Reception of the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution

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The reception of the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution began soon after its proclamation on March 28, 1849. According to the Frankfurt National Assembly, this imperial constitution , intended for all of Germany, would already have come into force, but the larger German states did not recognize it. The Frankfurt Imperial Constitution , however, was expressly the model for the Erfurt Union Constitution , the draft of which for the Three Kings Alliance was already available at the end of May 1849 .

The Frankfurt model had a direct or indirect effect, via the Union constitution, on the constitutions of the individual states, in particular the part about the fundamental rights of the German people . It also had a weaker and weaker influence on the all-German constitutions of the 19th and 20th centuries; in rarer cases it is still used today for a historical legal comparison.

General

Government system according to the Frankfurt constitution of 1849

There is a long tradition in literature that claims that the imperial constitution had a long-term effect on the later constitutional and legal life of Germany. However, there is no judicial practice: a court rarely refers to the FRV by way of historical interpretation, in the period from 1850 to 1998 only about a dozen times. This could be due to the fact that the legal content of the FRV has not been dealt with very much or a corresponding depth of the historical interpretation is not necessary. The historical continuity could be constructed retrospectively, because in the time after the revolution many members of parliament were persecuted, and in the late 19th century there were important voices who rejected or questioned the role of the FRV as a role model.

In fact, even in the ten years of the reaction era (until 1859) , the FRV had “an astonishing charisma,” said Kühne. Even imposed changes to constitutions and electoral laws could at best weaken this. The reaction was permanently afraid of a new revolution and did not want to go too far. Due to the tactical readiness to make concessions, the supporters of the imperial constitution were given leeway: They could partially invoke the Union constitution of 1849/1850, which was modeled on the imperial constitution and was never officially objected to by the Prussian government. The content of fundamental rights could also be put into simple laws that were less manageable than a catalog of fundamental rights. Or you agreed to legal reservations on fundamental rights in a constitution; these reservations were later the subject of simple, perhaps influenceable legislation. The FRV had "a braking effect that should not be overestimated in the various reverse revisions."

State constitutions from 1849

Austria

The Austrian constitution of April 25, 1848 ( Pillersdorf's constitution ) could not yet have been influenced by the work of the Frankfurt National Assembly. The Kremsier draft 1848/1849 of the Austrian Reichstag does not contain any traces from Frankfurt either, because the Slavic Reichstag majority consciously ignored the Frankfurt efforts to protest against the planned incorporation into the German Reich. For the imposed March constitution, at most, the same sources were used as the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Minister of Justice's proposal to orientate oneself on the fundamental rights in the Prussian constitution was not followed. In the deliberations on the Basic Law of 1867, the German basic rights were mentioned only very sporadically.

Prussia

Prussian constitution of 1850. The chambers were determined by far fewer subjects than according to the Frankfurt constitution, and the government was able to prevent unpopular laws entirely.

In the preliminary work of the Prussian National Assembly and the relevant committee ( Waldeck's draft from July 1848), however, there are many traces of the FRV. The reporter emphasized that the Frankfurt resolutions had been given "the most careful consideration" so that the Prussian constitution would not later contradict the German constitution. Both opponents and supporters of the Frankfurt National Assembly confirmed the correspondence. The fundamental rights were actually retained, albeit shortened.

When the Prussian constitution was revised, which led to the constitution of 1850 , the left were no longer present because of the introduction of unequal suffrage. The constitution should still be easily adaptable to the German constitution, whereby the Union constitution was now meant. The liberals used the reference to the Union constitution tactically to prevent an even more conservative Prussian constitution. This succeeded considerably because the Union constitution (like the FRV) provided for a future Reichsgericht that would punish overly conservative rules. In addition, the Prussian government did not want to present itself as too retrograde and thus implausible for the Union. In the area of ​​fundamental rights, on the surface, not much has changed in the revised constitution, but legal reservations later made significant restrictions possible.

Oldenburg

Likewise, the Landtag of Oldenburg agreed to submit to the future imperial constitution. The Oldenburg Constitutional Commission took over existing drafts. The editorial committee kept other Oldenburg resolutions if they gave the people more rights. The literal adoption (in spite of the expected FRV) of basic rights had the advantage that they could be made to apply immediately, while the Frankfurt basic rights themselves could only partially be implemented under state law through an introductory law.

Hamburg

In Hamburg , the so-called Constituent Constitution in 1849 was based entirely on the FRV, and the constituent assembly considered the validity of the Frankfurt fundamental rights to be beyond doubt. Their own fundamental rights were essentially factually consistent with them, despite different wording. The new constitution of May 1850 was again more conservative, but still too liberal for the German Confederation. Article 7 stated that “the basic rights of the German people” were to be considered part of the Nine Constitution itself. The Constitutional Committee of the Citizenship requested the deletion of Article 7 in 1859 so as not to cause difficulties with the federal government. The citizenry followed him with 74 votes to 72.

Erfurt Union Constitution 1849/1850

Constitutional diagram for the Union of Erfurt, 1850. A council of princes could prevent laws, while the rich had strong voting rights.

The Constitution of the Erfurt Union , like the FRV, was not implemented, but it did influence later constitutions. When Prussia was already fighting the revolution in May 1849, it submitted a draft constitution for a German federal state on May 26 (within the framework of the Epiphany ). The Union's pioneering thinker, Joseph von Radowitz , wrote in his diary that the Union constitution was his editing of the Reich constitution; He promised Bassermann that there would be only a few changes, and during the alliance negotiations a printed copy of the FRV with handwritten changes was available. The FRV calls the minutes of the negotiations the template for the meeting.

Compared to the FRV, the “Erfurt” draft constitution gave the Reich level fewer powers and restricted basic rights. The head of the empire was divided into two parts: the Prussian king as the "Reichsvorstand" appointed the Reich ministers, while Prussia, together with the other states, was able to prevent laws as a "prince's college". The draft electoral law made Frankfurt suffrage unequal. That was a compromise in favor of second medium-sized states, which, however, rejected the project a few months later.

The Union parliament in Erfurt had a majority of liberals, at least on fundamental issues, and reversed some changes in the constitution. It again strengthened the role of the head of the Reich and gave the Volkshaus the final decision on the budget again. Implementing laws for the Union constitution were passed, for example for the establishment of the Reichsgericht, expressly referring to the ideas of the National Assembly.

German national club

The German National Association of 1859 was unsure whether to invoke the FRV directly. Despite its popularity among the people, it would probably not have been suitable to inspire Prussia for the role it was intended to play in the formation of the nation state. In 1862 the implementation of the imperial constitution with basic rights and electoral law came into the association's program without restriction. The chairman Rudolf von Bennigsen, on the other hand, only wanted to campaign for the "essential content". When the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck was able to record diplomatic successes against Denmark, the program item was again formulated in a non-binding manner a year later. Internal disputes on this issue emerged and later led to the split of the National Liberal Party under Bennigsen.

From April to June 1866, Bismarck submitted several proposals to the Bundestag to set up a democratically elected federal parliament. It should pass federal laws with a majority together with the Bundestag. Although he did not mention the FRV, he did explicitly mention the Frankfurt Reich Election Act of 1849 as decisive. (After the German War it actually became the model for the Reichstag election.) Most states, however, rejected a parliament because it would have curtailed their independence.

North German Confederation and Empire 1867–1918

Draft for the North German Federal Constitution, 1866

The deputy chairman of the national association, the democrat Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch , demanded that the basic features of the FRV be taken into account. Many groups appealed to the FRV, including some of the Liberals and the Socialists, but no longer unconditionally. Greater German calls for a thorough revision or a directory were also loud. Unanimously, so also Bismarck, who thus took public opinion into account, they followed in the allocation of federal competence to the FRV.

Contrary to Bismarck's assertion that the constitution of the North German Confederation was an ingenious inspiration of two days, he spent a long time doing the preparatory work and demonstrably taking the FRV into account. As early as March 1866 he wrote to the Prussian chief of staff that for military and political reasons he was hoping for Prussia to assume the position in northern Germany that the FRV had intended for German central authority. Several times in conversations he made the remark that he was striving for nothing completely different from the FRV. If abroad had intervened in the German War of 1866 (or after), he would have reserved the right to take the FRV as the full basis for revolutionary German unity and thus to receive the support of the national movement, the Crown Prince and the Prussian House of Representatives. But he was looking for a middle ground between the federal state and the confederation and shied away from fundamental material rights and too much parliamentary say in the budget (especially the military budget).

In the following phase, the constituent North German Reichstag of February 1867 discussed Bismarck's draft. In line with the FRV, the MPs managed to hold the Federal Chancellor responsible and expand the Reichstag's budget rights. A catalog of basic rights was missing, partly because long deliberations were feared and Bismarck expressed federal concerns, but the North German Confederation was given the authority over, for example, citizenship rights and freedom of movement, which the Reichstag expanded in the negotiations. The popular example of the FRV helped to bring the constitutional deliberations to an end so quickly in 1867.

Bismarck's imperial constitution of 1867 and 1871: The Bundesrat, representing the national governments, received absolute veto in legislation

In the North German Confederation and the German Empire , the FRV standard was partially implemented through simple legislation and not anchored in the constitution. Examples are the equal rights of denominations (1868), the Federal Election Act (1869) and later the Courts Constitution Act, the Emigration Act (1897) or the Reich Association Act (1908), partly with deliberate reference to the FRV. However, the important demands for an annual army budget, for a lesser role for the Federal Council and for MPs' diets remained unfulfilled .

Weimar 1918/1919

Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919

Immediately after the proclamation of the republic on November 9, 1918, Foreign Minister Wilhelm Solf asked whether the FRV could now be the basis for a new constitution. So instead of continuing to work with the two-week-old October constitution , many politicians, despite all other difficulties, spoke out in favor of the hardship of a new National Assembly. One of the reasons for this was the FRV, since after the collapse of Austria-Hungary the chance of a Greater Germany seemed to exist. The democratic idea of ​​a constituent national assembly should also be used against the impending revolution.

The main connection point in the Weimar National Assembly to the FRV then became a catalog of fundamental rights, although Hugo Preuss' government draft was content with only a few fundamental rights from the FRV . After all, the fundamental rights have essentially already been implemented by law. Preuss feared a long fundamental rights debate like the one that had taken place in Frankfurt, and in addition, in his opinion, it was not enough to repeat old fundamental rights of the 19th century. Social democrats and politicians from the Catholic Center Party were primarily responsible for a shift in the National Assembly . What was lacking, however, was a direct, enforceable legal effect of the Weimar basic rights, and legal reservations later made it easier to erode them.

Bonn 1948/1949

In the constitutions of the German states after 1945, there is hardly any evidence of the FRV's influence. The Weimar Constitution was looked at as a historical example and counterexample. The celebration of the century in 1948 again gave the FRV more attention when the Parliamentary Council began its work on the Basic Law . Many members were familiar with the FRV, also because they had studied it as working material in the national consultations. They used them for parental rights, individual basic rights, the financial system and, above all, for representing the member states at the federal level.

As in 1919, the idea of ​​a state house based on the Frankfurt model came up, with independent MPs instead of representatives of the state governments. (In the mid-1970s, the idea was taken up again within the framework of a commission of inquiry.) Just as unrealized, as in 1919, was the proposal to orientate itself on the Frankfurt preamble . According to council member Ludwig Bergsträßer , the colors of the federal flag should tie in with the tradition of Frankfurt and Weimar and thus with the idea of ​​personal freedom.

literature

  • Jörg-Detlef Kühne : The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985) (Habilitation Bonn 1983).

supporting documents

  1. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 64-67, p. 69 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  2. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 99/100 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  3. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 78/79 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  4. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 75-77 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  5. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 83/84 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  6. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 77/78 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  7. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 96-98 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  8. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 79/80 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  9. ↑ Hans Boldt: Erfurt Union Constitution . In: Günther Mai (Ed.): The Erfurt Union and the Erfurt Union Parliament 1850. Böhlau, Cologne u. a. 2000, pp. 417-431, here p. 422.
  10. ↑ Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 718.
  11. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 86/87 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  12. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 103-105 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  13. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1988, p. 519, p. 646.
  14. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 105/106, p. 111 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  15. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 108-110, pp. 117/118 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  16. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 112-114, 117/118 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  17. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 122–126 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  18. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 130-131 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  19. ↑ Willibalt Apelt: History of the Weimar Constitution. 2nd edition, CH Beck, Munich / Berlin 1964, pp. 295/296.
  20. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 132-136, p. 141 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  21. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 139/140 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  22. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), pp. 145/146 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).
  23. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 146/147 (Habilitation Bonn 1983).