Article 13 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany

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Article 13 of the German Basic Law (GG) guarantees the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home. This serves to protect the spatial privacy from interference by the state. This is primarily a right to freedom . At the same time, it obliges the state to protect the home from unauthorized private individuals.

Normalization

Article 13 of the Basic Law - a work by Dani Karavan on the glass panes on the Spree side at the Jakob-Kaiser-Haus of the Bundestag in Berlin

Since its last amendment on April 1, 1998, Art. 13 GG has read as follows:

(1) The home is inviolable.

(2) Searches may only be ordered by the judge, in the case of imminent danger also by the other organs provided for in the law and only carried out in the form prescribed there.

(3) If certain facts justify the suspicion that someone has committed a particularly serious criminal act specified by law, technical means for acoustic monitoring of apartments in which the accused is presumably staying may be used to prosecute the act on the basis of a court order if the investigation of the facts would otherwise be disproportionately difficult or futile. The measure is to be limited in time. The order is made by a panel of three judges. In the case of imminent danger, it can also be taken by a single judge.

(4) To avert urgent dangers to public safety, in particular a common danger or a mortal danger, technical means for monitoring apartments may only be used on the basis of a court order. In the case of imminent danger, the measure can also be ordered by another legally specified body; a judicial decision must be made up for immediately.

(5) If technical means are provided exclusively for the protection of persons working in apartments, the measure can be ordered by a legally specified body. Any other use of the knowledge obtained in this way is only permitted for the purpose of criminal prosecution or hazard prevention and only if the legality of the measure has been previously determined by a judge; in the event of imminent danger, the judicial decision must be made immediately.

(6) The Federal Government shall inform the Bundestag annually about the use of technical means in accordance with Paragraph 3 and in the area of ​​competence of the Federation in accordance with Paragraph 4 and, insofar as this requires judicial review, in accordance with Paragraph 5. A body elected by the Bundestag exercises parliamentary control on the basis of this report. The federal states guarantee equivalent parliamentary control.

(7) Interventions and restrictions may otherwise only be used to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to individual persons, on the basis of a law also to prevent urgent dangers to public safety and order, in particular to remedy the shortage of space, to combat the risk of epidemics or for Protection of vulnerable young people is made.

Art. 13 paragraph 1 GG guarantees the inviolability of the home. As a right to freedom, the basic right primarily serves to ward off sovereign interference in the privacy that the apartment offers. In addition, the legislator has the mandate to protect the home from private individuals. He fulfills this task, for example, by protecting the home within the framework of criminal and civil law .

History of origin

The intactness of the apartment was protected by § 140 of the Paulskirche constitution of 1849. This norm was based on Article 10 of the Belgian Constitution of 1831. It stated that the apartment was inviolable and made the house search subject to strict conditions. Article 6 of the Prussian constitution of 1850 guaranteed the inviolability of the apartment. This right could be restricted by law. The inviolability of the home was not mentioned in the constitution of the German Empire , but it did apply in the state constitutions. The prerequisites for sovereign interference in the apartment therefore resulted from simple law, such as the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO). The constitutional protection of the apartment by the Weimar Imperial Constitution (WRV), which guaranteed the inviolability of the apartment in Art. 115, was taken up again.

In the course of drafting the Basic Law, the Parliamentary Council took up the guarantee of Art. 115 WRV and adopted it in Art. 13 GG. When the Basic Law came into force on May 24, 1949, this comprised three paragraphs: the guarantee of fundamental rights and the options for limiting it. Article 13, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law contained special requirements for searches as a particularly serious intrusion into the inviolability of the home. The standard was as follows:

(1) The home is inviolable.

(2) Searches may only be ordered by the judge, in the case of imminent danger also by the other organs provided for in the law and only carried out in the form prescribed there.

(3) Interventions and restrictions may incidentally only to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to individual persons, on the basis of a law also to prevent urgent dangers to public safety and order, in particular to remedy the shortage of space, to combat the risk of epidemics or for Protection of vulnerable young people is made.

The first and so far only revision was made to Art. 13 GG by law of March 26, 1998 with effect from April 1 of the same year. In this way, the legislature created the current paragraphs 3-6 of Article 13 of the Basic Law, which link the technical monitoring of dwellings to certain requirements. With the new regulation, the legislature wanted to create the legal framework to use technical surveillance as a means of combating organized crime . In jurisprudence, it was extremely controversial whether this change is constitutional: Critical voices accused the legislature of the new paragraphs creating the opportunity to intervene in the core area of ​​private life , which as an elementary component of human dignity according to Art. 1 Paragraph 1 GG does not may intervene. The Federal Constitutional Court considered the new regulation in its ruling on the large eavesdropping attack of 2004 to be compatible with the Basic Law. However, there was a restrictive application of the authority for technical surveillance in order to exclude violations of human dignity.

An even earlier restriction of the protection of the home took place in 1956 with the addition of Article 17a, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, which states: "Laws that serve the defense, including the protection of the civilian population, can stipulate that the fundamental rights of free movement ( Article 11) and the inviolability of the home (Article 13). "

Protection area

Art. 13 GG protects the citizen against encroachment on his home. To this end, the fundamental right guarantees a sphere of freedom that sovereigns may only intervene under certain conditions. This sphere is called the protection area . If the sovereign intervenes in this and this is not constitutionally justified, Art. 13 GG is violated.

Jurisprudence differentiates between the personal and factual areas of protection. The personal protection area determines who is protected by the fundamental right. The objective area of ​​protection determines which freedoms are protected by the fundamental right.

Personally

Art. 13 GG does not restrict the group of fundamental rights holders, so that the fundamental right protects everyone. On the one hand, the protection area covers natural persons . On the other hand, associations of persons , in particular legal persons under private law, can invoke Article 13 of the Basic Law, since the fundamental right according to Article 19 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law is essentially applicable to them. For them, however, the protection of Art. 13 GG is weaker, since the protection of the home is closely related to the guarantee of human dignity (Art. 1 Paragraph 1 GG), which only protects natural persons.

According to the prevailing view, anyone who unjustifiably takes possession of an apartment is not protected by Art. 13 GG. Public authorities as apartment owners are also not protected, since they are not in a risky situation typical of basic rights with regard to the privacy of apartments.

Factual

Art. 13 GG names the dwelling as an object of protection. In the context of constitutional law, law understands this to be an elementary living space that serves personal development and enables the individual to withdraw from the public eye. The scope of the area of ​​protection of Art. 13 GG is largely determined by the privacy that the apartment offers its owner: Any space that offers its owner a certain amount of privacy can be considered as an apartment. This applies to living spaces as well as rooms that are closely related to living spaces, such as basements, outbuildings and gardens. However , the judiciary does not judge detention rooms as apartments, as these are subject to the institution's house rules. Therefore, prison staff are allowed to enter cells without prior notice.

In jurisprudence it is controversial to what extent work and business premises qualify as apartments. Legal scholars object to their inclusion in Article 13 of the Basic Law that such premises do not have sufficient privacy. The prevailing view in jurisprudence, which is also followed by case law, includes business premises in the area of ​​protection of Article 13 of the Basic Law. To this end, she states, on the one hand, that business premises are used for free professional practice, which is an expression of the development of personality that occurs within apartments. In addition, the forerunners of Art. 13 GG were also designed in such a way that they also protected commercially used spaces. Finally, some foreign legal systems also regard work and business premises as apartments, such as the Austrian and Italian. The prevailing view, however, limits the scope of the protection of Article 13 of the Basic Law for business premises: Only premises that are not accessible to the general public experience full protection of fundamental rights. Spaces open to the general public experience weaker protection under Art. 13 GG, since they offer their owner less privacy. This has an impact on the level of justification for interference.

Fundamental rights competitions

Art. 13 GG supersedes the basic right of general freedom of action as a special right to freedom ( Art. 2 Paragraph 1 GG). With regard to the technical monitoring of an apartment, the special regulations of Art. 13 GG continue to supersede the general right of personality from Art. 2 Paragraph 1 GG, Art. 1 Paragraph 1 GG.

If an interference with Art. 13 GG leads to an authority obtaining data from an apartment, its further use is protected by the right to informational self-determination , which is a special form of the general right of personality. In such cases, telecommunications secrecy ( Art. 10 GG) can be used alongside Art. 13 GG. If the premises against which the encroachment on fundamental rights is directed is used by the press or radio , its justification is based on both Article 13 of the Basic Law and the basic communication rights of Article 5 (1) of the Basic Law.

Interventions in the inviolability of the apartment affect the property guarantee of Art. 14 GG, since the owner of the apartment is forcibly limited in his power over the apartment. Art. 14 GG, however, withdraws from the more specific fundamental right of Art. 13 GG, insofar as the sovereign interference affects the privacy of the home.

Intervention

An encroachment occurs when the guarantee content of a basic right is shortened by sovereign action. With regard to the inviolability of the home, this applies if the spatial privacy of a home is invaded. Art. 13 GG distinguishes between several forms of intervention in this regard.

Art. 13 paragraph 2 GG regulates the search. Here, a sovereign searches for something or a person within an apartment that the apartment owner does not want to voluntarily reveal to the state. The law provides for searches, for example, in criminal proceedings ( Section 102 - Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), for security (e.g. Section 41 of the Police Act North Rhine-Westphalia) and for enforcement ( Section 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure ).

Art. 13 paragraphs 2-6 GG relate to the technical monitoring of dwellings. Here, a sovereign uses technical means to perceive processes within an apartment that would remain hidden to him without it. This is done, for example, through optical and acoustic monitoring measures, such as microphones or cameras. These measures are known as eavesdropping. Legal science differentiates between large and small eavesdropping. The former is regulated in Art. 13 Paragraph 3 and 4 of the Basic Law and describes the surveillance of the living space for the purpose of investigating criminal offenses or for the purpose of averting danger. The small eavesdropping is described in Art. 13 Paragraph 5 GG. Such a measure exists when a public authority monitors a living space exclusively for the protection of a person who is located inside the apartment using technical means, such as an undercover investigator ( Section 110d StPO).

Art. 13 paragraph 7 GG covers other interventions in the inviolability of the home. This includes, for example, the inspection of premises by an authority, as provided for in Section 22 of the Catering Act for restaurants and Section 17 of the Crafts Code for craft businesses . The entry into an apartment by an expert for the purpose of gathering evidence in the context of civil proceedings is also an encroachment according to Art. 13 Paragraph 7 of the Basic Law . The same applies to the unauthorized stay in an apartment by a sovereign.

Justification of an Intervention

If there is a sovereign interference, it is lawful if it is constitutionally justified. The protection of spatial privacy by Article 13 of the Basic Law is closely related to the guarantee of human dignity. An encroachment on Art. 13 GG is therefore not justifiable if it also constitutes an encroachment on human dignity. Therefore, for example, the collection of data from the core area of ​​private life is not permitted. As far as human dignity is not affected, Article 13 of the Basic Law allows the limitation of the inviolability of the home. The prerequisites for this depend on the nature of the encroachment on fundamental rights.

Search, Art. 13 Paragraph 2 GG

According to Article 13, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, the search of an apartment may only be ordered by a judge on the basis of a formal law . The involvement of a judge is intended to ensure that the greatest possible protection of fundamental rights is achieved for the benefit of the apartment owner. The prerequisites that the judge examines here result from the norm that authorizes searches. Unless violating an authority against the judicial order, this leads to the obtained by the search of evidence generally may not be used judicially .

In the case of imminent danger, another organ may order the search instead of a judge, provided it is legally authorized to do so. According to Section 105 (1) StPO, this applies to the public prosecutor's office and the police . There is a risk of delay if the obtaining of a judicial order based on concrete evidence leads with sufficient probability that the purpose of the search is thwarted. The Federal Constitutional Court interprets this exception narrowly, as it significantly shortens the protection of the home.

The other requirements for the search are specified in the respective procedural regulations. These must comply with the principle of proportionality derived from the rule of law , which is also of great importance for the justification of other encroachments on fundamental rights. An encroachment on fundamental rights is proportionate if it pursues a legitimate purpose, is suitable for its promotion, is necessary for this and does not cause any disadvantage for the addressee that is disproportionate to the purpose pursued. In the context of criminal proceedings, for example, the gravity of the offense and the degree of suspicion are of great importance for assessing proportionality. A search of a law firm because of a traffic offense is fundamentally prohibited .

Technical observation

Surveillance for repression purposes, Art. 13 Paragraph 3 GG

The technical surveillance of living space is permissible according to Art. 13 Paragraph 3 GG if it is used to prosecute particularly serious crimes. This requirement is concretized by § 100b paragraph 2 StPO, which names the relevant acts. With regard to such an act, facts must justify the suspicion that the person being eavesdropped committed it.

The measure may be carried out in apartments where the suspect is likely to be. It is subsidiary to other measures, which is why it may only be decided if the matter cannot be clarified in another way with reasonable effort.

The monitoring can, in principle only by a three Judges Chamber be placed. If there is imminent danger, however, an order by a single judge is sufficient. The order must set a time limit for the measure. According to Section 100d Paragraph 1 Clause 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, living space surveillance may generally last a maximum of one month.

Furthermore, the apartment owner must be informed of the measure in accordance with Section 101 (5) sentence 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as soon as this does not endanger the purpose of the investigation or an important legal asset. Article 13, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law does not contain a corresponding requirement, but the Federal Constitutional Court requires that the holder of fundamental rights be informed of any interference with his or her fundamental rights.

According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, surveillance must be broken off as soon as information is intercepted that comes from the core area of ​​the private life of the intercepted person, as the measure would otherwise violate his or her human dignity. If such data is recorded, it must be deleted immediately.

Monitoring for prevention purposes, Art. 13 Paragraph 4 GG

Art. 13, Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law allows technical surveillance to continue to avert danger . The prerequisite for this is that there is an urgent danger to public safety, such as a common danger or a mortal danger.

There is a risk if there is sufficient probability that damage to a police asset will occur in the foreseeable future if the events continue unhindered. Public safety and in some federal states also public order are protected assets . When a danger is urgent is controversial in jurisprudence. Some voices assume that it is a danger to a particularly important legal asset, others assume that the urgency relates to the moment of time. Another view combines both approaches and regards as urgent a danger that exists for an important legal asset and threatens to result in damage in the near future. A common hazard is a hazard to a large number of people or legal interests of significant value.

In the case of Article 13, Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law, the order must in principle be ordered by a judge. If there is imminent danger, the measure may also be ordered by another legally specified body. However, the judge's decision must be made up for immediately.

Surveillance to protect undercover investigators, Art. 13 Paragraph 5 GG

Article 13 (5) of the Basic Law allows surveillance with the help of technical means to protect people who are deployed in an apartment. This regulation applies, for example, to undercover investigators (§ 110a StPO). In contrast to measures under Article 13 Paragraphs 3–4 of the Basic Law, a judicial order is not required for measures under Article 13 Paragraph 5 of the Basic Law. However, the data obtained during such a use may only be used for purposes other than protective purposes if the legality of the measure has been determined by a judge.

Information obligation, Art. 13 Paragraph 6 GG

Art. 13, Paragraph 6, Clause 1 of the Basic Law defines a duty to inform the executive . According to this, the Federal Government informs the Bundestag annually of measures under Article 13 Paragraph 3–5 of the Basic Law that fall within the competence of the Federal Government . This should enable the Bundestag to assess the benefits of these measures and control the activities of the executive. Article 13, Paragraph 6, Clause 3 of the Basic Law stipulates a comparable duty to inform at the state level.

Other measures, Art. 13 Paragraph 7 GG

Art. 13 paragraph 7 GG standardizes the requirements for other interventions in the inviolability of the home. According to this, sovereigns may intervene in the basic right in order to avert a common danger or a mortal danger.

If a law so stipulates, the measure may also be taken to prevent urgent dangers to public safety and order, in particular to remedy the shortage of space, to combat the risk of epidemics or to protect young people at risk. In contrast to Article 13 (2) of the Basic Law, within the framework of Article 13 (7) of the Basic Law, a purely material law is sufficient as a basis for intervention.

The wording of Article 13, Paragraph 7 of the Basic Law also includes official access rights. This is standardized, for example, in Section 41 (4) PolG NRW, which authorizes the police to enter publicly accessible rooms and properties in order to avert danger during work, business or residence hours. This authorization basis - like numerous similar overriding norms - does not meet its wording according to the requirements of Art. 13 Paragraph 7 GG. According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, the qualified justification requirements of Article 13, Paragraph 7 of the Basic Law do not apply to simple access rights, however, since its limitation provisions exceed the need for protection of the owner of the premises. Therefore, the court does not regard entering a business premises as an interference with Art. 13 GG, but as an interference with the general freedom of action. It considers this to be justified if the measure is based on an authorization that standardizes the purpose and scope of entry. Furthermore, it must take place at times when the apartment is open to visitors. After all, it must be necessary and appropriate. This jurisprudence meets with great contradiction in jurisprudence because it does not fit into the structure of Article 13 of the Basic Law.

European law

At the European level, the inviolability of the home as part of private life is protected by Art. 8 Paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to this, every person has the right to respect for their home. Like the Federal Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) understands the term apartment broadly and also subsumes business premises under it. According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, the ECHR and the case law of the ECHR have an indirect effect on the German legal system by influencing its interpretation .

The home is also protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . This also regards the protection of the home as part of the protection of privacy. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been a binding part of Union law since the Treaty of Lisbon . Before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the ECJ derived the protection of the home as a general legal principle from the legal systems of the member states. Initially, it only extended protection to private homes. After the ECHR extended the protection of the home to business premises, the ECJ followed this case law. Therefore, the guarantee of freedom of housing under Union law largely corresponds to that of Art. 8 ECHR.

literature

  • Gilbert Gornig: Art. 13 . In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  • Hans Hofmann: Art. 13 . In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  • Hans Jarass: Art. 13 . In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  • Jörg-Detlef Kühne: Art. 13 . In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  • Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 . In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  • Klaus Stern: Art. 13 . In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  • Heinrich Wolff: Art. 13 . In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Handkommentar . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 43. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  2. ^ Lothar Michael, Martin Morlok: Grundrechte . 6th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3871-7 , § 9, marginal no. 366.
  3. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 57. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  4. ↑ Johannes Koranyi: The protection of the home in criminal law . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2014, p. 241 (242).
  5. ↑ BVerfGE 89, 1 (13) : Tenant's right of possession.
  6. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 7. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  7. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 , Rn. 3. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (Ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  8. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 8. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Comment The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  9. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 9. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  10. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 10. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  11. ↑ Hans Hofmann: Art. 13 , Rn. 1. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  12. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 15, Rn. 1.
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  15. ↑ a b BVerfGE 109, 279 : Large bugging attack.
  16. ^ Christoph Gusy: Eavesdropping and Basic Law . In: Juristische Schulung 2004, p. 457 (461–462).
  17. ↑ Hans Jarass: Preparation before Art. 1 , marginal no. 19-23. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  18. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 6, Rn. 2.
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  20. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 6, Rn. 2.
  21. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 663.
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  23. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 , Rn. 17. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  24. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 15, Rn. 7-8.
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  26. ↑ Udo Fink: Art. 13, Rn. 4. In: Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Eds.): Beckscher Online Commentary GG. 34th edition. 2017.
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  29. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 969-971.
  30. ↑ BVerfGE 89, 1 (12) : Tenant's right of possession.
  31. ↑ BVerfGE 42, 212 (219) : Quick / search order.
  32. ↑ Michael Kloepfer: Constitutional Law Volume II . 4th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-59527-1 , § 66, Rn. 5.
  33. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 , Rn. 10. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (Ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  34. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of May 30, 1996, 2 BvR 727/94, 2 BvR 884/94 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1996, p. 2643.
  35. ↑ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: Art. 13 , Rn. 4. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  36. ↑ Georg Hermes: Art. 13 , Rn. 26. In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1-19. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, ISBN 978-3-16-150493-8 .
  37. ↑ BVerfGE 96, 44 (51) : Search order II.
  38. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 972.
  39. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 668.
  40. ↑ BVerfGE 32, 54 (70) : Company access right .
  41. ↑ BVerfGE 32, 54 (75) : Company access right .
  42. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 , Rn. 14. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  43. ↑ a b Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 137. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  44. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , chap. 968 .
  45. ↑ BVerfGE 20, 162 : Spiegel.
  46. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 13 , Rn. 2. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  47. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 8, Rn. 1.
  48. ↑ BVerfGE 51, 97 (107) : Foreclosure I.
  49. ↑ BVerfGE 76, 83 (89) : Foreclosure III.
  50. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 13 , Rn. 8. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  51. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 977.
  52. ↑ BVerfGE 75, 318 (327) : Expert.
  53. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 672.
  54. ↑ Hans Hofmann: Art. 13 , Rn. 32. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  55. ↑ BVerfGE 115, 166 (196) : Communication connection data.
  56. ↑ BVerfGE 57, 346 (355) : Foreclosure II.
  57. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 76. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  58. ↑ Georg Hermes: Art. 13 , Rn. 42-43. In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1-19. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, ISBN 978-3-16-150493-8 .
  59. ↑ Gerwin Moldenhauer, Marc Wenske: Current developments in case law on the danger in arrears . In: Legal Training 2017, p. 206.
  60. ↑ BVerfGE 103, 142 (155) : House search.
  61. ↑ BVerfGE 51, 97 (111) : Foreclosure I.
  62. ↑ Mike Wienbracke: The principle of proportionality . In: Journal for Legal Studies 2013, p. 148.
  63. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 480.
  64. ↑ BVerfG, decision of February 11, 2015, BVerfG 2 BvR 1694/14 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2015, p. 1585.
  65. ↑ BVerfG, decision of September 7, 2006, 2 BvR 1141/05 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2006, p. 3411.
  66. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 119. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  67. ↑ Elmar Krüger: The concept of danger in police and regulatory law . In: Juristische Schulung 2013, p. 985 (985–986).
  68. ↑ Stefan Korte, Stephan Dittrich: Protected property and probability of damage in hazard prevention law . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2017, p. 332 (333–336).
  69. ↑ BVerwGE 47, 31 .
  70. ↑ Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke: Police and regulatory law . 9th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-7509-0 , Rn. 78.
  71. ↑ Stefan Korte, Stephan Dittrich: Protected property and probability of damage in hazard prevention law . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2017, p. 332 (338).
  72. ↑ Gilbert Gornig: Art. 13 , Rn. 124. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  73. ^ Dieter Kugelmann: Police and regulatory law . 2nd Edition. Springer, Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-23374-6 , Chapter 5, Rn. 154.
  74. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 13 , Rn. 24. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: hand commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  75. ↑ BVerfGE 109, 279 (373) : Large bugging attack.
  76. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 13 , Rn. 3. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  77. ↑ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: Art. 13 , Rn. 50. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  78. ↑ Klaus Stern: Art. 13 , Rn. 92. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  79. ↑ Hinnerk Wißmann: Basic cases to Art. 13 GG . In: Juristische Schulung 2007, p. 324 (327).
  80. ↑ BVerfGE 32, 54 (77) : Company access right .
  81. ↑ BVerfGE 97, 228 (266) : short reports.
  82. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 989
  83. ↑ ECHR, judgment of April 28, 2005, 41604/98 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2006, p. 1495.
  84. ↑ BVerfGE 111, 307 : ECHR decisions.
  85. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Paper: Art. 13 , Rn. 9. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .