Sikorski-Maiski Agreement

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The Sikorski-Maiski Agreement was an international treaty between the Polish government- in- exile in London and the Soviet Union during the Second World War to fight the German Empire together . It was signed in London on July 30, 1941 by the Polish Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski and the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom Iwan Maiski in the presence of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden .

At the signing of the agreement, seated from left to right: Sikorski, Anthony Eden, Churchill, Maiski.

prehistory

The German Reich and the Soviet Union had on August 24, 1939 (dated August 23, 1939) the German-Soviet non-aggression pact : (name of non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics closed). The pact guaranteed the German Reich Soviet neutrality for the prepared attack on Poland and in the event of a possible entry into war by the Western powers . A secret additional protocol "in the event of a territorial-political reorganization" added most of Poland and Lithuania to the German sphere of interest , eastern Poland, but also Finland , Estonia , Latvia and Bessarabia to the Soviet sphere of influence. After the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, three Soviet armies occupied eastern Poland on September 17 . The Polish government fled on 17./18. September 1939 to neutral Romania , where she was interned. The Polish government in exile formed on September 30th tried to organize the resistance against the occupiers with fled troops. The last units of the Polish armed forces remaining in Poland surrendered on October 6, 1939. The Polish government-in-exile and the Soviet Union subsequently viewed each other as enemies, although there was no declaration of war .

contract

The situation changed after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. On June 22, 1941, Churchill pushed for a political settlement of the serious conflict that had existed between the Polish government-in-exile in London and the Soviet Union since the Soviet invasion of what was then eastern Poland in 1939. Foreign Minister Eden proposed to moderate negotiations on this between Sikorski and Maiski. Sikorski initially objected that for him as head of government an ambassador was not the right negotiating partner, but Eden prevailed. At the first meeting, Sikorski appeared in parade uniform and was visibly irritated that Maiski was wearing a light summer suit.

At the beginning of the negotiations, it was only undisputed that diplomatic relations would be resumed; Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had declared the Polish state to be non-existent in October 1939. At first, Sikorski insisted that the restoration of Poland's pre-war eastern border be included in the treaty, but Maiski blocked it at that point on Moscow's orders.

Sikorski demanded the immediate return of several hundred thousand deported Polish citizens from the depths of the Soviet Union, including around 200,000 captured officers and soldiers. Maiski claimed there were only 20,000, but Sikorski cited articles in the Soviet press in the fall of 1939 that mentioned 190,000 prisoners of war , including 10,000 officers. After consulting Moscow, Maiski promised an amnesty for her, and Polish armed forces were to be formed from her ranks on the territory of the USSR . Sikorski initially rejected an amnesty, as this required criminal acts; instead, the judgments against the Poles would have to be overturned as illegitimate. But he finally gave in on this point too. In the agreement, both sides finally agreed on the release of the Polish prisoners and deportees and on a joint fight against the German Reich.

Two weeks later, on August 14, 1941, a military agreement was signed in Moscow that regulated the framework for the establishment of a Polish army in the Soviet Union : Brigadier General Władysław Anders , imprisoned in Moscow , was to be headed, but under Soviet high command. The British should provide the equipment, they should bring it in from the Middle East. In addition, the Soviet Union declared that it recognized that the German-Soviet treaties "relating to territorial changes in Poland have ceased to be in force".

However, the two agreements led to the resignation of several ministers in the government-in-exile. They accused Sikorski of not having vigorously represented Polish interests because of the unresolved border issue. Placing the Polish military under Soviet command was also completely unacceptable, given the fact that the Red Army had stabbed the Poles in the back in September 1939 and the Soviet secret police, the NKVD , had established a reign of terror in eastern Poland. But Sikorski prevailed. For him, the return of hundreds of thousands of compatriots from Soviet captivity was a priority, and border and status issues he hoped to be able to settle later. As a result of the treaty, the majority of Polish citizens deported to the USSR were released.

effects

Ultimately, the Sikorski-Maiski Agreement was only an unsuccessful interlude between the German attack on Poland and the simultaneous Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September 1939 on the basis of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the renewed break in relations after the discovery of the Katyn massacre in March 1943.

Web links

Wikisource: Sikorski-Maiski Agreement  - Sources and full texts (Polish)

Footnotes

  1. ↑ katyncrime.pl: Events 1941–1942 ( Memento of the original of December 12, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , accessed on June 29, 2010. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.katyncrime.pl
  2. ↑ Ivan Majskij: Vospominanija sovetskogo diplomata. Moskva 1971, pp. 485-488.
  3. ↑ Witold Wasilewski: Ludobójstwo. Kłamstwo i walka o prawdę. Sprawa Katynia 1940-2014. Łomianki 2014, pp. 28–29.
  4. ↑ Evan McGilvory: A Military Government in Exile. The Polish Government-in-Exile 1939-1945. Solihull 2010, pp. 85-90.
  5. ↑ Sławomir Koper: Polskie pikiełko. Obrazy z życia elit emigracyjnych 1939-1945. Warszawa 2012, p. 308.
  6. ↑ Krzysztof Ruchniewicz : "Poland is not lost yet": the historical thinking of Poles . LIT Verlag Münster, 2007, ISBN 978-3-8258-0893-8 , p. 48 .