Hope speech

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Newsreel from 1946

The so-called Hope Speech for Germany , Speech of Hope or Stuttgart Speech , official name Restatement of Policy on Germany , was given on September 6, 1946 by the American Foreign Minister James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart . It was seen by many Germans as a turning point in post-war history, which gave them courage. Despite cautious criticism of the Soviet policy on Germany, it opened up an all-German perspective. In future Germany should govern itself again after a peace treaty was signed. It was the first official announcement of Allied government policy, at which Germans, the prime ministers of the German states , were also present.

The change of course in the Allied occupation policy did not take place. Instead of the unification of the four zones of occupation under an all-German government, which Byrnes had proclaimed as a political goal, only a western solution could be realized with the bizone . Six months after the speech, US foreign policy changed direction and, with the Truman Doctrine, was directed against its former war ally, the Soviet Union.

prehistory

In the final minutes of the Potsdam conference, five basic principles ( denazification , demilitarization , democratization , decentralization , dismantling ; in short, the five D) were adopted. To clarify the question of what the future of Germany should look like, the four victorious powers had agreed on a council of foreign ministers to prepare a settlement. Byrnes had put a plan up for discussion at its first meeting in autumn 1945, but the Soviet side rejected it. At the following meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Paris from July 29 to October 15, 1946, the German question was excluded at the request of the Soviets. The Paris peace treaties signed on February 10, 1947 were limited to the former allies of the German Reich. Germany was divided into zones of occupation and the Soviet Union was not ready to negotiate on the basis of free elections to merge the four zones of occupation into one German state. Until the Byrnes speech there was therefore neither a settlement for the future Germany agreed between the victorious powers, nor were the ideas of the American government known in Germany.

Economic issues

This speech represented a turning point in the occupation policy of the United States of America represents. Byrnes wanted to choose the German industrial potential so that Germany the European average living standard achieved is not enabled, an upgrade to operate. Byrnes wanted to use the surplus industrial potential that arises to cover Germany's import costs and to repay the reparations claims by the Allies. The restriction of the German industrial potential should not be of a permanent nature. Byrnes provided that Germany would be given the opportunity to peacefully rebuild its economy. Byrnes saw the implementation of the decision of the Potsdam Conference that the four zones of occupation should build a common economy as an important step towards achieving his goal . This had not happened at the time of the speech, although the Potsdam resolutions were already over a year old. Beyond the Potsdam resolutions, Byrnes saw it as necessary to install a common financial policy in Germany in order to prevent the threat of hyperinflation . For this he suggested a common financial authority. Furthermore, Byrnes pointed out that the Potsdam resolutions also provided for a common traffic, communication and postal system for Germany. This, too, had not been realized at the time of the speech. In view of the food shortages in Germany caused by the exploitation of the occupying powers, Byrnes proposed the establishment of a joint administrative center for agriculture in Germany. Byrnes concluded his economic proposals with the proposal to set up a joint agency that would take care of the export of coal and steel.

National Council with limited sovereignty

Byrnes' central demand was to form an all-German government that could legally conclude a peace treaty with the Allies . This government should be a national council made up of the prime ministers of the federal states. Subject to the powers of the Allied Control Council, it would be responsible for the fulfillment of the tasks of a central administrative authority and would have to have all the powers to ensure the administration of Germany as a unit as planned in the Potsdam resolutions. This National Council should also be entrusted with the task of drafting a new federal constitution for Germany (see Parliamentary Council ). The new constitution should ensure human and civil rights in Germany and be based on democracy.

Borders of Germany

Germany should not include the territory of Austria in the future (see also small German solution ). Byrnes declared the support of the USA for the cession of Königsberg and neighboring areas to the Soviet Union and for the westward shift of Poland decided in Yalta . The course of Poland's new western border has yet to be determined in a final agreement. The USA would support France's claim to the Saarland , but not his plan to separate the areas on the left bank of the Rhine from Germany and to internationalize the Ruhr area .

Prisoners of war

Finally, Byrnes discussed the German prisoners of war in his speech. He demanded the speedy extradition of all captured German soldiers. The USA itself wanted to bring its German prisoners of war back to Germany quickly.

Interpretation of the speech

In Byrnes' speech it became clear for the first time that a solution was conceivable for the USA that did not apply to all parts of Germany . “If full unification cannot be achieved, we will do everything in our power to secure the greatest possible unification.” In addition to the “greatest possible unification”, which occurred in January 1947 through the economic merger of the American and British zones to become a Bizone , Byrnes Germany holds out the prospect of regaining national sovereignty: "The American government takes the position that the German people within Germany should now be given the main responsibility for handling their own affairs with appropriate safeguards." There were several reasons for the policy of economic support for Germany and the granting of the greatest possible political sovereignty, which was already evident in the Byrnes speech. On the one hand, Germany should be immunized from the danger of Soviet influence. The necessary implementation of democratic values ​​could only succeed on the basis of a cooperative policy. In addition, the US administration hoped to be able to reduce its own costs by rapidly rebuilding the European and German economies. Last but not least, the experiences from the development after the Versailles Treaty had shown that the safeguarding of European peace could only be achieved through a mutually acceptable policy. Byrnes indirectly distanced himself from the Morgenthau Plan . The joint occupation program of the Potsdam Conference was considered to have failed completely in September 1946. It is disputed whether Byrnes' speech was intended as a criticism of the Soviet Union or of France. It is also controversial whether it marks a turning point in American policy on Germany or whether it sanctions the course already tacitly followed by the military government in Germany. Byrnes emphasized several times that he would adhere to the essential Potsdam agreements, above all to the economic unity of Germany. On December 2, 1946, the agreement on the amalgamation of the British and American occupation zones was signed, which defined the goal of achieving economic independence in this area by the end of 1949.

literature

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ byrnes-rede.de: economy in the postwar period
  2. ↑ Hanns Jürgen Küsters: Der Integrationsfriede , p. 289, ( Google Books  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. "Byrnes 'The Stuttgart speech signaled the departure of the United States from the policy of harshness towards Germany, the JCS 1067 directive and the idea of ​​the Morgenthau Plan, while at the same time keeping the option of regulating the Oder-Neisse border open. "@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / books.google.se  
  3. ↑ Speech text: "Austria has already been recognized as a free and independent country. Her temporary and forced union with Germany was not a happy event for either country, and the United States is convinced that it is in the interest of both countries and the peace of Europe that they should pursue their separate ways. "(Quoted from Byrnes- rede.de )
  4. ↑ the translation on www.byrnes-rede.de reads: “With the Yalta Agreement, Poland ceded the area east of the Curzon Line to Russia. To this end, Poland has demanded a revision of its northern and western borders. The United States will support a revision of these borders in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the territory to be ceded to Poland can only be decided once the final agreement has been reached. ... In Potsdam, subject to a final decision by the peace conference, certain areas that formed part of Germany were provisionally assigned to the Soviet Union and Poland. ... The heads of state agreed to support the proposal of the Soviet government regarding the final transfer of the city of Königsberg and the surrounding area to the Soviet Union in the peace settlement. Unless the Soviet government changes its mind on this, we will adhere to this agreement. … As for Silesia and other East German areas, the transfer of this area from Russia to Poland for administrative purposes took place before the Potsdam meeting. The heads of state agreed that Silesia and other eastern German areas should be administered by the Polish state until the Polish western border was finally determined and, for this purpose, should not be considered part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. As can be seen from the minutes of the Potsdam Conference, the heads of state did not agree to support the cession of a certain area. "
  5. ↑ German-American Center ( Memento of the original from July 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. / James F. Byrnes Institute eV @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.daz.org
  6. ^ John Gimbel: On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on US Postwar German Policy . In: Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 87, No. 2. (June 1972), pp. 242-269.