Flying Tigers Flight 66
| Flying Tigers Flight 66 | |
|---|---|
 The crashed Boeing 747 at Heathrow Airport , 1980 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | controlled flight into terrain |
| place | Puchong , Malaysia |
| date | February 19, 1989 |
| Fatalities | 4th |
| Survivors | 0 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | Boeing 747-249F |
| operator | Flying Tigers |
| Mark | N807FT |
| Surname | Thomas Haywood |
| Departure airport |
 Changi Airport , Singapore
|
| Destination airport |
 Subang Airport , Kuala Lumpur , Malaysia
|
| Passengers | 1 employee of the company |
| crew | 3 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On February 19, 1989, a Boeing 747-249F had an accident on Flying Tigers flight 66 near Kuala Lumpur after the aircraft fell below the minimum altitude on the approach to Subang Airport . The four occupants of the cargo plane were killed in the accident.
Flight history
The lightly loaded Boeing 747 of the cargo airline Flying Tigers took off at 6:04 a.m. local time from Changi Airport in Singapore and rose to a cruising altitude of around 6,000 meters (20,000 feet) . The 33-minute scheduled flight to Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur was carried out by the first officer , while the captain took on the role of “ pilot not flying ”. The pilots received clearance from the Malaysian air traffic control to head for the undirected radio beacon Kayell (NDB Kilo Lima) in the southeastern extension of runway 33 and to descend to 2,134 meters (7,000 feet).
After approach control had transferred the flight to the air traffic controller in the control tower , a request followed at 0629 to continue the descent to 1,067 meters (3,500 feet). Two minutes later, the crew received the information that the instrument landing system (ILS) on runway 33 was not in operation. The air traffic controller offered the pilots that they could alternatively conduct an ILS approach to runway 15. The crew decided against it.
At 06:32, the air traffic controller gave clearance for an NDB approach to runway 33 and the request to descend to the safety altitude of 2,400 feet (731 meters). This notification was made with the wording: "Tiger Six Six, descend two four zero zero" ( "Tiger Six Six, descend two four zero zero" ). The pilots understood the instruction as follows: "Tiger Six Six, descend to four zero zero" ( "Tiger Six Six, descend to four zero zero" ). The captain confirmed the requirement with the words: “Okay, four zero zero” , without the air traffic controller noticing the incorrectly repeated altitude and without the captain correcting it. The crew continued the descent and fell below the minimum permitted altitude by around 610 meters (2,000 feet). Dense early morning fog prevented visual contact with the ground.
The Ground Proximity Warning System triggered a proximity alarm for the first time 30 seconds before the impact and indicated that the altitude was too low. The pilots completely ignored the three very loud acoustic warnings. You did not initiate the mandatory go-around maneuver . At 06:36 a.m., the Boeing 747 struck a ridge about one kilometer from the Kilo Lima radio beacon at an altitude of 133 meters (437 feet MSL ), damaging the wings and the horizontal stabilizer . A few seconds later the machine hit again and lost its landing gear . The plane slid up a second hill, caught fire, and was completely destroyed. The site of the accident was around 14 kilometers southeast of the destination airport.
Cause of accident
The Malaysian air traffic control had determined that the words "hundred" (hundred) and "thousand" (thousand) should be used for altitude information . The pilot should therefore have used the phrase "descend two thousand four hundred" . The traffic control requirement was not consistently implemented in operational practice. The controller in charge deviated from the required standard terminology because he had the impression that his instructions were not always understood by the pilots. Crews who regularly flew to the airport reported that some air traffic controllers found it difficult to pronounce the word "thousand" so they only used numbers. Your instructions were answered in the same, non-standardized form by the pilots.
The investigators also criticized the crew's inadequate flight preparation . Due to construction work at Subang Airport, the instrument landing system (ILS) was only in operation at times. The Malaysian authorities had reported the downtime in international NOTAMs , which, however, had not been read by the US pilots. They assumed that the ILS would be available and had not obtained any information about the procedure or the minimum flight altitudes that applied to an NDB approach before take-off. The crew therefore did not question the (misunderstood) clearance of the controller, even though it brought them to an exceptionally low altitude of only 120 meters (400 feet) 15 kilometers from the runway threshold.
According to the investigators, the accident would have been avoidable if the pilots had responded to the alarm from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and initiated a climb. The first acoustic warning was given 30 seconds before the impact, four seconds later the GPWS sounded a second time. Both warnings were ignored by the pilots who went through the landing checklist. In the last 14 seconds of the flight, the GPWS triggered a continuous alarm without any reaction from the crew.
Web links
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g catastrophes in the sky, Andrew Brookes, Bonn 1994
- ↑ a b Record of air traffic and cockpit conversations on youtube.com
Coordinates: 3 ° 0 ′ 55 ″ N , 101 ° 38 ′ 20 ″ E