Azerbaijani-Russian relations

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Azerbaijani-Russian relations
Location of Azerbaijan and Russia
AzerbaijanAzerbaijan RussiaRussia
Azerbaijan Russia

The relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation are very tight due to the common Soviet history. They are especially important for Azerbaijan. The main aim of Azerbaijani foreign policy is to maintain the country's independence from Russia. Russia, on the other hand, is trying to expand and consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus.

Since the Baku region fell to Russia in the wake of the Golestan Treaty and until the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has ruled Azerbaijan, which, from the Azerbaijani point of view, amounts to two centuries of Russian colonial rule. The influences of Soviet communism on Azerbaijani society are permanent.

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union , Russia temporarily lost control of the Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, which has close ethnic ties to Turkey and Iran . The violent crackdown on protests in Tbilisi (April 9, 1989) and Baku (January 20, 1990) intensified alienation from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the country's first president, Ayaz Mütəllibov, pursued a pro-Soviet or pro-Russian policy after his declaration of independence. Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, Russia was not an attractive partner for the former Soviet republics, while a new state had to be established in Baku.

Mütəllibov's successor Əbülfəz Elçibəy pursued erratic, anti-Russian, pro-Turkish and pro-Western policies. He viewed Russia as a threat to Azerbaijan's independence because since around 1993, when the Russian state was consolidated, Russia had tried to keep the South Caucasus in its own sphere of influence. Russia, which had supported Azerbaijan at the time of the Soviet Union in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , now sided with Armenia. In November 1993 Moscow decided that Russia should have a military presence in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and that the external borders of the CIS should be guarded by Russian military. Azerbaijan refused, the Russian military left Azerbaijan for the most part by 1992. Since 1999, Russia has also wanted to prevent the spread of democratically minded governments in the sphere of influence that it regards the former Soviet Union as. Russia has offered Azerbaijan several times to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if Azerbaijan joins the Russian security architecture in return, which would significantly curtail the country's independence. It is unlikely that Azerbaijan will ever accept this offer.

In 1993, a rebellion led by Surət Hüseynov overthrew the Azerbaijani Popular Front government and President Elçibəy after the withdrawing Russian army (104th Airborne Brigade) gave him their weapons. Heydər Əliyev prevented Hüseynov from taking power and put himself at the head of the state. Əliyev led Azerbaijan into the Commonwealth of Independent States, which Russia wanted, not least because it was on the verge of defeat in the war with Armenia. But he wanted to talk to Moscow about the stationing of Russian troops only after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had been resolved, which never happened - Russia's control over Azerbaijan was slipping more and more. Russian attempts to create strife among non-Azerbaijani ethnic groups had only limited effect, so that the ethnic aspect was ruled out as a lever for influence in Russia.

Əliyev's strategy was to secure the independence of Azerbaijan with the help of its energy resources. The export of oil and natural gas should not only fill the state treasury, but also strengthen the West's interest in Azerbaijan and its independence. Azerbaijan demonstratively excluded Russian companies from the treaty of the century for the exploitation of Azerbaijani oil and gas reserves, which was a slap in the face for Russia. Only a few days after the signing of the treaty of the century, another attempted coup by Hüseynov failed. Hüseynov found refuge in the last remaining Russian military base, after which Russia lost all military influence over Azerbaijan. The only means by which Russia could still exercise control of Azerbaijan was through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline , through which Azerbaijani oil could be exported westward.

When Russia invaded Chechnya in 1994 and failed to gain control of the small breakaway republic and the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline that ran through Chechnya, Azerbaijan, like Georgia, Uzbekistan and later Armenia, turned more towards the west. From 1998 Azerbaijan, like its neighbor Georgia , considered joining NATO , Azerbaijan even considered allowing NATO bases on its territory. In addition, the Chechnya war made the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline feasible despite high costs; in 1998, five presidents in Ankara signed a declaration calling for the construction of the pipeline.

Thanks to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus pipeline , Russia, unlike in numerous other successor states of the Soviet Union, does not have a monopoly over energy plants in Azerbaijan. This means energy and foreign policy independence for Azerbaijan and Georgia; for example, in 1999 Azerbaijan withdrew from the Russia-led organization of the Collective Security Treaty . Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan’s joint plans to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline met with strong opposition in Moscow. Russia warned that ignoring its position could end in a scenario like Georgia in 2008 .

With the beginning of the Putin era in Russia, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia improved. Azerbaijan stopped its support for the Chechens , the two states agreed to draw a border in the Caspian Sea . A reason for the better relations and the relative independence of Azerbaijan from Russia that should not be underestimated is the KGB past of the two presidents Vladimir Putin and Heydər Əliyev, which ensures a good basis for communication. Əliyev, however, had the rank of general in the KGB, Putin was only a lieutenant colonel. Furthermore, in the mid-2000s, the West and Turkey were not very open to the dictatorship that Əliyev established, while Putin established a similar style a little later. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, Russia continued to support Armenia; Russian peacekeepers reject Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan did not comply with Russia's demand not to build pipelines past Russian territory. When Russia demanded that Azerbaijan sell all of its gas to Russia after the end of the Nabucco pipeline , Əliyev refused, saying that he would either sell it directly to the West or leave it in the ground. Azerbaijan also takes a different position than Moscow in terms of foreign policy: It behaved neutrally during the Russian invasion of Georgia and described the controversial victory of Russia-oriented Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine as illegitimate.

Web links

Commons : Azerbaijani-Russian Relations  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Svante E. Cornell : Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, ISBN 0-7656-3003-6 , pp. 338 .
  2. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 342 .
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h Frederik Coene: The Caucasus: an introduction . 1st edition. Routledge, London 2010, ISBN 978-0-203-87071-6 , pp. 174 .
  4. ^ A b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 339 f .
  5. ^ A b Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 341 .
  6. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 356 .
  7. ^ A b c Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 345 .
  8. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 351 .
  9. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 346 .
  10. ^ A b c Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 350 .
  11. ↑ Claude Moniquet and William Racimora: The Armenia-Iran Relationship - Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus region . European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, Brussels 2013, p. 43 ( esisc.org [PDF]).
  12. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 352 .
  13. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 357 .
  14. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 353 .