al-Hashd al-Sha'bī

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Fighters of the popular mobilization and the Iraqi army on a mission in Salah ad-Din .

Al-Hashd al-Sha'bī ( Arabic الحشد الشعبي, DMG al-ḥašd aš-šaʿbī or al-Haschd al-Watani  /الحشد الوطني / al-ḥašd al-waṭanī  / 'National Mobilmachung '), also known as the People's Mobilization Forces / Units / Committee (PMF / PMU / PMC) , is an umbrella organization sponsored by the Iraqi state and made up of 40 almost exclusively Shiite militias . This alliance was created in June 2014 after the Iraq crisis and the expansion of the Islamic State in western Iraq. The members themselves reject the designation as “militia”.

Background and origin

On June 15, 2014, the Iraqi government established the popular mobilization after the Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had issued a fatwa two days earlier . This fatwa called for the defense of Iraq against IS, which conquered Mosul, the second largest city, in mid-June 2014 . The alliance brought together a number of Shiite groups, most of whom received direct aid from Iran. There were also some Sunni tribal warriors. Popular mobilization is officially under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, although some popular mobilization groups operate independently.

Composition and organization

There are no official figures on the fighting power of popular mobilization; different estimates assume that it is e.g. B. at Tikrit there are around 20,000 fighters, while there are said to be between 60,000 and 120,000 in total. There are also around 1,000 to 3,000 Sunni members. In early March 2015, there seemed that the people's mobilization and Yezidi fighters from Sinjar recruited.

The individual organizations of popular mobilization can be roughly divided into three groups: groups without political precursors and ambitions, which merely follow Sistani's fatwa; Groups that were founded by political parties or are their armed arm and groups that have fought for years in Iraq against the US armed forces and in the Syrian civil war. Among the most famous groups are the peace companies that emerged from the Mahdi Army , the Kata'ib Hesbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Schuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq and the Badr Brigades of the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq .

The leader of the people's mobilization in the Iraqi government is Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also a national security advisor. The alleged leader of the popular mobilization on the battlefield was Jamal Jafaar Mohammed Ali Ebrahimi, also known as Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis , the head of the Kata'ib Hesbollah. (Abu Mahdi was killed along with Qasem Soleimani in a drone attack by the US Army on January 3, 2020. ) According to Iraqi sources, each organization has its own command structure and coordinated cooperation is rare. Other well-known leaders besides al-Muhandis are Qais al-Chazali of the Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq and Hadi al-Amiri of the Badr Brigades. According to the New York Times, this diversity of autonomous command structures undermines the authority of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi .

The militiamen are trained by Turkish and Iranian military advisors and also by people from Hezbollah . The presence of the Iranian commander of the al-Quds unit, Major General Qasem Soleimani, caused a stir . The Popular Mobilization is believed to have its own military intelligence and media team that uses propaganda videos and daily updates to raise combatants' morale.

On April 7, 2015, the Prime Minister's Office ordered that all state institutions and organs of government should regard popular mobilization as an official organ under its direct command.

equipment

Equipping the people's mobilization appears to be a problem as, for example, in late January 2015 a video emerged of a large convoy of the Kata'ib Hesbollah, in which an American M1 Abrams tank, several M113 crew vans, Humvees , MRAPs and Iranian all-terrain vehicles of the type Safir 4x4 have been included. According to some sources, the Iraqi government is said to be supplying the militia with American armaments. American officials see regular Iraqi soldiers in this convoy, who have affixed Kata'ib Hesbollah flags to the convoy in solidarity with the militia, but admitting that it is difficult to track the whereabouts of American weapons.

Alongside these American arms, Iran is the largest arms supplier: in 2014, Tehran is said to have sold arms and equipment worth almost $ 10 billion to Baghdad. There are also daily deliveries from Iran.

In May 2015, the United States supplied Baghdad with equipment valued at $ 1.6 billion, the major beneficiary of which is likely to be popular mobilization.

Larger stakes

The popular mobilization has already fought in several battles against the IS, the most important of which so far was the battle for Tikrit in March 2015. Haider al-Abadi rejected participation in popular mobilization in the reconquest of Mosul on April 6, 2015 because of possible sectarian tensions. Nonetheless, Shiite militiamen are said to be in the Sunni province of al-Anbar , which led to protests by the local administration that reject the mobilization of the people in al-Anbar. When Ramadi was retaken in autumn 2015, the Iraqi government deliberately refrained from popular mobilization.

In the offensive on Mosul from October 2016, the popular mobilization fought on the left flank in the wider area of ​​Mosul. In November they were able to liberate a few smaller villages and towns and thus secure the area between al-Qayyara in the south and Tal Afar west of Mosul. The airport in Tal Afar was captured and caught up with the Kurdish forces in Jabal Sinjar , so that Tal Afar was surrounded on all sides. In May 2017, popular mobilization was able to liberate all important Yazidi towns south of the Jabal Sinjar. On May 29, the people's mobilization forces reached the Syrian border near the Jebel Sinjar. Later on, the Al-Hashd al-Shebī were involved in the recapture of Tal Afar (August 27, 2017) and al-Hawijah (October 4, 2017).

Laws and guidelines

Laws and rules of conduct for popular mobilization are those of the Iraqi government, as they are officially subordinate to the Prime Minister, but Ali al-Sistani has published a guide for the fighters, which comprises 20 points. This is how the fighters should treat the people of the liberated areas according to Islamic law, so that no acts of revenge or desecration of corpses are committed. All people - whether Muslim or Christian - should not be mistreated or their belongings stolen.

Criticism and allegations of war crimes

Some of the popular mobilization fighters have been charged with war crimes and acts of revenge on sectarian grounds. According to Amnesty International , Shiite militiamen abducted, tortured and killed several Sunnis. Crimes are said to have occurred during the retaking of Tikrit. Iraqi officials made it clear that every crime would be investigated and the criminals punished. Spiritual figures such as Ali al-Sistani and Hussein Ismail Al-Sadr warned the fighters and ad hoc committees of inquiry began to investigate the allegations.

In addition to these allegations, the Sunni Iraqis still have some concerns about popular mobilization: For example, popular mobilization is to be depoliticized and serve as a national armed force, i.e. not an extended arm of Shiite parties. Furthermore, some critics claim that popular mobilization operates outside the constitution, although they have an official budget and receive salaries, during which the Kurdish peshmerga are recognized in the constitution, but do not receive salaries from Baghdad.

The recruitment of the Yazidis also creates tension with the Kurdish regional government. In November 2012 there were clashes between Peshmerga and the mobilization of the people in Tuz Churmatu , with some dead.

Web links

Commons : al-Haschd asch-Schaʿbī  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Islamic State: The caliphate strikes back. In: The Economist . May 23, 2015, accessed May 25, 2015 .
  2. ^ Daniele Raineri: Assalto finale a Tikrit. In: Il Foglio Quotidiano. April 2, 2015, accessed April 11, 2015 (Italian).
  3. ↑ a b Mustafa al-Chadimi: Will Sistani be able to control popular mobilization forces? (No longer available online.) In: Al-Monitor. March 12, 2015, archived from the original on March 13, 2015 ; accessed on March 14, 2015 .
  4. ^ Islamic State: Iraq Battle Against ISIS For Tikrit Led By Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Forces. International Business Times, accessed March 3, 2015 .
  5. ↑ Ali Mamouri: Concern grows over Iraq in unregulated Shiite forces. (No longer available online.) In: al-Monitor.com. February 17, 2015, archived from the original on March 24, 2015 ; accessed on March 15, 2015 .
  6. ↑ a b Better pay, better weapons: are shiite militias growing more powerful than iraqi army? In: Niqash. Retrieved January 29, 2015 .
  7. ↑ Liz Sly: Pro-Iran militias' success in Iraq could undermine US In: The Washington Post. February 15, 2015, accessed March 22, 2015 .
  8. ^ Robin Wright: In War Against ISIS, Numbers Don't Always Tell the Story. The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2015, accessed March 23, 2015 .
  9. ↑ a b Daniele Raineri: Dentro a Tikrit, gli sciiti arrivano sui luoghi delle stragi. April 4, 2015, accessed April 11, 2015 (Italian).
  10. ↑ Hashd al-Shaabi / Hashd Shaabi Popular Mobilization units / People's Mobilization Forces. In: GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved November 12, 2015 .
  11. ↑ a b Ali Nasir: Shiite militia recruiting Yezidis, strengthening foothold in Shingal. Rudaw, March 2, 2015, accessed November 12, 2015 .
  12. ^ A b Mustafa al-Chadhimi: Why Iraq needs to depoliticize their Popular Mobilization Units. (No longer available online.) Al-Monitor, July 10, 2015, archived from the original on September 22, 2015 ; accessed on November 12, 2015 .
  13. ^ Iraqi Popular Forces Warn to Disclose Coalition's Support for ISIL. (No longer available online.) In: Islamic Invitation Turkey. March 1, 2015, archived from the original on March 3, 2016 ; accessed on March 17, 2015 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.islamicinvitationturkey.com
  14. ^ The National Security Adviser and the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee arrives at Kirkuk. (No longer available online.) Beladi News, archived from the original on February 17, 2015 ; Retrieved January 5, 2015 .
  15. ^ Tony Badran: Exporting the Islamic Revolution. In: NOW. March 6, 2015, accessed March 15, 2015 .
  16. ^ Ali Haschem: Iraqi town celebrates victory over Islamic State. (No longer available online.) In: al-Monitor. January 2, 2015, archived from the original on April 3, 2015 ; accessed on March 15, 2015 .
  17. ↑ Gary Grappo: Iran's Strategic Victory: Hezbollah-ized Iraq. In: The Daily Journalist. March 14, 2015, accessed March 16, 2015 .
  18. ^ Anne Barnard: A Balancing Act as Iraq Claims Gains in Tikrit. In: The New York Times. March 12, 2015, accessed March 16, 2015 .
  19. ↑ 20 Turkish officers train Iraqi Mobilization Forces, media sources. In: Iraq Tradelink News Agency. April 15, 2015, accessed April 15, 2015 .
  20. ^ Ali Haschem: Iraq's Shiite forces claim victory over IS. (No longer available online.) In: Al-Monitor. March 16, 2015, archived from the original on March 20, 2015 ; accessed on March 20, 2015 .
  21. ↑ Analysis 03-06-2015. In: Center for American and Arab Studies. March 7, 2015, accessed March 17, 2015 .
  22. ↑ Zana K. Gulmohamad: A short profile of Iraq's Shi'a militias. Terrorism Monitor, April 17, 2015, p. 4 , accessed July 10, 2015 .
  23. ↑ Iraqi Cabinet regards Popular Mobilization Forces an official organ, Cabinet. In: Iraq TradeLink News Agency. April 7, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015 .
  24. ↑ Bill Roggio, Caleb Weiss: Video shows Hezbollah Brigades convoy transporting American M1 tank. In: The Long War Journal. January 28, 2015, accessed March 17, 2015 .
  25. ↑ Josh Rogin, Eli Lake: Iran-Backed Militias Are Getting US Weapons. In: Bloomberg View. Retrieved March 17, 2015 .
  26. ^ Armed with US weapons, infamous militia beating ISIS. February 2, 2015, accessed March 17, 2015 .
  27. ↑ Ryan Missy: Tracking US weapons grows harder in the fog of Iraq's fragmented war. In: The Washington Post . March 26, 2015, accessed April 4, 2015 .
  28. ↑ Hamza Shirtawi, Qassim Abdul-Zahra: Iran eclipses US as Iraq's ally in fight against militants. In: MilitaryTimes. January 12, 2015, accessed March 20, 2015 .
  29. ↑ David Enders: US Starts Sending $ 1.6 Billion Worth of Promised Arms to Iraq - But Who Will Get Them? In: Vice News . June 6, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015 .
  30. ↑ Shiite volunteers enter Anbar province. In: Iraq TradeLink News Agency. May 6, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015 .
  31. ↑ a b http://www.sistani.org/english/archive/25036/ (www.sistani.org) on ​​12th of Feb 2015, accessed on the 3rd of April 2015
  32. ↑ Iraqi Shia militias accused of murder spree. In: al-Jazeera . October 14, 2014, accessed March 16, 2015 .
  33. ↑ Iraqi PM Abadi: Shiite militia won't join battle for Mosul. In: Rudaw. April 7, 2015, accessed April 16, 2015 .
  34. ↑ Ali Mamouri: Iraq needs justice, revenge not. (No longer available online.) In: The Arab American News. March 12, 2015, archived from the original on March 15, 2015 ; accessed on March 15, 2015 .
  35. ↑ Iraq's PM Abadi Orders Probe Into Two Civilian Deaths at Anbar Security HQ. In: Canada Headlines. February 13, 2015, accessed March 15, 2015 .
  36. ^ Imad Farhadi: The Constitutionality of the Popular Mobilization Force. In: The MENA Informer. March 24, 2015, accessed March 31, 2015 .
  37. ↑ Shiite "Popular Mobilization" is unconstitutional. (No longer available online.) In: KurdishGlobe. February 2, 2015, archived from the original on April 3, 2015 ; accessed on March 31, 2015 .