Revolt of the admirals
During the admirals' uprising in the late 1940s, several high-ranking officers in the US Navy took public positions against the US government's military plans .
background
In November 1943, General George C. Marshall called for the War Department and the Navy Department to be merged after the war. This led to the "Unification Debates" and ultimately to the passage of the National Security Act (July 1947). With this law a National Security Council , the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and an independent air force ( United States Air Force ) were created.
The debate leading to the "insurrection" lasted for several years; It peaked in 1949 when several officers, including Chief of Naval Operations Louis E. Denfeld and Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan , were either fired or forced to resign (Denfeld was relieved of duties on November 1, 1949 and retired in 1950).
The generals of the newly formed Air Force advocated the doctrine that any future war could be won through strategic bombing , especially with nuclear weapons . This would of course require a large fleet of heavy long-range bombers . So they asked for extensive funding to be the first to start building the B-36 Peacemaker bomber .
The admirals of the Navy contradicted the Air Force . They pointed to the overwhelming dominance of aircraft carriers in the Pacific War and wanted to get Congress to authorize a large fleet of supercarriers and their support groups, starting with the USS United States (CVA-58) . No war can be won through strategic bombing alone, according to the Navy . In addition, the decision to fight future wars only with nuclear weapons is immoral.
Demolition of the USS United States project
James V. Forrestal , himself a former naval aviator , became Secretary of the Navy in May 1944. In 1947 the independence of the United States Department of the Navy was abolished; it was subordinated to the newly created Ministry of Defense as part of the National Security Act together with the War Department . Forrestal was Minister of Defense from 1947. He supported the position of the Navy and commissioned the USS United States . On March 28, 1949, he resigned for health reasons. US President Truman named Louis A. Johnson as Forrestal's successor; Johnson was close to the Air Force . Less than a month after taking office, Johnson arranged for all activities related to the USS United States to be halted . In protest, John L. Sullivan , first Secretary of the Navy , resigned on May 24, 1949.
A few days later Johnson announced that the aircraft of Marines ( Marine Corps ) would subordinate to the Air Force. This plan was quietly buried after resistance arose in Congress . The Air Force frowned upon the Navy for its aircraft carriers because they were aeronautical installations that they could not control. Secretary Johnson, who was a proponent of the new Air Force , therefore tried to prevent the procurement of these ships as much as possible.
A research group led by Captain Arleigh Burke , called the Op-23, began collecting material to confirm doubts about the Convair B-36's performance and capabilities . An anonymous document soon emerged in which the B-36 was described as a "billion dollar error" and Minister Johnson was suspected of pursuing personal interests with the construction of the B-36. Johnson had served on the board of directors of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) before becoming minister.
Results of the Congressional Hearings
In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee wrote that there was no evidence to support Johnson's aircraft procurement allegations. The evaluation of the B-36 is a matter for the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group , and the armed forces should not allow themselves to judge the weapons of other armed forces. For this reason, the termination of the USS United States project was sharply criticized, as Johnson had confirmed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force that the ship was unusable for the Navy . The committee was with Johnson's decision in a high speed, bypassing the competent Congress - Committee dissatisfied and wrote "National security is not solely a matter for the executive level; this includes not just Congress, but the entire American people, represented by their Congress. The Committee cannot tolerate the manner in which public questions are decided ”.
The identified author of the anonymous document was Cedric R. Worth , a civilian assistant to the Navy Undersecretary. A committee of inquiry recommended that the man be removed from office. After a judicial questioning, Worth was released.
The committee expressed its firm support for the further unification of the military leadership, but wrote that “too much unification would be sought in too short a time” and that the Navy would hold back in the marriage of the armed forces, the Army too eagerly involved and the Air Force could not be tamed. The committee may not find Association Puritans at the Pentagon, the report said.
Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Denfeld (Denfeld had been appointed "Chief of Naval Operations" on December 15, 1947). This was an act of revenge because of his statements.
Army General Omar N. Bradley , Chairman of the United Joint Chiefs of Staff , spoke of the admirals as “fancy dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play unless they can call the signals” (for example: “capricious Prima donnas who do not work for a cause as long as they do not set the tone "), who were in" open rebellion against civilian control ". The unofficial position of the army and air force went even further. Both branches of the armed forces felt that the navy and marine infantry should be completely abolished. Mainly financial considerations played a role. The armed forces were in the midst of troop reduction after World War II . The Army and Air Force believed that their lives depended on securing as many missions as possible.
Lasting effects
The "uprising of the admirals" opened a discussion in military circles that continues to this day about the role of nuclear weapons, strategic bombing and the unification of military command. The first test of national doctrine began on June 25, 1950, when the Korean War broke out. It was decided that North Korea should not be brought to its knees by strategic bombing, but by an invasion by ground forces, aided by ship gunfire and amphibious assaults. This limited war was seen as an anomaly by the supporters of the Air Force doctrine . But the Vietnam War and various smaller conflicts were then fought without strategic bombing. The idea of defeating an enemy with few or no losses of one's own is still tempting, but with the beginning of the 21st century, the means of choice are no longer high-altitude bombers, but cruise missiles and unmanned drones . The Korean War made it clear again that aircraft carriers were the most important military means of enforcing US foreign policy . Shortly after the North Korean attack began, Secretary of Defense Johnson saw this and promised the Navy that it would get new aircraft carriers as soon as it requested them.
literature
- Jeffrey G. Barlow: Revolt of the Admirals, the Fight for Naval Aviation (1945-1950).
Web links
- Hermann Wolk article in Air Force Magazine, from 1988
- Death and Rebirth of the Supercarrier - Andrew Toppan, 1996
Individual evidence
- ↑ see also English Wikipedia
- ↑ see also English Wikipedia