Battle of Usdau
| date | August 27, 1914 |
|---|---|
| place | Usdau , formerly East Prussia, now Poland |
| output | decisive German victory |
| consequences | Enclosure of the 2nd Russian Army |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 40000, First Army Corps of the 8th Army | 1st Army Corp of the 2nd (Narew) Army |
| losses | |
|
841 dead 1,376 wounded |
unknown |
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The battle of Usdau on August 27, 1914 was the decisive battle in the Battle of Tannenberg in the First World War . With the breakthrough at Usdau , the successful encirclement of the 2nd Russian Army could be initiated.
prehistory
On August 23, 1914, the command of the Army High Command (AOK) of the 8th Army changed. The order to move the 1st Army Corps to southern East Prussia had been issued by the old AOK. On August 24th, the 37th Division was put back in a more favorable position near Tannenberg. This gave the enemy the impression of a general retreat. This became clear to the AOK through deciphered radio signals. The AOK ordered the decisive attack on Usdau on August 26th. This led to differences with General Hermann von François , who did not comply with this order due to a lack of artillery. Only one of the units subordinate to François, namely the Mühlmann detachment (the troops that had moved out of the Vistula fortress Thorn ), went ahead and took the heights of Seeben . Usdau was about 8 km to the east. In the opinion of the AOK, however, time was of the essence. Surrounding the left wing of the weak 8th Army near Mława would have torn the army unit apart.
Skirmish
On August 26th, the high command of the 2nd Russian Army arrived in Neidenburg . Believing that only weak German forces were in front of him, and trying to move the 8th Army to retreat across the Vistula, Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov ordered them to attack. The attack should be carried out by the XIII., XV. and half XXIII. Army Corps.
Against the left flank of the retreating German troops, the VI. Army Corps advance over Allenstein. The 1st Russian Army Corps was supposed to cover its own left flank. In the evening he was informed about the German action against this left flank at Usdau and about the successful strike of the 41st Division against his 2nd Infantry Division. Nevertheless, he stuck to the attack resolution for August 27th.
The XIII. Army Corps marched to Allenstein on August 27 and occupied this city without a fight. On this day, the AOK of the 8th Army repeated the order to break through for the 1st Army Corps in sharp form: “The attack on Usdau was to begin on April 27th. We want to witness the decisive battle here, so that the cooperation of I. and XX. AK, which was already regulated by order, to be monitored on the spot. "
After the breakthrough at Usdau, strong forces should continue to hit Neidenburg in order to achieve the XX. Relieve Army Corps . These in turn should support the attack from the north. When the AOK set out from Löbau on August 27th to pursue the breakthrough near Gilgenburg south of the Großer Damerau lake , the message from the 1st Army Corps reached it at 5 a.m. that Usdau had been taken and the breakthrough had taken place . Unfortunately, the news turned out to be false: the Meischlitz estate (now Myślęta) was mistaken for Usdau.
François had grouped the 1st Army Corps against Usdau as follows: The 2nd Division formed the left wing . She attacked from the southwest. The right wing was taken over by the 1st Division , which encountered Usdau from the west or north-west. The detachment under Lieutenant General von Schmettau (the XX Army Corps had designated six battalions, two squadrons and two batteries for this purpose) was to attack Usdau from Bergling. But the attack was delayed again. The artillery of the 1st Division had only arrived in the dark on the evening of August 26th.
There were also difficulties in providing the Schmettau detachment. When the AOK took over the command post at around 7 a.m., it was able to observe the village of Usdau, which is around 7 km away, in a telescopic sight. The village was under heavy German artillery fire; Russian artillery responded briskly; German infantry pushed back the advanced Russian infantry. The actual attack on the village did not take place until 11 a.m. The artillery had shot the there ready for attack, so that the attacking infantry encountered little resistance. The 1st Division was immediately assigned to pursue Neidenburg.
But the initial false report of the capture of Usdau had caused François to let the 2nd Division advance on the south wing as well. They encountered strong Russian resistance from the south-east. The bulk of the infantry came to a halt at Heinrichsdorf. A battalion flees back to Montowo in panic. On this news, François ordered the 1st Division to end the advance on Neidenburg and to turn south to fall into the flank of the enemy of the 2nd Division.
The Russian forces, however, withdrew to Soldau before the 1st Division attacked . General Richard von Conta , the leader of the 1st Division, was able to reach the Soldau bridges on this day and watch with astonishment the Russian forces flowing back. The 2nd division then swiveled to the north and this structure (2nd division in the north and 1st division in the south) should be continued until the battle of the Masurian Lakes . However, the soldiers of the 1st Division were so exhausted by the efforts of the last few days that a new attack on Soldau no longer seemed reasonable. François ordered the pursuit to cease that afternoon and expected the fight to resume the following day.
consequences
After the breakthrough of the 1st Army Corps and the Schmettau Detachment near Usdau on August 27, 1914, the Russian troops flooded back to Mława , so that Soldau could be captured by the 1st Division on August 28, 1914 without major problems. The 2nd Division advanced to Neidenburg and completed the encirclement in the south. For the 1st Army Corps, almost a day of rest began on August 29, 1914; the battle of Tannenberg was practically decided. Suddenly on August 30th an air report came in : The 1st Russian Army Corps was marching from Mława to Neidenburg to enable the enclosed 2nd Army to retreat. The Army High Command put all available troops on the march. These would not have arrived until August 31st. The situation was saved by General Hermann von François . The 1st Army Corps threw all available forces at Soldau against the attacking 1st Russian Army Corps, while the 2nd Division at Neidenburg did not give up the enclosure.
Judgment of the 1a of the operational department of the AOK
“Nevertheless in the center of the battle at the reinforced XX. Army Corps, due to various frictions, a greater success could not be booked, the 27th is the decisive day of the battle. He brought the victorious breakthrough at Usdau and gave the high command the certainty, as a result of the victory at Bössau and the retreat of the Russian VI. Army Corps on Ortelsburg, the I. Reverve Corps and the XVII. Army corps to encircle the Russian center. "
photos
Overview of the situation on August 27, 1914
A Russian trench in Usdau that was stormed by the Grenadier Regiment "Kronprinz" (1st East Prussian) No. 1 .
Corpses of Russian soldiers near Usdau
The burying of the corpses in shell funnels
Usdau today. Why August 26, 1914 was chosen in the epitaph is not clear.
literature
- Erich Ludendorff : My war memories 1914-1918 Berlin 1919.
- Max Hoffmann : Tannenberg as it really was. Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin 1926.
- Paul von Hindenburg : From my life. Leipzig 1934.
- Alexander Solzhenitsyn : August fourteen. Luchterhand, Neuwied 1973.
- Christian Zentner : The First World War. Data, facts, comments. Moewig, Rastatt 2000, ISBN 3-8118-1652-7 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Erich Ludendorff : My war memories 1914-1918 Berlin 1919, p. 40.
- ↑ Max Hoffmann : Tannenberg as it really was. Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin 1926, p. 280.