Problem of other minds: Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 11:56, 9 April 2018

The problem of other minds is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological challenge raised by the skeptic: given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds?[1] It is a central tenet of the philosophical idea known as solipsism; the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist. Solipsism maintains that no matter how sophisticated someone's behavior is, behavior on its own does not guarantee the presence of mentality.

See also

References

  1. ^ Hyslop, Alec (14 January 2014). Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). "Other Minds". Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. ISSN 1095-5054. Retrieved May 26, 2015.

Further reading

  • Wisdom, John, Other Minds (1952)
  • Dennett, D.C., Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (1978)
  • Anita Avramides, Other Minds (2001). Routledge.
  • Masahiro Inami, The Problem of Other Minds in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (2001), Journal of Indian Philosophy

External links