Alliance for work, training and competitiveness

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The alliance for work, training and competitiveness (hereinafter referred to as the alliance or alliance for work) was initiated in 1998 by the then federal government under Gerhard Schröder after the election victory of the SPD and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen . Announced in the SPD's election manifesto as the “Alliance for Work, Innovation and Justice”, the declared aim was to make the alliance a main instrument for combating unemployment . A forerunner of the alliance, the "Alliance for Work and Site Assurance", was initiated under the Kohl government by the then IG Metall chairman Klaus Zwickel . In addition to the Concerted Action (1967–1977), the alliance is the only example of a tripartite corporatist arrangement between trade unions , employers' associations and the government at the national level in the history of the FRG.

Origin and structure

The alliance for work, training and competitiveness met nine times for top-level talks between December 7, 1998 and March 3, 2003. The results of the alliance were recorded in joint statements. There were also joint statements by the Confederation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) and the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB).

The alliance was structured in top-level discussions, a steering group, a benchmarking group and working groups on various topics. The Federal Chancellor, the Minister of the Chancellery, the responsible ministers and four chairmen of the business and employers' associations as well as five union chairmen took part in the top-level talks. The ministers of the Chancellery coordinated the alliance - initially Bodo Hombach and, after his resignation, Frank-Walter Steinmeier .

The benchmarking group was given the task of making international country comparisons. This method, so criticized Christoph Butterwegge , ignored the conflicting interests and assumed a rational solution to the problem of unemployment, which could simply be imitated through best practices . The benchmarking group scientists Wolfgang Streeck and Rolf G. Heinze , who were appointed to the group for the Federal Chancellery, worked out a draft for a low-wage sector , which they published in Spiegel before the discussion at the top level. In addition to Streeck and Heinze, Heide Pfarr (WSI of the Hans Böckler Foundation ), Gerhard Fels ( Institute of the German Economy ) and Günther Schmid ( WZB ) belonged to the group.

Results (resolutions)

The result of the first top-level discussion on December 7, 1998 contained a series of measures that mainly met the demands of the employers: flexible working hours , a corporate tax reform , a permanent reduction in non-wage labor costs , a structural reform of the social security system , which leads to a reduction in the labor factor, An improvement in innovation and competitiveness , an employment- promoting collective bargaining policy , the dismantling of structural barriers to the establishment and growth of companies, the development of new fields of employment and training opportunities for low-skilled workers by testing and using new instruments (training and further training as well as incentives to take up work). Apart from the agreement on the goals, however, no specific measures were adopted.

At the second top-level discussion on February 25, 1999, no joint declaration was made. The only aim was to dovetail the Alliance for Work more closely with the state level.

In a joint declaration by the DGB and the BDA after the third top-level meeting on July 6, 1999, it was agreed to further differentiate the labor market institutions of the collective bargaining agreement through opening clauses and corridors. “ With this in mind, within the framework of applicable laws and collective bargaining agreements, we advocate company alliances for securing and promoting jobs, creating training positions and improving competitiveness. »In addition, the participants agreed on a training consensus.

In a joint declaration by the Alliance for Employment for the fourth top-level discussion on December 12, 1999, it said: “The prerequisites for expanding employment are new investments, new markets, new ideas and new independence.” In addition to the goal of offering every young person an apprenticeship position, the integration of the long-term unemployed and the low-skilled in the primary labor market by means of a three-year trial of the Mainz model and the Saar model agreed.

In the fifth top-level discussion (January 9, 2000), issues relating to collective bargaining policy were discussed, which resulted in general statements and which should be differentiated in the collective bargaining sector-specific. The parties involved agreed on an “employment-oriented and longer-term collective bargaining policy”. The scope for distribution based on productivity growth should be used primarily for agreements that have an impact on employment. In addition, the alliance should deal with the topic of flexible working hours. The topic of partial retirement and early retirement from working life has been removed from the alliance and moved to the level of collective bargaining.

At the sixth alliance discussion on July 10, 2000, only existing declarations such as the training consensus, the collective bargaining policy declaration by the BDA and DGB and the initiatives to promote the employment of low-skilled workers were confirmed. Concrete new measures that should emerge from the alliance were not named.

On March 4, 2001, the seventh and final alliance discussion took place, which resulted in a joint declaration. This touched on a wide range of topics such as the reduction of overtime, a qualification offensive, the improvement of employment opportunities for older workers, job placement, old-age provision and wealth creation.

In July 2001, the DGB and BDA again called for the alliance for work to be retained. The last peak meetings on January 25, 2002 and March 3, 2003 remained inconclusive. The alliance ended in spring 2003. Shortly after he declared the alliance to have failed, Gerhard Schröder made the government declaration on Agenda 2010 . He pointed out that in contrast to the particular interests of the social partners, the federal government represents the welfare of society as a whole.

Observers rate the failure of the alliance talks in March 2003 as a trailblazer for Agenda 2010 : “ With the resumption of negotiations after the election on March 3, 2003, the Federal Government cleared the way for Agenda 2010. The failure of another attempt to negotiate social and labor market reforms on a tripartite basis legitimized the exclusion of the associations from the reform process. »With the failure of the Alliance for Labor and Schröder's declaration to unilaterally loosen protection against dismissal, he terminated the consensus between the SPD and the unions, which had campaigned strongly for the SPD in the federal election campaign.

Positions: Critics and supporters of the alliance

In the benchmarking group made up of scientists, opinions dominated, such as Wolfgang Streeck and Rolf G. Heinze, Walter Riester and Bodo Hombach . Alternative positions close to those of Lafontaine were not represented. Streeck campaigned for the alliance to be oriented towards an activating labor market policy. Denmark and the Netherlands were regarded as role models. In the plea by Streeck and Heinzes for a renewal of the German model , a line of argument is already emerging that should be typical of the red-green labor market policy: « The ways of thinking must also change ... People also tend to settle down in dependency and marginality, when they are denied the experience of being able to fend for themselves. In our north-western European neighboring countries it has long been known that it is part of the community's solidarity obligations not to protect its members from market pressures that could induce them to reassert themselves »In the following statements by Streeck, which he originally made on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the DGB presented, he anticipates the Agenda 2010 “ Lowering labor costs, making labor markets more flexible and improving incentives to take up work - these are the undeniable main themes of any serious, real success-oriented effort to solve the current employment problem, and they define the practical political challenges that the German trade unions in the current Alliance for Work will have to face at some point if they want to continue to be able to help shape the labor market and employment. »

At the beginning of the alliance talks, some social scientists were optimistic about stabilizing the welfare state by renewing the concertation. Schroeder / Esser assumed that “ an alliance for work offers the opportunity to shape the necessary transformation of the German model in such a way that its strengths - above all the connection between social integration and economic competitiveness - are retained precisely through the changes sought can be. “In contrast to Esser's analysis that the Germany model was a selective corporatism that excluded parts of the working class in an alliance of trade unions with employers for the export model Germany in the economic crisis of the 1970s, the successful combination of social integration and economic competitiveness is described as the strength of the Germany model.

The opinions of the unions represented in the alliance for work changed in the course of the alliance talks. On the trade union side, more and more critical voices rose in the course of the alliance rounds. This led to disagreements between IG Metall and IG BCE , which, with its chairman Hubertus Schmoldt, showed clear preferences towards the course of the New Center propagated by Gerhard Schröder . This was shown, among other things, in his criticism of IG Metall's proposal to retire at 60 in 1999.

Impact of the Alliance for Labor

The alliance's consequences for work, training and competitiveness emerged on two levels: In addition to concrete political and economic consequences, there were changes in the political discourse, which in the following years resulted in legislative proposals by the red-green federal government.

Concrete political and economic consequences of the alliance

The question of the derivation of concrete political consequences and measures from a national alliance for work, which above all can show declarations of intent, is worth discussing.

Cornelia Fraune identifies rather modest effects and a weak level of concertation. Nico Fickinger sums up that of the changes in labor market and collective bargaining policy, only the Job-AQTIV Act was flanked by the Alliance for Work. It would be difficult to prove whether the surplus of apprenticeships achieved in 2000/2001 and wage moderation in the 2000/2001 collective bargaining round can actually be attributed to the Alliance for Work.

Consequences for the political discourse: The alliance as a forerunner of agenda politics

The alliance for work was related to the politics of the new center of the red-green federal government under Gerhard Schröder. Schröder himself initially staged the alliance as a central political institution: “ For me, such a new supply-side agenda for the left is one of the characteristics of what I call the politics of the New Center. The alliance for work is the focus of such a policy. »

After 2000, however, he gradually lost interest in the concert. " Schröder, for whom the chancellor round was initially just a smoke candle in the federal election campaign and later just a vehicle for concentrating power in the internal party dispute with the SPD chairman Oskar Lafontaine, did not know what to do with the alliance even after the resignation of his adversary "

The most important consequence that emerged from the Alliance for Work, Training and Competitiveness was the discursive link between unemployment and competitiveness . With this, the red-green government took over the supply and competition-oriented line of argument of the Kohl government.

Historical classification: corporatism / concerted action

Compared to the concerted action under the SPD Economics Minister Karl Schiller (1967–1977), the alliance for work was set up in a time of trade union defensive and social cuts. In contrast to the Concerted Action, which was initially under the influence of Keynesian control ideas, it has clear supply-oriented features and pursued the strategy of a differentiated wage policy.

The involvement of the trade unions in the guiding principle of competitive corporatism ( securing the location) had already become clear in 1995 with the advance of Klaus Zwickel, which was commented by the then CDU General Secretary Angela Merkel as follows: “ Wage restraint against job creation and job guarantee - it came down to this simple formula IG Metall boss Klaus Zwickel in autumn 1995. Even if most of them quickly realized that it couldn't be that easy, of course. Because they just don't exist, jobs at the push of a button, with a promise and guarantee and then also quantified as precisely as possible: It was nevertheless a taboo that Zwickel risked in autumn 1995. That is why the remarkable thing about this advance was not in its substance, but in the fact that someone had jumped over his shadow. It was the offer of a trade union leader, who was also a member of the SPD, for a dialogue with employers, moderated by a CDU-led federal government. The magic of Zwickel's idea lay in this political constellation. »

The alliance for work in an international context

In the run-up to entry into economic and monetary union, social pacts were concluded in many European countries in which the government concluded agreements with employers' associations and trade unions on a central, but also on a decentralized level, on a restrained wage policy , flexibilization of the labor markets or decentralized collective bargaining systems. In all then EU countries with the exception of France and Great Britain, tripartite social pacts were concluded in the 1990s, e.g. B. on labor market reforms.

The alliance for work in Germany must also be seen against the background of the Luxembourg process initiated by the European Union in 1997. This was supposed to lead to an approximation of the employment policies of the member states and was clearly competitive.

literature

  • Arlt, Hans-Jürgen / Nehls, Sabine (eds.): Alliance for work: construction, criticism, career (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung), Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999.
  • Bieling, Hans-Jürgen / Deppe, Frank: European integration and industrial relations - on the criticism of the concept of "competitive corporatism", in Schmitthenner, Horst / Urban, Hans-Jürgen (ed.): Welfare state as a reform project. Options for another policy , Hamburg 1999, 275-300.
  • Butterwegge, Christoph: Crisis and future of the welfare state , Wiesbaden 2006, (3rd ed.)
  • Josef Esser / Wolfgang Schroeder: Model Germany: from the concerted action to the alliance for work. In: From politics and contemporary history: Supplement to the weekly newspaper Das Parlament. B 37 1999, pp. 3-12.
  • Fickinger, Nico: The consensus given away: the alliance for work, training and competitiveness 1998 - 2002. Motivation, framework conditions and successes , Wiesbaden 2005.
  • Fraune, Cornelia: New Social Pacts in Germany and the Netherlands , Wiesbaden 2011.
  • Hassel, Anke / Hoffmann, Rainer: National alliances and perspectives of a European employment pact, in: Arlt / Nehls (ed.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career , Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, 213–229.
  • Leggewie, Claus: goats to gardeners? The alliance for work in the political process, in: Arlt / Nehls (Hrsg.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career , Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, 13–24.
  • Schröder, Gerhard: The alliance as the focus of our policy of the new center, in: Arlt / Nehls (Hrsg.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career, Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, 49–56.
  • Streeck, Wolfgang / Heinze, Rolf G .: Complete overhaul of the German model. Departure for more jobs, in: Arlt / Nehls (Hrsg.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career , Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, 147–166.
  • Streeck, Wolfgang: The trade unions in the alliance for work, in: Abel, Jörg / Sperling, Hans-Joachim (eds.): Upheavals and continuities: Perspectives of national and international industrial relations , Munich and Mering 2001, 271–279.
  • Urban, Hans-Jürgen (Ed.): Employment alliance or location pact. The “Alliance for Work” put to the test , Hamburg 2000.
  • Wolf, Michael: From the “Concerted Action” to the “Alliance for Work”, in: Utopie Kreativ , H. 117, July 2000.

Web links

supporting documents

  1. ↑ Wolfgang Schroeder / Josef Esser: Model Germany: From the Concerted Action to the Alliance for Work, in: From Politics and Contemporary History: Supplement to the weekly newspaper Das Parlament, B 37, 1999, p. 8.
  2. ↑ Christoph Butterwegge: Crisis and Future of the Social State, Wiesbaden 2006, 3rd edition, p. 165.
  3. ↑ Cornelia Fraune: New Social Pacts in Germany and the Netherlands, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 184f.
  4. ↑ http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/ersep/imi66_d/0030005.asp  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.eu-employment-observatory.net  
  5. ↑ Nico Fickinger: The consensus given away. The Alliance for Work, Training and Competitiveness 1998–2002, Wiesbaden 2005, 309f.
  6. ↑ DGB and BDA 1999
  7. ^ Alliance for work, training and competitiveness: Joint declaration of the alliance for work, training and competitiveness on the results of the 4th top-level discussion on December 12, 1999, quoted from Nico Fickinger (2005), 318-320.
  8. ^ Alliance for work, training and competitiveness: Joint declaration of the alliance for work, training and competitiveness on the results of the 5th top-level discussion on January 9, 2000, quoted from: Nico Fickinger 2005, 320f.
  9. ↑ Cornelia Fraune: New Social Pacts in Germany and the Netherlands, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 205.
  10. ↑ Cornelia Fraune: New Social Pacts in Germany and the Netherlands, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 212.
  11. ↑ Nico Fickinger: The consensus given away. The Alliance for Work, Training and Competitiveness 1998–2002, Wiesbaden 2005
  12. ↑ Cornelia Fraune, Social Pacts in Germany and in the Netherlands, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 217.
  13. ↑ Claus Leggewie: Bucks to gardeners? The alliance for work in the political process, in: Arlt / Nehls (Hrsg.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career, Wiesbaden 1999, p. 24.
  14. ↑ Wolfgang Streeck: The unions in the alliance for work 2001, 278f.
  15. ^ Wolfgang Streeck / Rolf G. Heinze: Retreading the German model. Departure for more jobs, in Arlt / Nehls (ed.): Bündnis für Arbeit, Wiesbaden 1999, p. 159
  16. ↑ Wolfgang Streeck: The trade unions in the alliance for work, in: Jörg Abel and Hans-Joachim Sperling (eds.): Upheavals and continuities: Perspectives of national and international labor relations, Munich and Mering 2001, p. 273.
  17. ↑ Wolfgang Schroeder / Josef Esser: 1999, Model Germany: From the Concerted Action to the Alliance for Work, in: From Politics and Contemporary History: Supplement to the weekly newspaper Das Parlament, B 37, 1999, p. 3.
  18. ^ Josef Esser (1982): Unions in the Crisis, Frankfurt am Main
  19. ↑ Retirement at 60: Schmoldt criticizes the attitude of IG Metall. In: Spiegel Online . December 27, 1999, accessed June 10, 2018 .
  20. ↑ Cornelia Fraune: New Social Pacts in Germany and the Netherlands, Wiesbaden 2011, 174ff.
  21. ↑ Nico Fickinger: The consensus given away. The alliance for work, training and competitiveness 1998–2002, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 192ff.
  22. ↑ Gerhard Schröder: The alliance as the focus of our policy of the new center, in: Arlt / Nehls (Hrsg.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career, Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, p. 55.
  23. ↑ Nico Fickinger: The consensus given away. The Alliance for Work, Training and Competitiveness, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 248.
  24. ↑ Wolfgang Schroeder / Josef Esser: Model Germany: From the Concerted Action to the Alliance for Work, in: From Politics and Contemporary History: Supplement to the weekly newspaper Das Parlament, B 37, 1999, p. 11
  25. ↑ Angela Merkel: Hope at best, fraud at worst. The idea of ​​the alliance has survived, in: Arlt / Nehls (ed.): Alliance for work: construction, criticism, career (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung), Opladen / Wiesbaden 1999, p. 108.
  26. ↑ Anke Hassel / Rainer Hoffmann (1999): National alliances and perspectives of a European employment pact, in: Arlt / Nehls (ed.): Alliance for work. Construction, Criticism, Career, Wiesbaden, 213–229., 213f.
  27. ↑ Bob Jessop: Changes in Welfare Regimes and the Search for Flexibility and Employability, in: Henk Overbeek (Ed.): The Political Economy of European Unemployment: European Integration and the Transnationalization of the Employment Question, London / New York 2003, pp. 29-50.