Head of the Reich 1848–1850

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The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In a contemporary caricature with the Frankfurt Imperial Crown. He makes his decision dependent on the counting of his uniform buttons: “Should I? - shouldn't I? - Should I?! Button, you want! nu jerade nich !! "

The question of a head of the empire or an emperor was a central point of contention in the German unification attempts from 1848 to 1850. In the provisional constitutional order with the central authority as well as in the constitutional plans of that time it was about how a German head of state comes into his office and what rights they have should.

In the Frankfurt constitution of March 28, 1849, an emperor of the Germans was envisaged as head of the empire. Although the National Assembly elected the first incumbent, the office would have been hereditary thereafter. The emperor should be inviolable in the sense of the constitutional monarchy , but appoint responsible ministers.

Friedrich Wilhelm IV. , King of Prussia, rejected the imperial dignity proposed to him. Instead he tried unsuccessfully to unite Germany on its own. In the Erfurt Union he was striving for , the head of the Reich was first called the Reich Board , then the Union Board . The Union Board should have shared certain rights with other princes, especially the veto of legislative decisions.

Background and labels

The title of emperor originally comes from the ancient Roman Empire and was known not least from the medieval Holy Roman Empire . It had become common practice that the German king also carried the title of Roman emperor. For centuries this was the head of the Austrian Habsburgs, until 1806 the empire was dissolved under pressure from Napoleon . It was made easier for Austria to renounce the Roman-German imperial crown by being allowed to elevate itself to the Austrian Empire .

Emperor Barbarossa , colored copper engraving from 1847

In the German Confederation from 1815 there was no emperor: the highest body was a federal assembly (often called the Bundestag) with the chairmanship for Austria. The romanticism of that time , however, had a preference for the medieval empire, combined with the idea of ​​a powerful emperor. The point of reference for such fantasies was, for example, Friedrich I (Barbarossa) from the 12th century, who, according to the Kyffhauser myth, slept in a mountain but would return to unite Germany.

As early as 1814/15, when the establishment of the German Confederation was still being discussed, Freiherr vom Stein had demanded a German Kaiser as federal executive. Up to 34 small and medium-sized countries followed suit. But due to the disagreement between Prussia and Austria, but also the other larger states, a federal executive did not come about, neither in the form of an emperor nor a board of directors ("German Committee") of the five largest states. As Stein explained to the Russian tsar in a memorandum on February 17, 1815, Austria should provide the German emperor so that it would be firmly united with Germany.

In the years 1848 to 1850, there are other expressions that circumscribed or concealed the monarchical character of a German head of state: head of the empire , head of the empire , or governor . In some cases one could also imagine an elected president or a prince as primus inter pares (first among equals; in the case of an organ made up of several people, one spoke of a directorate ).

When speaking of a central or imperial authority, it meant the state in the sense of the highest federal level, today's federal level. Thus one distinguished the competencies of the central authority from those of the individual states. There was then a further question of who exercised this central authority. Mostly one thought of a monarch whose power was limited by a constitution, a representative body and the responsibility of his ministers . Government or imperial government could mean the monarch together with the ministers or just the ministers (as an interchangeable part of the government).

Revolution and attempted federal reform March – May 1848

After the violent events in Berlin on March 18, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV promised that he would lead the national unity movement.

On behalf of the Prussian king, Joseph von Radowitz drafted a memorandum in 1847, which on March 15 resulted in an Austro-Prussian conference plan. The memorandum spoke of a central authority, but was silent about a possible German head of state. In his application of February 12, the Baden MP Bassermann mentioned chambers of estates in the Bundestag and unified national institutions, but also no head of state. On the other hand, Heinrich von Gagern, MP from Hesse , explicitly mentioned an interim head of Germany in his application of February 28, who should appoint a responsible cabinet.

In March 1848 unrest similar to the one in the February Revolution in France broke out in the German states . The terrified German monarchs set up liberal governments, and these sent liberal envoys to the Bundestag. The general population assumed that the time had come to unite Germany and give it a modern constitution. The Bundestag elected a national assembly that would draw up a constitution and agree it with the governments .

Even before the election, the Bundestag set up a committee that made a constitutional proposal for a national federal state, the Seventeen Draft of April 26, 1848. In the foreword, the draft emphasized the importance of the appointment of a strong head of the Reich in order to promote German unity to guarantee. The head of the empire, called emperor, should be inviolable with responsible ministers. He should have a say in laws just like the Reichstag, the partially elected parliament. According to Jörg-Detlef Kühne, this draft is the first in the March Revolution to include a hereditary emperor . Although the draft was not given formal status, it was nevertheless an influential template for the later imperial constitution of March 28, 1849.

Another development took place in the Bundestag itself. There was a decision on May 3 to set up a federal directorate to finally give the federal government an executive. The three members should include one representative from Austria and one from Prussia. Bavaria should make a list of proposals for the third, and the other individual states of the Senate Council (Bundestag) would then vote for the third. Because of the resistance from the states and also from liberal politicians, and because the National Assembly would soon meet (May 18), the Bundestag did not set up this body.

National Assembly

Caricature of the (alleged) enthusiasm of German princes to become crowned head of Germany; 1848. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Steps on the shoulder of the German Michel .

The National Assembly wanted to set up a provisional constitutional order with a provisional central executive. According to Ernst Rudolf Huber , "the lack of a central power [...] was the core evil of the old federal constitution". Seven different solutions were now up for debate, which kept cropping up until March 1849:

  1. Temporary Democratic-Republican head of the Reich (President), for example four, five or seven years. It should be elected by the people or by the parliament. This was supported by the Democrats and partly by the left-wing center in the National Assembly.
  2. Dynastic-republican head of the empire. Only a member of a ruling royal house would be eligible for election. He could be elected by the people or the parliament, also for a limited period.
  3. Democratic Directory, with three, five or seven members. Any citizen would have been eligible. The federalist thinkers among the Democrats were in favor of this solution.
  4. Dynastic Directory, the ruling princes could have been elected, or princes of certain states appointed on a permanent basis. One example was the proposed “prince triumvirate of the three uncles”, Archduke Johann (uncle of the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand), Prince Wilhelm the Elder (uncle of the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV.) And Prince Carl (uncle of the Bavarian King Maximilian II.).
  5. Electoral empire, with an emperor elected by the people or parliament for life. A member of a dynasty or just a ruling prince would be eligible. This solution mainly favored the left center.
  6. Alternating empire, the Austrian prince was to be the head of the empire for six years and then the Prussian for six years.
  7. Hereditary emperorship, but the first official would have to be elected first. A member of a dynasty or just a ruling prince would be eligible. In the future the crown would be inherited. In the hereditary empire, which would have been occupied by a ruling prince, a permanent personal union between the head of the empire and the sovereign would have arisen. In practice, only the Austrian emperor and the Prussian king came into question. For the hereditary emperor as a solution, those who wanted a united empire capable of acting against the individual states stood up.

Provisional constitutional order

On June 3, 1848, the National Assembly set up a committee with fifteen members, which proposed a board of three with a majority of 11 to four votes. Governments should propose it and the National Assembly should approve it. The Board of Directors would set up a ministry (government) to be responsible to the National Assembly.

The democratic minority of the Committee of Fifteen, on the other hand, thought of an Executive Committee (an executive committee). The chairman would be elected by the National Assembly and then appoint the remaining committee members. The majority of the National Assembly could vote out the Executive Committee at any time. The moderate Democrat Robert Blum envisioned the Executive Committee essentially sending the decisions of the National Assembly to governments for execution. The determined democrats, on the other hand, demanded that the provisional government immediately take over actual executive power over all of Germany.

The majority did not want to leave the familiar ground of the pre-March constitutional law; Although the imperial government was supposed to have parliamentary responsibility, one turned against a pure parliamentary rule based on the example of the Convention in the French Revolution. The left-wing center also wanted the National Assembly not to be able to recall the president at the head of the executive.

Archduke Johann of Austria , Imperial Administrator of the German Empire from June 29, 1848 to December 20, 1849

Heinrich von Gagern , the Liberal President of the National Assembly, brought about an end to the various proposals on June 24th and thus the debate from June 19th to 25th. He called on the National Assembly to use its own power (in a "bold grip") to set up a provisional central authority. On June 28, a majority in the National Assembly then voted for the Central Power Act and the day after for the election of Archduke Johann as Reich Administrator ; an imperial administrator is traditionally the official who governs until the final monarch is appointed. Johann of Austria was popular with the people and was therefore most likely to be acceptable to the left, on the other hand, acceptable as a nobleman of the right. Reichsverweser Johann then set up the first total Reich Ministry in July and August , the actual government of the emerging German Reich .

Debates on the Imperial Constitution

In January 1849, a vote had broken out in the National Assembly, which showed the many different opinions. On January 19, 1849, the majority rejected the proposal of the moderate and the determined left with 339 votes against 122 to appoint an elected head of the Reich for a period (any German would have been eligible). In subsequent votes, only 97 members voted for a directorate, only 80 for an alternating head of the Reich, 39 for an elected head of the Reich for life, 14 for an election for 12 years, 196 for an election for six years, 120 for an election for three years . The only unanimous agreement was that the head of the Reich should bear the title of Kaiser of the Germans and that it should not be hereditary (but also not elected).

The MPs in the National Assembly mostly belonged to political groups that were named after the inns in which they met. In addition, there are historical-political terms such as determined democrats or constitutional liberals, as well as location descriptions such as left, right, left center, etc. These classifications were then partly overlaid by what is perhaps the most important individual question in the National Assembly: Greater German or Little German.

At the beginning of the National Assembly it was taken for granted that Austria belonged to Germany. However, a large part of the entire Austrian state lay outside the German Confederation, whose borders were in principle also those of the new German Reich. Even in Austria within the imperial borders, many people lived without a German mother tongue. If Germany were to become a nation state, Austria had to make a decision:

  • Greater German solution : Austria is split into a German and a non-German part. The Austrian emperor could remain head of both parts, but they would have to have separate constitutions and administrations.
  • Small German solution: Austria remains outside Germany, with which it is linked via a kind of confederation of states.

On March 4, 1849, Austria itself thwarted plans to include Austria in the Reich. On March 11th, the National Assembly learned that the Austrian Emperor had passed a new constitution. Austria became a unified state and, according to a declaration of March 13, wanted to join a federation as a whole, which would have had a directory but no actual representative body.

Decisive votes and election of the emperor

The German National Assembly in the
Paulskirche in Frankfurt

The majority of the right - wing liberals from the casino faction were in favor of a hereditary emperor. To do this, they wanted to elect the Prussian king. This hereditary imperial party (restaurant: Weidenbusch) had a majority in the constitutional committee, but not in the entire national assembly. The Greater Germans gathered in the Mainlust inn, the news from Vienna took the wind out of their sails. One of their leaders, Karl Theodor Welcker , swung over to the Weidenbusch camp. On March 12, he surprisingly submitted a motion to conclude the constitutional deliberations quickly:

  • Foreign countries are trying to intervene in the development of the German constitution.
  • The entire present Imperial Constitution of the first reading, taking into account the wishes of the governments, is to be adopted as a whole in a single resolution. The later Reichstag would have to make improvements.
  • The King of Prussia becomes hereditary emperor. A deputation (delegation, delegation) from the National Assembly will notify the King of the election.
  • German Austria may join the German federal state at any time.

This Welcker proposal was rejected by 283 votes (right, left) against 252 (center). The Reich Ministry resigned, but remained in office. An agreement between the leftist Heinrich Simon and the acting Reich Minister President Heinrich von Gagern succeeded in organizing a majority for the content of the Welcker application ( Pact Simon-Gagern ): A group of the hereditary imperialists supported the democratic right to vote, a group of the On the left, in turn, the hereditary empire.

On March 22nd, MP Bernhard Eisenstuck proposed that the individual paragraphs be voted on, but that amendments should only be accepted if they were supported by at least 50 MPs. The section on the head of the Reich should be voted last. The request was accepted. In the following votes, the two important decisions were made on March 27th:

  • About the Reich territory: The separation of German and non-German countries (which referred to Austria) was somewhat milder and reformulated into a target provision. Nevertheless, it remained that Austria could not join as a state. Because of the well-known attitude of the Austrian government, Austria was hereby de facto excluded.
  • About the head of the Reich: 279 against 255 members decided that the dignity of the head of the Reich should be transferred to a ruling prince. 267 versus 263 MPs decided that dignity will be hereditary.

The majority for the hereditary imperial dignity came about because four Austrians joined the small Germans in protest against the Austrian government. The small German solution was supported by the center, parts of the left (Simon-Gagern Pact) and some right-wing groups. On March 28, the National Assembly elected the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. As emperor. 290 voted for him, 284 abstained, 29 were absent. The abstentions came mainly from the Greater Germans and most of the left.

Frankfurt Constitution of March 28, 1849

Constitutional diagram for the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution of 1849.

The constitution of the German Reich of March 28, 1849 begins with a definition of the Reich and goes over into a long catalog of the competences that the Reich level ("Reichsgewalt") had over the individual states. This is followed by section III on the head of the Reich (with sections 68–84).

The title of the head of the empire is " Emperor of the Germans ". According to § 68, the "dignity of the head of the Reich [...] is transferred to one of the ruling German princes" without explicitly saying who transfers it. The following paragraph then stipulates that the prince in question inherits the dignity, namely the firstborn son. The Reichstag determines its civil list (its income).

According to the imperial constitution, the emperor's powers were:

  • Appointment of the Reich Minister
  • Representation of the Reich under international law, appointment of diplomats, etc.
  • Appointment and closure of the Reichstag, dissolution of the Volkshaus (according to certain rules)
  • Proclamation of the law, legislative initiative, suspensive veto against legislative decisions
  • Pardons and mitigation of sentences in criminal matters within the competence of the Reichsgericht
  • Maintaining the Reich peace (against unrest) and disposing of the armed forces
  • Employment of the Reich officials
  • Government authority in all imperial affairs, provided the constitution does not assign individual imperial powers to other organs

The emperor was inviolable or irresponsible, so he could not be deposed or politically held accountable by anyone. In order to exercise his office, he had to take an oath on the constitution; had the heir of a deceased emperor refused permanently, a reign would have been the only possible solution. Furthermore, the emperor could only exercise his office if his actions were signed ( countersigned ) by a Reich minister . Who he appointed Reich Minister was in turn up to the personal decision of the emperor.

The constitution says nothing about the Reich government, the Reich Ministry, or its internal organization. Even the fact that the emperor is dismissing the government is not expressly written down; it has to be interpreted. The Reich ministers are responsible , but the constitution does not explain what the content of the responsibility was. The Reichstag is given rights to control the government, such as the right of the Reichstag to quote with the government's obligation to provide information. But there is no vote of no confidence. According to Huber, the parliamentary system was denied, at least formally. But if the German Reich had come into being, the system of government would have been parliamentarized, also because the Reich ministers were also allowed to belong to the People's House of the Reichstag.

Empire and Prussia

Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

Franz Krüger: Portrait of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia

The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Dreamed of a new Roman-German Empire with Austria at its head since his youth in the spirit of romantic historicism . The Prussian king would exercise the military command as a federal general. The temptation of the National Assembly for Frederick William IV was greater than he was ready to admit. But he was faced with a complicated situation, against the background that the power of the monarchs increased again at the beginning of 1849. The camarilla at his court no longer worked as effectively as it did in 1848; from this circle Leopold von Gerlach was in favor of returning to the German Confederation. Cabinet chief Count Brandenburg kept a low profile, apparently he wanted to use the idea of ​​German unity in realpolitical terms to increase Prussian power. The king considered him disobedient, which made constitutionalism and ministerial responsibility even more unbearable.

Count Brandenburg persuaded the king to leave out his romantic plans in a circular dispatch to the German governments. The circular dispatch of January 23, 1849 called imperial dignity unnecessary, but did not reject it directly; Austria should remain connected with the rest of Germany, which is uniting itself more closely. She already referred to the need for the other states to agree to a solution.

Historians have judged the circular dispatch differently. According to Huber, the hereditary imperialists could see them as encouragement. Bernhard Mann believes that the king's aversion to the title of emperor was at least officially expressed in it. According to David E. Barclay, the dispatch had made it clear how fickle the King was about where a decision should have been made. In a close circle he had insulted the Imperial Crown of the National Assembly as a dog collar, but it was still not clear how he would ultimately answer the Frankfurt MPs.

In the individual states, from January to March 1849, it was found that 18 small and medium-sized states were in favor of the hereditary empire. However, it was rejected by the large states of Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover and Saxony. Something similar became apparent after Reich Minister President Heinrich von Gagern sent the previous draft of the Reich constitution to the governments on January 28th. The same great states rejected it, Prussia and thirty other governments (with all sorts of additional declarations) accepted it in principle. Due to the resistance of the major states, Prussia withdrew from its circular dispatch, the State Secretary responsible for it, Count Bülow, was dismissed on February 22, 1849. His successor Foreign Minister Count Arnim-Heinrichsdorf was considered pro-Austrian.

There were also negative voices abroad. Great Britain and Russia warned the Prussian king against accepting the imperial crown by the National Assembly, and they hoped that Austria would intervene. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia even threatened Berlin with war, because he had to assume that a small Germany would have got into a war against Austria and perhaps other German states, perhaps with civil war and revolutions as the consequences. The Russian invasion of Hungary is to be understood in this sense: The Tsar thereby strengthened Austria and signaled that he was ready for military intervention.

Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Caused “manifold confusion”, judges Huber: “With many statements he had encouraged the bourgeois movement to place their national democratic hopes in him.” His rejection of an imperial crown with democratic participation was rooted less from conceit than from conceit Afraid of a democratic dynamic. The terrible picture was the tyranny of Napoleon , who had elected himself emperor in 1804, and the election of Louis Napoléon , who seemed to follow the example of 1804 around the turn of the year 1848/1849. The citizen king Louis-Philippe was installed democratically and parliamentary in 1830, so illegitimate in the view of the right, and was replaced by a democratic republic in the revolution of 1848.

Jörg-Detlef Kühne wants to cite the international situation as an objective excuse for the rejection, because of which a peaceful formation of an empire would hardly have been possible. However, a “courageous policy” by Prussia could have succeeded “at least temporarily”. The social democrat August Bebel said that the king was already insane at that time, another explanation refers to the "medieval nature of his constitutional ideas".

Emperor's deputation and first reaction

Caricature on the imperial question. The Germanic wise men (left) wear the imperial crown to the poorly profiled Prussian king (center of picture, blue uniform). The Prussian king is influenced by the Russian tsar (green uniform), the young Austrian emperor Franz Joseph and the other kings (the Bavarian with a beer mug on the crown).

The historian Bernhard Mann judges that the hereditary imperial family's program had become so much an obsession that the question of feasibility had faded into the background. They hoped that the king could somehow be made to accept it, if necessary by the Prussian system of government or even some kind of palace revolution forcing him to do so.

One weakness was that the hereditary emperorship was accepted in the National Assembly with a majority of only four votes and that many members of the parliament abstained from electing the emperor. It was also controversial whether the National Assembly had the right to elect an emperor at all. Nevertheless, the imperial constitution had come into being legally and existed at all, so, according to Mann, “it was by no means doomed to failure from the outset, provided that some stronger group did not try to kill it by force; even then she would have had a chance of survival. "

The National Assembly appointed an emperor's deputation of 32 members to indicate to the king that he was elected emperor. Naturally, it only included MPs who had elected him. Led by Eduard von Simson , President of the National Assembly, the deputation arrived in Berlin on April 2nd. Friedrich Wilhelm IV received the deputies the next day in the Berlin Palace . Neither the king nor his cabinet wanted to outright refuse to support the German federal state. The wording of his answer sounded accommodating, but the tone made it clear to the deputation that he was rejecting the imperial dignity.

The king said in the introduction:

"Gentlemen! The message, as the bearer of which you came to me, deeply moved me. […] In the resolution of the German National Assembly, which you, Gentlemen, hand over to me, I recognize the voice of the representatives of the German people. This call gives me a right, the value of which I appreciate. […] The German National Assembly has counted on Me above all, where it is important to establish Germany's unity and strength. I honor your trust and thank her for it. I am ready to prove by deed that the men were not mistaken [...] "

But, it was said, his resolution could not be reached without the "free consent" of the ruling princes. A sentence at the end of the answer had to be understood as a threat against revolutionary unrest: "If the Prussian shield and sword are needed against external or internal enemies, I will not be absent even without a reputation."

A minority of the deputation wanted to understand the answer as a conditional assumption. But Samson wrote a declaration that the constitution must be accepted unconditionally; this declaration was unanimously approved by the deputation. Originally, the Prussian cabinet wanted to meet the National Assembly further than the King. It now stood behind him and confirmed that the king wanted to take the lead in Germany, but that the constitution had to be agreed between the National Assembly and the governments. Prussia invited the governments to a congress in Frankfurt and wanted to give a definitive answer within two weeks.

The members of the deputation reported to their parliamentary groups on the evening of April 7th. Everyone was very outraged by Friedrich Wilhelm IV and wanted to adhere to the constitution in its current form and to the Reich election law. They set up a committee of thirty members to examine the deputation's report. It boiled down to the threat of a new revolution that governments should be forced to accept. The hereditary imperialists were at the end of their possibilities if Prussia did not give in. The left intended to go further as it was less afraid of a new revolution.

Final rejection April 28, 1849

Caricature in the Düsseldorf monthly magazine , April 1849. Heinrich von Gagern on the left, a female personification of Prussia in the center, the Prussian king playing with a bear on the right. "What are you crying little jumping jacks?" - "I carved your little one a crown, now he doesn't want it!"

In a collective note dated April 14, 28 governments declared that they accepted the constitution and the election of the emperor. The King of Württemberg, the only king, adopted the constitution against his will on April 25, under pressure from his liberal government and popular anger. The Prussian government under Count Brandenburg, however, declared on April 21 that it would never accept the imperial constitution unchanged. But the National Assembly hoped that the king would dismiss the government and still accept the constitution and a leadership position, even if not the imperial title, and only then undertake constitutional changes.

The central authority sent representatives to Berlin to change Frederick William IV's mind. On April 28, however, the king's final rejection took place. He justified them by saying that the constitution interfered too much with the powers of the states, that individual basic rights were unacceptable, and above all that he disliked the emperor's suspensive veto against laws. Together with the democratic right to vote, the constitutional-monarchical principle is endangered. This is an attempt to legally establish the republic. In reality, according to the historian Wolfram Siemann, the king was concerned with the power of disposal over “his” soldiers. Friedrich Wilhelm IV was not the “romantic on the throne”, but “a cool, calculating, power-conscious monarch”.

On May 4, 190 against 188 members of the National Assembly voted for the National Assembly itself to hold the elections for the first Reichstag and not (as provided for in the Imperial Constitution) the emperor. The Reichstag was to have its first session on August 1st and then confer the dignity of emperor to the prince of the largest state that participated in the empire. On the question of the extent to which violence would be necessary to enforce the constitution, the National Assembly finally split, while it also lost more and more members of parliament through illegal actions by the governments.

Erfurt Union 1849/1850

Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And his mastermind Joseph von Radowitz believed that Prussia itself could found a German Empire under a conservative auspices. This attempted unification later became known as the Erfurt Union . In addition, Prussia invited representatives of the four kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and Württemberg to a conference. Only with Saxony and Hanover did the three kings alliance of May 26, 1849 be concluded, but these as well as other states left the project again at the end of 1849 or in the course of 1850. The project also failed because of the hesitation of the Prussian king, who did not want the Made the Union constitution dependent on the consent of the other governments.

The draft of a Union constitution from May 1849 adopted many formulations from the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution. But the national level would have had slightly fewer competencies than before. The title "Reichsoberhaupt" became "Reichsvorstand", the title of emperor was dropped. The most peculiar change, which the new constitution was supposed to make more acceptable to the middle states, was the distinction between the Imperial Board and the Princely College, in order to combine a hereditary head with a Directory:

  • The Prussian king should be the imperial executive. He exercised the executive power and appointed and dismissed the Reich ministers.
  • There were six votes in the prince's college: one for Prussia (Reichsvorstand), one for Saxony, the rest had to be shared by several states. In the event of a tie, the Reich Executive Committee decided. The college of princes exercised the legislative functions; no law could be passed without his consent.

On February 26, 1850, an additional act of the administrative council of the Union changed the designation (German) “Reich” to “German Union” and the “Reichsvorstand” to “Unionvorstand”. The Princely College adapted them to the new circumstances after Saxony and Hanover had stayed away. The Erfurt Reichstag also changed the constitution slightly in April 1850. The majority there were mainly politicians who had belonged to the hereditary imperial family in Frankfurt. They had the goal of strengthening the Union Board: This was now given a veto in the event of constitutional changes, not the Prince's College as a whole. The Union Board no longer exercised its executive powers "with the consent and in conjunction with the Princely College". The idea of ​​the MP Otto von Bismarck and others to abolish the Princely College in favor of a purely advisory body and to turn the State House of the Reichstag into a Princely Council was not accepted .

Comparison with the constitution of 1867/1871

Wilhelm I , German Emperor , in 1879. Wilhelm was the younger brother of Friedrich Wilhelm.

The draft constitution of 1849/1850 provided the tradition for Bismarck's constitution of 1867 and 1871. To a certain extent, this also applies to “the organization headed by the Prussian King-Emperor”, according to Hans Boldt. In the North German Federal Constitution of 1867, the entire state level (and thus the entire state government) had considerably fewer powers than in the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution. In addition to a Reichstag (like the Volkshaus), there was a Federal Council. The governments of the states involved sent representatives to the Bundesrat who, depending on the size of their state, could cast a certain number of votes. This Bundesrat system can also be found today in German federalism.

The Federal Council, like the Princely College in the Union Constitution, together with the Reichstag had the legislative competence and the legislative initiative. According to the constitution, the “ Federal Presidium ” belonged to the King of Prussia. The Presidium appointed the Chancellor, who was " responsible ". At the beginning of 1870, Bismarck pursued an imperial plan for a short time : The king should accept the imperial title in order to achieve a higher status, which should give impetus to German unification efforts.

During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1871, the North German Confederation became the German Empire. On December 8, 1870, the Reichstag accepted the title of “ German Emperor ” for the Presidium. On January 1, 1871, the changes came into force. The imperial proclamation on January 18, 1871 in the Palace of Versailles, charged with propaganda, is better known than the constitutional amendments . King Wilhelm had resisted the imperial title whenever possible, but finally gave in to Bismarck's urging.

rating

The empire of the Imperial Constitution of March 28, 1849 was a compromise between the monarchical and the democratic principle. It seemed like a contradiction that the people had elected a national assembly which now placed imperial power in the hands of a hereditary and inviolable emperor. However, according to Huber, the National Assembly did not follow the democratic unity of power according to Rousseau , but the liberal separation of powers according to Montesquieu . Accordingly, it created an independent empire to counterbalance the Reichstag.

The emperor elected by the National Assembly, according to Thomas Nipperdey , was “a symbol of this revolution”, democratically elected, but then withdrawn from democratic change because of his inheritance. “That was the peculiar expression of the mediation and compromise policy of the Liberals [...]. That was also an opportunity for the monarchy to legitimize itself in a modern and new way. ”Not only the Prussian state parliament, but also parts of the conservative establishment were in favor of acceptance, the latter, however, under conditions such as a different right to vote. For a realization of the imperial constitution one would have had to reckon with the resistance of the left as well as with a war against Austria and Russia. "But that did not come to the test of history" because the king did not want to connect with the revolution. Manfred Botzenhart saw more confidently in the imperial constitution “a stable, progressive and promising basis for founding an empire in the middle of the 19th century [...] - only there was no one in Germany at that time who would have been up to the tasks of such an empire and who According to Kühne, it was the unanimous view at the time that the middle states would not have refused if Prussia had lived up to its intended role.

By combining democracy and empire, the revolution made it possible for imperial power to assume an independent and influential position. The emperor had his own constitutional privileges; As a symbol of imperial unity and guarantor of freedom, the emperor was able to establish a new legitimation; with an emperor bound by moderation and justice, the dangers of democratic nationalism could be contained. Ernst Rudolf Huber: “The good old law was able to unite with the good new law in an act of reconciliation. But the moment was missed. It should not offer itself to the monarchy and the nation in this form again. "

See also

supporting documents

  1. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume I: Reform and Restoration 1789 to 1830 . 2nd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1967, pp. 514/515.
  2. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 588-590.
  3. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. Habil.-Schr., Bonn 1983, 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985) OCLC 801154230 , p. 43.
  4. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 164.
  5. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 807-809.
  6. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 166.
  7. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 167.
  8. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 171-173.
  9. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 173/174.
  10. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 810.
  11. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 684.
  12. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 684.
  13. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 684/685.
  14. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: Documents on German constitutional history. Volume 1: German constitutional documents 1803-1850 . 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1978 (1961), No. 106 (No. 100). Proposal by MP Welcker for en bloc acceptance of the Imperial Constitution of March 12, 1849 , pp. 373/374.
  15. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 688-690.
  16. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 816/817.
  17. Simplified after: Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 828.
  18. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 827, p. 832.
  19. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 828/829.
  20. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 811.
  21. ^ David E. Barclay: Frederick William IV and the Prussian Monarchy, 1840-1861 . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, pp. 192/193.
  22. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 811/812.
  23. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 811/812.
  24. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here p. 266.
  25. ^ David E. Barclay: Frederick William IV and the Prussian Monarchy, 1840-1861 . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 194.
  26. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 811-813.
  27. Konrad Canis: Bismarck's Foreign Policy 1870 to 1890. Rise and Endangerment , Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2004, p. 21.
  28. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 818/819.
  29. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. Habil.-Schr., Bonn 1983, 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 49.
  30. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here p. 267.
  31. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here pp. 266/267.
  32. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 695/696.
  33. ^ David E. Barclay: Frederick William IV and the Prussian Monarchy, 1840-1861 . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 194.
  34. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: Documents on German constitutional history. Volume 1: German constitutional documents 1803-1850 . 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1978 (1961), No. 114 (No. 107). Reply of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. To the deputation of the German National Assembly of April 3, 1849 , pp. 405/406.
  35. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 696.
  36. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: Documents on German constitutional history. Volume 1: German constitutional documents 1803-1850 . 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1978 (1961), No. 114 (No. 107). Reply of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. To the deputation of the German National Assembly of April 3, 1849 , pp. 405/406.
  37. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here pp. 273, 275.
  38. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849. In: Historical magazine. Vol. 214, Issue 2, April 1972, pp. 265-309, here pp. 275-277.
  39. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here pp. 266/267.
  40. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here pp. 275–277.
  41. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 697/698.
  42. ^ Wolfram Siemann: 1848/49 in Germany and Europe. Event, coping, memory. Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 20.
  43. ^ Bernhard Mann: The end of the German National Assembly in 1849 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Vol. 214, Issue 2 (April 1972), pp. 265–309, here p. 292.
  44. Hans Boldt: Erfurt Union Constitution . In: Günther Mai (Ed.): The Erfurt Union and the Erfurt Union Parliament 1850. Böhlau, Cologne [u. a.] 2000, pp. 417-431, here p. 422.
  45. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 718.
  46. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 820.
  47. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 771.
  48. Hans Boldt: Erfurt Union Constitution . In: Günther Mai (Ed.): The Erfurt Union and the Erfurt Union Parliament 1850. Böhlau, Cologne [u. a.] 2000, pp. 417-431, here p. 430.
  49. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 828.
  50. Hans Boldt: Erfurt Union Constitution . In: Günther Mai (Ed.): The Erfurt Union and the Erfurt Union Parliament 1850. Böhlau, Cologne [u. a.] 2000, pp. 417-431, here pp. 430/431.
  51. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume III: Bismarck and the realm . 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 657/658, 706.
  52. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, pp. 817/818.
  53. ^ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1860–1866. Tape. 1: Citizens' world and a strong state. Beck, Munich 1983, pp. 660/661.
  54. Manfred Botzenhart: German Parliamentarism in the Revolutionary Period 1848–1850. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 792.
  55. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: The imperial constitution of the Paulskirche. Model and realization in later German legal life. Habil.-Schr., Bonn 1983, 2nd edition, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1998 (1985), p. 61.
  56. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1988, p. 820.