Schlattmann program

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The Schlattmann program was a state investment compulsion vis-à-vis the private sector in the steel industry at the time of National Socialism . It was exercised in 1935 by Reich Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht , and served both to relieve the deficit in Germany's foreign trade balance and to arm itself.

Origin and content

Foreign exchange control and import restrictions as a result of structural balance of payments problems

Since the currency stabilization of 1924 Germany suffered from balance of payments problems . Because of the overvaluation of the Reichsmark and the restrictive customs policy of important trading partners, the German export industry did not earn enough foreign currency to be able to pay for the necessary raw material and agricultural imports . The German balance of payments was balanced by capital imports from abroad. This injection of capital dried up when the world economy slipped into a deep crisis in 1931 . As a result of insurance and banking failures , the foreign creditors withdrew their funds on such a large scale that the Reichsbank lost a considerable part of its foreign exchange reserves. The insolvency of the internationally heavily indebted German Reich had been a real danger since 1931. The Berlin Central Bank countered it in 1931 with capital controls . In order to permanently relieve the balance of payments and to replace imports with German products, Reich Economics Minister Alfred Hugenberg embarked on an increasing course of self-sufficiency in the spring of 1933 . His officials initially concentrated on the agricultural sector , but the steel industry soon came into their sights. In 1934 the German raw material and foreign exchange crisis intensified: job creation and armament ensured growing investments and an upturn in the domestic economy , but export demand - and with it the foreign exchange income - remained inadequate. In order to be able to import at least the most important goods, Hugenberg's successor, Hjalmar Schacht, introduced a complete foreign exchange control system and import restrictions according to state-defined urgency levels in mid-1934 .

The control measures of competing Nazi authorities in the steel sector

To distribute foreign currency and control the use of raw materials in the iron sector, a monitoring center for iron and steel was set up on August 13, 1934 in the Reich Ministry of Economics (RWM). Rudolph Scheer-Hennings took over. The agency actually allocated its blast furnace Möller to the smelting works by allocating foreign exchange for imported ores . In addition to the Reich authorities actually responsible, the NSDAP now also positioned itself : On November 13, 1934, Adolf Hitler gave his economic representative Wilhelm Keppler the "Order for German Raw Materials". It also focused on heavy industry , which obtained 70% of its iron ore from abroad. This dependency on imports not only cost foreign currency, but also harbored military risks: In the event of war, it was to be expected that the enemy would cut off the ore supply and bring German armaments to its knees. In order to prevent this, Keppler had to look for ways in which foreign imports could be replaced by domestic raw materials. This gave rise to a major cost problem for the steel industry, since the mining and extraction of domestic ores, which are chemically and physically very problematic, made steel production much more expensive. From Keppler's arms industry perspective, cost considerations played no role. In 1935 he urged the reluctant Ruhr industry to push ahead with the smelting of German iron ore. He came into conflict with Schacht and the head of the mining department at RWM, Heinrich Schlattmann . The RWM also called for more domestic ore smelting, but within narrower limits than Keppler and Pleiger. In the opinion of the RWM, these were located where excessive pig iron costs endangered the competitiveness of the German export industry. Schlattmann always emphasized that Germany's “freedom of defense” had to be supported by adequate ore mining, but this could only be done to the extent that it was economically justifiable and sustainable.

The Schlattmann program as a reaction to foreign trade problems

In August 1935, France terminated the existing trade agreement with Germany. Suddenly a gap opened up in Schacht's system of bilateral foreign trade relations, which meant that imports of French iron ore were at risk. The Saarland steel industry in particular was dependent on a smooth supply of minette . On August 7, 1935, Schlattmann informed the German iron and steel works that the RWM wanted to work out a program for a significant increase in domestic ore mining and asked the addressees to make appropriate suggestions. The representatives of the steel industry agreed on August 13, 1935 to submit a joint plan to the RWM, which provided for a significant increase in domestic ore extraction. It was of the opinion that "the industry cannot raise all of the money to be invested and must therefore be supported by the Reich." In mid-August 1935, the plans were discussed at a meeting of the Ruhrwerke in Berlin and then summarized in a memorandum. which the industrialist Hermann Wenzel personally handed in at the RWM in mid-September. In their memorandum of September 10, 1935, Ruhrwerke calculated the costs that would arise at their mine and smelter sites if they increased iron ore production in their area of ​​responsibility by 4.3 million t by the end of 1936 and smelt these additional quantities would: These were one-off investment costs of 40.5 million RM and a permanent increase in production costs of 19 million RM per year. The plants refused to bear this burden themselves and demanded that it be clarified by negotiation as to who should finance these investments and reimburse them financially for the “proven long-term burden”. A member of the Mannesmann AG board of directors complained about the subsequent negotiations with the Reich that “some of them have assumed a very sharp character. The reluctant or even negative attitude of the blast furnace people towards the demand to use German ores in considerable quantities is noted very badly and has given rise to the threat that sharp measures must be taken to solve the problem of German ores. " In November 1935, the RWM presented the Ruhrwerke with its own ore program, which accepted their proposal of September 10, but formulated around 40% higher funding targets. At the beginning of December 1935, Schlattmann and the Ruhr industrialists agreed on a two-stage plan that provided for the additional extraction of 5.8 million t of domestic ore with an iron content of 1.7 million t from the Ruhrwerke's area of ​​responsibility. The latter had not only made concessions on quantities, but also abandoned their demands for state payments. On January 24, 1936, the so-called Schlattmann program came into effect.

Schacht's stage win

The Schlattmann program was a stage victory for Schacht, who wanted to ensure the global economic integration of Germany. The more radical plans of Keppler, determined exclusively by armament considerations, could not prevail. The latter's office had even involuntarily contributed to its own defeat by covering the Ruhr industry with much more far-reaching demands and thereby misjudging its tone. Keppler's employee Paul Pleiger accused the steel industrialists of “sabotage” and “meanness”. Under these circumstances, the Ruhr preferred, for tactical reasons, to avoid differences with the RWM and to come to an agreement quickly with Schacht and Schlattmann. However, Schacht's victory was only temporary. After the four-year plan was announced in autumn 1936, the Office for German Raw Materials , founded by Hermann Göring , took over the direction. In this party-related authority, headed by Fritz Löb , Pleiger held the main department for metals and energetically pushed ahead with the implementation of his plans from December 1936. Schacht and the RWM were left behind. At the end of 1937, Schacht resigned as Reich Economics Minister. Schlattmann followed him. Both had promoted the National Socialist armament since 1933, but did not completely lose sight of the realities of the business and the economy.

literature

  • Reichsbank: Annual reports 1924–1933 .
  • Carl Hermann Müller: Outline of foreign exchange management . Berlin, 1938.
  • Dietmar Petzina: Autarky Policy in the Third Reich. The National Socialist four-year plan . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt Stuttgart, 1968, ISBN 978-3-86764-653-6 .
  • Matthias Riedel: Iron and coal for the Third Reich. Paul Pleiger's position in the Nazi economy . Musterschmidt Göttingen, 1973, ISBN 978-3-7881-1672-9 .
  • Gerhard Mollin: Mining corporations and the Third Reich . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988, ISBN 3-525-35740-0 .
  • Rainer Haus: Lorraine and Salzgitter in the iron ore policy of German heavy industry from 1871–1940 . Salzgitter City Archives, 1991.
  • Wolf-Ingo Seidelmann: "Making iron for the fighting army!" Doggererz AG - a contribution by the Otto Wolff Group and the Saarland steel industry to the National Socialist autarky and armaments policy on the Baar in Baden. UVK Verlag Konstanz and Munich, 2016, ISBN 978-3-86764-653-6 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Reichsbank: Annual Reports 1924-1933 .
  2. ^ Rainer Haus: Lothringen and Salzgitter in the iron ore policy of German heavy industry from 1871–1940 . Archive of the City of Salzgitter, 1991, ISSN  0941-0864 , p. 125 .
  3. ↑ Wolf-Ingo Seidelmann: "Making iron for the fighting army!" Doggererz AG - a contribution by the Otto Wolff Group and the Saarland steel industry to the National Socialist autarky and armaments policy on the Baar in Baden . UVK Verlag Konstanz and Munich, 2016, ISBN 978-3-86764-653-6 , p. 30 .
  4. ↑ Wolf-Ingo Seidelmann: "Making iron for the fighting army!" P. 31 .
  5. ↑ So Schlattmann loud note of the steel industrialist Erich Tgahrt about his conversation with Schlattmann on 7 December 1935 Konzernarchiv Saarstahl AG, Völklingen, RESW FK 57/2526. Quoted from: Wolf-Ingo Seidel man: "iron provide for the fighting army!" S. 32 .
  6. ^ Minutes of the meeting at the Hotel Kaiserhof in Essen on August 13, 1935, ThyssenKrupp corporate archive, Duisburg A / 13271. Quoted from: Wolf-Ingo Seidel man: "iron provide for the fighting army!" S. 32 .
  7. ^ Ruhrwerke to the Reich Ministry of Economics of September 10, 1935, Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe 237/32713. The content of the memorandum is extensively discussed by Rainer Haus: Lothringen and Salzgitter in the iron ore policy of German heavy industry from 1871 to 1940 . S. 141 ff . and Matthias Riedel: Iron and Coal for the Third Reich. Paul Pleiger's position in the Nazi economy . Musterschmidt Göttingen, 1973, ISBN 978-3-7881-1672-9 , pp. 46 ff .
  8. ^ Minutes of the extended board meeting on October 14, 1935, Salzgitter AG corporate archive / Mannesmann archive, Mülheim / Ruhr. Quoted from: Wolf-Ingo Seidel man: "iron provide for the fighting army!" S. 32 .
  9. ^ So the note from the steel industrialist Erich Tgahrt about his conversation with Schlattmann, Hermann Kellermann, and others on December 7, 1935, Corporate Archives Saarstahl AG, Völklingen, RESW FK 57/2526. Quoted from: Wolf-Ingo Seidel man: "iron provide for the fighting army!" S. 35 .
  10. ↑ Exact funding specifications: State Office for Geology, Raw Materials and Mining, Freiburg, Fasz. 13A / 150. Printed in: Wolf-Ingo Seidelmann: »Making iron for the fighting army!« P. 439 .
  11. ↑ Wolf-Ingo Seidelmann: "Making iron for the fighting army!" P. 36 .