Occupation of the Rhineland (1936)

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The stationing of armed forces in the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, which was demilitarized due to the Treaty of Versailles , is referred to as the occupation of the Rhineland or remilitarization of the Rhineland , in Nazi propaganda "Rhineland liberation" .

The ratification of the Franco-Soviet assistance contract on 27 February 1936 in the French National Assembly took Adolf Hitler as an excuse and left the Disengagement Zone in the Rhineland, the Versailles Treaty provisions to revise further and further strengthen its military position in his future plans. The occupation did not lead to any significant negative consequences for Germany . The victorious powers , especially Great Britain , let themselves be pacified by the German declarations of peace. Because of the passivity of France and Great Britain, one of the last opportunities was missed here to thwart the dictator's plans for conquest in good time simply by acting decisively.

Hitler himself is said to have commented on this several times afterwards, even during the war, as follows: The 48 hours after the invasion of the Rhineland were the most exciting time in his life. If the French had moved into the Rhineland at that time, the Germans would have had to withdraw with disgrace and shame, because the military forces they had at their disposal would by no means have been sufficient for even moderate resistance .

Prehistory of the Rhineland

Allied occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War
Mapping of the eastern border of the demilitarized Rhineland in accordance with the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno

After the First World War , the Rhineland was occupied by the Allies and evacuated by German troops. In the Versailles Peace Treaty , Germany was “ prohibited from maintaining or building fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine as well as on the right bank west of a line drawn 50 kilometers east of this river. “In Article 43 Germany was banned from any military mobilization in the area. Should Germany violate the aforementioned provisions, this would be regarded as a “ hostile act against the signatory powers (...) and as a disruption of world peace. “In the Locarno Treaty of December 1, 1925, which Germany had voluntarily signed and ratified in contrast to the Versailles Treaty, these provisions were confirmed. There (Part A, Art. 2) a violation of Art. 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty is described as a legitimate reason for French and Belgian intervention against Germany. Such a breach of contract “obliged” all other contracting parties to the Locarno Agreement to “immediately provide their assistance” (Part A, Art. 4 Paragraph 3). In addition, in such a case, the matter should be brought before the League of Nations (Part A, Art. 4 Para. 1).

The regulations on the Rhineland mainly served the security needs of France . The troops of France and other states, which were also stationed for 15 years in the Rhineland, also in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, were withdrawn prematurely by June 30, 1930 with the acceptance of the Young Plan by Germany. However, this in no way invalidated the provisions on demilitarization from the German side. The Rhineland was of great importance for economic reasons and for armaments policy, as parts of the Ruhr area , the industrial center of Germany and the “ traditional armory of the Reich ” were located in the demilitarized zone . In a note from the General Staff of the Army from 1935 on the military and political situation, it was stated that France always had 13 divisions ready for immediate invasion of Germany and that they could occupy the left bank of the Rhine at any time by demilitarizing the Rhineland and the eastern bank of the Rhine.

Time for the occupation

Long before 1933, the foreign policy and military ranks of the German Reich repeatedly developed plans to reverse the demilitarization of the Rhineland at the next diplomatic opportunity. Although the Reichswehr had concrete plans for an occupation since March 1933, the military and political leadership of the Reich assumed in the following period that this would not be possible before 1937. Accordingly, Hitler had planned the occupation for 1937. The fact that he let the German troops march into the Rhineland in the spring of 1936 mainly depended on the international situation that was favorable for Hitler.

Conflict in Abyssinia

The Italo -Ethiopian War played a certain role in this , as it diverted the attention of the Western powers from the center of Europe. The disputes between the Western powers over possible sanctions against Italy led to a deterioration in Franco-British relations and a rapprochement between Italy and Germany. The conflict contributed significantly to the dissolution of the Stresa Front (Great Britain, France and Italy).

Ratification of the Franco-Soviet assistance treaty

Hitler used the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Assistance Pact on February 27, 1936 in the French National Assembly as the occasion for the German troops to march into the demilitarized zone and thus for the violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties . As early as November 29, 1932, France and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact that obliged both parties to be neutral in the event of an attack by a third power. After the contract expired, a new mutual assistance pact was signed in Moscow on May 2, 1935 . Germany responded that if the mutual assistance pact were approved in the French parliament and the Senate, there would be no possibility of rapprochement with France. Hitler immediately used the resolution in the National Assembly as a pretext for the reoccupation of the Rhineland without waiting for the treaty to be dealt with in the French Senate (the second chamber, which at the time was almost equal).

Before the occupation, Hitler made sure to Benito Mussolini that Italy would not intervene in the event of a German reaction to the ratification of the treaty. On February 22, 1936, Mussolini remarked to the German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell , that he too considered the treaty to be “ harmful and dangerous ”. Hassell envisioned a possible reaction by Italy to the ratification of the Franco-Soviet treaty in the French parliament and senate. Mussolini assured that Italy would neither react to this, although he was still hostile to this treaty, nor to a reaction from Germany to the same. H. Italy would not take part in any action by France and Great Britain against Germany.

Upcoming Reichstag election

In addition to the attention-grabbing Abyssinia conflict and the ratification of the Franco-Soviet assistance treaty, domestic political motives also played a role in the choice of the timing. Reichstag elections were to take place in Germany at the end of March, and Hitler hoped that the reoccupation would gain greater approval among the population.

Justification for the world public

The official reason given for the occupation was the ratification of the French-Soviet Assistance Pact, which the German government regards as a violation of the Locarno Treaties, since the powers in Locarno have committed themselves to peaceful policies against each other and the pact is clearly against Germany judge. As a result, Germany no longer sees itself bound by the obligations resulting from the Locarno Treaty.

The memorandum of the German Reich government , which was handed over to the ambassadors on March 7, 1936, contains the justification “ that the obligations that France (had) entered into in the new pact are not compatible with its obligations under the Rhine Pact (Locarno treaties) (would be). "There Hitler also proposed the" establishment of a system of European peacekeeping, "which would include the creation of a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France and Belgium for a period of 25 years, an air pact, which was to serve the security of Europe, non-aggression pacts with the states on the eastern border of Germany on the model of the nonaggression pact with Poland, and the re-entry of Germany into the League of Nations provided.

German troops march in on March 7, 1936

The action, called "Winter Exercise", was started on Hitler's orders, whereupon the Reich Minister of War Werner von Blomberg issued the provisional order on March 2 to march into the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. But it was not until March 4th that Hitler issued the definitive order and one day later the final date, March 7th, was set. This was one day before "Heroes' Remembrance Day " , ie the Sunday Reminiscere (fifth Sunday before Easter ) on March 8th, which Hitler chose as the historical background. The Reich Cabinet was only informed of the action by Hitler on March 6th.

On the morning of March 7th, three battalions of the Wehrmacht moved into the Rhineland and set up garrisons in Aachen , Trier and Saarbrücken . Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels , who went to the Rhineland especially for the occupation, describes in his diary entries " the great enthusiasm " with which the occupation was received by the population. At the same time, the ambassadors in Paris , London , Rome and Brussels received the declaration of the Reich government on the invasion of German troops, in which the step was justified. On the same day at 12:00 p.m. Hitler assembled the Reichstag and gave one of his typical peace speeches, in which he justified the occupation with the French ratification of the assistance treaty and expressed Germany's will for peace. He then dissolved the Reichstag in order to “give the German people the opportunity to solemnly approve the policy of restoring the national honor and sovereignty of the Reich [...], which was concluded today. "

French reaction

behavior

On the day of the occupation, France's first reaction was on the radio. The French government was amazed that the Locarno treaties would be broken by Germany. The next day, an official German statement was issued by the German News Office , the official, central press agency of the German Reich . On March 8, the French Council of Ministers demanded a sharp reaction and instructed the General Staffs to mobilize parts of the French army for military action. The desired demonstration of power failed, however, because of the reluctance of the military leadership, which did not want to risk a war with Germany. Foreign Minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin (1889-1958) showed no initiative worth mentioning. Since the provisions of the Locarno treaties were violated by Germany's actions, France believed that an alliance occurred. France should have been supported by England in an armed conflict against Germany. However, since London refused, France only turned to the League of Nations and reinforced its troops along the Maginot Line .

reasons

Parliamentary elections were scheduled for April 26 and May 3, 1936 in France. The government under Prime Minister Albert Sarraut was campaigning and was unsure whether the French people would support an armed conflict against Germany. In almost all socially significant groups, including the military, pacifist currents were predominant at the time . The left parties even demanded their own unilateral disarmament without corresponding consideration from the other side (Germany). The socialist Léon Blum , future Prime Minister of the Popular Front government (June 4, 1936 to June 29, 1937), took the view that the state would become inviolable and inviolable through its moral standing alone, and that he would thereby force other states to follow his example consequences. Since the construction of the heavily fortified Maginot Line, France's military strategy has been static and defensive and not designed for offensive operations. In the Wehrmacht, which was only just being established, there was no serious military threat to be seen in the foreseeable future - which it wasn't at the time.

UK response

behavior

The British government under Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin convened a meeting of the Signatories of Locarno in London on March 8 and a meeting of the League of Nations Council on March 14. One day after the occupation, Anthony Eden (British Foreign Secretary since late 1935) commented on the previous day's events in a memorandum. In it he wrote, among other things, that it was not about the facts themselves that were created by Hitler, but about "the manner in which they proceeded [...] which we regret" .

reasons

In view of Germany's armaments efforts, the British government decided in January 1936 to arm itself quickly and at the same time to reach an understanding with Germany through negotiations. As early as mid-February, Foreign Minister Eden reported in the cabinet that remilitarization of the Rhineland was to be expected anyway and that it would therefore be better for England and France to negotiate with Germany. So at least there is still a chance of getting something in return from Germany.

At the same time, the broader intentions of Hitler in the United Kingdom were largely ignored and glossed over against the background of widespread pacifism. There were about 50 anti-war organizations in Britain at the time. There was not a single public demonstration against the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but several so-called peace demonstrations ("peace" rallies), which were supposed to prevent the government from taking countermeasures.

Consequences for the balance of power in Europe

The occupation of the Rhineland led to the final collapse of the Stresa Front (see above) and the erosion of the provisions of the Locarno Treaties. Italy turned away from the system of collective security in Europe and moved closer to Germany. Britain was not ready to deal with problems in the center of Europe that it was not directly affected by and to support France here. For its part, France did not want to take action against Germany alone. The League of Nations failed in its deliberations on Germany's breach of treaty and also failed to come to a uniform position or decision on sanctions against Germany. So the League of Nations did not intervene in any way.

The reoccupation was a great success for the Nazi regime . A further revision of the Versailles treaty provisions was achieved, and the possibility now arose of militarily fortifying the border in the west and militarily securing the Ruhr area, which is so immensely important in terms of economics and arms policy . Domestically, too, the occupation of the Rhineland was a complete success. Hitler's reputation among the population was strengthened again, the disputes over the National Socialist church policy (see church struggle ) almost forgotten. With the clear improvement in Germany's position of power in Europe, the opportunities for France to independently put a stop to the emerging state in the east worsened. France's reputation in Europe had also suffered greatly from the failure to respond. The smaller states on the edge of Central Europe now reoriented themselves. In Poland , for example, pro-German political currents that wanted to move closer to Germany in terms of foreign policy gained influence. Although Britain condemned Germany’s behavior, the Empire’s policy during this period was almost neutral. By refusing to honor its alliance commitments and to provide France with military assistance, London clearly rejected the policy of collective security in Europe. Domestic and overseas interests were more important here than security on the continent, which contributed to the fact that Germany could arm itself unhindered and thus prepare for a major war in Europe.

The remilitarization of the demilitarized zone on the Rhine stand next to the reintroduction of compulsory military service on 16 March 1935 a further momentous violation of Hitler against the Treaty of Versailles. The reoccupation followed 1938, the annexation of Austria and the gradual annexation of Czechoslovakia , the first step - the annexation of the Sudetenland - was initially formally confirmed by the Munich Agreement .

Missed opportunity to stop Hitler

Goebbels and Hitler with Reichswehr Minister v. Blomberg , here on Memorial Day ("Heroes' Remembrance Day") February 25, 1934

With regard to the questions of how and at what point in time the German war machine under Hitler could have been stopped without great effort, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 was repeatedly viewed as a key historical event. On August 8, 1947, the French National Assembly ordered a parliamentary investigation into the events of 1933-1945. In its final report it was stated that an immediate counter-occupation was undoubtedly possible in 1936 because of the massive military superiority of France at the time. In the case of German resistance, it could even have been extended to other important centers in Germany.

The German side was fully aware of these possibilities for France. After 1945 several German generals who were involved at the time testified that in the event of French resistance to the Rhineland Action, Germany would not have been able to assert itself in any way. There were also orders to withdraw immediately behind the Rhine in the event of French resistance. In addition, the invading troops were ordered to be ready to march back within an hour. According to several witnesses, Hitler himself behaved extremely nervously immediately after the invasion and repeatedly considered reversing the occupation. According to a diary entry by Joseph Goebbels ( Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda ), one of these situations arose when Hitler was informed that the ambassadors of France and Great Britain had registered for visits after the invasion. Assuming that sharp countermeasures were now being announced, Hitler developed a readiness to command the invading troops back even before the ambassador was received. However, he no longer needed to address his willingness to the ambassadors, as they had only come to protest against the unilateral breach of the Locarno Treaty.

Czech President Milos Zeman said at a Holocaust conference in Prague in January 2015: If France and England had intervened militarily against the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the Holocaust would never have occurred.

literature

  • Wilhelm Deist : Army Armament and Aggression 1936–1939 . In: Klaus Hildebrand , Ferdinand Werner (ed.): Germany and France 1936–1939 . Munich 1981, pp. 129–152.
  • James Thomas Emmerson: The Rhineland Crisis, 7 March 1936: a study in multilateral diplomacy , Iowa State University Press in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science , 1977, 383 pp. ISBN 0-8138-1865-6 .
  • Helmut-Dieter Giro: The Remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. Hitler's Way to War? Klartext, Göttingen 2006, ISBN 978-3-89861-557-0 . (Unabridged version as PDF )
  • Eva Haraszti : The invaders: Hitler occupies the Rhineland . Translation from Hungarian by Zsófia László and Brian McLean. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983
  • Michael Müller: France and the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The reaction of diplomats, politicians and the military . In: Geschichte im Westen 1 (1986), pp. 14-30.
  • Esmonde M. Robertson: For the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Documentation . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 10 (2), 1962, pp. 178–205 ( PDF ).
  • Esmonde M. Robertson: Hitler and the sanctions of the League of Nations - Mussolini and the occupation of the Rhineland . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 26 (1978), pp. 237–264 ( PDF ).
  • Rainer F. Schmidt : The foreign policy of the Third Reich 1933-1939 . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-608-94047-2 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Paul-Otto Schmidt : Extra on the diplomatic stage 1923–1945. Experiences of the chief interpreter in the Foreign Office with the statesmen of Europe. From Stresemann and Briand to Hitler, Chamberlain and Molotov. Athenäum, Bonn 1949. New edition: EVA, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-434-50591-1 , p. 320 (after 10th edition 1964).
  2. ^ Peace Treaty of Versailles , June 28, 1919, Article 42, taken from: Helmuth Stoecker (Ed.): Handbook of Treaties 1871–1964. Treaties and other documents from the history of international relations . Berlin 1968, p. 192.
  3. ^ Peace Treaty of Versailles , June 28, 1919, Articles 42 to 44, taken from: Helmuth Stoecker (Ed.): Handbook of Treaties 1871–1964. Treaties and other documents from the history of international relations . Berlin 1968, p. 192.
  4. ^ Law on the Locarno Treaties and Germany's entry into the League of Nations , in: documentArchiv.de (Ed.), As of March 19, 2008.
  5. ^ Wilhelm Deist : Army Armament and Aggression 1936-1939 . In: Klaus Hildebrand and Ferdinand Werner (eds.): Germany and France 1936–1939 , Munich 1981, p. 132.
  6. ↑ Klaus-Jürgen Müller : General Ludwig Beck, studies and documents on the political-military world of ideas and activities of the Chief of Staff of the German Army 1933-1938 . Boppard am Rhein 1980, p. 434 f.
  7. ↑ Aristotle A. Kallis: Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945 . Routledge, London 2000, pp. 78-83.
  8. ↑ Aristotle A. Kallis: Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945 . Routledge, London 2000, p. 82.
  9. ↑ Aristotle A. Kallis: Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945 . Routledge, London 2000, p. 83.
  10. ↑ Hans-Adolf Jacobsen , Werner Jochmann (Ed.): Selected documents on the history of National Socialism 1933-1945 , Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1961, Document 14.II.-5.III.1936: From the records of the German ambassador in Rome Ulrich von Hassell, and p. 88.
  11. ^ Document No. 5, Hassell's report on the conversation with Mussolini on February 22, 1936 in Rome , taken from: Esmonde M. Robertson: Hitler and the Sanctions of the League of Nations - Mussolini and the occupation of the Rhineland . in: Karl D. Bracher, Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.): Quarterly books for contemporary history , 26th year, Stuttgart 1978, p. 198.
  12. ↑ The German government justified the invasion of German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland in the “Memorandum of the Reich Government” , which was handed over to the ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome and Brussels on March 7, 1936. The memorandum can be found in the files on German foreign policy (ADAP), Series C, the Third Reich. The First Years, Volume 5, p. 123.
  13. ↑ Files on German Foreign Policy (ADAP), p. 14.
  14. ^ Esmonde M. Robertson: For the reoccupation of the Rhineland 1936. Documentation . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 10 (2), 1962, pp. 178–205, pp. 204f.
  15. ↑ Quotation taken from: Rainer F. Schmidt: The foreign policy of the Third Reich 1933–1939 . Stuttgart 2002, p. 198.
  16. ^ Quotation taken from: Max Domarus: Hitler. Speeches and proclamations. 1932-1945 . Commented on by a German contemporary. Part 1 triumph. Second volume 1935–1938, 4th edition, Loenber 1988; The speech can be found on pages 582 ff.
  17. ↑ Vincent Adoumié: Histoire de France: De la république à l'État français 1918–1944 , Hachette Éducation 2005, 256 pp. ISBN 2-01-181885-0 .
  18. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland , Diss., Univ. Düsseldorf, 2005, pp. 159-183, especially p. 174.
  19. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro, p. 46ff 1.5 The defensive attitude of the French military
  20. ^ The attitude of London to the German memorandum of March 7, 1936 was dealt with in a memorandum of Eden on March 8, 1936. Quoted in Friedrich Kießling (ed.): Sources on German foreign policy 1933–1939 . 1st edition, Darmstadt 2000, ISBN 978-3-534-08026-7 , pp. 126-128, quotation p. 128.
  21. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland , Diss., Univ. Düsseldorf, 2005, p. 306.
  22. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland , Diss., Univ. Düsseldorf, 2005, pp. 305-322.
  23. ↑ James Thomas Emmerson: The Rhineland Crisis, 7 March 1936: a study in multilateral diplomacy , Iowa State University Press in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science , 1977, 383 pp. ISBN 0-8138-1865-6 , p 144.
  24. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: The Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936: Hitler's Way to War? Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte and the history of North Rhine-Westphalia, Volume 76, Verlag Klartext 2006, p. 84, ISBN 978-3-89861-557-0 .
  25. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: The Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936: Hitler's Way to War? Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte and the history of North Rhine-Westphalia, Volume 76, Verlag Klartext 2006, pp. 76f, ISBN 978-3-89861-557-0 .
  26. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: The Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936: Hitler's Way to War? Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte and the history of North Rhine-Westphalia, Volume 76, Verlag Klartext 2006, p. 80, ISBN 978-3-89861-557-0 .
  27. ↑ James Thomas Emmerson: The Rhineland Crisis, 7 March 1936: a study in multilateral diplomacy , Iowa State University Press in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science , 1977, 383 pp. ISBN 0-8138-1865-6 , p 98.
  28. ↑ Helmut-Dieter Giro: The Remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936: Hitler's Way to War? Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte and the history of North Rhine-Westphalia, Volume 76, Verlag Klartext 2006, p. 82, ISBN 978-3-89861-557-0 .
  29. ^ Hermann Graml : Hitler and England. An essay on National Socialist foreign policy 1920 to 1940. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, p. 86. ISBN 978-3-486-59145-3 .
  30. ↑ FAZ No. 23, January 28, 2015, p. 2.