype

Israel serves Smooha as the archetype of ethnic democracy. The domination of Israelis on the territory and the protection of Israeli culture and the Jewish religion are clear goals of the Israeli state. Israel complies with all of the characteristics of ethnic democracy listed above. According to the mini model, the clear goal of the Israeli state is to provide a home for Jews from all over the world. So it relates to both its inhabitants and the diaspora:

“Zionism is de facto the state ideology. Its central objective is to make Israel Jewish in demography, language, culture, institutions, identity and symbols, and to protect Jewish lives and interests all over the world. It accepts the historical development of Jews as an ethnic nation, in which ethnicity, religion and peoplehood are intertwined. A member of the Jewish people cannot be a member of a non-Judaic religion. "

- Smooha : 2005: 485

Israelis also feel three major dangers threatening the state: Israel's physical and political survival in the region, Palestinian citizens living in Israel (demographic threat), and ties to Palestinians and a future Palestinian state. In addition, Israel is a diminished democracy, as the Arab minority has individual and collective rights, but these have only limited effects. The Jewish population enjoys preferential treatment and privileges in some areas. Since the Arab minority, despite the situation described, is loyal to the Israeli state and possesses democratic means to fight for their rights, Smooha regards Israel as an archetype for his model of ethnic democracy.

Estonia and Latvia

Estonia and Latvia can be considered close cases both historically and regionally. Their assignment to the model of ethnic democracy is controversial. Both countries declared their independence shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union and reestablished historically existing states, which were to form the national state of the Estonians and Latvians respectively. As a reaction to the decades of belonging to the Russian- dominated Soviet Union, both states established a political system that should help protect the core ethnic group, their language and their culture. The main problem, however, was how the two Baltic states dealt with the predominantly Russian-speaking minority, which at the time of regaining independence made up around 30 percent of the population in both Latvia and Estonia. Since most of these residents immigrated during the Soviet occupation, they are not automatically entitled to citizenship under the laws of the two states. This depends on the successful completion of a language test. Thus, the majority of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia were initially denied some of their political rights, such as the right to vote. However, this fact contradicts Smooha's model of ethnic democracy, which is why he also claims:

"In this controversy over classification, I tend to regard Estonia and Latvia as nationstates that are slowly developing into ethnic democracies. They do not exhibit the essential feature of ethnic democracy, namely, that permanent residents are enfranchised and able to avail themselves of democratic procedures in their fight for change. Estonia and Latvia deny Automatic citizenship to Russian-speakers despite the fact that they are, and they see themselves as, a permanent part of the state and demand automatic citizenship. In contrast, Israel is an ethnic democracy because the Arab minority is extended citizenship and the non-citizen Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not and do not want to be part of Israel. "

“In this classification controversy, I tend to view Estonia and Latvia as nation-states slowly evolving into ethnic democracies. They do not show the essential characteristic of ethnic democracy, namely that permanent residents have the right to vote and are able to use democratic processes in their struggle for change. Estonia and Latvia deny Russian speakers citizenship despite the fact that they are a permanent part of the state, see themselves that way and demand automatic citizenship. In contrast, Israel is an ethnic democracy because the Arab minority renews citizenship and the non-citizens Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not Israelis and do not want to be part of Israel. "

- Smooha : 2001: 245

In applying the model of ethnic democracy to Latvia, Diatchkova nevertheless regards the criteria of ethnic democracy as largely met. In her opinion, the problem of citizenship fits into the model, even if, according to Diatchkova, it is not of an ethnic nature. According to Diatchkova, in principle every resident who passes the historical, geographic and language test can obtain citizenship. Residents of non-Latvian or non-Estonian ethnic groups who were citizens before 1940 were automatically granted citizenship as were their descendants. Thus, according to Diatchkova, the ethnic minorities also have the opportunity to participate politically in the state. An intermediate position in this discourse is taken by Järve who, in his consideration of Estonia, claims that it is on the way to an ethnic democracy or even a civil democracy. Since the number of "non-citizens" (mostly members of the Russian-speaking minority) is steadily decreasing, the difference in the political rights of the residents disappears and thus the basis for discrimination against marginalized groups. Smooha sums up all positions in a nutshell:

“Järve's account of Estonia and Diatchkova's account of Latvia raise two issues: classification of the regime and future trends. Järve claims that Estonia can already be viewed as an ethnic democracy for the one-seventh of its Russian-speaking population who are citizens. As the proportion of non-citizens (close to one-fifth of the total population in 2000) steadily drops, Estonia as a whole will increasingly qualify as an ethnic democracy. Less critical is Diatchkova who takes it for granted that Latvia is already an ethnic democracy. "

- Smooha : 2005: 244

Malaysia

After 1970, Malaysia's original concordance democracy transformed into a restricted ethnic democracy. The Malay majority of the population became the core ethnic group with clear dominance over the state apparatus. Malay was introduced as the state language and Islam was established as the state religion ; members of the Malay ethnic group also enjoy advantages in access to university facilities and offices, as well as often economic advantages over other ethnic groups. However, the Chinese and Indian minorities still enjoy collective rights, cultural autonomy and can form coalitions in parliament. The predominance of an ethnic group and the simultaneous granting of collective and (limited) individual rights to minorities are clear signs of ethnic democracy, according to Smooha.

literature

• Diatchkova, Svetlana (2005) “Ethnic Democracy in Latvia”, in Smooha, Sammy & Järve, Priit (eds) The fate of ethnic democracy in Post-Communist Europe, 81–114.
• Järve, Priit (2005) “Re-independent Estonia”, in Smooha, Sammy & Järve, Priit (Eds.) The fate of ethnic democracy in Post-Communist Europe, 61–80.
• Smooha, Sammy (1989) "Arabs and Jews in Israel, Vol. 1. Boulder", CO: Westview Press.
• Smooha, Sammy (1997) “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype”, Israel Studies, Volume 2 (2), 198–241. http://img2.tapuz.co.il/CommunaFiles/32398285.pdf
• Smooha, Sammy (1999) “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Characterization, Cases and Comparisons”, working paper presented at the Conference on Multiculturalism and Democracy in Divided Societies, Center of Multiculturalism and Educational Research, University of Haifa.
• Smooha, Sammy (2002) “The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”, Nations and Nationalism, Volume 8 (4), 475–503. http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/faculty/kedar/lecdb/ethno_democracy/21e.pdf
• Smooha, Sammy (2001) “The Model of Ethnic Democracy”, ECMI Working Paper No 13 European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI). http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1893/pdf/working_paper_13.pdf
• Smooha, Sammy (2005) “The Non-Emergence of a Viable Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe”, in Smooha, Sammy & Järve, Priit (Eds.) The fate of ethnic democracy in Post-Communist Europe, 241-257.
• Smooha, Sammy (2005) “The Model of Ethnic Democracy”, in Smooha, Sammy & Järve, Priit (Eds.) The fate of ethnic democracy in Post-Communist Europe, 5-60.

Individual evidence

1. ^ Smooha 1989
2. ^ Smooha 1999
3. ^ Smooha 1997
4. ↑ Smooha 2001: 28
5. ↑ Smooha 2001: 5
6. ↑ Smooha 2001: 26
7. ^ Smooha 2001: 28-29
8. ↑ Smooha 2001: 10 (own translation)
9. ^ Smooha 2002: 478
10. ↑ cf. Smooha 2002: 478
11. ↑ Smooha 2001: 25
12. ↑ Smooha 2001: 29
13. ↑ Smooha 2001
14. ↑ Smooha 2001: 29, own translation
15. ↑ Smooha 2001: 29
16. ↑ Smooha 2001: 29, own translation
17. ↑ Smooha 2001: 31, own translation
18. ↑ Smooha 2001: 31
19. ↑ Smooha 2001: 32, own translation
20. ↑ Smooha 2001: 32, own translation
21. ↑ Smooha 2001: 32
22. ↑ Smooha 2001: 33, own translation
23. ↑ Smooha 2001: 34
24. ↑ Smooha 2001: 33, own translation
25. ↑ Smooha 2001: 34
26. ↑ Smooha 2001: 34, own translation
27. ↑ Smooha 2001: 36ff.
28. ↑ Smooha 2001: 36, own translation
29. ↑ Smooha 2001: 36, own translation
30. ^ Smooha 2001: 36
31. ↑ Smooha 2001: 37, own translation
32. ↑ Smooha 2001: 37, own translation
33. ↑ Smooha 2001: 37ff.
34. ↑ Smooha 2001: 37, own translation
35. ↑ Smooha 2001: 37, own translation
36. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
37. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
38. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
39. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
40. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
41. ↑ Smooha 2001: 38, own translation
42. ↑ Smooha 2001: 39, own translation
43. ^ Smooha 2001: 40
44. ^ Smooha 2001: 41
45. ^ Smooha 1997: 199
46. ^ Smooha 1997: 199
47. ^ Smooha 1997: 199
48. ^ Smooha 1997: 199
49. ↑ cf. Smooha 2001: 12ff.
50. ↑ cf. Smooha 2001: 20f.
51. ↑ cf. Järve 2005
52. ↑ further applications can be found in Smooha, Järve: 2005
53. ^ Smooha 2005: 485
54. ^ Smooha 2005: 486
55. ^ Smooha 2005, Smooha 1997
56. ↑ cf. Diatchkova 2005, cf. Järve 2005
57. ↑ Smooha 2001: 245
58. ↑ cf. Diatchkova 2005: 86ff.
59. ↑ Järve 2005: 75-76
60. ^ Smooha 2005: 244
61. ↑ cf. Smooha 2001: 81
62. ↑ cf. Smooha 2001: 81