Peter Winch

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Peter Guy Winch (born January 14, 1926 in Walthamstow , London ; † April 27, 1997 ) was an English philosopher who made important contributions to the philosophy of the social sciences , to philosophical ethics and the philosophy of religion . He was an interpreter of Ludwig Wittgenstein .

Life

Winch attended Leyton County High School for Boys . He served in the Royal Navy from 1944 to 1947 . In 1949 he graduated from Oxford University . From 1951 he taught philosophy at the University of Swansea. In 1964 he went to Birkbeck College at the University of London , and since 1967 he has been a professor at King's College London . In 1984 he was appointed to the University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign Campus.

Winch was married to Erika Neumann. They had two children.

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Winch's best-known book is The Idea of ​​a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy from 1958, which was directed against positivism in the social sciences and developed the views of RG Collingwood and the later Wittgenstein, Winch opposes a duty of the social sciences to shake off philosophy and imitate the natural sciences, to find their Newton in order to keep up with the times. In the book, Winch wanted to correct the implied picture of philosophy and with it the idea of ​​a natural scientific social science. The correct understanding of philosophy also results in the correct understanding of society:

“That the social sciences are in their infancy has come to be a platitude amongst writers of textbooks on the subject. They will argue that this is because the social sciences have been slow to emulate the natural sciences and emancipate themselves from the dead hand of philosophy; that there was a time when there was no clear distinction between philosophy and natural science; but that owing to the transformation of affairs round about the seventeenth century natural science has made great bounds ever since. But, we are told, this revolution has not yet taken place in the social sciences, or at least it is only now in the process of taking place. Perhaps social science has not yet found its Newton but the conditions are being created in which such a genius could arise. But above all, it is urged, we must follow the methods of natural science if we are to make any significant progress.
I propose, in this monograph, to attack such a conception of the relation between the social studies, philosophy, and the natural sciences. [...] It will consist of a war on two fronts: first, a criticism of some prevalent contemporary ideas about the nature of philosophy: second, a criticism of some prevalent contemporary ideas about the nature of the social studies. The main tactics will be a pincer movement: the same point will be reached by arguing from opposite directions. To complete the military analogy before it gets out of hand, my main war aim will be to demonstrate that the two apparently diverse fronts on which the war is being waged are not in reality diverse at all; that to be clear about the nature of philosophy and to be clear about the nature of the social studies amount to the same thing. For any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society. "

“It has already become the cliché of textbook authors on the subject that the social sciences are still in the toddler stage. This is so, it is argued, because the social sciences were slow to imitate the natural sciences and free themselves from the inheritance of philosophy. There used to be no sharp separation between philosophy and science. But with the change in the 17th century, science has drawn the most drastic limits to date. Nevertheless, we are told, this reversal in social science has not yet taken place. Or at least it's just now happening. Perhaps social science has not yet discovered its Newton. But at least the conditions are created for such a genius to emerge. First of all, however, it is urgently demanded, we must adhere to the scientific methods if we want to make any remarkable progress.

In this book I propose an attack on such a conception of the relationship between the social sciences, philosophy, and natural sciences. [...] The book will wage a two-front war. First, a critique of some of the prevailing contemporary conceptions of the nature of philosophy. Second, a critique of some of the prevailing contemporary conceptions of the nature of the social sciences. The most important tactic will be that of a gripper operation: the same point is to be reached by arguments from different directions. To conclude the analogy with the military operation, before it gets out of my hand, my main aim will be to prove that the two seemingly different fronts on which I declare war are in fact not at all different. Getting clarity about the nature of philosophy and the nature of the social sciences amounts to the same thing. For any study of society that is worthwhile must be philosophical in character, and any philosophy that is worthwhile must deal with the essence of human society. "

He was also influenced by the Wittgenstein student Rush Rhees and the philosopher Simone Weil , who had converted to Catholicism . Its philosophy has been called sociologism . A few sociologists took up his radical criticism of the subject.

Winch knew Wittgenstein and saw himself as a loyal Wittgensteinian, but that influence was mainly through Rhees, who was his colleague at the University of Swansea . In 1980, Winch translated and published Wittgenstein's Culture and Value . After Rhe's death in 1989, Winch became Wittgenstein's administrator. Winch insisted on the continuity of Wittgenstein's life's work, from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; he saw the later work as the completion of the entire analytic tradition.

Rush Rhees introduced Winch to the work of Simone Weil. Her philosophy attracted him, but also her Wittgenstein-like personality, in her asceticism , her socialism and the Tolstoic religiosity.

In his philosophical work, Winch first tried to free the Wittgenstein interpretation from misunderstandings. In his original work he left the Oxford philosophy of language and analyzed the world of life with the terminology of the late Wittgenstein, for example as a language game . Winch also touched on areas that were very important to Wittgenstein, but which he had only treated incidentally in his teaching, such as ethics and religion . One example is Winch's moral distinction between a successful and a failed attempted murder. The gradual ebb of enthusiasm for Wittgenstein also captured Winch's quite independent performance and he was ignored by large parts of contemporary philosophy.

Wittgenstein had said that philosophy leaves the world exactly as it was found, but Winch did not fully agree, new dominant modes of expression destroyed the old structures:

“I wanted to show by these examples that a new way of talking sufficiently important to rank as a new idea implies a new set of social relationships. Similarly with the dying out of a way of speaking. Take the notion of friendship; we read in Penelope Hall's book The Social Services of Modern England (Routledge) that it is the duty of a social worker to establish a relationship of friendship with her clients; but that she must never forget that her first duty is to the policy of the agency by which she is employed. Now that is a debasement of the notion of friendship as it has been understood, which has excluded this sort of divided loyalty, not to say double dealing. To the extent to which the old idea gives way to this new one social relationships are impoverished (or if anyone objects to the interpolation of personal moral attitudes, at least they are changed). It will not do, either, to say that the mere change in the meaning of a word need not prevent people from having the relations to each other they want to have, for this is to overlook the fact that our language and our social relations are just two different sides of the same coin. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters. "

“With these examples, I wanted to show that a phrase that is novel enough to count as a new idea also implies a new set of social relationships. It is similar with the extinction of a speech. Take the concept of friendship. We read in Penelope Hall's book on Social Services in Modern England that it is the duty of a social worker to develop friendly relationships with her clients. However, the social worker must never forget that her first duty is the strategy of the agency where she is employed. This is now a devaluation of the concept of friendship as it has been understood up to now, namely with the exclusion of such a split-up loyalty, if one does not want to talk about fraud. To the extent that the old concept gives way to this new one, social relationships become impoverished. (At least if someone refuses to resort to moral attitudes, social relationships will be altered.) Nor will it be acceptable to claim that simply changing the meaning of a word does not have to prevent people from having relationships with one another as they do want it. Because this overlooks the fact that our language and our social relationships are just two different sides of the same coin. Giving a meaning to a word is the same as describing its use. And the description of usage is identical to describing the social relationships into which the word enters. "

Publications (a selection)

  • The Idea of ​​a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy . Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
    • The idea of ​​social science and its relationship to philosophy . Suhrkamp ( theory ), Frankfurt am Main, 1966.
  • Nature and Convention . In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Volume 60, 1959-1960, pp. 231-252.
  • Understanding a Primitive Society . Aristotelian Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 1, 1964, pp. 307-324.
  • Can a Good Man Be Harmed? In: Aristotelian Society Proceedings , 1965-1966, pp. 55-70.
  • Wittgenstein's Treatment of the Will . In: Ratio , Volume 10, 1968, pp. 38-53.
  • Introduction: The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy . In: Peter Winch (Ed.): Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein . Routledge, London, 1969, pp. 1-19.
  • Ethics And Action , Routledge, London, 1972.
  • (as editor and translator): Ludwig Wittgenstein: Culture and Value . Oxford 1980.
  • Simone Weil: 'The Just Balance' , Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1989.
  • Trying to Make Sense , Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
    • Try to understand . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main, 1992. Joachim Schulte (translator).
  • Persuasion . In: Midwest Studies in Philosophy , Volume 17, 1992, pp. 123-137.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ DZ Phillips, Peter Winch in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography , 2004
  2. ^ PW: The Idea of ​​a Social Science pp. 1-3
  3. ^ C. Sutton: The German Tradition in Philosophy . Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1974
  4. ^ Anthony Giddens : New Rules of Sociological Method . Hutchinson, London, 1976.
  5. ↑ Colin Lyas: Peter Winch biography
  6. ↑ Peter Winch's Introduction to the Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein , London, 1969. and Peter Hacker : Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Philosophy . Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.
  7. ↑ Peter Winch: Trying . In: PW: Ethics and Action .
  8. ↑ Philosophical Investigations §124
  9. ^ PW: The Idea of ​​a Social Science , p. 123
personal data
SURNAME Winch, Peter
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Winch, Peter Guy (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION English philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH January 14, 1926
PLACE OF BIRTH Walthamstow , London
DATE OF DEATH April 27, 1997