Tank battle near Mtsensk

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Tank battle near Mtsensk
date October 6, 1941 to October 7, 1941
place Perwy Woin south of Mtsensk
output soviet victory
consequences high German losses, defense against a rapid advance on Tula
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

Soviet Union 1923Soviet Union Soviet Union

Commander

Willibald von Langermann and Erlencamp

Mikhail J. Katukov

Troop strength
4th Panzer Division with 72 tanks of which 56 are operational.
According to Soviet information, 100 tanks
4th tank brigade with 22 T-34 , 7 KW-1 and 31 BT . According to German information, 45 tanks
losses

Soviet figures:
43 tanks, 16 PAK , 6 trucks , 500 men


German information:
14 tanks total, some damaged tanks

Soviet information:
2 tanks, 4 tanks damaged


German information:
17 tanks

The tank battle near Mtsensk (also: tank battle near Mtsensk) was a battle on 6/7. October 1941 between German and Soviet tanks in World War II , which was largely decided by the superiority of the Soviet T-34 .

The battle

During the Battle of Moscow , the 2nd Panzer Army advanced on Tula . On October 7th, she received the order "to break through to Tula as early as possible". The 4th Panzer Division encountered the Soviet 4th Panzer Brigade under the leadership of MJ Katukow . A two-day battle developed in which the German side, according to their own statements, suffered heavy losses due to the superiority of the Soviet tanks and was unable to gain any terrain. According to Soviet information, the tank commander, Lieutenant Kukarin, with his gunner IT Ljubischkin alone destroyed 16 German vehicles, 9 of them tanks. The counterattack of the 4th Panzer Brigade could only be stopped by the artillery regiment of the 4th Panzer Division. The otherwise rather sober war diary of the 4th Panzer Division describes how two gunners jumped on a T-34 in their distress, whose viewing slits smeared with dirt and destroyed the engine with an ax. A guards throwing department was also deployed under the command of Captain Tschumak, with the then new Katyusha .

The tank commander Hermann Bix of the 6th Company of the 35th Panzer Regiment describes the fighting as follows in his war diary:

"6. October - We move on towards Mtsensk. At the level of the village of Woin, we encounter heavy resistance. […] Then I see a column of tanks rolling along the railway line about 600 meters in front of us. […] But we can, we just don't want to believe it: even the best-placed hits ricochet off the armor! The crew doesn't even react when we shoot the tower full of guns. The Russian tanks roll on, undeterred by our angry fireworks, right in front of our noses, at an ideal shooting distance, towards our poor comrades on the runway. And then we see what we previously thought was not possible, we see our tanks reset company by company, turn around and disappear behind the height with Characho. Lekschat also orders that we should withdraw, since our losses on the right wing are too great. And we can't manage these beasts with our cannons even at the shortest distance, while they can calmly and comfortably shoot us at 1000 meters. It makes you cry! - Colonel Eberbach, our regimental commander, recognizes the dangerous situation just in time. He brings in 8.8 flak and 10 cm field guns, which are supposed to prevent the breakthrough of the superior Russian tanks, against which we are completely powerless. The 8.8 Flak shoots a T 34, but then it also gets a direct hit. The second gun is no better. General perplexity is rampant. "

Monument to the battle in Pervy Woin

The commander of the 5th tank brigade Heinrich Eberbach wrote after the war:

“But from October 4th to 7th, during the advance against Mtsensk, our tanks encounter a Russian tank brigade that is equipped exclusively with T34 and KWI heavy combat vehicles. Our Panzer III and IV are hopelessly inferior to these steel colossi . The Russian crews are excellently trained and well managed. The tank brigade commander has to give his troops, who are used to victory, two orders to disengage in order to save them from annihilation. The own losses are high, the mood is depressed. "

The commander in chief of the 2nd Panzer Army Heinz Guderian wrote in his memoirs:

“The 4th Panzer Division was attacked by Russian tanks south of Mtsensk and had bad hours. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T 34 showed itself in glaring form. The division suffered dire losses. The intended rapid advance on Tula had to cease for the time being. "

For their services, Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade was renamed the 1st Guards Tank Brigade. As in the other battles for Mtsensk more and more T-34 occurred, Guderian demanded a commission of representatives of the Army Ordnance Office , defense ministry to the tank designers and armor-building companies that the conditions for the construction of new tanks and in place Pak should study. The commission arrived on November 20th. The commander of the XXIV Army Corps to which the 4th Panzer Division belonged, Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, wrote after the war:

"The constructive superiority of the Soviet tank had such a strong impact that the well-known German designer Professor Porsche had to be summoned to the battlefield in front of Tula and brought together with the most experienced German tank officers from the fighting front."

In answering a questionnaire of the OKH regarding experiences in the Eastern campaign on March 12, 1942, the 4th Panzer Division listed the T-34 first under item 36 "Particularly good Russian equipment" and characterized it with the words:

"Russian tank T 34, 27 tons, very broad chain and therefore high cross-country mobility, good fording ability, superior speed, superior armor thanks to sloping surfaces, excellent diesel engine, superior armament (7.62 cm cannon with high penetration and very good aiming device). Disadvantage: high fuel consumption. "

Web links

Commons : 1st Guards Tank Brigade  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Christian Hartmann : Wehrmacht in the Eastern War . Munich 2010, p. 308.
  2. KTB of the 4th Panzer Division. Quoted from David Stahel: Operation Typhoon . Cambridge 2013, p. 66.
  3. MJ Katukow : At the top of the main thrust . Berlin 1979, p. 40.
  4. Janusz Magnuski: From Tankograd to Berlin. Development and testing of the T-34 . Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1980, p. 53.
  5. KTB of the 4th Panzer Division. Quoted in Stahel, p. 66.
  6. Katukow, p. 42.
  7. 10 on the 1st day and 4 on the 2nd day. KTB of the 4th Panzer Division. Quoted in Stahel, p. 66 f.
  8. Katukow, p. 42.
  9. KTB of the 4th Panzer Division. Quoted in Stahel, p. 66.
  10. Army Group Command of Army Group Center “Continuation of operations in the direction of Moscow”. Completely printed in: Klaus Reinhardt : Die Wende before Moscow . Stuttgart 1972, p. 300 f.
  11. Igor Schmeljow: Panzer from seven decades . Berlin 1988, p. 68.
  12. Magnuski, p. 56.
  13. Hartmann, p. 309.
  14. Katukow, p. 41.
  15. Hans Schäufler: It was a long way ... tanks between the Vistula and the Volga . Neckargemünd 1973, p. 32 f.
  16. Schäufler, p. 59.
  17. Heinz Guderian : memories of a soldier . Stuttgart 1994, p. 211 f.
  18. Schmeljow, p. 68.
  19. Guderian, p. 215 f.
  20. ^ Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg : The big question. Thoughts on Soviet Power . Homburg undated, p. 64.
  21. Rudolf Steiger : Tank tactics in the mirror of German war diaries 1939–1941 . Freiburg 1973, p. 172.