Occupation of Jutland
| date | March 8-21 , 1864 |
|---|---|
| place | South of Kolding |
| output | Advance into Jutland and recall of Wrangel |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Prince Friedrich Karl |
|
| Troop strength | |
| 31,000 men | 34,000 men |
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Missunde - Königshügel - Danewerk - Schlei - Oeversee - Jutland - Vejle - Jasmund - Düppeler Schanzen - Fredericia - Helgoland - Alsen - Lundby - North Frisian Islands
The occupation of Jutland was part of the German-Danish War . A first invasion across the Jutland border on February 17, 1864 by Field Marshal von Wrangel was the cause of a diplomatic controversy between the powers Austria and Prussia . Finally, the Jutland peninsula was occupied by the Allies from March 8 to March 21, 1864.
course
Kolding is occupied by the guard hussars
After Flensburg was occupied on February 7th, discussions about how to proceed took place at headquarters . On the one hand, one could have turned to Düppel in order to follow the main part of the Danish army , or one could have advanced the advance to North Schleswig and Jutland. Moltke, who was always against a siege of the fortifications at Düppel, believed that the occupation of Jutland would make a decisive impression in Copenhagen. Jutland clearly belonged to the Danish heartland, i.e. to the Kingdom of Denmark , which was actually not part of the immediate war goal. He traveled to headquarters especially for this and found an open ear from Wrangel. On February 10th, Wrangel ordered Friedrich Karl of Prussia to stay with a corps at Düppel, while he pursued the enemy to the north with the Austrian forces under Ludwig von Gablenz and the combined Prussian Guard Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Otto von der Mülbe should. In this way the Danes reached the rescuing Düppeler Schanzen even in a dissolved state, although their persecuting opponent, Prince Friedrich Karl, did not attack them energetically because Wrangel's orders tied his hands, although such an approach would have promised success. The Danish armed forces had planned the 4th Division under Cai Detlev Hegermann-Lindencrone to secure North Schleswig and Jutland . However, this had already left North Schleswig with his units , so that Wrangel could reach the borders of Jutland by February 17th without a fight. Meanwhile, the Austrian civil commissioner Friedrich Revertera von Salandra had made it clear to the Prussian liaison officer with staff Eduard Vogel von Falckenstein on February 14th that crossing the border would lead to political and diplomatic problems. Falckenstein made sure that Bismarck was informed of this. The agreements with Austria were actually limited to Schleswig. Bernhard von Rechberg immediately feared that such a step would favor an alliance between France and England. The Austrian ambassador in Berlin Alajos Károlyi also warned against this step. On February 15, for example, a royal order was issued to Wrangel not to cross the border for the time being. On this occasion, the Minister of War, Albrecht von Roon, immediately let it be known that he had to coordinate his orders with Bismarck regarding the occupied territories. The next day the field marshal learned that General Gablenz had already received the definitive order from Emperor Franz Josef, at the instigation of Revertera from Salandra's report , not to participate in the invasion of Jutland with his troops. The emperor announced the same to his ally King Wilhelm. Although Friedrich von Wrangel knew that he only had instructions to occupy Schleswig (see Prinzenpalais ), this interference aroused the old warrior monstrously. Wrangel also had no idea of the diplomatic and political difficulties and remembered the Schleswig-Holstein survey of 1848, which, in his opinion, had failed due to indecision. So he wanted to cut the Gordian knot without authorization and telegraphed to the king without informing his entourage , unencrypted, and complained about it in crude language
"... these graduates, who disrupted the most beautiful operations, deserved the gallows."
The following day, February 17th, he personally hurried from Appenrade to Hadersleben to supervise the march into Jutland on the spot. When Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia was informed about this through General Eduard Vogel von Falckenstein, he intercepted Colonel Eduard Moritz von Flies, who was commissioned with the implementation, and was thus able to stop the Commander-in-Chief's arbitrary plan in time. Nevertheless, the intervention of the prince came too late for the guard hussars , who were already in Jutland with their leader Georg Ferdinand von Bentheim and who had fled to the town of Kolding after a battle with the Danish troops and held it occupied. Most of the Austrian and Prussian troops remained in Christiansfeld and Hadersleben. When Wrangel issued the counter-order, the bad impression of the hasty retreat could also be prevented by the intervention of the prince: the guard hussars remained there. So the invasion was half done.
Diplomatic aftermath
Moltke meanwhile hurried back to Berlin to explain the whole process and did not find any resistance for his view from Bismarck, Roon or the King, if only Austria shared this insight: The one split on the battlefield would result in a great crisis drawn. Austria now sent General Johann Carl Huyn to Berlin to clarify the purpose of taking Kolding. The invasion of Jutland would split the forces and give the Danes the opportunity to defeat individual units with superior strength. On the other hand, Moltke could argue that the occupation of Schleswig was not the purpose of the war but, viewed in itself, would be an inadequate means of attaining the legal status sought. An extension of the lines of operations is also unproblematic given the existing balance of power. The Danes would have 34,000 soldiers in the field, of which they could use a maximum of 27,000 to advance. The Allies had 31,000 men at Kolding, 29,000 at Düppel and 5,000 in reserve in Holstein. Edwin von Manteuffel was then sent from Berlin to Vienna to bridge the differences that had arisen in a personal meeting with Emperor Franz Josef . He brought a personal letter from King Wilhelm to Emperor Franz-Josef, which Bismarck had written. In the letter of February 21, 1866, Bismarck tries to reassure the emperor:
“Our policy would be a mistake if we did not lead it to a satisfactory conclusion; I attach great importance to England's friendship, but I don't believe that England or any other power will find it in their interests to attack us as long as we remain united ”
Manteuffel further explained to the emperor that the heavily demoralized Danish army should not be allowed to rest now. It was absurd during war if the Jutian border were closed to the Germans, whereas the Danes could freely pass it at any time. Nevertheless, the emperor referred to diplomatic difficulties that particularly affected Austria. Manteuffel could hardly move in Vienna for almost five days. Only when news from Paris and London arrived in Vienna more favorable: Palmerston and Napoleon III. could not agree against the Allies! Therefore, on February 29, 1864, Franz-Josef consented to the invasion of Jutland. However, he wanted a precise explanation from Prussia, what the exact purpose of the capture would be and how it would be explained to the other major European powers. Bismarck immediately replied to the Kaiser by telegram: The purpose is threefold:
- Reprisals for the taking away of German ships
- Division of the Danish armed forces (see battle near Vejle )
- Overcoming Danish resistance to armistice and conference (see London Conference (1864) )
Manteuffel was given a free hand for military measures. On March 1, he reached the following compromise with the Prussian diplomat Karl von Werther and the Austrian diplomat Bernhard von Rechberg : Düppel and Alsen should remain the main object. In order to cover the Danish attacks from Fredericia , Wrangel should now get authorization to cross the Jutian border, which was justified diplomatically with the expansion of the Danish hostilities at sea. The major European powers should be told that this would not change the military goals of the Allies: Lauenburg, Holstein and Schleswig. They are still ready for the conference and the armistice.
The occupation of Jutland from March 8-21, 1864
On March 6th, the Wrangel headquarters received authorization to cross the Jutian border. On March 7th the Field Marshal gathered and formed the two corps and on March 8th he crossed the border to the Kingdom of Denmark. The Marshal's orders were that the III. Corps, which Garden was supposed to move east against Fridericia, thrust towards Snoghøj and the II. Corps (Austrians under FML von Gablenz) parallel to this in the west, thrust towards Vejle , which resulted in the battle at Vejle on the same day . The main objective was the occupation of the Fredericia fortress in order to withdraw Jutland from Danish access.
Personal aftermath for Wrangel
Because of all these incidents, the Prussian Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia became the head of military operations from mid-March 1866 , for which the king had given him special powers. In the course of the war, Wrangel and Moltke often argued. On March 30th, the king issued a cabinet order to him not to issue any military orders from now on without first consulting the Crown Prince. Without knowing the content and assuming it was a special recognition for him, he read it aloud on his staff, which ended with the sentence: "This cabinet order is only intended for you and must be kept secret." the king's order, which had actually been kept discreet out of tact, was called out by himself. When a ceasefire was concluded on May 12th, he resigned his command entirely and asked for his release, which was granted on May 18th. Ultimately, Wrangel was no longer actively used in the subsequent conflicts. However, Wrangel's quotation from the gallows is still widely used.
It upset Bismarck, who referred it to himself, and Wrangel. After Wrangel's return to Berlin, Bismarck treated the Field Marshal like air. At the royal table the field marshal finally asked the prime minister: “You can't forget my son?” “No” was Bismarck's gruff answer. After a short pause the field marshal asked: “You cannot forgive my son?” “With all my heart,” laughed Bismark.
literature
- Frank Jung: 1864. The war for Schleswig-Holstein. Ellert & Richter Verlag for the Schleswig-Holstein newspaper publisher, Hamburg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8319-0566-9 .
- Oliver Bruhns: Schleswig city stories. In: Reimer Witt, Oliver Bruhns: 1200 years of Schleswig. ed. from the Lions Club Schleswig, 2006.
Individual evidence
- ^ A b Heinrich von Sybel : The establishment of the German Empire by Wilhelm I. Primarily after the Prussian state acts. Third volume, Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 1889, p. 189.
- ^ Heinrich von Sybel: The establishment of the German Empire by Wilhelm I. Primarily after the Prussian state acts. Third volume, Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1889, pp. 195–197.
- ↑ Gottlob Dittmar : History of the German People. Third volume, Winter, Heidelberg, 1893, p. 524.
- ↑ Bismarck: Thoughts and Memories . Stuttgart 1959, p. 263 f.
Coordinates: 55 ° 29 ′ 24 ″ N , 9 ° 28 ′ 12 ″ E