Panarctic Oils Flight 416
| Panarctic Oils Flight 416 | |
|---|---|
 A Lockheed L-188 Electra registered in Canada, similar to the accident machine |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Controlled flight into terrain (icy sea surface) |
| place |
Byam Channel , 2 miles south of Rea Point Airfield , Melville Island , Northwest Territories , Canada
|
| date | October 30, 1974 |
| Fatalities | 32 |
| Survivors | 2 |
| Injured | 2 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
 Lockheed L-188 Electra
|
| operator |
Panarctic Oils
|
| Mark |
CF-PAB
|
| Departure airport |
Calgary Airport , Alberta , Canada
|
| Stopover |
Edmonton Airport , Alberta , Canada
|
| Destination airport |
Rea Point Airfield , Canada
|
| Passengers | 30th |
| crew | 4th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On October 30, 1974, on Panarctic Oils Flight 416 , a Lockheed L-188 Electra passenger aircraft launched at Edmonton Airport crashed shortly before landing at Rea Point Airfield on Melville Island in the Canadian Arctic . The machine hit the icy surface of the Byam Channel and then went under. All 30 passengers and two of the four crew members were killed in the accident.
Aircraft and operator
The crashed machine was a Lockheed L-188 Electra with the serial number 1141, which was first delivered to Northwest Orient Airlines on May 23, 1961 with the aircraft registration N136US . From December 29, 1969, the machine with its new identification CF-PAB belonged to the fleet of International Jetair Inc. and from March 1970 to Panarctic Oils. The four-engine aircraft was equipped with four turboprop engines of the type Allison 501-D13 equipped.
The company Panarctic Oils was a 1968 company established to explore oil deposits in the Canadian Arctic Circle . It later merged into Petro-Canada . To transport employees and equipment, Panarctic Oils initially chartered machines from other companies, but soon set up its own fleet of aircraft.
Flight history
First flight segment
Panarctic Oils Flight 416 began at 6:05 pm on October 29, 1974. The Lockheed L-188 Electra left Calgary Airport on a positioning flight for Edmonton Airport . At that time there was only a three-person crew, consisting of a flight captain, first officer and flight engineer on board. The half-hour flight passed without any particular incident. The machine was prepared in Edmonton for the onward flight to the arctic north of Canada. Baggage and cargo weighing 20,000 pounds (approximately 9,070 kilograms) was brought on board and the machine was refueled with 21,000 pounds (approximately 9,525 kilograms) of Jet-B aircraft fuel. The flight captain and the flight engineer were each replaced. The new captain has been informed of the weather conditions and the flight plan has been submitted.
Second flight segment
The duration of the second flight segment should be 4 hours and 12 minutes. 30 passengers got on, as well as a fourth male crew member who acted as load master and flight attendant on the combined cargo and passenger flight.
The plane took off again from Edmonton at 8:04 p.m. The flight went without any particular incident. As far as Fort Smith (Northwest Territories) , the machine was flown at an altitude of 18,000 feet (about 5500 meters), then it rose to 21,000 feet (about 6400 meters). In accordance with the schedule, the machine scanned at 23:04 Byron Bay in Nunavut . About 160 kilometers further north, the machine rose to an altitude of 25,000 feet (approx. 7620 meters). When the machine was around 150 miles from Rea Point, the crew made radio contact with the landing site. A VOR / DME straight approach to runway 33 was carried out. Apart from a few turbulence at an altitude of 4000 feet (approx. 1220 meters), the initiated descent was calm. When they were approximately 17 miles from Rea Point Airfield, the pilots maintained an altitude of 2,000 feet for 1 minute and 45 seconds before lowering the plane further until it settled in at a distance of just under 10 kilometers from the airfield at an altitude of 875 feet (approximately 267 meters). The crew contacted Rea Point airfield and provided information on their DME range on the final approach.
On the approach, the engine power was set to 1500 hp each. Both VHF navigation devices were set to the frequency of the Rea Point rotary radio beacon and both radio compasses to the non-directional radio beacon of Rea Point. Both barometric altimeters in the cockpit were set to the local air pressure of the target airfield of 29.91 inches Hg (1012.9 hPa). The indicated airspeed (IAS) was 150 knots (278 km / h) with a headwind component of 30 knots (56 km / h), which corresponds to a speed of 120 knots (222 km / h) above ground. The landing checklist has been processed and the landing flaps and landing gear fully extended. The landing lights were extended but not switched on, but the lights in the leading edge of the wings and the taxi lights were. The master did not hold a preliminary landing briefing.
the accident
Looking out of the cockpit window, the flight engineer believed he could see the icy sea. The captain, however, believed that the engine was above a layer of cloud, then took the thrust back and pushed the control horn forward, whereby significant g-forces acted on the engine. The rate of descent increased rapidly to 1,700 to 2,000 feet (518 to 610 meters) per minute. When the machine was at a height of 200 feet (approx. 61 meters) and 3 kilometers from the runway, the first officer called out to the pilot in command of the machine that the rate of descent was too high, but he did not respond. At an altitude of 50 feet (approx. 15 meters) the first officer and the flight engineer both called out to the captain again, but this time again there was no reaction. The first officer reached for the thrust levers on the right, but the flight engineer's hand was already there. The machine hit the ice. On impact, the cockpit section tore off the fuselage, part of the cargo was thrown out of the machine and slid up to 275 meters over the ice. The hull of the machine sank into the hole made by the impact in the ice surface. After the cockpit section came to a standstill on the ice, the flight engineer released his seatbelt. As he straightened up, he saw that the captain and first officer were still in their seats. Although he was injured, the first officer managed to loosen his seat belt. The flight engineer managed to pull him onto the ice surface when the ice collapsed around the cockpit section shortly afterwards, which then fell into the water and sank.
Victims and survivors
Only the first officer and the flight engineer survived the accident. One passenger who had survived died of hemorrhagic shock on the way to the hospital in Edmonton, several thousand kilometers away, due to severe blood loss . Of the aircraft's remaining 31 occupants, 16 had potentially survivable injuries. Of these individuals, it is estimated that five survived longer than 15 minutes, four survived for 10 to 15 minutes, and seven for less than 10 minutes. Of those who survived less than 10 minutes, six were found on the ocean floor, likely drowned.
Although the crash site was only 2½ miles (approximately 4 km) from the end of the runway, approximately two hours passed from the time of the crash to the arrival of the rescue workers. The delay was due to an inadequately defined response procedure for emergencies. There was no off-airport vehicle on standby and the emergency measures after radio contact with the aircraft was broken off were initiated only hesitantly. However, according to the accident report, it was unlikely that a faster response would have affected the outcome. The location of the crash site with the extreme distance to larger cities with professionally equipped accident clinics makes this judgment appear plausible.
Reactions
In an article in Medicine Hat News on November 4, 1974, the crash site in the Arctic Ocean was described as the "worst place for an (air) accident" in icy conditions. The island is about 700 kilometers from the Canadian mainland, within a radius of hundreds of kilometers there are only Arctic Oceans and polar steppes, most areas are uninhabited, a professional medical infrastructure was and does not exist in the region, the nearest large cities with professionally equipped accident clinics are thousands of kilometers away. The distance to Edmonton, where the originally rescued passenger should be transferred, is more than 2,400 kilometers as the crow flies. The weakened accident victims with their potentially survivable injuries were exposed to extreme cold and rapid first aid could hardly be provided.
Cause of accident
A 60-page report was published on the accident. The following accident factors were specified:
- The approach continued below the minimum descent altitude permitted by the airline ;
- the pilot in charge reacted inappropriately to a visual cue and suddenly initiated the last rapid descent, this descent was described as "irrational";
- the excessive rate of descent was not corrected due to a partial incapacity of the pilot in command;
- the crew resource management in the final phase of the flight was inadequate;
- the airline has not provided a flight operations manual or similar document adequately specifying the duties and responsibilities of the aircrew;
- the flight was carried out in accordance with the operating regulations for private and not those for commercial flights;
- the emergency measures at Rea Point airfield were inadequate.
swell
- 32 killed as plane crashes in Arctic , New York Times, October 31, 1974.
- Operating history of the machine
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h Aircraft accident report in the Aviation Safety Network
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Inquiry Into the Matter of a Crash of a Panarctic Electra Aircraft at Rea Point, Northwest Territories, October 30, 1974, before His Honor Judge WA Stevenson: report. (PDF, English)
- ↑ Plane crash reviewed , Medicine Hat News, November 4, 1974.