African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples

The African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples ( also called Banjul Charter after the venue, Banjul , where it was drawn up ) was adopted at the 18th meeting of the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 27. Adopted unanimously in Nairobi June 1981 . Contrary to many expectations, it came into force after only five years on October 21, 1986 in accordance with Article 63, Paragraph 3 of the Charter, after Niger became the 26th state to deposit its instrument of ratification. By 1997, 51 of the 53 member states of the OAU had ratified the Charter. This makes the African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples the world's largest regional human rights protection regime .

The charter should take particular account of the characteristics of the African continent. This is also explicitly expressed in the foreword to the draft Charter: the establishment of the Charter ...

"... was guided by the principle that the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights should reflect the African conception of human rights. It was therefore not necessary to copy simply and purely what was done in other regions or at world level. The African Charter should take as a pattern the African Philosophy of law and meet the needs of Africa. "

The genesis of the charter

African lawyers have been busy developing a regional human rights protection concept for Africa since the early 1960s. In 1961, 194 lawyers from 32 countries, including 23 from Africa, met under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists in Lagos to examine the possibilities of enforcing the rule of law in Africa. At this conference the idea of ​​establishing an African human rights commission was first expressed.

The Lagos Conference ended with the adoption of a document entitled The Law of Lagos , which contained the idea of ​​establishing an African Human Rights Commission in the form of a recommendation to the Council of African States.

At this conference, the then President of the Republic of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwé , called for the Council of African States to issue an African human rights charter as a sign of confidence in the supremacy of law . However, Azikiwé's demand went unheeded. However, the idea of ​​establishing an African human rights commission continued to be tirelessly pursued by African lawyers and civil rights activists. The United Nations organized a series of seminars on human rights. The most important of these events took place in Dakar ( Senegal ) in 1966 , in Cairo ( Egypt ) in 1969 , in Dar es Salaam ( Tanzania ) in 1973 and in Monrovia ( Liberia ) in 1979 . In Francophone Africa, the International Commission of Jurists organized various conferences and symposia. At two of these meetings in Dakar in 1967 and 1978, the idea of ​​setting up a regional human rights commission for Africa was also expressed by the delegates and addressed as an urgent request to the OAU.

In 1978 the UN Human Rights Commission also repeated its call for a regional African human rights commission. As early as 1972 she asked the OAU to do so in a resolution and even promised support from the Secretary General of the United Nations if necessary .

At the OAU summit in Monrovia in July 1979, the OAU Secretary General was given the mandate to initiate the process of setting up a human rights commission. In the same year, the draft for the OAU working group on this topic was approved shortly afterwards at the UN seminar in Monrovia.

During only three meetings of this working group in Dakar (1979) and Banjul (1980 and 1981), the final draft of the charter was adopted and unanimously adopted at the OAU summit conference in Nairobi in June 1981 with only minor changes. It came into force on October 21, 1986.

The African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples

The African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples is divided into three parts: Rights and Obligations (Art. 1–29), Measures for the Protection of Human Rights and Peoples' Rights (Art. 30–63) and General Provisions (Art. 64 -68).

The first part is divided into two chapters: human rights and rights of peoples (Articles 1–26) and duties (Articles 27–29). The second part of the charter is divided into four chapters: Establishment and organization of the African Commission on Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples (Art. 20–44), Tasks of the Commission (Art. 45), Proceedings before the Commission (Art. 46– 59) and Applicable Principles (Articles 60–63).

The Charter follows the classic dualistic theory of the relationship between international law and national law: the domestic applicability of the rights and obligations laid down in the Charter is made dependent on their implementation in national law (Art. 1). Art. 1 is reinforced by a provision in Art. 62, according to which the contracting states are obliged to submit to the Commission every two years a report on the measures taken to implement the provisions of the Charter.

The basic principles of the Charter

The basic principles of the Charter can be summarized under three headings:

• Values ​​of African culture
• The philosophy of law and human rights
• The influence of socio-political factors

It has been stressed repeatedly that the Charter should in particular reflect the values ​​of African culture. Léopold Sédar Senghor , then President of the Republic of Senegal, said in his opening speech at the conference of African experts at which the draft charter was negotiated:

Europe and America have built their system of rights and liberties with reference to a common civilization, to their respective peoples and to specific aspirations. [...]

It is not the case for us Africans either to copy or to seek originality for the sake of originality. We will need to show proof simultaneously of imagination and effectiveness. We may find inspiration in those of our traditions that are good and positive. You should therefore always bear in mind the values ​​of our civilization and the real needs of Africa.

The fundamental concern of the African states can be summarized as follows: to draft a charter that respects those traditions and customs that are considered worthy of preservation and which at the same time fits into a worldwide set of rules for the protection and promotion of individual and collective rights.

Another fundamental principle of the African Charter is the philosophy of law and human rights. This includes both an African concept of human rights and the international development of human rights theory in teaching. With regard to the African concept, this includes the aforementioned elements of the interweaving of rights and duties, the privileged position of the community and the rejection of judicial solutions. In addition, the charter reflects the current state of human rights theory at the time of its creation: in particular economic, social and cultural rights as well as collective rights and the so-called rights of the third generation were taken into account.

The final basic principle of the charter marks the influence of socio-political factors. Like no other human rights convention, the peculiarities of the African continent had to be taken into account: the underdeveloped status, the differences in geography, ethnic groups and other factors and the great diversity of political, economic and cultural concepts. Finally, there is one more phenomenon of particular importance: colonialism and racial discrimination .

This clearly shows that the negotiations on the African Charter took place under special influences and conditions.

The substantive provisions of the Charter

The preamble

The preamble itself is already a program for human rights. Among other things, it reaffirms the promise made in Article 2 of the OAU's charter to “eliminate all forms of colonialism , neocolonialism , apartheid and Zionism in Africa, to coordinate cooperation and efforts to improve the living standards of the African peoples, as well as international cooperation to promote "(para. 3). Reference is made to the "power of tradition and the values ​​of African civilization" to underline the importance traditionally attached to these values ​​in Africa (para. 4). The aim is to meet those who believe that democratic experience is incompatible with the history of the African people.

Individual rights

The Charter contains provisions prohibiting discrimination (Art. 2); the principle of equality before the law and equal protection by the law (Art. 3); the right to physical integrity (Art. 4); the right to respect for human dignity and recognition of legal personality (Art. 5); the right to personal freedom and security (Art. 6); the right to be heard (this also includes the right to legal protection, the right to be regarded as innocent until the guilt has been determined by a competent court, the right to a defense and the principle of nulla poena sine lege [Art. 7 ]); freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 8); freedom of expression and information (Art. 9); freedom of association and association (Art. 10); freedom of assembly (Art. 11); freedom of movement and the right of asylum (Art. 12); the right to political participation and equal access to public facilities and services (Art. 13); the right to property (Art. 14); the right to work and equal pay (Art. 15); the right to health (Art. 16); the right to education and to participate in the cultural life of its community (Art. 17) and to protect the family, including measures to protect women, children, the elderly and the disabled (Art. 19). The African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples thus largely coincides with the provisions of other human rights conventions with regard to its provisions on individual rights. However, there are some special features:

There is no parallel in any other human rights codification to the provision in Article 9, Paragraph 1, Clause 5 of the Charter: “The act is personal and may only be imposed on the perpetrator.” Such a provision may well be for the reader who comes from the Western human rights tradition seem strange, as it goes without saying that punishing a clan or a village is not a legitimate means of punishing a criminal. Nevertheless, this was the practice in some African countries. So there was B. Such a provision in Article 14 of the Ugandan Constitution.

All other provisions of Articles 2 to 18 can also be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Human Rights Covenants of 1966. It therefore seems more practical to ask which rights contained in the other international human rights regimes are missing in the African Charter:

The first of these rights is the right to a nationality and the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, as found in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 20 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It cannot be concluded from this, however, that the African states wanted to retain the possibility of withdrawing their nationality as a possible instrument; rather, the concept of nationality plays a much smaller role in Africa than in Europe. Belonging to a community was based much more on being part of the family, the clan, the tribe and the village. There are far fewer “grown” nations in Africa than in Europe. State borders were drawn arbitrarily by the colonial powers, so that as a consequence the natural feeling of belonging to a nation is low. This explains why “nationality” in Africa is more of a formal bond and consequently did not need to be protected as a human right. Most African states are only in the process of developing a nation (so-called nation-building).

Furthermore, the right of free choice of spouse is missing in the African Charter (Art. 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights). The lack of such a provision can probably be explained by the fact that the actual situation in many African states, especially that of the rural states, is still far from this ideal and that legal enforcement would have little chance of success. This explains the lack of such a provision in the United Nations Human Rights Covenant of 1966 on civil and political rights, in whose negotiations, in contrast to those for the general human rights declaration of 1945, many African states already took part.

The lack of a right to an adequate standard of living (Art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and to leisure and paid leave (Art. 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) already dictates the actual economic situation of most African states.

In addition, the lack of a provision on the protection of private life is striking (Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). The reason for this is on the one hand the already mentioned position of the individual in African society, i. e. the strong involvement in the family, the clan, the village. On the other hand, the practicability of the actual possibility of enforcement in the absence of such a right is cited.

Finally, there is also no provision about the outlawing of the death penalty or at least about a restriction of its use, as found in Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Art. 6 of the UN Human Rights Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in Art. 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights is. The African Charter contains the simple formulation: "Everyone is inviolable" (Art. 4) and further that "no one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right". This clearly shows that the imposition and execution of the death penalty is a legitimate means as long as the legally prescribed formal criteria are met. By way of comparison, it can be stated that although the African Charter contains almost identical provisions on individual human rights as in other international human rights codifications, a distinct African approach is discernible. This approach is less evident in the formulation of new human rights than in the omission of rights contained in other conventions.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of granted human rights, regardless of whether through international law or national law, depends on the extent to which they may be restricted. You will find that the African Charter restricts a large number of rights granted ab initio by referring to the law applicable in the respective state. U. Oji Umozurike considers this to be so crucial that in his work on the African Charter he classifies individual rights into two groups: those that may be restricted and those that apply without restriction.

In only four cases, the Charter specifies the circumstances under which rights may be restricted: Deprivation of liberty is only permissible under “reasons and conditions that have been previously established by law” (Art. 6). The freedom of assembly may only be subject to the “statutory restrictions, in particular in the interests of national and public security, public health, morality and the rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 11). Under the same conditions, the right to leave any country may be restricted (Art. 12, Paragraph 2). Ultimately, the right to property may only be encroached upon in the “public interest or in the interest of the common good” (Art. 14).

The Charter does not provide any substantive conditions for restricting the following rights: Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion ("reasons of public security and order" - Art. 8), freedom of expression ("within the framework of the law" - Art. 10, Paragraph 1) , Freedom of association (“within the framework of the law” - Art. 9 Paragraph 2), the right of asylum (“insofar as this is in accordance with the law” - Art. 12 Paragraph 3), the right of residence for foreigners (“only based on a lawful decision”) - Art. 12 para. 4) and the right to participate in the political process (“in compliance with the statutory provisions” - Art. 13 para. 1).

Such restrictions or limitations imposed by "operation of law" are often vague and open to abuse. Philip Kunig calls this "a considerable structural defect", while Umozurike believes that this is less serious if one read the Charter as a whole, in particular the provisions of Art. 60 and 61: These articles determine the principles applicable to the Implementation of the Charter Monitoring Commission. According to this, it has to be guided by “international law in the field of human rights” as well as the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and will consequently watch over possible abuse.

Duties

With the African Charter, human obligations are included for the first time in an international treaty for the protection of human rights. Only in the American Charter of Human Rights is there a provision in Art. 32 about the “responsibilities” of the individual towards his family, his community and humanity and about the fact that all rights are limited by the rights of others. In previous treaties, obligations of the state were otherwise only declared by listing the rights of the individual.

First and foremost are the obligations of everyone towards their families and society, towards the state and other legally recognized communities and the international community of states (Art. 27, Paragraph 1). Furthermore, everyone is obliged to respect their fellow human beings and to maintain mutual respect and tolerance (Art. 28). Finally, Art. 29 lists a number of individual duties: the duty to protect the harmonious development of the family, to respect and support one's parents when they are in need, and to serve one's community by giving it his physical and mental strength provides. In addition, the obligation is named not to endanger the security of the respective country, as well as to maintain and strengthen the national independence and territorial integrity of his country. Furthermore, the individual has the duty to pay taxes imposed in the interest of society and to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values ​​in relation to other members of society in a spirit of tolerance, dialogue and cooperation and to promote the moral well-being of the people To contribute to society and ultimately to do our best to promote and achieve African unity, at all times and at all levels. In view of this catalog the question inevitably arises as to the possibility of enforcing these provisions. First of all, it should be noted that not all provisions are entirely unenforceable. For example, the duty to care for parents in need, as well as the duty to pay taxes, could be enforced with the help of regulatory law. However, this section, while it reflects traditional African values, is generally to be regarded as less suitable for effective implementation than as a code of good faith of the people of the African states.

There can be various reasons for the incorporation of duties of the individual in the Charter. On the one hand, the influence of socialist states, or those that sympathized with socialism, is held responsible for it in the negotiations on the Charter. The constitutions of some such states contain 'fundamental duties' which should also be reflected in the charter.

In some cases, however, it is argued that such provisions correspond to an African conception of human rights:

The African conception of man is not that of an isolated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity.

The European conception of human rights, that is to say, a set of principles whose essential purpose is to be invoked by the individual against the group with which he is in conflict, is not met with in traditional Africa. In Africa, the individual, completely taken over by the archetype of the totem, the common ancestor or the protective genius, merges into the group.

Indeed, the African tradition will have been instrumental in introducing obligations into the charter. A fact that was in the interests of the socialist states. Overall, the number and the thoroughness with which these partly overlapping duties have been selected shows the paramount importance that the drafters of the Charter have attached to them.

International rights

The weight given to the rights of the peoples in the Charter is already evident from the inclusion of the term in the title. In the African Charter, international rights are the embodiment of the African conception and philosophy of the person in the community. International rights, as laid down in this document, go far beyond the right to self-determination, the only international law known to the European-American human rights tradition. They embody a new view of human rights:

The concept of peoples' rights represents a significant shift from looking at human rights purely as individual rights; It emphasizes collective or solidarity rights for the larger group - the society or community - to which the individual is interlinked.

African international law includes first of all the right to self-determination (Art. 20, Paragraph 1, Clause 2, Art. 22, Paragraph 1) and the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources (Art 1 of the two international human rights covenants. In addition, there is the right to lawful recovery of unlawfully stolen property (Art. 21, Paragraph 2). Furthermore, the principle of equality between peoples (Art. 19) has been incorporated into the Charter, which is also reflected in the Charter of the United Nations ; the right to decolonization (Art. 20, Paragraph 2), to development (Art. 22, Paragraph 2), to peace (Art. 23) and to a satisfactory environment (Art. 24).

a) The concept of "peoples"

Before the individual provisions of Articles 19-24 of the Charter can be discussed below, the term “peoples” as used in the Charter must first be discussed. The Charter itself is silent on this.

This term could encompass an entire nation or all citizens of a state, or just an ethnic group. If the latter were the case, claims of individual population groups against the state would arise from the international rights embodied in the charter, on the other hand only claims on an intergovernmental level. This makes it clear that a uniform definition of the term “peoples” is essential for understanding the Charter.

According to Dinstein, the objective element of a "people" is the existence of an ethnic group that is linked by a common history. It is not enough to understand an ethnic bond in terms of a common ancestry, rather it is essential to have a common ethos and a state of mind. A people is both entitled and obliged to identify itself as such.

Brownlie places greater emphasis on the distinct character of a community expressed through the institutions of the government under which that community lives. The distinct character of the community depends on a number of factors: The most important is the breed, which Brownlie equates with nationality. The concept of race can only be expressed scientifically, with culture, language, religion and group psychology dominating. The physical elements of race or nationality indicate the cultural definition of the group, but do not necessarily determine it.

In a report for the United Nations, Cristescu gave a limited definition of “people”, although it was not possible to cover all possible situations. Then the following three elements developed:

(i) The term “people” describes a social whole that has a clear identity and its own characteristics;

(ii) It implies a relationship with a territory even if the people have been displaced to another place and replaced by another population;

(iii) A people must not be confused with an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority whose existence and rights are protected by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Social Rights.

According to these three views, the main attributes of nationality are common interest, group identity, unmistakability and a territorial connection. According to this, a “people” could just as well be a group of people within a certain territorial unit as well as all people within this unit.

The most recent attempt to define this term, which received some approval from legal experts , was published in a report of a UNESCO meeting of experts on international law . In doing so, u. a. the following characteristics for the nationality worked out:

1. The group or individuals share some or all of the following in common: a) a common historical tradition b) the identity of an ethnic group c) a cultural homogeneity d) a linguistic entity e) a religious or ideological affinity f) a territorial connection g ) a common economic life

2. The group as a whole must have the will or the awareness to be identified as a people. Finally, Kiwanuka believes that there are instances in the Charter where the term “people” can have several meanings. He made the following four possible interpretations: (a) all persons within the geographical limits of an entity yet to achieve political independence or majority rule; (b) all groups of people with certain common characteristics who live within the geographical limits of an entity referred to in (a), or in an entity that has attained independence or majority rule (i.e., minorities under any political system); (c) the state and the people as synonymous (however, this is only an external meaning of "people"); and (d) all persons within a state.

According to Kiwanuka, the different interpretations correspond to the different areas that claim international law. This concept was then integrated into the charter on the one hand in order to preserve the African understanding of the individual and society, and on the other hand in order to have a legal instrument in the fight against external forms of political, social and economic domination.

Ultimately, Kiwanuka's flexible conception of the term “people” in the charter comes closest to doing justice. The right of peoples to self-determination laid down in the Charter is not intended to give individual ethnic groups the legal legitimation for secession, nor should the individual, smaller units of society be disregarded, to which the Charter also attaches greater importance.

Reading the Charter, one will always have to keep in mind the various possible meanings of the word “people”, which arise from the respective context.

b) The right of peoples to self-determination

The most important international law in the Charter is the right of peoples to self-determination . It gives all peoples “the indisputable right and inalienable right to self-determination. They decide freely about their political status and shape their economic, social and cultural development according to their freely chosen policy ”(Art. 20). The right to self-determination was the basis of decolonization in Africa.

It is questionable how “people” should be understood in this context. The OAU has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the principle of “territorial integrity”, even if it actually draws boundaries through traditional units. As a result, the application of the right to self-determination to “smaller” ethnic groups within a state and thus the possibility of secession would have to be eliminated. Nevertheless, a right to secession is partly derived from the right to self-determination. Such an interpretation could be based on Art. 19 sentence 2: “The rule of one people over another cannot be justified by anything”. This led to a conflict within the doctrine of self-determination and thus to some violent clashes.

Ultimately, preference will be given to the restrictive application of this right in order to avoid possible wars of secession. In the border dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali , the ICJ decided that

the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self -determination of peoples.

While in Europe peoples have formed states in the exercise of the right to self-determination, the development in Africa has been the other way round: The rebellion against colonial rule has led to states in which "peoples" are now to be formed (nation-building). Protection of minorities in the form of granting the right to self-determination would inhibit this process. The African states and the OAU are of the opinion that the right to self-determination does not apply outside the colonial context. This expresses the view that this right would run counter to the idea of ​​“African unity” and the process of “nation-building” in the post-colonial states.

In the case of Kantagese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire had the African Commission to decide whether the people of Katanga should break away from Zaire or not. First of all, the Commission discussed whether it even had the authority to decide on this case; most commissioners felt it was not their job to redraw the borders. At its 17th meeting in 1995, the Commission decided that the complaint would be unsuccessful, “without convincing legal arguments,” Ankuma said. The commission made no statement as to whether it fell within its competence to decide on claims from the right to self-determination;

In other words, the Commission failed to make a decision as to whether or not the term people as used in the African Charter includes the various ethnic, religious, racial groups etc. within sovereign African States.

The question of the extent of the peoples' right to self-determination under the African Charter will thus remain an academic one as long as the political reality of the application of positive international law in Africa takes precedence.

c) Right to economic, social and cultural development

The charter recognizes the right to economic, social and cultural development (Art. 22 Para. 1). The link between human rights and development was explicitly recognized in Article 5 of Lomé IV. According to this, the states, individually or jointly, are obliged to ensure the exercise of the right to development (Art. 22, Paragraph 2). The right to development is a relatively new right. It was first formulated in 1972 by Kéba Mbaye , President of the Supreme Court of Senegal, in an address to the International Institute for Human Rights in Strasbourg. Before the Drafting Committee of the African Charter, Senegalese President Senghor placed particular emphasis on development:

Our overall conception of Human Rights is marked by the Right of Development since it integrates all economic, social and cultural rights, and also civil and political rights. Development is first and foremost a change of quality of life and not only an economic growth required at all cost, particularly in the blind repression of individuals and peoples. It is the full development of every man in his community.

The law should cover both a positive duty for the individual (active participation in the development process) and duties for other states: a negative duty to refrain from anything that could conflict with the right to development of the signatory states, as well as a positive duty to help . It is not clear what this duty should look like. It could be development aid, for example, but there is considerable controversy about this.

d) Other international rights

The charter also covers other international rights. There is a reference to the principles of the United Nations with regard to the peaceful coexistence of peoples (Art. 23). In the African Charter, however, in view of the particular African sensitivity with regard to subversive activities directed against the state, this principle was restricted to the effect that under such conditions, for example, the right of asylum can be restricted.

In addition, Art. 24 sets out the “ right to an environment which is generally satisfactory and which is favorable to development”. The unresolved contradiction between the need for industrialization, road construction and urbanization on the one hand and the need for local, regional and universal environmental protection on the other is reflected in this provision; however, it does not contain any solution.

According to Christian Much, these rights ultimately represent a reflex of the hegemonic claims of states and peoples and thus lie in the logic of historical development since the formation of nation states and power blocs. Apart from possible applications of the already granted right to self-determination (see above), the international rights embodied in the Charter remain a political program, an appeal to the developed states. The actual effect of these rights will largely depend on these states.

The African Commission on Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples

The second part of the African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples is entitled “Measures for the Protection of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples”. It contains provisions that can protect the rights embodied in the Charter. The African Commission on Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples has been empowered with this task . It was established in accordance with Art. 30 to promote human and peoples' rights and to ensure their protection in Africa. Organizationally, the commission is an organ of the OAU, entrusted with certain competencies in the field of human rights.

The African Court of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples

In 1998 another protocol to the Charter was adopted, creating an African Court of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples . The protocol came into force on January 25, 2004. In July 2004 the Assembly of Heads of State or Government decided that the Court should be merged with the African Court of Justice .

swell

1. ^ 'Meeting of Experts for the Preparation of the Draft African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights',' Introductory Statement '
2. ↑ LS Senghor, quoted from K. Mbaye
3. ↑ BO Okere
4. ↑ K. M'baye, quoted from BO Okere
5. ^ NS Rembe
6. ^ IGH, Burkina Faso vs. Republic of Mali
7. ↑ E. Ankuma
8. ↑ Address of November 28, 1979 to Meeting of Experts Preparing the Draft African Charter, OAU Doc. CAB / LEG / 67/5 p. 5

References

See also

• History of human rights in Africa
• European Convention on Human Rights
• American Convention on Human Rights
• Human rights treaty

literature

• EVO Dankwa: Conference on regional systems of human rights protection in Africa: The Americas and Europe , in: Human Rights Law Journal 13 (1992) pp. 314-317.
• Rose M. D'Sa: Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter , in: Journal of African Law 29 (1985) pp. 72-81.
• Malcom D. Evans and Rachel Murray (Eds.): The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2006 . 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002. ISBN 978-0-521-88399-3 .
• Richard N. Kiwanuka: The Meaning of 'People' in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights , in: American Journal of International Law 82 (1988) pp. 80-101.
• Edem Kodjo: The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights , in: Human Rights Law Journal 11 (1990) pp. 271-283.
• Philip Kunig; The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa , in: German Yearbook of International Law 25 (1982) pp. 138-168.
• Isaac Nguema: Human Rights Perspectives in Africa: The Roots of a Constant Challenge , in: Human Rights Law Journal 11 (1990) pp. 261-271.
• Clement Nwankwo: The OAU and Human Rights , in: Journal of Democracy 4.3 (1993) pp. 50-54.
• S. Kwaw Nyameke Blay: Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self-Determination in the wake of the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights , in: Journal of African Law 29 (1985) pp. 147-159.
• B. Obinna Okere: The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems , in: Human Rights Quarterly 6 (1984) pp. 141-159.
• Fatsah Ouguergouz: The African Charter of Human & People's Rights. A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003. ISBN 9041120610 .
• U. Oji Umozurike: The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights , in: American Journal of International Law 77 (1983) pp. 902-912.
• Hassan B. Jallow : The Law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights . Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2007. ISBN 1425114180 .

Web links

• African Charter of Human Rights and the Rights of the Peoples