Crossing over the Schlei
| date | February 6, 1864 |
|---|---|
| place | South of Arnis and Kappeln , villages at a passable point on the Schlei |
| output | Withdrawal of the Danish troops from Schlei and Danewerk |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 26,000 men & artillery | 16,000 men & artillery |
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Missunde - Königshügel - Danewerk - Schlei - Oeversee - Jutland - Vejle - Jasmund - Düppeler Schanzen - Fredericia - Helgoland - Alsen - Lundby - North Frisian Islands
A successful bypassing of the Danewerk was on February 6, 1864, when crossing the Schlei .
Starting position
The attempt to take the Danish fortress near Missunde in a surprise coup and to enclose the defenders of the Danewerk at the rear failed when crossing the Schlei.
history
The commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, the king's nephew Prince Friedrich Karl , realized that the transition could only take place further east at Arnis and Kappeln, the narrow points of the Schlei. In order to disguise the evasion maneuver, several batteries continued to fire at Missunde on the two days after the lost battle, and numerous campfires were lit in the evenings. Unnoticed by the enemy, the bulk of it was laid in two woods across from Arnis and von Kappeln, sheltered from the fog and heavy snowdrifts. For the pontoon bridge at Arnis, pioneers had brought the pontoons required by horse-drawn wagon close to the shore. The second, simultaneous crossing, from Ellenberg to Dothmark (both today districts of Kappeln), should be done by rowing boats; Fishing boats that were confiscated in Kiel and Eckernförde. As a precaution, their artillery had also been positioned at crossings. It was decided that on February 6th at 4 a.m. the crossing of the combined avant-garde brigade and the 12th infantry brigade (Röder) should begin on the one hand north of Kappeln near Ellenberger Holz, on the other hand south of Kappeln on the requisitioned boats. The two brigades, united under General von Manstein, the commander of the 6th Division, were supposed to free the northern Schleiufer from enemy Danish soldiers and take a position around the bridge building about a half-circle of a ¾ mile in diameter. The 7th Engineer Battalion was assigned to provide support.
Four artillery batteries were deployed to cover the transition: a 12-pounder battery between Ellenberg and the Ellenberger Holz, another near Loitmark, south of Kappeln, a 6-pounder rifled battery below Arnis near Kopperby and a main battery above Arnis near Schonsburg. The bridge was to be built by the 3rd Brandenburg Engineer Battalion. On the night of February 6th, no loud orders could be given and, despite the icy cold, no warming campfires could be lit. Even in the Carlsburg manor house, the headquarters of Prince Friedrich Karl, not a single light could be seen. But before the really dangerous crossing at 4 a.m., a preacher from the area had appeared and claimed that the Danes had left the opposite bank.
“As early as 9 o'clock in the evening, a preacher appeared at a Prussian department who assured me in a definite way that the Danes were gone. A non-commissioned officer of the Westphalian Pioneer Battalion (No. 7) offered to sit across the loop in order to convince himself of the truth of the statement. He drove off under cover of darkness. […] The Westphalian pioneer sergeant had left the hill near Dothmark (district of Kappeln, author's note) and found the guns nailed up. "
The ban on campfires was lifted at 3 a.m. Without firing a shot, the pioneers bridged the 250 meter wide loop near Arnis in less than two and a half hours. They were not hindered by the Danes either, but all the more by the shore ice and the strong north-east wind. The loop was only open in the middle, but it was also full of drift ice. The ice still held on both sides, so it had to be thrown up before the pontoons could be lowered. If the Danes had not evacuated Arnis, the bridging of the Schlei would have cost the Prussians enormous sacrifices. In retrospect it was found that the Danish War Council met for the last time in the Prinzenpalais on February 5, 1864, chaired by Lieutenant General Christian Julius de Meza . The attempted circumvention did not go unnoticed. But by bypassing in the east, the weak Danish lines were overstretched. So it was decided almost unanimously to vacate the Danewerk. This happened on the night of February 5th to 6th. The 3rd Division began the retreat at 10 p.m. as it was at risk from the crossing over the Schlei the next morning. This proceeded in two columns: First the 9th Brigade under Major General Steinmann with most of the artillery and cavalry. The second column followed about 1 ¼ mile behind and consisted of the 7th and 8th Brigades. On February 6, 1864, almost 26,000 Prussians were able to cross the Schlei near Arnis and others in Kappeln cross the Schlei undisturbed and safe. The transfer began at 9.45 a.m. and after about 8 hours at 4.30 p.m. the entire 1st Army Corps was transferred. While the translation was still in progress, Field Marshal von Wrangel received the message that the enemy had evacuated his sector and that half an hour after midnight the last Dane had marched out of the city of Schleswig. So the attempted circumvention had ultimately caused the Danewerk to give up. According to a newspaper note that day, the Arnissers are said to have found all the bacon in the place out of joy at the liberation, in order to distribute it to the Prussian soldiers.
result
Due to the planned crossing over the Schlei near Arnis, the Danewerk could no longer be held. By gaining the forecourt and establishing fortress-breaking artillery in the battle for King's Hill , the danger of a breakthrough had now become latent. With the crossing over the Schlei in winter there was also the danger that the fortress belt would be bypassed. This was one of the reasons why the Danewerk had to be given up on February 5, 1864. Please refer to point 1 of the reason for withdrawal.
"1. that the durability of the Danes is based on the obstacle afforded by the Eider, the Schlei and the floods. However, that the Schlei's obstacle is currently only a gully and that it is impossible to move up the ice in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. "
literature
- Frank Jung: 1864. The war for Schleswig-Holstein. Ellert & Richter Verlag for Schleswig-Holsteinischer Zeitungsverlag , Hamburg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8319-0566-9 .
- Oliver Bruhns: Schleswig city stories. In: Reimer Witt, Oliver Bruhns: 1200 years of Schleswig. ed. from the Lions Club Schleswig, 2006.
Web links
Individual evidence
- ↑ The Schleibote
- ^ Theodor Fontane: The Schleswig-Holstein War in 1864, Berlin 1866, p. 77
- ↑ The Schleibote
Coordinates: 54 ° 37 '43.7 " N , 9 ° 56'11.8" E