Battle for Elmina 1625

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Historical view of Elmina 1668

The Battle of Elmina on October 25, 1625 was a military conflict during the Dutch-Portuguese War , in which it was about control of the Portuguese fortress of São Jorge da Mina ( Elmina Castle in what is now Ghana ). The battle ended in a catastrophic defeat for the Dutch . The fortress that ruled or protected the city of Elmina was the most important on the Portuguese Gold Coast .

prehistory

The Battle of Elmina in 1625 was the fifth attempt by the Netherlands (the then Republic of the Seven United Provinces ) to conquer the strongest European fortress in West Africa from the Portuguese , thus finally breaking their supremacy on the West African Gold Coast and the Spanish colonies in America from cut off the supply of slaves , most of which ran through Elmina. Immediately after the Dutch West India Company took control of the nearby Dutch Fort Nassau in 1623, preparations began under the command of Arent Janzs van Amersfort for an attack on the city and fortress of Elmina in the form of a diplomatic offensive to recruit local allies for the attack . He was able to win the kingdom of Sabu, on whose territory Fort Nassau lay, the empire of the Fanti and also the ruler of the distant Accra .

In autumn 1625 a fleet of 15 ships under the command of Jan Dircksz Lam and Andries Veron with about 1200 soldiers and sailors from the Dutch West India Company reached the coast off Elmina. The attempt of the two commanders to inform van Amersfort about the arrival of the fleet failed because van Amersfort was in Accra at the time. Lam therefore decided to venture the attack on Elmina in disregard of the system of native allies that van Amersfort had forged, based on the firepower of his cannons and more than 1000 Dutch soldiers. They used the Kommenda area as a deployment area and warned its rulers to side with the Portuguese. It was only immediately before the attack that van Amersfort joined the fleet with a small contingent of Dutch soldiers and around 150 local warriors from Sabu, but this did not change the plan of the attack.

On the Portuguese side there was the Portuguese garrison of the fortress with 56 men under Governor Fernando de Sottomayor , reinforced by African allies. However, Sottomayor was informed of the arrival of the fleet through his network of local trading partners and, through gifts that comprised almost the entire inventory of goods in the fortress, achieved that the ruler of Kommenda, insulted by the actions of the Dutch, committed himself to neutrality and the ruler of Fetu pledged support with food in the event of a siege of the fortress. He also secured the support of the warriors of the city of Elmina, pointing out good relationships he had so far and a promise to pay a substantial amount for each head of a Dutchman that was cut off and brought to him.

Course of the battle

The Dutch landed 15 kilometers away from Elmina in Kommenda with more than 1,000 soldiers and sailors as well as 150 Sabu warriors, who wore orange pieces of fabric on their arms to distinguish them from opposing fighters, and marched along the coast towards the city. The troops, exhausted and unaccustomed to the tropical heat, reached the hills around the city seemingly unnoticed at dusk and camped there to begin the attack the following morning. After an agreed cannon shot from the fortress, however, 200 fighters from Elmina who were hidden there and armed with machetes stormed down from the hills. The skilled fighters survived a first volley from the weapons of the Dutch by throwing themselves on the ground. In the time it took the Dutch to reload their weapons, the warriors from Elmina had already reached them. Panic broke out and by nightfall the Dutch had lost 375 soldiers, including Admiral van Veron, 66 sailors and several fighters from Sabu. Van Amersfort was badly wounded but was rescued by his allies from Sabu to Kommenda. Other warriors from Sabu, at the sight of the apparently total defeat, threw away their orange ribbons and mingled with the men from Elmina. According to eyewitness reports, the losses would have been even greater if the fighters from Elmina had not stopped to rob and behead dead and captured Dutch people. According to the official records of Commander Lam, the Elminaers forced Dutch captives to undress before beheading them in order to protect the precious European fabrics. This time-consuming procedure probably saved the lives of many fleeing Dutch people. The Portuguese, on the other hand, had only 27 deaths and captured 15 flags, just as many drums and more than 1,000 muskets , pikes and pistols .

A bombardment of the fortress from the ship's cannons the next day did little damage to its strong walls. Still, the Dutch planned another attack, this time with local support. In the following days, the wounded Van Amersfoort sought troops from the ruler of Kommenda, of whose support he hastily informed the survivors of the two fleet commanders. On November 4, 1625, the Dutch fleet began bombing the city of Elmina. Warriors from Kommenda should ambush the fleeing Elminaern and put them down. However, the ruler of Kommenda felt bound by his neutrality agreement with the Portuguese and did not send any warriors to Elmina. When Amersfoort even met a Portuguese envoy at the court of the ruler of Fetu, it was clear that all the surrounding native empires had allied themselves with the Portuguese. He announced this to the fleet commander and on November 29, 1625, the Dutch fleet left the Gold Coast with the survivors of the battle.

The fifth attempt by the Dutch to take the strategically important fortress (1596, 1603, 1606 and 1615) failed. It was not until 1637 that they succeeded in taking the city.

See also

swell

  1. ↑ Then, Seaton, p.34
  2. ↑ Rodriguez, p.236
  3. ↑ Meuwese, Marc: Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: 289. Leiden, Boston 2012, ISBN 9789004210837
  4. ↑ Meuwese, Marc: Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: 291. Leiden, Boston 2012, ISBN 9789004210837
  5. ↑ Glete, Jan Warfare at sea, 1500-1650: maritime conflicts and the transformation of Europe (2000)
  6. ↑ Boxer, p.86
  7. ↑ Meuwese, Marc: Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: 292. Leiden, Boston 2012, ISBN 9789004210837
  8. ↑ Meuwese, Marc: Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: 293-294. Leiden, Boston 2012, ISBN 9789004210837
  9. ↑ Meuwese, Marc: Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: 295-296. Leiden, Boston 2012, ISBN 9789004210837

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