Right-wing paramilitarism in Colombia and National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela: Difference between pages

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{{Infobox National Military
'''Paramilitarism in Colombia''' refers to the origin and development of [[paramilitary]] groups in [[Colombia]] during the 20th century. Paramilitary groups, whether of private or public origin, having legal or illegal support, were originally organized during the [[Cold War]] [[proxy war]]s as small groups, being created as either a preemptive or reactive consequence to the real or perceived growing threat represented by the actions of [[guerrilla warfare|guerrillas]] and militant political activists of [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] ideology.
|country= Venezuela
|image=
|caption=
|age=18
|manpower_age=15–49
|manpower_data=2005 est.
|available=6,236,012
|fit=4,907,947
|reaching=252,396
|active=Roughly 100,000
|branches= [[Army of Venezuela|Army]]<br>[[Navy of Venezuela|Navy]]<br>[[Venezuelan Air Force|Air Force]]<br>[[Venezuelan National Guard]]<br>[[National Reserve]]
|amount=$1,7 billion (FY04)
|percent_GDP=1.5% (FY04)
}}


[[As of 2008]], the '''National Armed Forces of [[Venezuela]]''' (FAN, {{lang-es|Fuerza Armada Nacional}}) is roughly 100,000 individuals in four service branches--the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), Air Force, and the Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC), commonly known as the [[Venezuelan National Guard|National Guard]].
Paramilitarism in its present form, after the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]], has become one of the parties most responsible for continuing human rights violations in Colombia during the later half of the current [[Colombian Armed Conflict]], as the result of a trend that dates to the late 1970s or early 1980s. According to [[Human Rights Watch]] (HRW) and other [[human rights]] organizations, paramilitary groups and the [[Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia|United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia]] (AUC) in particular, would be considered responsible for 70 to 75% of identifiable political murders in Colombia. Paramilitarism has also become associated with several of the major druglords that operate the [[illegal drug trade]] of [[cocaine]] and other illegal substances. In 2005, some of the largest caches of cocaine and a few of its corresponding processing labs were seized by the Colombian military and police, in areas of paramilitary influence or under their protection.


==Organization==
The AUC, considered to number somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 men, underwent gradual demobilization starting the year 2003 during a controversial process of negotiations with the administration of President [[Alvaro Uribe Velez]]. One of the most disputed issues between the paramilitaries and the Colombian government dealt with the subject of extraditing some of their top leaders to the United States for drug trafficking charges, a topic that halted demobilizations during the later quarter of 2005. During late November, demobilizations restarted and were expected to conclude by [[February 15]] [[2006]]. The AUC fully demobilized after the process, but remnants of combatants from these groups are still operating in newly organized small and regional groups under new names, as the case of the Águilas Negras (Black Eagles) in [[Norte de Santander Department]] or in other cases as simple common delinquents.
As of 2008, about 600,000 soldiers were integrated in the military through a fifth service branch, the Armed Reserve, although some of this force is more of a [[militia]] than a formal, professional armed corps.


In 2006 the FAN was transformed into six service branches, the Army, Navy, Air Force, National Guard, National Reserve and the Territorial Guard. The Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard will serve under the Strategic Operational Command (''{{lang|es|Comando Estratégico Operacional}}''), the National Reserve and the Territorial Guard will serve under the National Reserve and Mobilization Command (''{{lang|es|Comando General de la Reserva Nacional y Movilizacion Nacional}}'')
==Historical Background==
===1960s===
Part of the earliest history of paramilitarism in Colombia goes back to the 1960s, when [[United States|U.S.]] President [[John F. Kennedy]] and his government promoted a proxy war under regional security initiatives such as Plan LASO (Latin American Security Operation), ostensibly to counter the possible extension of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] influence in the region at the hands of guerrilla insurgents and local [[Communist]] Parties. As a result, small groups of civilians throughout [[Latin America]] were armed and trained as guides, informants and/or security collaborators by local and foreign military officers, with the intention of providing aid in [[counterinsurgency]] operations and/or subsequently establishing a permanent citizen militia and intelligence network if possible.
In the specific case of Colombia, Plan LASO was implemented as a military offensive in the southern [[Tolima Department]] against Communists, radicalized [[Colombian Liberal Party|Liberal]] guerrillas and self-defense militias, which had set up one of several autonomous enclaves known as [[Marquetalia Republic|Marquetalia]]. The Commander of the Colombian Army and later Defense Minister (1962-1965), General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, was a veteran of the [[Korean War]] and was influenced by contemporary [[US military]] war doctrines, receiving recommendations from a team of military experts which visited the country in February 1962. The head of the visiting team was General [[William Yarborough]] and his recommendations included the training of local civilian personnel as part of the military effort being carried out against the Tolima guerrillas and also to counter the influence of the [[Colombian Communist Party]]. <ref name="columbia2">Human Rights Watch [http://www.humanrightswatch.org//spanish/informes/1996/colombia2.html Las Redes de Asesinos de Colombia. La asociación militar-paramilitares y Estados Unidos] (Spanish)</ref>


The Venezuelan army bears the title "''{{lang|es|Forjador de Libertades}}''" or "Forger of Freedoms". This refers to Venezuelan armies fighting Venezuela's independence war, as well as the independence wars of five other countries, namely [[Colombia]], [[Ecuador]], [[Perú]], [[Panamá]] (then part of [[Viceroyalty of New Granada|New Granada]], present day Colombia) and [[Bolivia]].
The 1962 military offensive failed to expel the guerrillas from their [[Marquetalia]] enclave, leading to a further attempt in 1964 which managed to do so. Most of the rebel combatants themselves were able to flee and later regrouped as the "Southern Tolima Block", eventually forming the core of the [[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]] (FARC) in 1966.


====Law 48 of 1968====
===Branches===
[[Image:741450194 6de1735767 o.jpg|right|thumb|350px|Venezuelan Su-30's fly over the new bridge of the [[Orinoco]] river ]]
The first outright legal framework for the training of civilians by military or police forces for security purposes was formally established by the Colombian presidential decree 3398 of 1965, which vaguely stated that it was necessary to organize and motivate the country's population against the danger of Communist insurrection.
National Armed Forces (''{{lang|es|Fuerzas Armada Nacional}}'' or FAN) includes:


*[[Army of Venezuela|Ground Forces]] or Army (''{{lang|es|Fuerzas Terrestres}}'' or ''{{lang|es|Ejercito}}'')
The decree was later developed into the Law 48 of 1968, which allowed the creation of self-defense militias by private citizens for the purposes of protecting their properties and lives, an activity which was thus recognized as a right, and was therefore eligible to receive aid and guidance from the Defense Ministry and the [[Military of Colombia|Colombian Military]].
*[[Navy of Venezuela|Naval Forces]] (''{{lang|es|Fuerzas Navales}}'' or ''{{lang|es|Armada}}'')
**[[Venezuelan Marine Corps|Marine Infantry]] (''Infanteria Marina'')
*[[Venezuela Air Force]] (''{{lang|es|Fuerzas Aereas}}'' or ''{{lang|es|Aviacion}}'')
* [[Venezuelan National Guard|Armed Forces of Cooperation]] or [[Venezuelan National Guard|National Guard]] (''{{lang|es|Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacion}}'' or ''{{lang|es|Guardia Nacional}}'')
* National Reserve (''{{lang|es|Reserva Nacional}}'')
* [[Home Guard|Territorial Guard]] (''{{lang|es|Guardia Nacional}}'')


===Rank===
Colombian Military training and procedure manuals dating from this era began to include some practical aspects and further developments of the above principles. Under the heading of "Regulations to Counter Guerrilla Combat", one of the later manuals (in use in the 1980s) explained how to organize civilians against leftist guerrillas, specifically how to use civilians as informants about guerrilla activities and how to get their support during military operations against them. In theory, civilians were to be organized into "self-defense committees" which would maintain contact with local military officers, keeping a high level awareness about any suspicious communist action in their communities, in particular those of suspected "guerrilla supporters", vaguely defined as such. The manual also allowed military personnel to dress in civilian clothes when necessary to infiltrate areas of suspected guerrilla influence, and also for civilian helpers to travel alongside military units. Separately, in order to help gain the trust of local citizens, the military was advised to participate in the daily activities of the community where applicable.<ref name=columbia2/>
The army's officer rank system is unremarkable, but the system of non-commissioned ranks is notably complicated, with eighteen non-commissioned ranks from ''{{lang|es|Distinguido}}'' to ''{{lang|es|Maestro Técnico Supervisor}}''. (For comparison, there are seven [[NATO]] non-commissioned ranks (OR-3 to OR-9) and six British non-commissioned army ranks.)


===1970s===
==Modernization==
[[Image:p1010525x.jpg|right|thumb|350px|A Mi-26 Transport helicopter in a Military parade over Caracas, Venezuela]]
By the early 1970s, most of the original projects to train civilians as military informants or as self-defense forces had fettered out, though newer local efforts continued. Several of the measures were often partially and sporadically implemented for short periods of time by local military and police officials, with no lasting nationwide network of informants or of self-defense committees being permanently established. The effectiveness of the practical application of the theoretical principles was compromised due to budget constraints and the Colombian government's distrust of some top military officers, including General Alberto Ruiz Novoa himself, who resigned in 1965 amid a political scandal.
The Venezuelan government has embarked on a massive military modernization and purchases that greatly expand their defensive and offensive capabilities, including negotiations for [[Germany|German]] submarines and transport aircraft, several agreements with [[Russia]] (outlined below), transport aircraft and naval vessels from [[Spain]], radars from [[China]], home-made and designed armored light vehicles and rocket launchers, studies for [[Leopard 2]] main battle tanks, amongst many others. Most if not all European military hardware have not been deliver to Venezuela due to The U.S. embargo.


===2005-2006===
Novoa had supported the creation of self-defense militias by private citizens, also proposing a strong push towards "civic-military" development projects in order to lessen the appeal of Communism in marginal or impoverished sectors. He considered that this was part of a "carrot and stick" approach to counterinsurgency that had its roots in contemporary U.S. doctrine, calling for the use of force and of persuasion. Once he was out of the government and retired from the military, he continued to defend both aspects of the theory in a lower profile role as a [[military analyst]] of continuing policies.


In 2005 Venezuela signed agreements with Spain to procure 12 naval [[transport]] and [[reconnaissance aircraft]] and eight naval [[patrol vessel]]s. The deal is worth $1.5-2 billion [[dollars]] to the Spanish [[defense industry]], as well as an estimated 900 new jobs, but was cancelled due to the U.S. embargo.
As the mid-1970s progressed, it appeared that no sustained effort on the part of the Colombian state materialized, neither on the side of the<!--Who's the stick and who's the carrot?? It's a bit confusing please use encyclopedic terminology.--> "stick" nor on that of the "carrot". Despite this, at the time it was sometimes perceived as easier to allow local officials to attempt the earlier rather than on the later. The expansion of the Communist Party's political influence in some areas, a national strike in 1977, the [[19th of April Movement]]'s (M-19) emergence and the FARC's continuing recruitment and criminal activity were perceived by many military officers and several Defense Ministers as part of a dangerous insurrectional strategy that deserved to be stopped, if necessary through the use of force.


Venezuela in 2006 purchased 100,000 [[AK-103]] assault rifles and 53 Russian helicopters<ref>[http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/0,,MUL90712-5602,00.html G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>, including 12 [[Mi-17]] military helicopters.<ref>[http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/11/16/internacionales/5876 El Nuevo Diario - Managua, Nicaragua - Venezuela compra Fusiles y helicópteros rusos<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>
Feeling that the government was not fully backing their efforts, petitions requesting additional measures and support were increasingly made to successive governments by high ranking members of the military. A 1978 decree, known as the Security Statute, was implemented by the [[Julio César Turbay]] administration (1978-1982), giving the military an increased degree of freedom of action, especially in urban areas, to detain, interrogate and eventually judge suspected guerrillas or their collaborators before military justice tribunals. Human rights organizations, newspaper columnists, political personalities and opposition groups complained about an increase in the number of arbitrary detentions and acts of [[torture]] as a result. The Security Statute became highly unpopular and public pressure for its abolition gradually increased, until it was phased out towards the end of the Turbay administration.<ref>Puerto Berrío [http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/libros/nm/z14I/cap3.html derechos.org] (Spanish)</ref>
The government of Venezuela has also announced its intention to obtain about 3 dozen more Russian helicopters, including Mi-17 "Hip", [[Mi-26]] "Halo" and [[Mi-24|Mi-35]] "Hind" as well as announcing the procurement of 24 [[Su-30]]MK Interceptors.<ref>http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=707&language_id=1</ref> These deals are reportedly valued at US$5.3 billion <ref>[http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/0,,MUL90712-5602,00.html G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>.
Venezuela has announced the purchase of 3 batteries of the [[TOR-M1]] system, with the possible acquisition of 600 armored vehicles - possibly the [[BMP 3]] or the Sabiex Iguana FV4.<ref>[http://www.fav-club.com/flash/fcn44/favclubnews44.htm www.fav-club.com<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref> Border defense systems are being purchased from [[Brazil]], plus [[Steyr]] anti-riot trucks and expanded [[Tiuna]] purchases.


A co-operative research into [[Unmanned aerial vehicle|UAV]] between Venezuela and Iran is also underway.<ref>[http://english.eluniversal.com/2007/01/30/en_eco_art_30A830041.shtml Daily News - eluniversal.com<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>
The controversial Security Statute did not appear to specifically reinforce the mostly abandoned strategy of civilian militias, though it did not rule it out either. In some cases, the attempted implementation by local military contingents of smaller scale security and intelligence programs tended to divide rural communities and would potentially provoke an increase of internal harassment and resulting abuses against political agitators and protest movements, irrespective of their actual relationship with the guerrillas.


====Private initiatives====
===2007-2008===
In 2007, the Belarusian military optics industry supplied the Venezuelan army with night vision devices, and installed on - as [[Hugo Chavez]] described: "every single rifle in the Venezuelan army."<ref>[http://www.eux.tv/article.aspx?articleId=5241 EUX.TV - Belarus to provide Venezuela night vision devices<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>
The relative [[de facto]] abandonment by the state of most initial attempts to widely spread civilian counterinsurgency, (except for those that local officials continued to engage from time to time) contrasted with the emergence of many fragmented private initiatives, such as those of landholders, contraband runners and of certain legal enterprises, like the emerald mining complex in the [[Boyaca Department]], which employed armed civilian personnel fundamentally in the role of bodyguards.


On August, 2007 President [[Hugo Chavez]] announced the purchase of 5,000 [[Dragunov sniper rifle]]s from the Russian [[Rosoboronexport]], adding that Venezuela must ready itself for a "possible US invasion"<ref>[http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/0,,MUL90712-5602,00.html G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>.
After the emerald mines were brought under state control and later privatized in 1973, some of the resulting concessions were controlled by members in a [[mafia]] style group, which used profits from the business to finance private protection schemes. Several private militia structures were formally created for the purposes of supporting and protecting businesses and its owners from the threat of guerrilla aggression, under the rights established by the Law 48 of 1968. Contemporary and later reports also indicated that sometimes they were also used to intimidate civilians into settling land disputes, in order to secure or to expand existing mining territories.


Venezuela is studying Antonov transport aircraft to revamp its aging fleet of transport craft, which includes [[IAI Arava]]s and [[Skytruck]]s. In June 2008 in a trip to [[Russia]] [[Hugo Chavez]] will sign a weapons deal for 10 (12 in the future) [[Il-76]] Candid heavy transports, and an additional 10 [[Mi-28]] "Havoc" attack helicopters. He will also purchase 3 [[Kilo class]] submarines.<ref>http://www.military.com/news/article/russia-to-sell-subs-to-venezuela.html?wh=wh</ref> Additional equipment may be included later on. The deal is expected to be worth more than 2 billion dollars and there talks between [[Russia]] for future possible purchases of [[Su-35]] fighters.<ref>[http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/16-06-2006/82082-Venezuela-0 Venezuela to purchase 24 new Russian fighter jets - Pravda.Ru<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>
An equivalent development took place near the city of [[Santa Marta]] along the Caribbean coast and the [[La Guajira Department]], where a limited [[bonanza]] in the illegal [[marijuana]] trade gave rise to comparable groups of bodyguards and hitmen while it lasted, before counternarcotics efforts at the repeated request of the United States and changes in the global market made the business much less prosperous.


In late september 2008, Russia will provide Venezuela with a $1 billion loan to buy Russian weapons, a Kremlin source said. "The Russian side has made the decision to extend to Venezuela a $1 billion loan for a military cooperation program," the source said ahead of a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez, who starts a two-day visit to Russia.<REF>http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080925/117104766.html</REF>
Towards the end of the decade, the illegal [[cocaine]] trade imposed mainly by [[Pablo Escobar]] and his [[Medellín Cartel]], took over and became a major source of profit, one which was used to begin to create a similar security apparatus, mostly out of hitmen and gang members at first. The emerging class of druglords was experiencing rapid upward social mobility and financial prosperity, which allowed it to buy lands from impoverished traditional landowners at low costs, especially in areas where guerrilla presence, influence and kidnappings had impeded standard economic activity. At the same time, some of the older landowners managed to make a successful transit into the newer business. Initially, the newer druglords and the guerrillas managed to establish a precarious agreement due to their common illegality and the mutual possibility to benefit from it, their differences persisted and soon led to a forceful split.


[[Venezuela]] plans to use most of the $1 bln loan granted by Russia to buy air-defense systems, a Russian military analyst said. "Venezuela needs primarily [[Tor-M1]] surface to air systems to protect the airfields where the 24 Su-30 MK2 jet fighters it bought from Russia are based," said Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Strategic Analysis, a Moscow based think tank. [[Caracas]] is likely to buy Igla-S portable SAM systems, and will also want Il-78 aerial tankers and Il-76 military freight aircraft. The tankers and freight planes for the Venezuelan Air Force will cost around $300 mln, Makiyenko said.<REF>http://en.rian.ru/world/20080926/117155439.html</REF> In addition to the air defence systems, The Venezuelan government will officially purchase [[Il-78]] aerial tankers and [[Il-76]] military freight aircraft.<ref>http://en.rian.ru/world/20080926/117155439.html</ref>
===1980s===
As individual druglords and their associates grew in power, size and influence, they formed unofficial cartels to better handle the business and settle internal disputes, such as the [[Medellín Cartel]] and the [[Cali Cartel]]. The cartels were then able to form more extensive security schemes, both for themselves, their businesses and their properties.


In late september, as a six-country tour, upon his arrival in [[People's Republic of China|China]] to discuss investment deals President [[Hugo Chavez]] we'll purchase Advanced Trainers from that country.<ref>http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080921230912.0dszz961&show_article=1</ref>
Increasing guerrilla extortions and kidnappings, as a whole on the rise since the previous decade, of cartel members and their families eventually led to the formation of a new style of armed force, usually considered by analysts to be the first modern paramilitary group of the contemporary period, or more specifically the "first generation" of modern paramilitarism.<ref>The Crisis of the Social Contract in Colombia [http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/emancipa/gen/colombia_2.html#txtnot27 CES - Notation #27]</ref>


===Controversy with the United States===
The kidnapping of [[Martha Nieves Ochoa]], a sister of the drug businessmen in the Ochoa family, by the [[19th of April Movement]] (M-19) led to a meeting of her family where it was decided that a ransom would not be paid, and eventually preparations were made in order to set up an aggressive response. On [[December 3]] [[1981]], three weeks later, leaflets were dropped from a small airplane before a soccer match in the [[Pascual Guerrero Stadium|Pascual Guerrero soccer stadium]] of [[Cali]], announcing the creation of the "Muerte a Secuestradores" (Death to Kidnappers) or MAS, an armed group which would henceforth seek to find and execute all kidnappers and their collaborators, whether of guerrilla or criminal origin.
These acquisitions and other projects have been greeted with criticism from the [[United States]], which opposes the government of President [[Hugo Chávez]]. The U.S. accuses Venezuela of starting an arms race, which they claim will destabilize the military equilibrium in South America. Venezuela is also accused of supplying small arms to neighboring Colombian [[guerrilla]] organizations including [[FARC]], which is sympathetic to Chávez.<ref>http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031006/6venezuela_3.htm</ref><ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/venezuela/story/0,12716,1396985,00.htm</ref>


United States criticism is met with skepticism by Venezuelan authorities, who claim the weapons are needed to update the basic equipment in the armed forces. In some cases, Venezuelan armaments like the [[FN FAL]] have been in service more than 50 years. The government also claims that the US has been the one to initiate arms races and de-stabilize countries by supplying subversive groups in [[Latin America]] throughout the past century (referring to the [[Cold War]] and the [[Contra (guerrillas)|contra affair]], among numerous other incidents).
The text of leaflet stated that 223 drug traffickers and mafia bosses were involved, of which each would contribute several million pesos and ten of their best men, to reach an expected number of 2,230 MAS members. At its height, the MAS itself is estimated to have had at least 1,500 men at arms.<ref>The start of the horror. . . birth to paramilitarism [http://www.colombialink.com/01_INDEX/index_historia/07_otros_hechos_historicos/0330_aparece_el_mas.html Columbia Link] (Spanish)</ref><ref>More money than ever for war 2002 - 2008, [http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoSeccion.aspx?IdSec=25 Semana] (Spanish)</ref>
In 1982, a meeting of drug traffickers, landowners, businessmen, local politicians of the Liberal and [[Colombian Conservative Party|Conservative]] Parties, local military officials and representatives of the [[Texaco|Texas Petroleum Company]] in [[Puerto Boyacá]] and [[Santander Department|Santander]] discussed the issue of growing guerrilla activity in the region, in spite of the climate of optimism that surrounded presidential candidate and later president-elect [[Belisario Betancur]]'s (1982-86) proposal of an amnesty and the future beginning of negotiations with the insurgents.


In the 1990s Venezuela requested a batch of F-16C/Ds to update its F-16 fighter fleet, but the U.S. government blocked the request.<ref>[http://www.airtoaircombat.com/background.asp?id=8&bg=59 AirToAirCombat.Com: F-16C Fighting Falcon LockheedMartin F-16 Origins<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref> In October 1997 the US government approved the sale of the two crash replacement F-16s, but subsequently halted the sale.<ref>[http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article25.html F-16 Air Forces - Venezuela<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref> In 2005 a contract with [[Israel Aircraft Industries]] to upgrade Venezuela's F-16s was frozen following U.S. pressure.<ref>[http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/10/us-roadblocks-re-the-venezuelaisrael-f16-upgrade-politics-or-protectionism/ US Roadblocks re: the Venezuela-Israel F-16 Upgrade: Politics or Protectionism?<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref> Chavez subsequently accused the U.S. of delaying the sale of spare parts to maintain Venezuela’s F-16s. After remarks by Chavez that he would sell or lend the 'unused' F-16's to any country that wanted them, including [[Iran]], the US Government agreed to supply the spare parts; however, the shipment was detained at the Customs Office in [[Maiquetia International Airport]] due to security concerns.<ref>[http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=10543 World/ReadArticle.Asp | August 15, 2007 | Global News For The Digital World<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref><ref>[http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID=2006-08-28T225206Z_01_N28369566_RTRUKOC_0_US-VENEZUELA-USA.xml&archived=False]{{Dead link|date=March 2008}}</ref>
During the meeting it was decided to create a fund to sustain an armed paramilitary force, with the intention of both protecting the participants and the general population from guerrilla action and of eradicating all signs of guerrilla presence in the region. The following year, the "Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio" (Association of Middle Magdalena Ranchers and Farmers) or ACDEGAM, was created to handle both the logistics and the public relations of the organization. Numerous assassinations, massacres and displacements of population ensued, involving suspected guerrilla sympathizers as well as innocent bystanders, members of political opposition groups, government officials, judges and members of judicial investigating teams.


Russia has agreed to sell more than $4 billion (£2 billion) worth of armaments to Venezuela since 2005 and disclosed that Mr Chávez wanted new antiaircraft systems and more fighter jets.<ref>[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4804157.ece | September 23, 2008 | Russia engages in 'gangland' diplomacy as it sends warship to the Caribbean | TimesOnline]</ref>
==== Expansion ====
Other groups of paramilitary forces were later created, often with greater or lesser influence from druglords, though also involving relatives of victims of past guerrilla crimes, and even a number of guerrilla deserters. The Castaño brothers, led by [[Fidel Castaño Gil]] and his brothers [[Carlos Castaño|Carlos]] and the lesser known [[Vicente Castaño|Vicente]], sought revenge for the FARC's kidnapping and murder of their father, a cattle rancher, which led them to collaborate with the military and later to create their own paramilitary group ("Los Tangueros") in northern Antioquia and Córdoba. [[José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha]], a druglord known as "El Mexicano" (The Mexican), controlled the Middle Magdalena valley together with another son of a cattle rancher, Henry de Jesús Pérez Duran, whose father had formerly created an independent paramilitary group there.<ref>Columbia - Paramilitary groups and self-defence [http://www.acnur.org/pais/index.php?accion=tema&id=17&iso2=CO acnur.org] (Spanish)</ref>


====U.S. military embargo====
President Belisario Betancur, once in power, ordered an investigation of reported abuses committed by military and police officers in cooperation with the MAS and other paramilitary groups, which resulted in a report by the National Ombudsman's office implicating some 59 active duty security officials, including two battalion commanders with jurisdiction over the general area of [[Puerto Boyacá]] and [[Puerto Berrio]]. The accusations were downplayed and rejected by military spokesmen, which cited the Law 48 of 1968 as making the organization of self-defense groups a legitimate action to protect against guerrilla activity. The investigation, over the objections of Ombudsman Carlos Jiménez Gómez, eventually was handled by military tribunals which dismissed all the charges.
The government of the United States announced an [[embargo]] of [[military]] material and equipments to Venezuela; no [[US]] made [[weapons]] or [[technology]] can be sold to Venezuela by any country or [[company]].<ref>[http://www.webislam.com/?idn=5813 EEUU decreta un embargo de armas contra Venezuela<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref> This embargo has harmed several Venezuelan purchases, as not only are US technology goods unavailable, but other nations friendly to the US have been pressured to block sales of arms to Venezuela, as well. This is also considered one of the reasons Venezuela has turned to Russia and China for arms, in a move reminiscent of the [[Cold War]].
Below is a list of acquisitions frustrated directly or indirectly by the US embargo:<ref>[http://www.fav-club.com/ www.fav-club.com<!--Bot-generated title-->]</ref>
*{{flagicon|Czech Republic}} [[Aero L-159|Aero L-159 Alca]] Jets from the [[Czech Republic]]: the Czech government forbade [[Aero Vodochody]], the manufacturer, from creating a variant with [[France|French]] [[avionics]] and [[Ukraine|Ukrainian]] [[engines]], specially requested by Venezuela.
*{{flagicon|Sweden}} [[Saab AB]], a [[Sweden|Swedish]] arms company announced it would honor the US embargo, and would not sell arms to Venezuela. [[Carl Gustav recoilless rifle]]s, [[AT4]] AT weapons, as well as [[RBS-70]] [[Anti-aircraft warfare|AA]] systems are in service in the Venezuelan military.
*{{flagicon|Spain}} Spanish company [[EADS]] [[Construcciones Aeronáuticas|CASA]] halted the sale of several transport planes that contained extensive US technology.
*{{flagicon|Brazil}} Brazil was forced to cancel the sale of [[Embraer]] [[Super Tucano]] airplanes to the Venezuelan Air Force due to its use of [[Pratt & Whitney]] engines. Embraer was also forced to cancel the sale of AEW&C equipped planes.
*{{flagicon|France}} France decided to block the sale of [[Scorpene]] [[submarines]] to Venezuela.
*{{flagicon|Russia}} Russian companies [[Rosoboronexport]] and [[Sukhoi]] have been sanctioned by the US government for procuring arms for Venezuela.


==References==
By 1985, Betancur had taken steps to attempt to establish peace in the country by finding a political solution with the guerrillas, including the declaration of a cease fire and allowing the FARC to create a political party known as the [[Patriotic Union (Colombia)|Unión Patriótica]] (Patriotic Union) or UP. Those two moves were controversial and subject to criticism by several sectors of Colombian society, including but not limited to the military, landowners, drug traffickers, ACDEGAM under the Liberal politician Pablo Emilio Guarín Vera, and the nascent paramilitary groups.
{{reflist}}


http://www.globalfirepower.com/
General Fernando Landázabal, as Defense Minister, complained that the military's hands were being tied because the guerrillas were taking advantage of the cease fire in order to continue illegal activities under the cover of the UP, as guerrilla recruitment, kidnappings and skirmishes never fully ceased. Landázabal himself was not directly linked to paramilitary groups and their abuses, but critics and analysts considered that his discourse and his support for Law 48 of 1968 was often used to ostensibly contribute to their motivation and justification.<ref name=columbia2/>

The UP suffered a high death toll (at least between 2,000 and 3,000 and two presidential candidates by the end of the 1980s) at the hands of paramilitary groups, druglords and members of official security forces, which significantly contributed to the end of the cease fire in 1987 and the eventual end of the peace process with the FARC. Allegedly the FARC themselves have come to believe that the CIA participated in plotting the killings in collaboration with the paramilitaries, though that statement has not been addressed by other parties, including critics and opposition groups that prefer to blame sectors of the military and the political elite, in particular, and the state, in general.

In Puerto Boyacá and its surrounding area, once both real and suspected guerrilla influence had been mostly eradicated by paramilitary violence, became unofficially known as the "antisubversive capital of Colombia". In other words, the city became a self-proclaimed stronghold of anti-communism, a predominant political position which seemingly impressed President Betancur himself during a 1985 visit.

The further escalation of violence and the [[drug war]] towards the later half of the 1980s led to a frontal confrontation between druglords, their paramilitary allies and the government, especially after the 1984 and 1989 assassinations of Justice Minister [[Rodrigo Lara Bonilla]] and presidential candidate [[Luis Carlos Galán]], respectively. As a result, by the presidencies of [[Virgilio Barco Vargas]] (1986-1990) and [[César Gaviria]] (1990-1994), [[Pablo Escobar]] and his Medellín Cartel increasingly became the targets of the government's military and police offensives, after years of relative passivity due to bribery, intimidation and murder.

In 1989, as part of the above confrontation and recognizing the abuses committed under the vague provisions of the Law 48 of 1968, the Colombian Supreme Court declared it invalid and revoked the rights that it had granted. A month later, President Barco issued the Decree 1194 of 1989, which prohibited the creation, promotion or organization of paramilitary or self-defense groups, declaring such activities illegal.

Some of the paramilitaries of Puerto Boyacá, in particular the "Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio" (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of the Middle Magdalena), sought, through the intervention of ACDEGAM's spokesman [[Iván Roberto Duque Escobar]] (after the 1987 murder of his predecessor Pablo Emilio Guarín Vera), to develop a little known proposal for a political party known as "Movimiento de Reconstrucción Nacional" (National Reconstruction Movement) or MORENA, roughly between 1988 and 1989, until government pressure after the death of Luis Carlos Galán led to the cancellation of its electoral recognition.

====Yair Klein====
In the 80s, [[Yair Klein]], an Israeli ex-military and mercenary established a private mercenary company called [[Spearhead Ltd]]. Through this company, Klein began providing arms and training to armed forces in [[South America]]. Klein was accused of training several members of [[Colombian]] [[paramilitary]] organizations and the militias of [[drug traffickers]] such as [[José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha]] and [[Pablo Escobar|Pablo Escobar Gaviria]].<ref>''Democracy Now!'', [http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/04/07/0232255 Who Is Israel's Yair Klein and What Was He Doing in Colombia and Sierra Leone?], June 1, 2000.</ref>

===Early to Mid-1990s===
Critics of the MORENA experiment saw it as an attempt at legitimizing paramilitarism and its abuses, as an extension of ACDEGAM, or as a copycat of [[El Salvador]]'s [[Nationalist Republican Alliance|ARENA]]. Separately and as part of an unclear series of events, contacts between the M-19 and the Middle Magdalena paramilitaries of Henry Pérez (allegedly murdered by Pablo Escobar in July 1991) and [[Ariel Otero]] (allegedly murdered by other paramilitaries in January 1992) allegedly led to a low profile demobilization of an undeterminate number of men in late 1991.

Several members of the M-19 guerrilla which were in the midst of demobilization themselves (including among them its commander [[Carlos Pizarro Leongómez]], assassinated in 1990 under orders of [[Carlos Castaño Gil]]), had considered that it was necessary to attempt to reincorporate paramilitaries into society to achieve a true reconciliation. Apparently, the fact that most of the paramilitary's fight had been focused on the FARC, [[National Liberation Army (Colombia)|ELN]] and [[Popular Liberation Army|EPL]] helped to ease tensions somewhat. Supposedly the demobilization of the paramilitaries was ignored by the central administration and therefore eventually reversed itself, amid internal conflicts between the participants.

According to HRW, a different set of paramilitaries, including the "Los Tangueros" of the Castaño family, returned some weapons and possibly demobilized a number of men, as a consequence of the demobilization of some 2,000 men of the EPL guerrilla in 1992, which by 1990 they had contributed to weakening in collaboration with military forces. The Castaños created a fundation known as "Fundación por la Paz de Córdoba", (Fundation for the Peace of Córdoba) or FUNDACOR, which provided some aid, land, cattle and money to hundreds of the former EPL fighters.<ref name="HRM">War Merciless - Colombian and international humanitarian law [http://hrw.org/spanish/informes/1998/guerra4A.html Human Rights Watch] (Spanish)</ref>

At the same time, the fall of the Medellín Cartel and the death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 contributed to the further development of paramilitarism as a more autonomous actor in the Colombian conflict. After Escobar's submission to justice and subsequent escape from the [[La Catedral]] compound, the struggle divided existing paramilitary groups which had previously maintained ties with the druglord's organization. Some of them turned against Escobar and, together with his rivals in the [[Cali Cartel]], members of official security forces and sometimes the victims of his earlier aggressions, helped to form "[[Los Pepes]]", for "Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar" (Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), a hit squad that attacked Escobar's remaining allies and relatives.

When the hit squad disbanded upon Escobar's death, a temporary power vacuum left each of the separate paramilitary forces mostly to their own devices. Fidel Castaño Gil mysteriously disappeared sometime between 1993 and 1994, and is thought to be either dead or in hiding. [[Carlos Castaño Gil]], as told to Human Rights Watch, would have stated that, with his brother gone, one of the reasons that led to the reactivation of his paramilitary apparatus by 1994 under the "Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba" (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba) or ACCU, was the continuation of the EPL's armed struggle by a dissident faction, in addition to the FARC's push into northern Colombia. Other analysts have argued that Castaño also sought to consolidate his influence over the drug business in the region.<ref name=HRM/>

==== U.S. Involvement in guerrilla policy ====
In 1990, the United States formed a team that included representatives of the U.S. Embassy's Military Group, [[U.S. Southern Command]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]], and the [[CIA]] in order to give advice on the reshaping of several of the Colombian military's local intelligence networks. The official reason for this restructuring was to aid the Colombian military in their counter-narcotics efforts.<ref name="HR">{{cite web | author =Author Unknown | month =November | year =1996 | url =http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killertoc.htm Human Rights Watch | title =Colombia's Killer Networks: the Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States | format = | work = | publisher =Human Rights Watch | accessdate =April 1 | accessyear =2006
}}</ref> The Intelligence Reorganization] Citing a Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Colonel (ret.) James S. Roach, Jr., then the U.S. Military Attaché and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) country liaison in Bogotá.<ref>{{cite web |author =Doug Stoles| title=The US War of Terror in Colombia | work=Bristol University Politics Department | url=http://www.aqnt98.dsl.pipex.com/choms.htm Doug Stokes| accessdate=February 27 | accessyear= 2006}}</ref>

Advice on the same subject had also been solicited from the [[Great Britain|British]] and [[Israel]]i military intelligence, but the U.S. proposal was eventually selected by the Colombian military.<ref name=INTELLIGENCEREORGANIZATION/> The result of these meetings was Order 200-05/91, issued by the Colombian Defense Ministry in May 1991.<ref name=INTELLIGENCEREORGANIZATION/>

Human Rights Watch (HRW) obtained a copy of the Colombian Armed Forces Directive No. 200-05/91.<ref>Colombia's Killer Networks Appednix A [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killerapendixa.htm Human Rights Watch], copy of the directive.</ref> The order itself made no mention of drugs at all. The document stated that the Colombian military, "based on the recommendations made by a commission of advisors from the U.S. Armed Forces, "presented a plan to better combat what they called "escalating terrorism by armed subversion."

The document called for setting up intelligence networks made up of military personnel and "civilians or retired non-commissioned officers with sufficient experience and status" as agents and informants under the control of active-duty officers, with the goals of gathering intelligence for military commanders and coordinating with local military units . Order 200-05/91 also stated that the entire intelligence chain of command as well as the networks themselves must remain secret. Once the reorganisation was complete, all "written material was to be removed", with "open contacts and interaction with military installations" to be avoided by all active members of the intelligence networks.

[[Human Rights Watch]] concluded that the resulting military intelligence networks, organized and operating according to the US suggestions incorporated by Order 200-05/91, subsequently laid the groundwork for continuing an illegal, covert partnership between the military and paramilitaries. HRW argued that the restructuring process solidified linkages between members of the Colombian military and civilian members of paramilitary groups, by incorporating them into several of the local intelligence networks and by cooperating with their activities. In effect, HRW believed that this further consolidated a "secret network that relied on paramilitaries not only for intelligence, but to carry out murder".

[[Human Rights Watch]] argued that this situation allowed the Colombian government and military to [[Plausible denial|plausibly deny]] links or responsibility for paramilitary human rights abuses. HRW stated that, far from diminishing violence, the military intelligence networks created by the U.S. reorganization appeared to have dramatically increased violence, citing massacres in [[Barrancabermeja]] as an example.<ref name="INTELLIGENCEREORGANIZATION"> Colombia's Killer Networks, [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer3.htm III: The Intelligence Reorganization]</ref>

Former civilian Defense Minister [[Rafael Pardo Rueda]], who took office three months after the intelligence reorganization had already started, told HRW in 1996 that in his opinion the new structure "was not intended to incorporate illegal groups or to carry out illegal activities". Despite this, HRW pointed out that the text of Order 200-05/91 failed "to make any mention of Decree 1194 [which had made paramilitarism illegal in 1989] or exclude paramilitaries from the ranks of the new intelligence networks," leaving a document that could well be used as a practical "blueprint" for such activities.

In 1996, [[Human Rights Watch]] referred to US advice and Order 200-05/91 by stating that "[United States] recommendations were given despite the fact that some of the U.S. officials who collaborated with the [intelligence restructuring] team knew of the Colombian military's record of human rights abuses and its ongoing relations with paramilitaries". Although "not all paramilitaries are intimate partners with the military," HRW added that the existing partnership between paramilitaries and the Colombian military was "a sophisticated mechanism, in part supported by years of advice, training, weaponry, and official silence by the United States, that allows the Colombian military to fight a dirty war and Colombian officialdom to deny it."<ref>Conclusions and Recommendations [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killer7.htm Human Rights Watch]</ref>

====CONVIVIR====
A [[February 11]] [[1994]] decree of Colombia's Ministry of Defense and a law passed in the Colombian Congress led to the creation of the [[CONVIVIR]], a national program of cooperative neighborhood watch groups, in response to growing guerrilla activity. Developing mainly during the administration of [[Ernesto Samper Pizano]] (1994-1998), the CONVIVIR groups quickly became controversial as it was considered to represent something of a revival of the Law 48 of 1968. Members of some former paramilitary groups transitioned into CONVIVIR, where they were joined by newer recruits and victims of guerrilla aggression, while others, such as the [[ACCU]], remained operating independently. The governor of Antioquia, [[Álvaro Uribe|Álvaro Uribe Velez]], whose father had been killed by the FARC during a kidnapping attempt in 1983, gained notoriety for his open support and promotion of the CONVIVIR at the time.

Reports argued that some CONVIVIR groups achieved results in providing security to communities and intelligence coordination to military forces, but apparently numerous members committed abuses against civilians, without a serious oversight over their operations and organization. In 1998, HRW stated that "we have received credible information that indicated that the CONVIVIR groups of the Middle Magdalena and of the southern Cesar regions were directed by known paramilitaries and had threatened to assassinate Colombians that were considered as guerrilla sympathizers or which rejected joining the cooperative groups".<ref>Columbia - The Human Rights Situation [http://www.hrw.org/spanish/inf_anual/1998/colombia.html Human Rights Watch] (Spanish)</ref>

After much political debate, a November 1997 decision of Colombia's Constitutional Court stated that CONVIVIR members could not gather intelligence information and could not employ military grade weapons. Other restrictions included increasing legal supervision, and in early 1998 dozens of former CONVIVIR groups had their licenses revoked, because they did not turn in their weapons and withheld information about their personnel. Due to these measures, some gradually turned in their weapons and phased themselves out. 237 of the restricted weapons were returned to authorities by the end of 1997. Other members did not comply and later joined existing [[paramilitary]] groups.<ref name=HRM/>

===Late 1990s to Early 2000s===
In April 1997, the creation of the [[United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia|Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia]], (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) or AUC was announced, formally inaugurating what has been termed by analysts as the "second generation" of paramilitarism. It is considered to be the result of Carlos Castaño Gil's efforts to achieve a measure of unity between most of the other paramilitary forces in the country. Several paramilitary groups did not join, but the AUC itself claimed to represent about 90% of existing forces at the time. Castaño's ACCU formally became the core of the new umbrella organization, while the other heads of paramilitary groups kept their own leadership positions, becoming part of a federated High Command of the AUC. It has been considered by observers that the FARC's advances as part of a 1996 to 1998 offensive eased the process of formal paramilitary unification.<ref> The corridor of the bloody dispute [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid_1975000/1975157.stm BBC News Mundo]</ref>

As a response, the AUC engaged in a renewed series of massacres and assassinations, often with the passive or active aid of elements of the Colombian government's security forces, according to human rights organizations.<ref>The "Sixth Division": A Pattern of Support [http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/2.1.htm Human Rights Watch]</ref>

===Massacres===
Many massacres are believed to have been perpetrated by Paramilitary groups in Colombia. Some of the most widely known are:

=== The Mapiripan Massacre ===
In [[Mapiripan]], [[Meta]] department at least 30 people were killed between July 14 to 20 1997. AUC members arrived in the town on July 14 and searched for people who were suspected leftist guerrilla supporters.<ref name="integrity">[http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=646 Mapiripan: A Shortcut to Hell], [[Center for Public Integrity]]</ref> They went from house to house referring a name list of leftist guerrilla supporters that was prepared by informants earlier. Civilians were taken to the town center where they were tortured by paramilitaries before being killed. During the period of 5 days they stayed in the area, the paramilitaries killed around 10 civilians per day.{{Fact|date=February 2007}} A victim named Antonio Maria Herrera was hung from a hook. Afterwards, paramilitaries quartered his body and threw the pieces into the Guaviare River.<ref name="president">Colombian President Pastrana Visits Washington This Week, [http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/10/27/colomb1343.htm Human Rights Watch]</ref> The other victims were hacked with machetes or their throats and limbs were cut with a chainsaw after they were tortured. Afterwards, the victims, some of them still alive, were thrown into the same river. The local judge of Mapiripan Leonardo Ivan Cortes called the police and the army eight times during the 5-day massacre, but they did not arrived until the AUC paramilitaries had left.<ref name=integrity/>

In March 1999, Colombian prosecutors accused Colonel Lino Sánchez of planning the massacre with Carlos Castaño. Sánchez was the operations chief of the Colombian Army's 12th Brigade. He has received special training by the U.S. Army Green Berets on Barrancón Island on the Guaviare River. The training was finished very close to the time of the massacre.<ref>The Massacre at Mapiripán [http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia6.htm Columbia Journal]</ref> The evidence showed that the paramilitaries landed unhampered at the San Jose del Guaviare airport which was heavily guarded by military personnel.<ref name=president/>

=== The Alto Naya massacre ===
A second massacre took place at [[Alto Naya]], [[Cauca Department|Cauca]] department on April 12, 2001, in which an estimated 120 civilians were killed. Ninety paramilitaries participated in the killings.<ref name="alto">The Alto Naya Massacre: Another Paramilitary Outrage, [http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia64.htm Columbia Journal]</ref>

The paramilitaries surrounded the area and ordered the people to line up, they introduced them selves as "Calima Front" and their main objective is to kill any one who supported guerrillas. They had questions about the guerrillas and hacked the people by machete blows if they gave negative answers.{{Fact|date=February 2007}}

Most of the bodies were found amputated by chainsaws. The victims included a 17 year old girl Gladys Ipia whose throat was cut and both hands amputated with a chainsaw, another woman's abdomen cut with a chainsaw, and the indigenous governor Cayetano Cruz had his body cut into two pieces by a chainsaw. 5,500 returned but 540 people are still displaced. Some of the villagers traveled to the Colombian Army’s Third Brigade an hour away. The villagers reported that paramilitaries were at that very moment slaughtering people in Alto Naya. But the soldiers replied, “We’ve heard this already, it’s a lie. We have no orders.”<ref>The Massacre at Alto Naya, [http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia178.htm Columbia Journal]</ref><ref name=alto/>

==== The Betoyes Massacre ====
Another massacre took place in [[Betoyes]], [[Arauca Department|Arauca]] department in early May 2003. Several people belonging to the indigenous Guahibo community were killed and over 300 people fled. Three girls, ages 11, 12, and 15, were raped. Another 16-year-old pregnant mother, Omaira Fernández was reportedly raped. Her womb was cut open and the fetus was hacked up by a machete before the paramilitaries dumped their bodies into the river. An Amnesty International reported on June 4, 2003 that the Colombian army's 18th Brigade's “Navos Pardo Battalion” fully supported the AUC in carrying out the massacre. "During a similar attack by a group of armed men in Betoyes in January 2003, witnesses said that the AUC armband of one attacker slipped to reveal the words “Navos Pardo Battalion” printed on the uniform beneath."<ref>The Massacre at Betoyes, [http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia164.htm Columbia Journal]</ref>

===Financing of the AUC by US Corporations===

The most well known case may be Chiquita Brands International, which has admitted to making payments to the AUC from 1997 to 2004. Due to this involvement with a terrorist organization, Chiquita's board members have even been requested in extradition. <ref>Chiquita's Board Members: Total Identification [http://www.colectivodeabogados.org/article.php3?id_article=1364 Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawers' Collective]</ref>. Nonetheless, Chiquita Brands may not be the only company involved with the AUC. According to Telesur, US congress member William Delahunt stated Chiquita Brands was only the "tip of the iceberg" in the financing of the AUC, after he met with paramilitary chiefs Salvatore Mancuso, Diego Fernando Murillo, Héctor Veloza and Rodrigo Tovar Pupo. Delahunt stressed: "I am concerned by the magnitude of the participation of the US companies." <ref>Demócrata Delahunt: Caso Chiquita Brands en Colombia es punta del iceberg [http://www.aporrea.org/tiburon/n107566.html TeleSUR]</ref>

==See also==
*[[United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia]]
*[[Carlos Castaño Gil]]
*[[Colombian Armed Conflict]]
*[[Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba]]
*[[Ulster Loyalist|Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland]] (information on the loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, who like the AUC took up a vigilante role during [[The Troubles]])


==External links==
==External links==
*[http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/ Alto Comisionado para la Paz] (Spanish)
* {{es icon}} [http://www.mindefensa.gov.ve Sitio oficial del Ministerio del Poder Popular para Defensa de Venezuela]
* {{es icon}} [http://www.ejercito.mil.ve/ Sitio oficial del Ejército Libertador (Venezuela)]
*[http://www.colombialibre.org/ AUC Official Website] (in Spanish)
* {{es icon}} [http://www.armada.mil.ve Sitio oficial de la Armada de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela]
*[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/ Center for International Policy - Colombia Program]
* {{es icon}} [http://www.aviacion.mil.ve Sitio oficial de la Aviación Militar de Venezuela]
*[http://www.colombiajournal.org/index.htm Colombia Journal Home]
* {{es icon}} [http://www.guardia.mil.ve Sitio oficial de la Guardia Nacional de Venezuela]
*[http://hrw.org/doc?t=americas&c=colomb Human Rights Watch - Colombia]
* {{es icon}} [http://www.aviacionejercito.mil.ve/ Sitio oficial de la Aviación del Ejército de Venezuela]
*[http://www.humanrightswatch.org//spanish/informes/1996/colombia2.html Human Rights Watch - Colombia: Las Redes de Asesinos de Colombia] (In Spanish)
* {{es icon}} [http://www.fav-club.com/ Sitio no oficial de la Fuerza Armada de Venezuela]
*[http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informes.php3?cod=8&cat=11 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights - Colombia 2005 Report] (Spanish and English)
{{commons|Category:Military of Venezuela|Military of Venezuela}}
*[http://www.nothingtoxic.com/media/1221945815/Mans_Second_Arm_Chopped_Off_With_Machete_Shocking! Video of paramilitary cutting a man's hand with machete while alive - Graphic Content]
{{South America topic|Military of}}

==Notes==
{{reflist|2}}

==References==
*Chomsky, Aviva and Francisco Ramírez Cuellar. ''The Profits of Extermination: How U.S. Corporate Power is Destroying Colombia''. Common Courage Press, 2005. ISBN 1-56751-322-0.
*Dudley, Steven. ''Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia''. 256 pages. Routledge, January, 2004. ISBN 0-415-93303-X.
*Duzan, Maria Jimena and Peter Eisner (translator). ''Death Beat: A Colombian Journalist's Life Inside the Cocaine Wars''. Harpercollins, 1994. ISBN 0-06-017057-3.
*Kirk, Robin. ''More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America's War in Colombia''. 288 pages. PublicAffairs. 1st ed. edition, January, 2003. ISBN 1-58648-104-5.
*Leech, Garry M. ''Killing Peace: Colombia's Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention''. Information Network of the Americas (INOTA), 2002. ISBN 0-9720384-0-X.
* Mitchell, Chip. ''Along for the Ride: Colombia's paramilitaries are getting a pass, with a wink from Washington.'' The Progressive, May 2005.
*Pardo Rueda, Rafael. ''La Historia de las Guerras''. Ediciones B-Vergara, 2004. ISBN 958-97405-5-3
*Pastrana, Andrés. ''La Palabra Bajo Fuego''. Editorial Planeta, 2005.
*Ramírez Santos, Alberto (editor). ''Las Verdaderas Intenciones de los Paramilitares''. Intermedio Editores, 2002.
*Ruiz, Bert. ''The Colombian Civil War''. 271 pages. McFarland & Company. October 1, 2001. ISBN 0-7864-1084-1.
*Toledo, Rebeca, Teresa Gutierrez, Sara Flounders and Andy McInerney (editors). ''War in Colombia: Made in U.S.A.''. 2003. ISBN 0-9656916-9-1.


{{Venezuela topics}}
{{Colombia_conflict|state=collapsed}}
{{Colombia topics}}


[[Category:Crime organizations based in Colombia| ]]
[[Category:Military of Venezuela| ]]
[[Category:Conscript militaries|Venezuela]]


[[es:Paramilitarismo en Colombia]]
[[es:Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela]]
[[fr:Armée vénézuélienne]]
[[hu:Venezuela hadereje]]
[[ru:Вооружённые силы Венесуэлы]]

Revision as of 08:33, 11 October 2008

Military of Venezuela
Service branchesArmy
Navy
Air Force
Venezuelan National Guard
National Reserve
Personnel
Military age18
Available for
military service		6,236,012, age 15–49 (2005 est.)
Fit for
military service		4,907,947, age 15–49 (2005 est.)
Reaching military
age annually		252,396 (2005 est.)
Active personnelRoughly 100,000
Expenditure
Budget$1,7 billion (FY04)
Percent of GDP1.5% (FY04)

As of 2008, the National Armed Forces of Venezuela (FAN, Spanish: Fuerza Armada Nacional) is roughly 100,000 individuals in four service branches--the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), Air Force, and the Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC), commonly known as the National Guard.

Organization

As of 2008, about 600,000 soldiers were integrated in the military through a fifth service branch, the Armed Reserve, although some of this force is more of a militia than a formal, professional armed corps.

In 2006 the FAN was transformed into six service branches, the Army, Navy, Air Force, National Guard, National Reserve and the Territorial Guard. The Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard will serve under the Strategic Operational Command (Comando Estratégico Operacional), the National Reserve and the Territorial Guard will serve under the National Reserve and Mobilization Command (Comando General de la Reserva Nacional y Movilizacion Nacional)

The Venezuelan army bears the title "Forjador de Libertades" or "Forger of Freedoms". This refers to Venezuelan armies fighting Venezuela's independence war, as well as the independence wars of five other countries, namely Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Panamá (then part of New Granada, present day Colombia) and Bolivia.

Branches

File:741450194 6de1735767 o.jpg
Venezuelan Su-30's fly over the new bridge of the Orinoco river

National Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armada Nacional or FAN) includes:

Rank

The army's officer rank system is unremarkable, but the system of non-commissioned ranks is notably complicated, with eighteen non-commissioned ranks from Distinguido to Maestro Técnico Supervisor. (For comparison, there are seven NATO non-commissioned ranks (OR-3 to OR-9) and six British non-commissioned army ranks.)

Modernization

A Mi-26 Transport helicopter in a Military parade over Caracas, Venezuela

The Venezuelan government has embarked on a massive military modernization and purchases that greatly expand their defensive and offensive capabilities, including negotiations for German submarines and transport aircraft, several agreements with Russia (outlined below), transport aircraft and naval vessels from Spain, radars from China, home-made and designed armored light vehicles and rocket launchers, studies for Leopard 2 main battle tanks, amongst many others. Most if not all European military hardware have not been deliver to Venezuela due to The U.S. embargo.

2005-2006

In 2005 Venezuela signed agreements with Spain to procure 12 naval transport and reconnaissance aircraft and eight naval patrol vessels. The deal is worth $1.5-2 billion dollars to the Spanish defense industry, as well as an estimated 900 new jobs, but was cancelled due to the U.S. embargo.

Venezuela in 2006 purchased 100,000 AK-103 assault rifles and 53 Russian helicopters[1], including 12 Mi-17 military helicopters.[2] The government of Venezuela has also announced its intention to obtain about 3 dozen more Russian helicopters, including Mi-17 "Hip", Mi-26 "Halo" and Mi-35 "Hind" as well as announcing the procurement of 24 Su-30MK Interceptors.[3] These deals are reportedly valued at US$5.3 billion [4].

Venezuela has announced the purchase of 3 batteries of the TOR-M1 system, with the possible acquisition of 600 armored vehicles - possibly the BMP 3 or the Sabiex Iguana FV4.[5] Border defense systems are being purchased from Brazil, plus Steyr anti-riot trucks and expanded Tiuna purchases.

A co-operative research into UAV between Venezuela and Iran is also underway.[6]

2007-2008

In 2007, the Belarusian military optics industry supplied the Venezuelan army with night vision devices, and installed on - as Hugo Chavez described: "every single rifle in the Venezuelan army."[7]

On August, 2007 President Hugo Chavez announced the purchase of 5,000 Dragunov sniper rifles from the Russian Rosoboronexport, adding that Venezuela must ready itself for a "possible US invasion"[8].

Venezuela is studying Antonov transport aircraft to revamp its aging fleet of transport craft, which includes IAI Aravas and Skytrucks. In June 2008 in a trip to Russia Hugo Chavez will sign a weapons deal for 10 (12 in the future) Il-76 Candid heavy transports, and an additional 10 Mi-28 "Havoc" attack helicopters. He will also purchase 3 Kilo class submarines.[9] Additional equipment may be included later on. The deal is expected to be worth more than 2 billion dollars and there talks between Russia for future possible purchases of Su-35 fighters.[10]

In late september 2008, Russia will provide Venezuela with a $1 billion loan to buy Russian weapons, a Kremlin source said. "The Russian side has made the decision to extend to Venezuela a $1 billion loan for a military cooperation program," the source said ahead of a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez, who starts a two-day visit to Russia.[11]

Venezuela plans to use most of the $1 bln loan granted by Russia to buy air-defense systems, a Russian military analyst said. "Venezuela needs primarily Tor-M1 surface to air systems to protect the airfields where the 24 Su-30 MK2 jet fighters it bought from Russia are based," said Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Strategic Analysis, a Moscow based think tank. Caracas is likely to buy Igla-S portable SAM systems, and will also want Il-78 aerial tankers and Il-76 military freight aircraft. The tankers and freight planes for the Venezuelan Air Force will cost around $300 mln, Makiyenko said.[12] In addition to the air defence systems, The Venezuelan government will officially purchase Il-78 aerial tankers and Il-76 military freight aircraft.[13]

In late september, as a six-country tour, upon his arrival in China to discuss investment deals President Hugo Chavez we'll purchase Advanced Trainers from that country.[14]

Controversy with the United States

These acquisitions and other projects have been greeted with criticism from the United States, which opposes the government of President Hugo Chávez. The U.S. accuses Venezuela of starting an arms race, which they claim will destabilize the military equilibrium in South America. Venezuela is also accused of supplying small arms to neighboring Colombian guerrilla organizations including FARC, which is sympathetic to Chávez.[15][16]

United States criticism is met with skepticism by Venezuelan authorities, who claim the weapons are needed to update the basic equipment in the armed forces. In some cases, Venezuelan armaments like the FN FAL have been in service more than 50 years. The government also claims that the US has been the one to initiate arms races and de-stabilize countries by supplying subversive groups in Latin America throughout the past century (referring to the Cold War and the contra affair, among numerous other incidents).

In the 1990s Venezuela requested a batch of F-16C/Ds to update its F-16 fighter fleet, but the U.S. government blocked the request.[17] In October 1997 the US government approved the sale of the two crash replacement F-16s, but subsequently halted the sale.[18] In 2005 a contract with Israel Aircraft Industries to upgrade Venezuela's F-16s was frozen following U.S. pressure.[19] Chavez subsequently accused the U.S. of delaying the sale of spare parts to maintain Venezuela’s F-16s. After remarks by Chavez that he would sell or lend the 'unused' F-16's to any country that wanted them, including Iran, the US Government agreed to supply the spare parts; however, the shipment was detained at the Customs Office in Maiquetia International Airport due to security concerns.[20][21]

Russia has agreed to sell more than $4 billion (£2 billion) worth of armaments to Venezuela since 2005 and disclosed that Mr Chávez wanted new antiaircraft systems and more fighter jets.[22]

U.S. military embargo

The government of the United States announced an embargo of military material and equipments to Venezuela; no US made weapons or technology can be sold to Venezuela by any country or company.[23] This embargo has harmed several Venezuelan purchases, as not only are US technology goods unavailable, but other nations friendly to the US have been pressured to block sales of arms to Venezuela, as well. This is also considered one of the reasons Venezuela has turned to Russia and China for arms, in a move reminiscent of the Cold War. Below is a list of acquisitions frustrated directly or indirectly by the US embargo:[24]

References

  1. ^ G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez
  2. ^ El Nuevo Diario - Managua, Nicaragua - Venezuela compra Fusiles y helicópteros rusos
  3. ^ http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=707&language_id=1
  4. ^ G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez
  5. ^ www.fav-club.com
  6. ^ Daily News - eluniversal.com
  7. ^ EUX.TV - Belarus to provide Venezuela night vision devices
  8. ^ G1 > Mundo - NOTÍCIAS - 'Gringo que se meter por aqui, 'pum'!', afirma Chávez
  9. ^ http://www.military.com/news/article/russia-to-sell-subs-to-venezuela.html?wh=wh
  10. ^ Venezuela to purchase 24 new Russian fighter jets - Pravda.Ru
  11. ^ http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080925/117104766.html
  12. ^ http://en.rian.ru/world/20080926/117155439.html
  13. ^ http://en.rian.ru/world/20080926/117155439.html
  14. ^ http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080921230912.0dszz961&show_article=1
  15. ^ http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031006/6venezuela_3.htm
  16. ^ http://www.guardian.co.uk/venezuela/story/0,12716,1396985,00.htm
  17. ^ AirToAirCombat.Com: F-16C Fighting Falcon LockheedMartin F-16 Origins
  18. ^ F-16 Air Forces - Venezuela
  19. ^ US Roadblocks re: the Venezuela-Israel F-16 Upgrade: Politics or Protectionism?
  20. ^ World/ReadArticle.Asp | August 15, 2007 | Global News For The Digital World
  21. ^ [1][dead link]
  22. ^ | September 23, 2008 | Russia engages in 'gangland' diplomacy as it sends warship to the Caribbean | TimesOnline
  23. ^ EEUU decreta un embargo de armas contra Venezuela
  24. ^ www.fav-club.com

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External links

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