Indirect strategy

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Indirect strategy ( English Indirect approach ), also strategy of the indirect approach , is an expression from the area of strategy that Basil Liddell Hart used in his military history work on the First World War . The meaning of this term is that maneuvers or psychological warfare are preferred to direct combat operations at the front . This is in contrast to the theory of Carl von Clausewitz , which was used in the First World War.

background

General Carl von Clausewitz, one of the founders of modern warfare, emphasized the importance of military strategy in conducting battles. He believed that the battle was the center of the war, the crucial point at which all strategic efforts must be directed: logistics, maneuvers, as well as deception, should only provide a better starting point in the battle in which the troops clash and the outcome of one Campaign is decided by physical violence. Accordingly, Clausewitz opposed surprising or misleading measures.

Clausewitz's teachings became very influential and served as inspiration for the war plans of the European armies in the 19th century. Above all, leading German military men such as Moltke the Elder , Moltke the Younger and Alfred von Schlieffen saw themselves as pupils of Clausewitz. During World War I, it turned out that this strategy did not produce any results. The development of new weapons such as the machine gun and the expansion of fortifications increased the risk of a frontal attack on fortified positions and inevitably claimed many victims. In numerous battles such as the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme , tens of thousands were killed before reaching enemy positions. The resulting stalemate on the battlefield became known as trench warfare .

Indirect strategy

Liddell Hart served as an officer in the British Army during World War I and was wounded in the Battle of the Somme. After the First World War he published military articles in which he called for people to free themselves from the dead end of battles. In his 1929 book The decisive wars of history , which was expanded in 1941 and published under the title The strategy of indirect approach , he analyzed numerous wars in the course of history, from ancient Greece to the Roman and Byzantine empires , the Middle Ages and the French Revolution and the coalition wars up to the First World War.

Liddell Hart argued that, as Clausewitz argued, war is decided not only by denying the enemy's ability to fight, but also by denying the enemy's willingness to fight, with the mental factor being far more important in war than the physical. Liddell Hart did not see the attack on enemy forces as the ideal solution and said that the most perfect strategy possible could be achieved "by making a decision without real combat".

The indirect strategy is based on the assumption that the impression created by the opposing commander is more important than the actual state of his armed forces. If it comes to the conclusion that one's own armed forces are inferior, wrong decisions can result, such as early withdrawal or unnecessary surrender. The commanders get this impression primarily from the morale of the combatants and less from the prevailing strategic situation. If a soldier succeeds in confusing and demoralizing the enemy armed forces, he will always prevail.

To this end, Liddell Hart put the emphasis on deception and surprises. Clausewitz considered surprises to be a waste of resources, as their benefits are short-lived. Liddell Hart confirmed this point, but said that a surprise could make such an impression that it would decide the war. Liddell Hart opposed frontal attacks and skirmishes with enemy forces. He was of the opinion, however, that maneuvers across enemy borders, bombing raids on targets in the hinterland, waging small-scale warfare or attacks on enemy supply lines were of crucial importance, since in such cases the armed forces would be far more impressed than the actual importance of the maneuver corresponds to. Liddell Hart stated that an attack did not necessarily have to take place at the most important point where most of the opponent's forces are concentrated, but at an unexpected point where little resistance is to be expected and a breakthrough could lead to dense battle fog. He also emphasized flexibility and improvisation in order to quickly take advantage of a situation and confuse the enemy.

Liddell Hart stated the following principles in his book:

Positive principles

  • Match your goal to your means.
  • Always keep your goal in mind, while adapting your plan to the conditions.
  • Choose the least expected line (or route).
  • Use the line of least resistance.
  • Take a line that opens up alternative destinations for you.
  • Make sure that both your plan and your assessments are flexible and can adapt to the circumstances.

Negative principles

  • Don't make a decisive blow while your opponent is on guard.
  • Do not start a new attack on the same line (or in the same form) after a failure.

Influences and criticism

The indirect strategy was adopted by several generals after the First World War. In Germany in particular, the army command was open to new strategies due to the restrictive conditions of the Versailles Treaty and military inferiority. The German Blitzkrieg at the beginning of World War II is based, among other things, on the sickle-cut plan , an indirect strategy that was practiced as part of the Western campaign in May 1940. Indirect strategies were also used in the further course of the war, for example in Operation Uranus , in which German armies were surrounded by the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad .

Indirect strategy is also at the center of asymmetric warfare , terrorism and guerrilla tactics, which consist of ambushing the enemy, upset him or his morale rather than seriously injuring him. The strategy of long-range missiles also refers to the indirect approach, as the use of such missiles is in many cases aimed at panicking the enemy and breaking his resilience.

Critics of the indirect strategy point out that Liddell Hart participated in World War I, which was characterized by an extremely direct strategy. His theory took an extremely opposite direction, in a thoroughly questionable way.

In current military theory, more importance is again attached to direct confrontation, depending on the need; the indirect strategy primarily serves as a conceptual stimulus. Liddell Hart's theories have received repeated confirmation from practice.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ The Strategy of Indirect Approach , Chapter XII. Pp. 213-215.
  2. ↑ Werner Hahlweg: Clausewitz with Liddell Hart. In: Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 41 (1959), p. 101.

literature

  • Basil Liddell Hart: The Strategy of Indirect Approach , Faber and Faber Ltd. London, 1954. ( Strategy . German by Horst Jordan , Rheinischer Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1954)
  • Werner Hahlweg : Clausewitz at Liddell Hart. An unidentified Clausewitz letter in Wolverton Park . In: Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 41 (1959), pp. 100-106.

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