Foucault-Habermas debate

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Foucault-Habermas debate was a written dispute between the philosophers Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas , which was continued in secondary literature after Foucault's death. In terms of content, it essentially revolved around a conflict between Habermas' concepts of communicative action and discourse ethics on the one hand and Foucault's approaches to genealogy and power / knowledge on the other. The question arose as to which of these approaches would be better to defend philosophically and which in practice would respond more effectively to the role of power in philosophy.

In a broader sense, also through the participation of other discussants, it developed into a discussion about the position and role of humanism , the Enlightenment and modernity in the world. Especially followers of Habermas saw it as a fundamental discussion between modern and postmodern .

procedure

Foucault and Habermas discussed each other's work on several occasions. While Habermas dedicated two chapters to Michel Foucault in his volume The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity , various shorter discussions with Habermas are scattered in various texts in Foucault. A large part of the debate took place in side-by-side discussions that were only constructed into a debate through the secondary literature. In addition, both thinkers could not agree on what exactly was the content of their debate. An agreement that was also made more difficult by the fact that both went through considerable substantive changes in the course of their thinking. For example, Habermas criticizes Foucault's views, which he had espoused in the mid-1970s, while Foucault answered him from the perspective of his theory from the early 1980s.

Foucault: Two lectures

Michael Kelly reconstructs the actual debate in four steps. The first step is the two lectures that Foucault gave in 1976 at the College de France. In these he did not specifically address Habermas, but dealt with the subject area that would later become central: the differences between legal and disciplinary power, his view of local criticism, and the genealogical method for criticizing power.

Habermas: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity

A few years later, Habermas replied in two chapters in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity , specifically dedicated to Michel Foucault. The texts go back to lectures that Habermas gave during Foucault's lifetime, but appeared in print only after his death. In it, Habermas dealt in particular with the role of power in Foucault's philosophy and the normative consequences resulting from it . If Foucault regards criticism itself as a form of power, it is impossible to formulate a criticism of power without undermining your own argumentation.

Foucault: Structuralism / Poststructuralism and What is Enlightenment?

Foucault, in turn, published two texts on the subject in which he marginally addresses Habermas: the interview Structuralism and Poststructuralism , published in 1983, and the lecture What is Enlightenment? , published 1984. Texts that led Foucault to the bon mot that Habermas disagreed with him, but that he himself was a little more of Habermas' opinion.

In What is Enlightenment , Foucault repeatedly presented his positive relationship to Immanuel Kant and his access to Kant's concept of criticism . At the same time, however, he also explained where the differences to Habermas lie: in the view of ethos and norms of modernity, which in turn determines what the philosophical conception of Critique is. Habermas seemed to have dropped a key point of the debate after reading Foucault's text What is Enlightenment? had read. There Foucault had placed himself in the ranks of the philosophy of modernity, which removed an important point of disagreement.

Habermas: Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present

The last text by Habermas in which he expresses himself in the debate is Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present , which he wrote on the occasion of the death of Foucault. There he acknowledges Foucault's analysis of society, but maintains that Foucault's criticism of power undermines the normative basis on which it rests.

Planned personal debate

A planned formal debate between Habermas and Foucault, which was scheduled for November 1984 at the University of California at Berkeley, no longer took place due to the early death of Foucault. The statements about the form and content of this event vary. According to Foucault, the Americans had proposed this debate and wanted to lead it over the point of modernity , since he himself was considered an anti-modernist or a postmodernist . However, this met with a lack of understanding, since he saw himself as a modernist and considered the term modern to be unproblematic.

According to Habermas, Foucault had his lecture What is Enlightenment? held directly before he proposed a joint conference to Habermas in March 1983. According to the plans, Richard Rorty , Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus should also attend the conference.

In secondary literature

In the years after Foucault's death, the debate was subsequently reconstructed and continued, especially in secondary literature. The assessments differ further. Michael Kelly writes in the foreword to his anthology on the debate that it is often shaped by Habermasians and often takes place one-sided in Habermas' terms. In addition, it is distorted by a strong presence of Heidegger- inspired interpretation. Amanda Anderson, on the other hand, describes the debate as one that resembles a "bloodless Foucaultian coup", in which Habermas only serves as a key word for an idealized rationalist position.

Prominent participants in the further debate were, for example, Axel Honneth , Nancy Fraser , Richard J. Bernstein and Thomas A. McCarthy , who develop the criticism of Foucault further, as well as James Schmidt and Thomas Wartenberg , Gilles Deleuze , Jana Sawicki and Michael Kelly, who argue, that Foucault's criticism is justified, if not in the way Habermas thinks it is necessary.

Foucault is mainly accused by the followers of Habermas of not being able to justify his view of criticism normatively.

Discussion points

humanism

The two thinkers have different views on humanism . While Habermas sees it as a circumscription of dialogical openness that is absolutely liberating, Foucault takes more ambivalent views and understands humanism as a power of self-empowerment that includes as much as it does. Habermas interprets himself as following Rousseau and his social contract and sees himself as a defender of democracy and human rights . Foucault's stance is much more ambivalent. For Foucault, humanism also promises emancipation to disadvantaged groups such as women, non-Europeans or the poor , but imposes uniformity and excludes those who do not fit into the general categories of humanism. Rationality dictates clear norms that can easily be administered by a technocratic elite. Simultaneously with this formation in society, every individual also goes through self-knowledge and self-control, which ensures that the innermost identity as a subject is synchronized with the innermost identity of other subjects, and thus creates a feeling of freedom and solidarity that older thinkers like Rousseau still do considered extensive external measures necessary.

For Foucault, humanism is contingent , a phase in human development that followed absolutism and will be superseded by the dissolution of the subject. Concepts like awareness or rights become irrelevant in such a phase. He devotes himself to these topics in great detail in Surveillance and Punishment (1975), drawing on his considerations from The Order of Things . In his text What is Criticism? Foucault turns against the idea of ​​a universal humanity. This was determined by its most important spokesmen Locke , Rousseau and Kant in such a way that it included above all wealthy European men, and others - women, non-Europeans, workers - the status of full members of humanity only insofar as they granted themselves disciplined in the likeness of wealthy European men. One of the tasks of criticism is to deconstruct humanism so conceived . Habermas specifically addresses Foucault in the same text, accusing him of identifying general principles of reality - such as humanity - from which he can then determine what is true or false, justified or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, is legitimate or abusive. Criticism should not be preoccupied with its own truth, but shed light on the particular historical conditions in which it operates.

Power and communication

The standard interpretation of the various viewpoints attributes to Habermas the attitude that critical practice takes place in consensus-oriented communicative actions that are not limited by power relations, while Foucault is ascribed to situating critical practice in strategic actions that are decisively influenced by power relations.

Foucault describes different conceptions of humanism. For example, consciousness and right can be called into question through premonitions (Heidegger). The universality of humanity is genetically in question. Habermas idealizes the “consensus-oriented communicative actions” he strives for by not recognizing structuring power relationships.

literature

  • Samantha Ashenden, David Owen (eds.): Foucault contra Habermas. Recasting the dialogue between genealogy and critical theory. SAGE, London et al. 1999, ISBN 0-8039-7771-9 .
  • Ehrhard Bahr: In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas. In: German Studies Review. Vol. 11, No. 1, February 1988, ISSN  0149-7952 , pp. 97-109.
  • John Brocklesby, Stephen Cummings: Foucault Plays Habermas: An Alternative Philosophical Underpinning for Critical Systems Thinking . In: The Journal of the Operational Research Society. Vol. 47, No. 6, June 1996, ISSN  0160-5682 , pp. 741-754, doi: 10.1057 / jors.1996.95 .
  • David B. Ingram : Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283.
  • Bo Isenberg: Habermas on Foucault Critical Remarks In: Acta Sociologica . Vol. 34, No. 4, October 1991, ISSN  0001-6993 , pp. 299-308, doi: 10.1177 / 000169939103400404 .
  • Bo Isenberg: Jürgen Habermas' critical remarks on Michel Foucault. In: German magazine for philosophy. Vol. 39, No. 12, 1991, ISSN  0012-1045 , pp. 1386-1399.
  • Michael Kelly (Ed.): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault / Habermas debate. MIT Press, Cambridge MA et al. 1994, ISBN 0-262-61093-0 .
  • Michael Kelly: Introduction. In: Michael Kelly (Ed.): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault / Habermas debate. MIT Press, Cambridge MA et al. 1994, ISBN 0-262-61093-0 , pp. 1-16.
  • Nancy S. Love: Foucault & Habermas on Discourse & Democracy. In: Polity. Vol. 22, No. 2, Winter 1989, ISSN  0032-3497 , pp. 269-293.
  • Thomas Biebricher: Self-Criticism of Modernity. Foucault and Habermas in comparison Campus Verlag, Frankfurt / New York 2005, ISBN 3-593-37599-0 .

Remarks

  1. ↑ a b c Amanda Anderson: The way we argue now. A study in the cultures of theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ et al. 2006, ISBN 0-691-11404-8 , pp. 139-140.
  2. ↑ a b c David B. Ingram: Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283, here p. 241.
  3. ↑ a b Michael Kelly: Introduction. In: Michael Kelly (Ed.): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault / Habermas debate. MIT Press, Cambridge MA et al. 1994, ISBN 0-262-61093-0 , pp. 1-16, here p. 3.
  4. ↑ a b c d e f Michael Kelly: Introduction. In: Michael Kelly (Ed.): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault / Habermas debate. MIT Press, Cambridge MA et al. 1994, ISBN 0-262-61093-0 , pp. 1-16, here p. 5.
  5. ↑ a b Michael Kelly: Introduction. In: Michael Kelly (Ed.): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault / Habermas debate. MIT Press, Cambridge MA et al. 1994, ISBN 0-262-61093-0 , pp. 1-16, here p. 6.
  6. ^ David B. Ingram: Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283, here p. 244.
  7. ^ David B. Ingram: Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283, here p. 245.
  8. ^ David B. Ingram: Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283, here p. 249.
  9. ^ David B. Ingram: Foucault and Habermas. In: Gary Gutting (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, ISBN 0-521-84082-1 , pp. 240-283, here p. 250.