Planning of the Navy for the Caspian Sea

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In the campaign against the Soviet Union in 1942, the Navy was planning for the Caspian Sea to use military ships in the inland sea .

Physical map : Black Sea (left), Caspian Sea (middle) and Aral Sea (right)
Military situation in 1942 between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea

background

With the beginning of Fall Blau , the planned conquest of the Caucasus region and its oil fields by the Wehrmacht on June 28, 1942, the Navy began to make preparations for an operation in the Caspian Sea . Should the Caucasus area be conquered, the Wehrmacht would be on the west coast of the largest inland sea in the world and the Navy would have to carry out tasks on the Caspian Sea, such as sea transport, mine search and the fight against Soviet naval forces .

Planning

At the end of June 1942 the question was raised whether it was possible to transport military sea vehicles overland from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, "since cutting off the Russian oil supply from Baku to Astrakhan would have a decisive influence on the conclusion of the Eastern campaign." As around 90% of Soviet oil production originated from the Caucasus region and the oil was largely transported by tankers across the Caspian Sea, a port on the coast of the inland sea in German hands would be a major threat to the fuel supply of the Soviet Union.

On July 18, 1942, the Navy stated: “If operations in the east continue to advance successfully, it will be necessary to deploy Axis Sea forces on the Caspian Sea. Naval war command is therefore examining all possibilities and making all preparations in order to transfer units of the Kriegsmarine and the Italian navy from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea without wasting time. Since there is no waterway between these two seas, only small vehicles can be considered for the overland transfer. "

On July 29, 1942, it was decided to set up the port city of Makhachkala as a naval base on the Caspian Sea as soon as the city was captured by the army .

At the end of July 1942, a number of German and Italian ships were planned for use on the Caspian Sea, including three Italian submarines .

Preparations

At the beginning of August 1942, in the areas in the North Caucasus conquered by German troops and in the area not yet conquered, the Foreign Army East secret service of the Wehrmacht carried out investigations into whether Italian speedboats on "special truck trailers" could also be transported from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. On August 12, the Foreign Army East confirmed the possibility of the Navy and indicated two road connections from Rostov on the Sea of ​​Azov to the Caspian port city of Makhachkala as transport routes.

In mid-August 1942 the assembly of 20 marine ferry frames and 20 sieve ferries on the Caspian Sea was proposed within the Kriegsmarine , which should be dismantled and brought there. On August 23, preparations began for the establishment of a naval equipment station on the Caspian Sea, which was to be responsible for repairs to naval vessels and the supply of spare parts, fuel, ammunition, food and so on. "Preparatory measures" for the "provision of port commander Astrakhan as well as the rapid transfer of naval motor boats from Azov into the Caspian Sea and measures to defend Astrakhan through coastal artillery and river mines have also been in progress since August 24th ."

On August 24, the war diary of the naval war command recorded that the railway line from Baku to Astrakhan, which runs along the western coast of the Caspian Sea and on which mainly oil was transported, was effectively destroyed by a German "long-distance patrol."

On August 30, the appointment of an admiral for the Caspian Sea with a staff was not considered possible due to a lack of staff, since even the Admiral Black Sea lacked staff. The previous plan should be maintained that the “Admiral Black Sea after the pacification of the Black Sea would be more involved in the operational tasks of the Kaspi Sea by moving his command post forward. - Until then, a naval commander who works according to the instructions of Admiral Black Sea will suffice . ”It was also noted that the completion of the rail link to the Caspian Sea“ will take some time ”and therefore the transport of naval forces to the Caspian Sea was delayed, which is why“ the sea commander can only carry out coastal tasks until then ”. A naval commander would also be sufficient for the tasks in the Kaspi Sea. The establishment of a staff for the Caspian Sea would therefore not be justified “at this moment”.

In contrast, at the end of August 1942, the port commander for Astrakhan was appointed and the first sea vessels were to be transported to the Caspian port city of Makhachkala, "for use on the Caspian Sea against communication routes there". These measures were taken although neither Astrakhan nor Makhachkala had been captured by then, but the German troops were still on the advance.

In mid-September 1942, "Admiral Black Sea's preparatory measures" for the "establishment of land transports from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea."

On October 12th, the navy called for the immediate start of construction of ten light speedboats for the Caspian Sea.

air force

Mine sweepers were used in the Black Sea and Sea of ​​Azov, and these machines were also intended to be used in the Caspian Sea.

Air reconnaissance was continuously flown over the port cities of the Caspian Sea. For example, on September 26, 1942, the war diary of the naval war command reads : “In the ports of the Caspian Sea Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Baku, Guryev and at the mouth of the Ural , numerous merchant ships, tankers, lighters and tugs were sighted. Only six minesweepers were found on warships in Astrakhan . "

For October 10, the Navy determined the size of the Soviet merchant fleet in the Caspian Sea: "About 160 ships with 339,000 GRT , including 94 tankers with around 270,000 GRT."

The Air Force also bombed Soviet shipping in the Caspian Sea.

Final measures

From September onwards, the German advance in the Caucasus region had slowed down considerably. The coast of the Caspian Sea had not yet been reached.

On October 27, 1942, the war diary of the Naval War Command noted: “In view of the slow progress of army operations on the Kaukasis front”, no Italian speedboats and submarines were to be transported into the Caspian Sea “until the issue of icing over the Sea of ​​Azov at the beginning of December was new Decision is necessary. "The approaching winter now had to be taken into account and that not even the east coast of the Black Sea had yet been reached:" The group believes that a preliminary focus of all available armed forces in the eastern Black Sea is necessary. "At the same time, it was stated:" Naval warfare is the The view that the ordnance for the Caspian Sea must be loaded shortly before the ports of cargo freeze over, as we absolutely must have ordnance available when the army reaches the Caspian Sea. "

At the end of October 1942, the Italian Navy asked the Navy what use these ships should now have because of the "longer laydown" of Italian sea vehicles - including submarines - in the Black Sea, which were actually supposed to be used in the Caspian Sea. The German answer on October 31st was: “Seekriegsleitung replied that as soon as suitable ports on the west coast of the Caspian Sea are occupied, weather and transport conditions permit, the intention is to transfer the Italian naval forces from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. The tasks there are essentially the same as in the Black Sea:

  • Securing own coastal traffic,
  • Support of army operations in the coastal area,
  • Prevention of hostile sea connections, especially oil transports,
  • Destruction of Russian naval forces and security vehicles.

The decision on the timing of the relocation of the MAS [Italian speed boats] and submarines will be made shortly before the start of the ice period in the Black Sea and Sea of ​​Azov. It depends on the development of the land situation in the Caucasus region and on road conditions. "

On November 8, 1942, the war diary of the naval war command stated that "rail transports of Italian small submarines on Russian railways to the Caspian Sea are possible" and "that the Italian MAS boats will not be transferred to the Caspian Sea before winter. The boats are to remain in use in the Black Sea. - The decision regarding the transfer of the Italian submarines during the winter remains reserved. "

On November 18, 1942, the Italian Navy was informed: “Auto-boat column with auto-boats [probably a kind of motor boat] remains in Mariupol for transfer by rail to the Kaspi Sea. A temporary leave of absence for crew and ground staff to Italy is possible. - Later rail transport of MAS boats to the Kaspi Sea possible as soon as Makhachkala is reached. "

In mid-November 1942, the German advance in the Caucasus region finally ended. Due to the course of the Battle of Stalingrad , the withdrawal of German troops from the Caucasus began in January 1943, and thus all plans and preparations of the Navy for an operation in the Caspian Sea became obsolete.

swell

  • War diary of the Naval War Command 1939–1945. Volumes June to November 1942. Mittler & Sohn, Herford 1993, ISBN 3-8132-0637-8 .