Lathen Transrapid accident

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The vehicle before the accident

The Lathen Transrapid accident was the world's most serious accident involving a monorail . On September 22, 2006, 23 people were killed and ten others were injured at the Emsland Transrapid test facility near Lathen .

Starting position

The Transrapid 08 was supposed to drive the test track with a group of visitors that morning. The facility was an attraction with around 1,000 visitors a day, a trip lasted ten minutes and cost 18 euros. All 31 passengers on this trip were relatives, guests or employees of the Transrapid operating company IABG and traveled free of charge: eleven employees and two apprentices from RWE , a supplier company of IABG, nine employees of the geriatric care service in Papenburg , a couple at the invitation of an employee of the operating company and some of their employees. Around nine o'clock the three train attendants and the visitors got on, one train attendant took a seat in front, two more drove in a measuring car at the end of the train, because every trip of the Transrapid was evaluated. The first tour of the day was always driven at 170 km / h instead of the possible 450 km / h. At 9:43 a.m., the train left the platform . As a safety measure, the Transrapid initially made a planned emergency braking, came to a stop and now waited for the final driver's license.

A workshop vehicle powered by a diesel engine and manned by two workers was located on the single-lane test route for the morning cleaning work and drove to pillar 120 of the route at about 9:30 a.m. after the work was completed. The switch leading to the parking facility was located here, and the workshop trolley waited here for permission from the control center to enter the parking facility. The crew inquired by radio when they were allowed to drive in, but received no answer from the control center.

At 9:52 a.m., the control center activated the power for the route. The control center was manned by two dispatchers , and security should essentially be guaranteed by the four-eyes principle . A dispatcher gave the driver of the Transrapid the driver's license by radio , whereupon he drove off. The acceleration of the vehicle was significant.

the accident

The workshop trolley of the test track (2001)

The dispatchers had both forgotten that the workshop vehicle was still on the route and had neglected to block the corresponding section of the route to the Transrapid, as was prescribed.

Exactly 57 seconds after departure, someone pressed the emergency brake at 9:53 a.m. , 25 meters afterwards the train hit the workshop vehicle at 162 km / h. The impact could be heard far. Why the driver had not seen the workshop vehicle on the track earlier on the completely straight stretch could not be clarified. The lightweight magnetic levitation train buried itself under the 60- ton workshop trolley and levered it up. In the process, the roof of the Transrapid at the head of the train was torn off and the vehicle was compressed under the workshop trolley. The train, wedged with the workshop trolley, came to a stop after about 300 meters.

consequences

23 people died and ten others were injured as a result of the impact, the workshop trolley and the front part of the magnetic levitation train were completely destroyed. The two workers in the workshop van survived injured because they were on the side of their vehicle facing away from the impact. At knock signals under their vehicle, which came from passengers who had survived in the front area of ​​the train, they unscrewed the floor panel of the vehicle and rescued three passengers. The two on-board technicians survived in the rear of the train.

The control center alerted the plant fire brigade and the first rescue workers arrived a quarter of an hour after the collision. When cutting up the wreck with cutting torches , three other survivors were found. A total of 200 rescuers were on duty and the work was completed around 10 p.m. The train involved in the accident was recovered between November 6th and 8th, and trial operation was suspended after the accident until July 2008.

The Osnabrück public prosecutor's office investigated the two dispatchers at the control center, two operations managers on the test track and two managing directors of the operating company for negligent homicide and negligent bodily harm . Ultimately, the cause was found to be human error . The public prosecutor's office relied primarily on reports from the Federal Railway Authority and the Technical University of Braunschweig . One of the avoidable causes was that the radio release for the Transrapid could not be overheard in the workshop vehicle because a different radio system was used, but above all the electronic lock for the Transrapid provided by the manufacturer was not used, which was caused by a route being occupied a workshop trolley could have been placed.

In May 2008, the Osnabrück regional court sentenced the two operations managers to fines of 24,000 and 20,000 euros, because the instructions for blocking routes were not sufficiently clearly defined in the operating rules. According to the public prosecutor's office, the dispatcher who had given the radio clearance for the Transrapid was primarily to blame for the accident, but the criminal proceedings against him were suspended because he was unable to stand trial because he was suicidal. The proceedings against the two dispatchers were later resumed and they were sentenced on June 3, 2011 to imprisonment of 18 months and one year each; the sentences were suspended on probation, the reasons given were the defendants' remorse, their mental illnesses and the risk of suicide. Both dispatchers were already retired at the time of the judgment, they waived, as did the public prosecutor's office, to appeal against the judgment, which made it immediately final.

literature

  • Andrea Niehaus: The "positive" shock. About the Transrapid accident in Lathen (Emsland) and its consequences. In: Unleashed forces - technology disasters and their consequences . In: Inklings yearbook for literature and aesthetics . Conference proceedings. Moers 2007, pp. 107-119.

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f g h Freia Peters and Ileana Grabitz : The protocol of a catastrophe . In: Die Welt , October 8, 2006.
  2. a b c Transrapid accident cleared up . In: Welt online, July 19, 2007
  3. a b Judgment after the Transrapid accident - probation for dispatchers . N-TV. March 3, 2011.
  4. ^ A b Transrapid accident: fines for managers . Daily mirror. May 23, 2008.
  5. ↑ Suspended sentences in the Transrapid trial . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, June 3, 2011.
  6. LG Osnabrück sentenced dispatchers in the second Transrapid proceedings to imprisonment . Beck Online. March 3, 2011.

Coordinates: 52 ° 52 '27.6 "  N , 7 ° 21' 4.8"  E