Accident escape (Germany)

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Damaged rear-view mirror on a parked car, the mirror cap is on the floor.

The escape from an accident (also known as a driver escape ) is a traffic offense in German criminal law , which is regulated in Section 142 of the Criminal Code (StGB) under the name Unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident .

Despite its placement in the midst of offenses against public order , the penal norm primarily aims to protect private property interests. To this end, it imposes various waiting and disclosure obligations on people involved in a traffic accident. This is to ensure that the victim of the accident receives the necessary information to assert claims for damages against the injured party. The standard therefore criminalizes certain behaviors that prevent relevant information about the course of a traffic accident from being obtained, such as moving away from the scene of the accident at an early stage.

The offense of § 142 StGB is particularly controversial in jurisprudence: On the one hand, its constituent elements are often criticized as inadequate and in some cases also as unconstitutional, on the other hand, the penal norm is in tension with the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination . Therefore, it has long been the subject of reform discussions. The current version of the standard has been in force since 1998.

The criminal significance of the accident escape is great: The number of proceedings initiated annually is around 250,000. The act can be sanctioned with a fine or with a prison sentence of up to three years.

Normalization

The offense of unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident is standardized in § 142 StGB and has been as follows since its last change on April 1, 1998:

(1) A party involved in an accident who leaves the scene of the accident after a road accident before he

1. has made it possible for the other parties involved in the accident and the injured party to ascertain his person, his vehicle and the nature of his involvement through his presence and by stating that he is involved in the accident or
2. has waited a reasonable time given the circumstances without anyone being ready to make the determinations,

is punished with imprisonment for up to three years or with a fine.

(2) According to paragraph 1, a person involved in an accident is also punished who

1. after the waiting period (para. 1 no. 2) or
2. entitled or excused

removed from the scene of the accident and does not allow the findings to be made immediately afterwards.

(3) The person involved in the accident is satisfied with the obligation to enable the determinations to be made retrospectively if he notifies the authorized person (para. 1 1) or a nearby police station that he was involved in the accident and if he gives his address and his place of residence as well as the license plate number and the location of his vehicle and keeps it available for immediate determination for a reasonable time. This does not apply if he deliberately thwarts the findings through his behavior.

(4) In the cases of paragraphs 1 and 2, the court shall mitigate the penalty ( Section 49 paragraph 1) or may waive the penalty under these provisions if the person involved in the accident is outside the flow of traffic within twenty-four hours of an accident, which is exclusively not results in significant property damage, voluntarily enables the determinations to be made retrospectively (para. 3).

(5) Anyone involved in the accident is anyone whose behavior, depending on the circumstances, may have contributed to the cause of the accident.

Due to the standard range of penalties of up to three years' imprisonment or a fine, unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident according to Section 12 (2) StGB is an offense . With this offense, the legislature aimed to protect the property of victims of accidents: the criminal liability of escaping from an accident is intended to ensure that victims can assert their claims against the damaging party. For this purpose, the perpetrator is subject to various obligations that serve to provide the injured party with the necessary information about the accident. In addition, some legal scholars see the purpose of the norm in preventing vigilante justice in traffic, for example by pursuing the fugitive offender.

History of origin

Forerunner of § 142 StGB

Even in the early days of the automobile, the problem arose that those involved in traffic accidents could quickly leave the scene without being identified. Therefore, some began emergency authorities in order, regulations should be enacted to oblige the parties to an accident to stop after the accident and to provide assistance.

In Germany, a first corresponding law was introduced on June 1, 1909. According to § 22 of the Law on Traffic with Motor Vehicles (KFG, a forerunner of the Road Traffic Act ), "the driver of a motor vehicle who, after an accident, attempts to evade detection of the vehicle and his person by escaping," was fined up to fined ten thousand Reichsmarks or imprisonment for up to two months. The perpetrator remained unpunished "if he reports to a local police authority on the next day after the accident at the latest and has the vehicle and his person identified."

With the ordinance amending the penal provisions on negligent homicide , bodily harm and escape in traffic accidents of April 2, 1940, Section 22 of the KFG was repealed and introduced as Section 139a in the Criminal Code, extending it to all road users. According to this, the “Führerflucht” was punished with imprisonment up to two years or a fine, in particularly serious cases with imprisonment from six months to five years or imprisonment from one year to fifteen years. According to State Secretary Roland Freisler , the purpose of the tightening of penalties was to combat the cowardice and recklessness that characterize fleeing from the scene of an accident. Therefore, despite its individual protective character, the paragraph was placed in the section on offenses against public order.

After the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, jurisprudence assumed that the standard was compatible with the Basic Law that came into force in May 1949 , so that it continued to apply it. With the Criminal Law Amendment Act of August 4, 1953, the numbering changed so that the norm can now be found under Section 142.

Striving for reform

The penal norm was controversial in jurisprudence from some points of view, in some cases they considered some voices to be unconstitutional: In particular, concerns were expressed about the fact that the norm might oblige the offender to self-incriminate, for example with regard to a drunk driving ( Section 316 StGB). This violates the rule of law in the form of the prohibition of the obligation to incriminate oneself (nemo tenetur principle). In 1963, however, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutional conformity of the offense of the accident escape, as the securing of the claims of the victim of the accident as intended by § 142 StGB outweighs the right of the perpetrator to protection from self-incrimination. In addition, it is not necessary for the authorities to take evidence at the scene of the accident, rather it is sufficient if the party involved in the accident grants the injured party alone the opportunity to take evidence.

Nevertheless, the reform of the facts was regularly discussed in jurisprudence. On April 1, 1970, the prison and penitentiary were replaced by the unified custodial sentence . On January 1, 1975, the legislature made minor linguistic changes to the standard. On June 21, 1975, the particularly serious cases were abolished and the maximum sentence was set at three years' imprisonment. However, these amendments did not change the essential content of Section 142 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, even after these changes, some considered the constitutional conformity of the offense to be doubtful and accused him of violating the criminal law requirement of certainty or the principle of guilt .

In the following years it was discussed whether the penalties of the norm should be adhered to, or whether they should be reduced or increased. In addition, the introduction of active repentance as a means of mitigating punishment and of cancellation was controversial . After several drafts, such a proposal was included in the drafting of the sixth criminal law reform act on the initiative of the State of Rhineland-Palatinate . On April 1, 1998, the Reform Act came into force and added a paragraph to Section 142 of the Criminal Code, which gave the perpetrator the opportunity to obtain impunity or at least a mitigation of punishment after completing the offense through behavior that is in the interests of the victim of the accident. However, this change in the law was also criticized in jurisprudence: The numerous prerequisites for the cancellation of the sentence, which went far beyond repentance regulations in other offenses, were criticized. Therefore, jurisprudence is still extremely critical of the facts. It is currently discussing, for example, the expansion of the regulation on active repentance and the introduction of a criminal complaint requirement .

Objective fact

Factual situation

Road traffic accident

The offense requires an accident that occurred in road traffic. An accident is a sudden event that is unintentionally caused by at least one person involved. Road traffic includes the entire traffic area that is open to an indefinite group of people. These include public and private roads as well as cycle and footpaths, but also petrol stations and parking garages. It is irrelevant whether the traffic is flowing or not. According to the prevailing opinion, the offense also includes accidents in which only pedestrians are involved, since the need to preserve evidence also exists in such collisions and is similarly endangered by fleeing from the scene of the accident. However, due to the term road traffic , events in rail, air and shipping traffic as well as those on the parking deck of a ferry are not relevant .

Realization of a typical traffic risk

It is also necessary that the accident is causally related to the dangers of road traffic, i.e. it represents the realization of a typical traffic risk. Such a hazard relationship exists in particular in the event of collisions between road users. However, there is still a sufficient connection if a driver loads a truck parked in public traffic and damages another vehicle in the process. It is controversial in jurisprudence whether there is a sufficient connection with shopping carts that roll away in the parking lot of a supermarket due to carelessness and damage other vehicles. Against the assumption of a road traffic accident, it is argued that this collision is not related to the accident potential of a motor vehicle. Proponents argue that even with public parking spaces there is a risk of the perpetrator fleeing quickly, so that the injured party cannot effectively pursue his claims.

It is controversial in jurisprudence whether a road traffic accident also exists if the damaging event is caused intentionally by one of the parties involved . The jurisprudence affirms this if the accident was caused unintentionally by at least one other person involved and it acts like the realization of a typical traffic risk. According to this, for example, there is also a road traffic accident if the perpetrator is rammed by a police car during a chase with the police. Deliberate causation of an accident leads to the exclusion of criminal liability according to § 142 StGB, if all those involved consciously cause the accident or one involved causes it deliberately , since the accident is then not the result of a typical road traffic hazard, but exclusively of criminal planning. It is therefore not an accident if a passenger grabs garbage cans on the edge of the road and hurls them against other vehicles. The same applies if someone throws bottles from a moving truck at other vehicles.

Damage as a result of the accident

The accident must have resulted in not inconsiderable personal injury or property damage. Personal injury is insignificant if it only marginally affects the physical integrity of the accident victim, for example because it is only light skin abrasions or contamination from puddle splashes. In the case of property damage, irrelevance is given if it is a question of damage for which typically no claim for damages is asserted. In legal practice, upper limits between € 25 and € 50 are used as a guide. In some cases, an amount of € 150 is considered sufficient, since claims for damages are typically only asserted in court in this order of magnitude. In the case of lower amounts of damage, there is no need to preserve evidence that Section 142 of the Criminal Code could protect.

The offense is not fulfilled if only the perpetrator suffers damage, since in this case no other person has a need to preserve evidence. This is also the case if the perpetrator has an accident with a vehicle that he has acquired under retention of title : Legally, ownership does not lie with the driver of the accident, but with the seller, but economically speaking, the perpetrator damages himself. If it is the damaged vehicle of the driver involved in the accident for a leased vehicle, there is mere self-harm if the leasing contract also makes the lessee liable for coincidence, as the lessor does not have to fear that his claims will be enforced due to this comprehensive liability obligation.

Party involved in the accident

Only one party involved in the accident can be a perpetrator as defined by the standard. Because of this limitation of the group of perpetrators, Section 142 of the Criminal Code is a special offense, which, according to Section 28 (1) of the Criminal Code, affects the criminal liability of those involved .

According to Section 142 (5) of the Criminal Code, whoever may have contributed to the cause of the accident according to the circumstances of the individual case is involved in the accident. Such a contribution exists if one's own actions were causal for the onset of success, are related to road traffic and are directly related to its risks. The type and scope of the participation are irrelevant. It is therefore not necessary that the person concerned violated traffic regulations or acted culpably.

In order to protect the injured party as much as possible, Paragraph 5 does not require that the conditions for contributing to the cause of the accident are actually met. Rather, it is already sufficient that participation in the accident can be assumed under the circumstances. Since this requirement is extremely vague and criminal liability for escaping the accident is also possible if it later turns out that the perpetrator did not contribute to the accident, the provision in science and practice is interpreted restrictively to the effect that a concrete suspicion of the actual involvement in the accident is necessary is.

The element of the offense does not require that the perpetrator is the driver of the vehicle. Therefore, a co-driver can also commit an offense under Section 142 of the Criminal Code. This assumes that he is present at the time of the accident and can contribute to the cause of the accident, for example by distracting or hindering the driver. The same can apply if a vehicle owner leaves his vehicle to a person who is obviously unfit to drive .

Acts

The standard contains four acts, which are divided into paragraphs 1 and 2. These paragraphs are related to each other: only if the perpetrator has not made himself an offense according to paragraph 1, a criminal liability according to paragraph 2 comes into consideration. The subject of the four acts is the disregard of a certain duty. Paragraph 1 has the obligation to enable determinations at the scene of the accident. Paragraph 2 obliges to enable determinations after leaving the scene of the accident.

Paragraph 1: Move away

Paragraph 1 contains two acts, both of which have as their object removal from the scene of the accident. Which is relevant depends on whether people are present at the crime scene who are willing to make determinations in favor of the injured party.

The scene of the accident is the place where the road traffic accident occurred. In addition to the immediate location of the event, it also includes the area within which participants can still be expected to stay based on the circumstances of the individual case. The assessment of whether a location is still part of the scene of the accident depends on the specific factual situation. The perpetrator moves away from the scene of the accident by creating a spatial distance to it that precludes the perpetrator from fulfilling his duty to tolerate findings. This is the case when it is no longer apparent from the outside that the perpetrator was involved in the accident. There is also a removal if the perpetrator is so far away from the scene of the accident that it is unlikely that persons willing to make the determination will contact the perpetrator to make the determinations.

There is no factual removal if the person involved in the accident is taken away from the scene of the accident without their own will, for example when being admitted to a hospital or when the police are taken away to take a blood sample . In addition, in the absence of physical distance from the events, there is no removal if the perpetrator is hiding in a poorly visible place at the immediate scene of the accident.

Number 1: Despite the presence of people who are ready to be determined

This alternative course of action is implemented when the perpetrator moves away from the scene of the accident, although there are people who are ready to be identified. From this alternative, the party involved in the accident is obliged to remain at the scene of the accident after an accident and to tolerate such determinations that are necessary to secure the claims of the injured party. However, if there are no claims for compensation from the outset, for example because the driver of the accident vehicle is the only injured party, the obligation to wait does not apply.

Since there is no obligation to incriminate oneself in criminal law, the perpetrator is generally only obliged to provide information about the accident when asked by the person making the decision. In particular, he is therefore under no obligation to burden himself without asking or to point out damage to third-party goods. However, the perpetrator has to identify himself as a party involved in the accident to others.

The determinations can be made by the police as well as by other persons who are willing to do so. Section 142 of the Criminal Code names the person of the perpetrator, the vehicle involved in the accident and the type of involvement in the accident as information that is typically the subject of the determination .

As soon as the person involved in the accident has given all the information requested, his or her obligation to be present expires, so that he can move away from the scene of the accident. Furthermore, this obligation does not apply to the fact that the other parties involved expressly or through conclusive action waive the determination of further information. It is also possible to presumably not be present at the scene of the accident. This comes into consideration in cases in which the claims of the injured party are not endangered. Such a case is, for example, damage to a relative. A declared waiver of determinations is, however, irrelevant if it is brought about by violence or threat. If the perpetrator obtained consent by deceiving, for example by providing false personal details, the prevailing view is that there is no effective waiver either. The same applies if the waiver does not recognize the scope of his decision.

Number 2: After a reasonable waiting period

If a person who is ready to make a determination is not present at the scene of the accident, the perpetrator is obliged to wait there for such a person to arrive so that he can make the necessary determinations in favor of the absent victim. The duration of the waiting obligation is not standardized by law, so that it is determined by the courts in individual cases. Decisive for this are the circumstances of the accident, such as the place and time, the weather conditions and the amount of damage caused. The waiting periods are usually between 15 minutes in the case of an accident with minor property damage and up to more than two hours in the case of an accident with injuries. Waiting times can be shortened if the perpetrator takes measures at the scene of the accident that make it easier for the injured party to provide evidence later, such as leaving a slip of paper on the victim's car or notifying the police. However, such measures do not generally lead to the exclusion of the obligation to wait.

If people who are ready to be determined arrive at the scene of the accident while waiting, the perpetrator is obliged to tolerate the necessary determinations in accordance with Section 142, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Criminal Code. If someone involved in the accident leaves the scene of the accident after the waiting period has expired, his obligations to take action to settle the claim do not end here. In this case, the legislature rather requires that the person involved in the accident report to the authorized person or a nearby police station and provide the necessary information. In addition, he must announce his own whereabouts and the parking location of his vehicle and be ready for further information.

Paragraphs 2 and 3: No subsequent determinations possible

According to paragraph 2, anyone who leaves the scene of the accident in a manner that does not meet the requirements of paragraph 1 is liable to prosecution. Paragraph 2 names several cases in this regard, divided into two numbers: Removal after a reasonable waiting period has expired (number 1) and justified or excused removal (number 2). In such cases, the perpetrator is obliged to make the necessary determinations immediately. Since the criminal charge here is an omission, paragraph 2 is an omission offense .

A justified removal exists if the act of the perpetrator is covered by a justification . For example, a justifying emergency and a justifying conflict of duties come into consideration . For example, if the perpetrator rescues a person who has had an accident by taking them to a hospital, he is exercising an emergency law and thereby avoiding his own criminal liability for failure to provide assistance . Conflicting obligations can also result from road traffic regulations. Likewise justified, the perpetrator moves away when he flees from the threatening aggression of an assembled crowd.

A case of excused removal is when the offender acts innocently on the basis of a criminal excuse . Section 20 of the Criminal Code , for example, can be considered as such . This norm orders the culprit to be innocent if he is in a state that excludes guilt . This can be the case, for example, in a state of shock, but total drunkenness can also be considered. However, it is sometimes disputed that the latter can lead to an excused removal. According to this view, paragraph 2 only covers cases in which the perpetrator moves away in an entirely non-criminal manner. Anyone who leaves the scene of the crime due to a state of intoxication, on the other hand, is liable to prosecution, as he / she fulfills the offense of Section 323a of the Criminal Code ( full intoxication ) in the event of intoxication-related incapacity . The objection to this view is that Section 142 (2) of the Criminal Code focuses solely on the existence of innocence, without going into its possible causes.

For a long period of time, case law equated justified and excused removal with unintentional removal. According to this opinion, the perpetrator could also commit a criminal offense under Section 142 (2) of the Criminal Code in which he only became aware of the accident after leaving the scene of the accident and then failed to make any determinations possible. The courts based this on the fact that the terms in Section 142 (2) number 2 - justified or excused - described behavior that the offender could not be criminally accused of. This also applies to unintentional removal, since negligent escape from an accident is not punishable. In jurisprudence, this line of argument has often been criticized as a forbidden analogy and thus unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court agreed with the decision of March 19, 2007, so that it declared this interpretation to be unconstitutional because of a violation of the legal certainty requirement set out in Article 103, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law .

The scope of the offender's obligation to catch up is specified in more detail in Section 142 (3) sentence 1 of the Criminal Code. This paragraph states that the perpetrator must declare as minimum requirements that he was involved in the accident and that he provides his address, whereabouts, license plate number and the location of his vehicle. In addition, he must be ready for further determinations. Possible addressees of the declaration are the injured party and police stations near the scene of the accident. According to Section 142, Paragraph 3, Clause 2 of the Criminal Code , the perpetrator is prohibited from thwarting efforts to establish a finding.

Perpetration and participation

Since Section 142 of the Criminal Code is a special offense, only the party involved in the accident can be the perpetrator. The criminal liability of persons who are not perpetrators is therefore only possible through participation , i.e. inciting and aiding and abetting . However, both forms of participation require that there is a person who has unlawfully committed the offense of Section 142 of the Criminal Code as a perpetrator. This is missing, for example, if someone causes an accident without noticing it, because Section 142 of the Criminal Code requires the perpetrator to know about the accident. If a co-driver notices the accident and urges the person who caused the accident to leave the scene of the accident, he is not liable to prosecution for inciting to flee the accident because there is a lack of a main offense that could be incited. Supporting the perpetrator after fleeing from the scene of the crime, for example through unjustified concealment of his or her identity, can prevent punishment ( Section 258 of the Criminal Code).

Aiding and abetting are acts that support the perpetrator in any way in carrying out the acts according to the offense. Both physical help, such as leading the driver away, and psychological help, such as encouraging the perpetrator to leave the scene of the accident, can be considered. A case of assistance is also present if someone untruthfully pretends to have driven himself in the process.

Aid is also possible through omission. For this, a guarantee from the assistant is necessary. Such a situation exists when the perpetrator is obliged to avert the occurrence of success. Such an obligation can result from the power of disposal over the crime vehicle. The case law saw an appropriate aid treatment in the fact that the vehicle owner who was traveling as a passenger did not prevent the driver who caused the accident with the passenger's car from continuing to drive the accident vehicle.

Subjective fact

The offense of unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident can only be committed willfully. The wording of Section 142 of the Criminal Code does not provide any further details on the requirement of intent, so that even contingent intent is sufficient as the weakest form of intent . The perpetrator must therefore at least have knowledge of the objective characteristics of the offense and accept the occurrence of the offense. It follows that the perpetrator must consider the existence of an accident that has led to not inconsiderable property damage, as well as his involvement in it, to be possible. If the offender is subject to a misconception with regard to one of these elements of the offense, there is an error of fact within the meaning of § 16 StGB, which leads to the deliberate exclusion and thus to the exclusion of criminal liability according to § 142 StGB.

In the event of criminal liability under paragraph 1, this knowledge must be available before the offender leaves the scene of the accident. If there is a case of paragraph 2, the perpetrator must be aware of the circumstances that justify his obligation to make up for the findings.

Law competitions

The offense can compete with offenses that are committed by causing the accident. Typically this applies to homicides and bodily harm . Whether this competition represents a ratio of the unity of the offense or the majority of the offense depends on whether the escape from the accident is based on a new decision to act. A unit of offense typically consists of the offense of driving while drunk , which can already be realized by continuing the journey after the accident.

Violations of Section 34 Paragraph 1 Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6b as well as Paragraph 3 of the Road Traffic Act are subsidiary to Section 142 of the Criminal Code , i.e. they are secondary to the criminal offense.

Litigation and sentencing

General

The act of paragraph 1 is completed when the perpetrator has moved away from the scene of the accident. Termination occurs when the distance between the perpetrator and the scene of the accident is so great that it can no longer be expected to be established by others. From this point in time, the statute of limitations begins , which is three years in accordance with Section 78 Paragraph 3 Number 5 StGB. The act is prosecuted ex officio as an official offense. The attempt is not punishable.

In addition to the fine or imprisonment of up to three years, the driver's license can be withdrawn by ordering a blocking period in accordance with Section 69 (2) number 3 of the Criminal Code. The prerequisite for this is that a person was at least not insignificantly injured in the accident or significant property damage occurred. If the driver's license is withdrawn, three points are entered for the offender in the register of fitness to drive , otherwise two. If the perpetrator was in the probationary period , this will be extended by two years and the perpetrator will be obliged to participate in an advanced seminar . Furthermore, according to § 74 StGB, the vehicle with which the perpetrator left the scene of the accident can be confiscated . Aspects that can influence the sentencing are the severity of the accident and the impairment of the preservation of evidence.

Active repentance, Section 142 (4) StGB

If the person involved in the accident has committed a criminal offense under Section 142 (1) or (2) of the Criminal Code, paragraph 4 of the standard can apply . Its regulation offers the perpetrator the opportunity to mitigate the sentence or even obtain exemption from punishment if he enables the necessary determinations within 24 hours of the accident. However, this only applies if the perpetrator has not yet been identified and the accident did not occur in flowing traffic. The latter applies to parking bumpers. Furthermore, no significant property damage must have occurred. This is mainly assumed from a value of around € 1,300. If the requirements of paragraph 4 are met, the court can lessen the sentence or waive the sentence altogether. This does not affect an entry in the register of fitness to drive with two points.

Driving ban and withdrawal of driving license

If the perpetrator knows or can know that a person was killed or not insignificantly injured in the accident or that significant damage was caused to other people's property, the normal consequence is the withdrawal of the driver's license, Section 69 (2) No. 3 StGB. In other cases, a driving ban ( Section 44 StGB) for up to six months may be imposed .

criminology

The Federal Criminal Police Office publishes annual statistics on all criminal offenses reported in Germany. However, this does not cover the facts of § 142 StGB. It is estimated that around 250,000 to 300,000 police-registered escape accidents per year. The number of annual convictions is around 40,000. It is very likely that the frequency of fleeing accidents will increase.

However, a large number of unreported cases is suspected in the offense . The number of unreported cases is estimated at 1:10 in some cases, so for every reported accident escape there are ten actually committed. Others suspect that the number of unreported cases is significantly higher. Accidental damage that was recognized too late or was of insufficient value as well as the contributory negligence of the accident victim is considered to be partly responsible for the large unreported field.

The likelihood of escaping an accident decreases as the value of the legal interest violated by the accident increases: While the assumed proportion of escapes in accidents is less than 10% in the case of personal injury, an escape frequency of 15 to 25% is assumed for minor damage to property. Frequently, according to estimates in at least 50% of all cases, those involved in the accident fleeing the accident are under the influence of alcohol.

Legal situation in other states

In many other countries, fleeing accidents is sanctioned to a lesser extent than in Germany. Some countries differentiate between accidents with property damage and personal injury. In Austria, escaping by accident is not a criminal offense, but merely an administrative offense . In Denmark and Switzerland, fleeing accidents is only sanctioned by means of fines. The corresponding offense of Dutch criminal law provides for impunity regardless of the type of damage caused if the perpetrator subsequently enables the injured party to make determinations about the accident.

literature

  • Andreas Ernemann: § 142 . In: Helmut Satzger, Wilhelm Schluckebier, Gunter Widmaier (Ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 3. Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28685-7 .
  • Thomas Fischer: Criminal Code with subsidiary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , §  142 , Rn. 2.
  • Klaus Geppert: § 142 . In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 .
  • Peter König, Peter duration, Fritz Hartung, Heinrich Jagusch (eds.): Road traffic law . 43rd edition. Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67136-4 , §  142 .
  • Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  • Hans Kudlich: § 142. In: Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (Ed.): Beckscher Online Commentary on the StGB. 30th edition. 2016.
  • Kristian Kühl: § 142 . In: Kristian Kühl, Martin Heger: Criminal Code: Comment . 29th, revised edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-70029-3 .
  • Joachim Renzikowski: § 142 . In: Holger Matt, Joachim Renzikowski (Ed.): Criminal Code: Comment . Vahlen, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-8006-3603-7 .
  • Detlev Sternberg-Lieben: § 142 . In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  • Jan Zopfs: § 142 . In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .

Web links

Wiktionary: Accident escape  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
Wiktionary: hit-and-run  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 2-3.
  2. ↑ Dominik Waszczynski: § 142 StGB: Structure and argumentation in the case solution . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2015, p. 507.
  3. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 9. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  4. ↑ a b c d Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 3. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  5. ↑ Klaus Geppert: § 142 , Rn. 1. In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 .
  6. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 20. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  7. ↑ a b Detlev Sternberg-Lieben: § 142 , Rn. 4. In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  8. ↑ Peter Cramer: Considerations on the reform of § 142 StGB . In: Journal for Legal Policy 1987, p. 157.
  9. ↑ BVerfGE 16, 191 .
  10. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 4. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  11. ^ Gunther Arzt, Ulrich Weber, Bernd Heinrich, Eric Hilgendorf (eds.): Criminal Law Special Part: Textbook . 2nd Edition. Gieseking, Bielefeld 2009, ISBN 978-3-7694-1045-7 , § 38, Rn. 52-53.
  12. ^ Klaus Geppert: Unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident . In: Jura 1990, p. 78 (78-79).
  13. ↑ Regina Engelstädter: The term “party involved in the accident” in Section 142 (4) of the Criminal Code . Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1997, ISBN 978-3-631-32161-4 , p. 238 .
  14. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 24-26. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  15. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 5, 27. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  16. ↑ Rupert Scholz: Accidental escape with no punishment with active repentance? In: Journal for Legal Policy 1987, p. 7 (10).
  17. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 26. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  18. ↑ Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen: § 142 StGB - a learning hydra . In: New Journal for Criminal Law 1990, p. 365.
  19. ↑ Reinhard Müller-Metz: On the reform of offenses and legal consequences in the field of traffic offenses . In: New Journal for Traffic Law 1994, p. 89.
  20. ↑ Bernd Schünemann: Overcriminalization and perfectionism as cancer damage to traffic law or: Germany - a country of criminal drivers? In: Deutsches Autorecht 1998, p. 424 (429).
  21. ↑ Gunnar Duttge: Suppression of archaic urges by means of criminal law? Reason and limits of a penalty for escaping traffic accidents . In: Juristische Rundschau 2001, p. 181 (185).
  22. ↑ Ziva Kubatta: To need for reform of the accident flight (§ 142 of the Criminal Code). In. Universitätsverlag Göttingen, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-940344-24-3 , p. 134-135 .
  23. ↑ BGHSt 8, 263 .
  24. ↑ a b BGHSt 24, 382 (383).
  25. ↑ Janique Brüning: The unauthorized removal from the scene of the accident acc. Section 142 of the Criminal Code . In: Journal for Legal Studies 2008, p. 148 (148–149).
  26. ↑ BGHSt 18, 393 .
  27. ↑ Rudolf Eichberger: The accident - an overview of a diverse term . in: Legal training  1996, p. 1080.
  28. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 7th
  29. ↑ BGHSt 14, 116 .
  30. ↑ OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of October 12, 1992, 3 Ws 97/92 = Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 1993, p. 77.
  31. ↑ Kristian Kühl: § 142 , Rn. 8. In: Kristian Kühl, Martin Heger: Criminal Code: Comment . 29th, revised edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-70029-3 .
  32. ↑ Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, judgment of September 16, 2011, III-3 RBs 143/11 = Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 2011, p. 619.
  33. ^ LG Düsseldorf, judgment of May 6, 2011, 29 Ns 3/11 = Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 2012, p. 194.
  34. ↑ Jan Zopfs: § 142 , Rn. 34. In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .
  35. ↑ Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, judgment of November 7, 2011, III-1 RVs 62/11 = New Journal for Criminal Law 2012, p. 326.
  36. ↑ OLG Koblenz, judgment of December 3, 1992, 1 Ss 306/92 = monthly publication of German law 1993, p. 366.
  37. ↑ BGHSt 12, 253 .
  38. ↑ BGHSt 24, 382 .
  39. ↑ BGHSt 48, 233 (239).
  40. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 13.
  41. ^ BGH, judgment of November 15, 2001, 4 StR 233/01 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2002, p. 626.
  42. ↑ OLG Hamm, judgment of May 12, 1982, 7 Ss 343/82 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1982, p. 2456.
  43. ↑ a b Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 35. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  44. ^ A b Thomas Fischer: Criminal Code with subsidiary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 11.
  45. ↑ Peter König, Peter Duration, Fritz Hartung, Heinrich Jagusch (Ed.): Road traffic law . 43rd edition. Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67136-4 , § 142, Rn. 28.
  46. ↑ Detlev Sternberg-Lieben: § 142 , Rn. 9. In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  47. ↑ Klaus Himmelreich, Wolfgang Halm: Overview of new decisions in traffic fines and traffic fines - overview April 1, 2007 - March 31, 2008 . In: New Journal for Criminal Law 2008, p. 382 (384–385).
  48. ↑ BGHSt 8, 263 (264).
  49. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 44. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  50. ↑ OLG Hamm, judgment of December 6, 1991, 20 U 228/91 = Neue Zeitschrift Verkehrsrecht 1992, p. 240.
  51. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 9.
  52. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 48-50. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  53. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 10.
  54. ↑ BGHSt 15, 1 (4).
  55. ↑ OLG Koblenz, judgment of February 2, 1988, 2 Ss 24/88 = Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 1989, p. 200.
  56. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 53. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  57. ↑ OLG Frankfurt, judgment of August 21, 1995, 3 Ss 222/95 = New Journal for Criminal Law Jurisprudence Report 1996, p. 86.
  58. ↑ Kristian Kühl: § 142 , Rn. 4. In: Kristian Kühl, Martin Heger: Criminal Code: Comment . 29th, revised edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-70029-3 .
  59. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 13.
  60. ↑ OLG Stuttgart, judgment of March 31, 1992, 1 Ss 124/92 = Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 1992, p. 384 (384-385).
  61. ↑ OLG Hamburg, decision of March 27, 2009, 3–13 / 09 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2009, p. 2074.
  62. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 20th
  63. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 21st
  64. ↑ Detlev Sternberg-Lieben: § 142 , Rn. 43. In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  65. ↑ OLG Hamm, judgment of November 16, 1984, 4 Ss 986/84 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, p. 445.
  66. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 85. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  67. ↑ OLG Hamm, judgment of September 20, 1978, 4 Ss 942/78 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1979, p. 438.
  68. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 15th
  69. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 43. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  70. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 28.
  71. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 61. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  72. ↑ OLG Cologne, judgment of June 3, 1981, 3 Ss 282/81 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1981, p. 2368.
  73. ↑ Werner Beulke: Criminal liability according to § 142 StGB after leaving the scene of the accident and later failure of the agreement? In: Juristische Schulung 1982, p. 816.
  74. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 32.
  75. ↑ OLG Stuttgart, judgment of June 21, 1982, 3 Ss (12) 184/82 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1982, p. 2266.
  76. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 31.
  77. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 29
  78. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 36.
  79. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 37.
  80. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 30th
  81. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 33.
  82. ↑ BGHSt 4, 144 (149).
  83. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 46.
  84. ↑ OLG Düsseldorf, decision of July 7, 1984, 5 Ss 283/88 - 233/88 I = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1989, p. 2764.
  85. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 47.
  86. ↑ OLG Munich, judgment of December 16, 1988, RReg 2 St 246/88 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1989, p. 1685.
  87. ^ Wilfried Küper: Accident escape and intoxication offense . In: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1990, p. 209.
  88. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 40.
  89. ↑ Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen: § 142 StGB - a learning hydra . In: New Journal for Criminal Law 1990, p. 365 (366).
  90. ↑ BGHSt 28, 129 (132).
  91. ↑ Jan Zopfs: § 142 , Rn. 105. In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .
  92. ↑ Wolfgang Mitsch: Careless removal from the scene of the accident . In: Juristische Schulung 2010, p. 303 (305).
  93. ↑ BVerfG, decision of March 19, 2007, 2 BvR 2273/06 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2007, p. 1666.
  94. ↑ BGHSt 29, 138 (141).
  95. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 115. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  96. ↑ Jan Zopfs: § 142 , Rn. 123. In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .
  97. ↑ OLG Frankfurt, judgment of April 24, 1998, 3 Ss 117/98.
  98. ↑ BayOLG, judgment of February 7, 1995, 2St RR 67/94.
  99. ↑ Bernhard Kretschmer: § 142 , Rn. 117. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  100. ↑ OLG Frankfurt, judgment of February 14, 1977, 3 Ss 680/76 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, p. 1833.
  101. ↑ OLG Stuttgart, judgment of August 7, 1981, 4 Ss (14) 394/81 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1981, p. 2369.
  102. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 5, Rn. 43.
  103. ↑ BGHSt 15, 1 .
  104. ↑ BGHSt 28, 129 (131).
  105. ↑ Carsten Krumm, Carsten Staub: Accident escape: The intent with regard to causing damage . In: New Journal for Traffic Law 2016, p. 362 (363).
  106. ↑ BGHSt 23, 141 (144).
  107. ↑ a b Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law Special Part I: Offenses against personal rights, the state and society . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0290-9 , § 70, marginal no. 49.
  108. ^ Felix Koehl: majority of offenses (§ 53 StGB) of drunk driving and accident escape and repeated offenses in road traffic under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of § 13 S. 1 No. 2 b FeV . In: New Journal for Traffic Law 2016, p. 360 (362).
  109. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 68.
  110. ^ A b Thomas Fischer: Criminal Code with subsidiary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 61.
  111. ↑ BGH, judgment of February 17, 1983, 4 StR 716/82 = criminal defense lawyer 1983, p. 280.
  112. ↑ BGHSt 10, 337 .
  113. ↑ Joachim Renzikowski: § 142 , Rn. 81. In: Holger Matt, Joachim Renzikowski (ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . Vahlen, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-8006-3603-7 .
  114. ↑ OLG Frankfurt, judgment of November 22, 2011, 3 Ss 356/11 = Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 2012, p. 349.
  115. ↑ Klaus Geppert: § 142 , Rn. 232. In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 .
  116. ↑ OLG Dresden, decision of May 12, 2005, 2 Ss 278/05 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2005, p. 2633.
  117. ↑ Hans Kudlich: § 142 , Rn. 80. In: Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (Ed.): Beckscher Online Commentary StGB , 30th Edition 2016.
  118. ↑ Jan Zopfs: § 142 , Rn. 129. In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .
  119. ↑ Stefanie Eifler, Daniela Pollich: Empirical research on crime: methodological and methodological foundations . Springer Science + Business Media, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-531-18994-9 , pp. 21 .
  120. ↑ Thomas Fischer: Penal Code with ancillary laws . 65th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-69609-1 , § 142, Rn. 2.
  121. ↑ a b c Ziva Kubatta: On the need to reform the escape route from traffic accidents (§ 142 StGB). In. Universitätsverlag Göttingen, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-940344-24-3 , p. 5 .
  122. ↑ Ziva Kubatta: To need for reform of the accident flight (§ 142 of the Criminal Code). In. Universitätsverlag Göttingen, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-940344-24-3 , p. 6 .
  123. ↑ Klaus Geppert: § 142 , Rn. 5. In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 . suspects the number of unreported cases to be well above 1:10; Gunnar Duttke: Suppression of archaic urges by means of criminal law ?, in: Juristische Rundschau 2001, p. 181 (182) assumes an unreported number between 1:10 and 1:30.
  124. ↑ Klaus Geppert: § 142 , Rn. 5. In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 .
  125. ↑ Gunnar Duttke: Suppression of archaic urges by means of criminal law ?, in: Juristische Rundschau 2001, p. 181 (182). Klaus Geppert: § 142 , Rn. 7-11. In: Heinrich Laufhütte (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code. Vol. 4: §§ 80 to 145d . 11th edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-89949-287-0 .
  126. ↑ Jan Zopfs: § 142 , Rn. 20. In: Klaus Miebach (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 3. Edition. tape 3 : §§ 80-184j. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-68553-8 .
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