Approach security signal
An approach security signal (sometimes also an approach security signal or route approach signal ) is a main signal in Germany at the beginning of routes that are equipped with ETCS Level 2 without signals (L2oS). The purpose of the signal is to prevent trains from entering route sections that are only equipped with ETCS L2oS without additional PZB . In Germany it only occurs as a Ks main signal.
The signals always show Hp 0 ("Halt") for signal-controlled trains in the direction of the ETCS-L2oS route and are darkened for trains with signal-controlled signals (ETCS Level 2) . For signal-controlled trains, the mast sign means that it is also a stop requirement. There is no route for signal-controlled trains in the direction of the ETCS-L2oS line. If there is no further route branching after the approach security signal, the signal can only display Hp 0 or be switched off.
The access ban on trains not equipped with ETCS on pure ETCS routes is implemented with access control signals. Along the currently only ETCS-L2oS routes ( VDE 8.1 and 8.2 ), there are access control signals in the following areas: Gröbers , near Halle (Saale) , in Erfurt Hbf , the Coburg connecting curves Niederfüllbach and Dörfles-Esbach and in the Unterleiterbach depot .
2000 Hz PZB magnets are located at the signals and at intervals of at least 250 m and again at least 400 m behind them , with which signal-controlled trains can be brought to a stop by emergency braking . The first magnet following the signal is intended to stop trains on which an emergency brake intervention on the signal is suppressed by an incorrectly operated PZB command button that is effective for a maximum of 225 m. The following magnet is intended to increase safety. In addition, an additional data point (type 35) is provided at the place where there is clearly an entry into an L2oS area, which triggers an emergency brake (change to operating mode Trip ) in vehicles without existing and active Level 2 equipment .
On the two Coburg connecting curves, access control signals cause travel times to be extended, as trains heading for the new line are only included in the ETCS routing at the previous main signal and the access control signal can only be switched off afterwards. As a result of the system, the previous signal always shows the signal image Ks 2 ("expect stop"), whereupon braking must be initiated, which can only be canceled after the access protection signal has been switched off.
To prevent this, it is recommended not to combine the advance signal of the approach security signal with the previous ETCS limit signal. However, this is not possible on the two Coburg curves for reasons of space. While the connecting curves are controlled by the ETCS-compatible electronic interlocking of the new line, the subsequent existing lines are controlled by non-ETCS-compatible existing interlockings. It is therefore not possible to switch to ETCS management earlier.
The concept of the access security signal was included in the driving regulations (guideline 408) with effect from December 2015 .
Access security signal Dörfles-Esbach, showing stop
Deactivated before the train passes
Deactivated during train passage
Again showing hold
Web links
- Locations of access control signals via Overpass API based on OpenStreetMap data (incomplete)
- ETCS for hobbyists: level change between PZB and level 2 . Video explanation of the access control signal and its further protection.
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Route brochure: New line VDE 8.1 Breitengüßbach - Erfurt. (PDF) (No longer available online.) DB Netz AG, June 1, 2017, pp. 23, 47 (PDF) , formerly in the original ; Retrieved December 25, 2017 . ( Page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ a b New edition of Guideline 408 - Driving Service Regulations - as well as updating of the related guidelines. (PDF) DB Netz AG, October 20, 2014, accessed on December 25, 2017 .
- ^ Christian Beckmann, Stefan Röver: ETCS for the digital rail Germany . In: DB Netz AG (Ed.): Infrastructure projects 2018 . Building at Deutsche Bahn. PMC Media House, Hamburg 2018, ISBN 978-3-96245-163-9 , pp. 114-119 .
- ↑ Reiner Behnsch, Jens Reissaus: Conception of the control and safety technology on the new lines of the VDE 8 . In: ETR Special . 2017, ISBN 978-3-87154-620-4 , ISSN 0013-2845 , pp. 53–55 ( eurailpress.de [PDF]).
- ^ Richard Kahl: Special features of ETCS Level 2 without signals . In: Jochen Trinckauf , Ulrich Maschek, Richard Kahl, Claudia Krahl (eds.): ETCS in Germany . 1st edition. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2020, ISBN 978-3-96245-219-3 , pp. 229 f .
- ^ Jörn Pachl: System technology of rail traffic . 8th edition. Springer Vieweg Wiesbaden, 2016, ISBN 978-3-658-12985-9 , pp. 90 .
- ↑ Benedikt Wenzel, Sebastian Pechtold: Planning of ETCS - New aspects and experiences using the example of VDE 8 . In: The Railway Engineer . No. 3 , March 2015, ISSN 0013-2810 , p. 36–39 ( eurailpress.de [PDF]).
