Asymmetry (ethics)

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The asymmetry is applied ethics naive a pair of moral beliefs that affect the generation of people. Texts on asymmetry typically begin with the observation that on the basis of common sense it can be said that, on the one hand, there is such a thing as “a duty to prevent the existence of suffering persons, but no corresponding duty or virtue to condition the existence of happy persons ". In other words, and more formally, "the asymmetry" consists of the following moral beliefs:

  1. "The prospect of a life of a person who would be absolutely miserable - beyond the threshold of a life worth living - is considered a reason to prevent this person's existence."
  2. "The prospect of a life for a person whose life would be a good and livable life is not in itself a reason for the existence of that person."

What exactly it means that a life is (no longer) worth living or (not) a good life is typically not the subject of discussions about asymmetry. Rather, it is about the apparent peculiarity of how in this type of decision, on the one hand, the prospect of an evil provides a good reason against an action; the prospect of an apparently comparable good does not constitute a reason for an apparently comparable action.

classification

Building on the tradition of analytical philosophy, and in particular the work of Derek Parfit on the so-called non-identity problem, an increasingly independent philosophical debate emerged from the 1980s on the above two propositions of asymmetry, which questions the coherence of these two statements within theories of moral justifications. ( McMahan 1981 ) is considered to be the first publication to address the problem of asymmetry. The term asymmetry has emerged as a standing term in these debates.

In defense of asymmetry

( McMahan 2009 ) spells out some possibilities that justify both parts of the asymmetry. First, one could try, for example, to reduce the asymmetry in reproductive decision-making to a more general asymmetry between actions that injure and actions that favor: Just as many thinkers weight injuries more heavily than favors, let the condition of the existence of a suffering person as a Conceive quasi-harm and weight it more heavily than quasi-favoritism in the conditioning of the existence of a happy person. A similar reduction is by ( Persson 2009 criticized) of ( Tooley 1998 defended): Both suggest the cause of a painful existence of negative as a violation of rights of the person -to-be specific. ( McMahan 2009 ) sees two types of problem here:

  • On the one hand, favoring and violating are comparative terms. A person is injured by an action if he is worse off because of the action than without the action (although a temporal or counterfactual comparison could be made here). The person who would be "injured" by the condition of the painful existence does not exist at the moment of the action, and it therefore remains questionable to what extent a comparison can be made with the state of this non-existent person, and consequently to what extent by one at all Injury in the real sense can be spoken of.
  • On the other hand, the asymmetry between benefiting and hurting is "stronger" than the asymmetry between creating "happy" and "miserable" people, because it is generally assumed that a favor is somehow morally positive and not - as in asymmetry - just perceived as a morally neutral option or individual freedom.

Finally, McMahan proposes to distinguish between the functions of intrinsic goods and evils that give rise to action and the functions of goods and evils that outweigh the functions. A good is the justification for an action if its presence is suitable to justify an action. Mainly in contrast to this is a good aspect of an action if it can outweigh the evils associated with an action, but does not constitute a reason to set the action (for evils quite analogously). If one accepts these different functions of goods and evils, the asymmetry could be justified precisely if it is assumed that goods which do not concern any existing persons have only a predominant function, but not an action-justifying function, and at the same time it would be assumed for evils that do not concern persons they have both functions. McMahan considers this way out to be an ad-hoc justification that cannot be motivated or found again from ethical problems beyond asymmetry. ( Algander 2012 ) contradicts this and gives appropriate examples.

Another defense of asymmetry has suggested ( Roberts 2011 ) which it calls "variabilism" since the assigned moral relevance of actions varies with the context in which the action takes place. Accordingly, “loss within a possible world in which the person experiencing loss exists or will surely exist has full moral relevance both to actions that cause that loss and to alternative actions that avoid that loss. On the other hand, a loss of the same person within a world in which the person never exists has no moral significance whatsoever. "

Alternatives to asymmetry

The problems in justifying the asymmetry have led some authors to find positions that reject parts of the asymmetry. There are various strategies for this: First, similar to Roberts' “variabilism”, one can limit the number of people affected by morality. For utilitarian theories in particular, determining this amount is crucially. There is the possibility of considering all people, regardless of whether they exist or not (“totalism”). On the other hand, one can only consider actually existing persons (“existentialism”) or necessarily existing persons. Many other provisions are conceivable. In ( McMahan 2009 ) another system of positions that reject asymmetry was proposed:

Subjectively symmetrical positions

The subjective-symmetrical positions assume that moral evils must always relate to the experiences of existing subjects. Thus, the subjectively symmetrical position can justify why it is morally neutral to condition happy existences; but it has to reject the thesis that it would be an evil ( ceteris paribus ) to bring a person into the world with the prospect of a miserable life. Such a positioning is suggested in ( Heyd 1994 p. 80 ff.). Another criticized conclusion of this position is that it suddenly makes a considerable difference whether an existence is prevented from the outset or is destroyed immediately after it has begun.

Impersonal symmetrical positions

Impersonally symmetrical positions assume that there are “impersonal values” as well as personal evils and goods; d. H. such evils and goods that are not related to goals or experiences of individuals. Examples that would cite representatives of such non-personal values ​​would be certain concepts of moral equality or an inherent value of nature, as assumed by parts of environmental ethics . More relevant to the asymmetry is that the prospective existence of a "happy" person could also be understood as such an impersonal good. Balanced is the position because the prospective positive and negative experiences of the persons -in-law are both included as impersonal values in the ethical balance with. This means that the first part of the asymmetry can be justified. However, it then becomes at least a virtue to condition the existence of “happy” people. ( Bradley 2013 ) opted for such a resolution of the asymmetry. In addition to the rejection of the second part of the asymmetry, it was also problematized that under its auspices it could sometimes be ceteris paribus more reprehensible to prevent an existence than to end an existence because, under suitable circumstances, those who have ended are less fortunate Lifetime would be withheld than with the completely prevented.

Antinatalist position

Another possibility is to recognize impersonal evils - "less suffering is always better than more suffering" - but to reject impersonal goods: "Less happiness is an evil only if a person can be individuated for whom the lack of happiness is also an evil. ”This position recognizes the first part of the asymmetry, but has to reject the second part and imply that the conditioning of any personal existence is always a moral evil, provided that this existence only contains some intrinsic evils. If this evil cannot be outweighed, it follows that every reproduction is a moral evil. This conclusion assigns this resolution to the so-called antinatalistischen positions ( lat . Anti "against" and natalis "birth") and is in analytic philosophy most prominently by David Benatar represented. It was developed from a reflection on asymmetry. In contrast to other anti-natalistic positions, such as those of the Church of Euthanasia , the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, or in contrast to Schopenhauer's position and the anti-natalistic parts of deep ecology , Benatar's argument does not assume a misanthropic worldview and can affirm that personal life is by and large a good life under suitable conditions.

Beyond the excitement triggered by the anti-natalistic conclusion of this dissolution of asymmetry, ( McMahan 2009 ) argues against Benatar's assumptions with a thought experiment: Assume that two potential persons A and B know that A would have a miserable life of short duration and B a long and by and large livable life. However, the lives of containing B as a result of illness in total a considerably longer time than miserable life of A and at this time it'll go B at least comparable bad as A . If, for whatever reason, one had to choose between the condition of an existence of either type A or B , Benatar would be forced to prefer existence of type A due to his precondition for the counterintuitive judgment . Benatar does not see this compulsion and argues against the fact that at the moment of the decision between either A or B both people somehow already exist and therefore the personal goods that make B's life by and large worth living can be included in the decision.

Web links

literature

  • Per Algander: A Defense of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics . In: Res Publica . 18, No. 2, May 2012, ISSN  1356-4765 , pp. 145-157. doi : 10.1007 / s11158-011-9164-0 .
  • Gustaf Arrhenius: The person-affecting restriction, comparativism, and the moral status of potential people . In: Ethical Perspectives . 10, No. 3, 2005, pp. 185-195.
  • David Benatar : Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence . Clarendon Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 9780199549269 .
  • David Benatar: Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics . In: The Journal of Ethics . 17, No. 1-2, June 1, 2013, ISSN  1382-4554 , pp. 121-151. doi : 10.1007 / s10892-012-9133-7 .
  • Ben Bradley: Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating . In: The Journal of Ethics . 17, No. 1-2, June 2013, ISSN  1382-4554 , pp. 37-49. doi : 10.1007 / s10892-012-9134-6 .
  • Krister Bykvist: The benefits of coming into existence . In: Philosophical Studies . 135, No. 3, 2007, pp. 335-362.
  • Daniel J. Elstein: The Asymmetry of Creating and Not Creating Life . In: The Journal of Value Inquiry . 39, No. 1, March 2005, ISSN  0022-5363 , pp. 49-59. doi : 10.1007 / s10790-006-7256-4 .
  • David Heyd: Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People . University of California Press, 1994.
  • Jeff McMahan : Problems of Population Theory . In: Ethics . 92, No. 1, 1981, pp. 96-127.
  • Jeff McMahan: Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist . In: Melinda A. Roberts (ed.) (Ed.): Harming Future Persons  (= International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine). Springer Netherlands, 2009, ISBN 978-1-4020-5696-3 , pp. 49-68.
  • Derek Parfit : Reasons and Persons , reprint. Edition, Oxford University Press, USA, 1986, ISBN 019824908X .
  • Ingmar Persson: Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives . In: Melinda A Roberts (ed.) (Ed.): Harming future persons ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem . Springer, Dordrecht; London 2009, ISBN 9781402056970 , pp. 29-47.
  • Stuart Rachels : Is it good to make happy people? . In: Bioethics . 12, No. 2, 1998, pp. 93-110.
  • Melinda A. Roberts: The asymmetry: A solution . In: Theoria . 77, No. 4, 2011, pp. 333-367.
  • Peter Singer : Practical ethics . Cambridge University Press, 1993.
  • Michael Tooley : Value, obligation and the asymmetry question . In: Bioethics . 12, No. 2, 1998, pp. 111-124.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ ( Benatar 2009 p. 32). Always own translations.
  2. ↑ ( Roberts 2011 pp. 1-2).
  3. ↑ ( Parfit 1986 p. 390).
  4. ↑ ( Roberts 2011 p. 356).
  5. ^ Terminology based on ( Singer 1993 pp. 87-90).
  6. ↑ ( Arrhenius 2005 p. 193).
  7. ↑ ( McMahan 2009 ).
  8. ↑ ( Benatar 2009 p. 32).
  9. ↑ ( Benatar 2013 )