Bielefeld Agreement
The Bielefeld Agreement was an agreement between the representatives of the Red Ruhr Army and representatives of the Reich government during the war in the Ruhr in 1920 .
prehistory
At the height of the Ruhr War, which broke out in connection with the Kapp Putsch , the Red Ruhr Army dominated large parts of the Ruhr area and the neighboring areas. However, the differences within the participants were great. The Hagen headquarters was relatively moderate, while the Mülheim Central Council was dominated by syndicalists . In Duisburg , anarchist forces took control and acted completely detached from all regional connections. Overall, the less radical USPD dominated the eastern and southern parts of the Ruhr area , while syndicalists and left communists predominated in the west .
The SPD-led Reich government in Berlin saw these differences among the insurgents as an opportunity. She wanted to drive a wedge between the various forces and thus weaken the impact of the entire movement.
The negotiations and the agreement
The government representatives were Reichspostminister and trade unionist Johannes Giesberts from the Center Party and the Prussian Agriculture Minister Otto Braun from the SPD . They held a conference on March 23 and 24, 1920 in Bielefeld . In addition to the executive councils of the insurgents, city administrations, the regional presidents of Düsseldorf , Münster and Arnsberg , the trade unions and the political parties from the center to the KPD took part. The Herford- born social democrat Carl Severing played a central role as Reich and Prussian state commissioner for the Ruhr area . He formulated the aim of the negotiations to come to an agreement on disarmament and the organization of the handover of weapons. While Braun and Giesberts endeavored to make as few concessions as possible, Severing stuck to the nine-point program that ADGB chairman Carl Legien had negotiated with Friedrich Ebert , which intended to strengthen the political influence of the labor movement in the politics of the Reich.
A commission actually came to an agreement. This Bielefeld Agreement initially contained similar wording as the agreement concluded a short time before at the Reich level between the trade unions and the government. It also made some specific points. For example, it provided for an amnesty for violations of the law that had occurred in the context of the resistance against the Kapp Putsch. With regard to the arms levy, an agreement was reached on cooperation between the municipal authorities and the executive councils. Both should even set up republican defenses together. The government representatives promised that if these agreements were followed, the Ruhr area would not be militarily occupied by the Reichswehr.
The agreement appeared to be a sensible attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully. Indeed, the insurgents were divided. The moderate forces, including the USPD and the Hagen headquarters, supported the agreements. The Essen Central Council and the KPD demanded new negotiations, while the radical executive councils of Mülheim and Hamborn rejected any agreement. The military leaders of the Red Ruhr Army took the same point of view. They preferred an “honorable downfall” to a supposedly lazy compromise.
Failure and escalation of the conflict
The demands for new negotiations might have been successful had it not been for the increasingly chaotic conditions in Duisburg. The Reich Cabinet under Hermann Müller left the basis of the Bielefeld Agreement and issued an ultimatum. This was intensified by the regional military commander-in-chief Oskar von Watter with regard to the arms surrender so that the insurgents, even if they were willing to respond, were technically unable to do so. Watter's approach shows a central weakness of the Bielefeld Agreement. The military was not included in the agreements, and since it was not effectively controlled by the government as a whole, it could act on its own. The consequence of Watter's ultimatum was the proclamation of a general strike by the Essen Central Council. This was followed by around three quarters of the miners in the area from March 29th. The military, especially the semi-official voluntary corps , put down the uprising in the period that followed, sometimes with brutal violence. In the end, the Bielefeld Agreement had no real effect.
Text of the agreement
As described above, the official work was created by a large committee from politics, parties and unions:
Bielefeld, March 24, 1920, 6.30 a.m., afternoon
The representatives of all parties and occupational groups involved declare that they want to bring their demands to unravel the situation resulting from the Kapp Putsch in line with the constitution and the government on the basis of the following agreement.
1. The present representatives of the governing parties will advocate with their parliamentary groups that, when the government is imminent in the Reich and in Prussia, the question of persons is resolved by the parties after agreement with the trade union organizations of the workers, employees and civil servants involved in the general strike and that these Organizations a decisive influence on the new regulation of the economic and socio-political laws is granted while preserving the rights of the people's representation.
2. Immediate disarmament and punishment of all those guilty of the coup or the overthrow of the constitutional government, as well as of the officials who have made themselves available to illegal governments. Impunity is granted to those who have violated the law in defense of the counter-revolutionary attack, if the violations and offenses occurred before the conclusion of these agreements, at the latest by March 25, 8 a.m. This provision does not apply to common crimes against persons and property.
3. Thorough cleaning of all public administrations and company administrations of counter-revolutionary personalities, especially those in leading positions, and replacement by reliable personnel. Reinstatement of all organizational representatives who were reprimanded in public services for political and union reasons.
4. The fastest implementation of the administrative reform on a democratic basis with the participation of the economic organizations of workers, employees and civil servants.
5. Immediate expansion of the existing social laws and the creation of new ones which guarantee full social and economic equality for workers, employees and civil servants. Rapid introduction of a liberal civil service law.
6. Immediate initiation of the socialization of the mature branches of the economy on the basis of the resolutions of the Socialization Commission, to which representatives of the professional associations are to be consulted. The socialization commission is convened immediately. The Reich takes over the coal and potash indicator.
7. Dissolution of all counterrevolutionary military formations that have not remained faithful to the constitution and their replacement by formations from the circle of the reliable republican population, in particular the organized workers, employees and officials, without resigning any class. With this reorganization, acquired legal claims of loyal troops and security services remain untouched. According to the commission, the troops to be disbanded afterwards include the Lützow , Lichtschlag and Schulz corps .
8. Effective registration and, if necessary, expropriation of the food available and increased combating of usury and slavery in town and country. Securing the fulfillment of the delivery obligation by setting up delivery associations and imposing tangible penalties in the event of a malicious breach of the obligation.
9. The constitutional authorities exercise their office in accordance with the statutory provisions. The enforcement and action committees now in existence have to set up the local defense in cooperation with the local authority and regulate the distribution of weapons. This must happen within ten days at the latest. Thereafter, those committees are replaced by an organizational committee formed from the organized workers, employees and civil servants and the majority parties, which, in agreement with the responsible community organs, participates in the implementation of the security service.
10. To support the regular security organs, if necessary, a local guard with a strength of up to three per 1000 inhabitants from the circles of the republican population, in particular organized workers, employees and civil servants, is formed. For the time during which they are called up for service, they are paid by the municipality, unless the state pays the costs. With the formation of local guardians, the resident guardians are abolished.
11. All those involved undertake to exercise all their influence so that the workers immediately return to their usual work. Employers are required to reinstate the returning workers.
12. The ammunition will be handed over immediately, as will the return of requisitioned and captured army equipment to the municipal authorities.
13. All prisoners are to be released immediately, at the latest by March 27, 12 noon.
14. If these agreements are loyally observed, the Reichswehr will not march into the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area. According to the declaration of the authorized representative of the Military District Command VI and the Reich Commissioner, the Military District Command will only act in political-military matters on written instructions from the entire Reich Ministry. Furthermore, the Reich Commissioner declares that he will appoint a shop steward for the workers who will be heard on all military and political actions that the Reich Commissioner has to decide on.
15. The aggravated state of emergency should be lifted immediately, the general state of emergency when the regulation set out in paragraphs 9 - 12 has taken place.
16. Reich Minister Giesberts will bring the question of the care of the bereaved and injured to the Reich Cabinet with the aim that the costs will be borne by the Reich. The Commission expects the Reich to hold the municipal associations harmless for all costs and damage they have suffered as a result of the unrest.
17. Neither the workers who took part in the fighting, nor the members of the police and resident services, nor the soldiers of the Reichswehr may suffer disadvantages or harassment because of their participation.
Giesberts , Reich Minister of Post; Severing ; Thielemann, Heinrich Meyer; F. Klupsch , E. Sasse, Cuno , Stens, Imbusch , Kloft , Hamm, Dr. Jarres , Max Herbrig, Paul, Oettinghaus , O. Braß , W. Enz, Fritz Charpentier , O. Triebel, Mehlich , keepers of the minutes.
Signatory
Thielemann, Karl: Member of the MSPD in Düsseldorf and party secretary. On March 18, he was to be appointed "civil commissioner", civil assistant to the military stationed in Düsseldorf.
Meyer, Heinrich: Member of the MSPD in Düsseldorf, belonged to the district executive committee of the free trade unions.
Sasse, Ewald: Upper City Secretary in Hagen, member of the DDP and representative of the Hirsch-Dunker trade union organization.
Stens, Hermann: Editor and party secretary of the DDP in Hagen.
Hamm, Sulpiz: Member of the center and 1st mayor of Recklinghausen.
Herbrig, Max: Member of the USPD in Gelsenkirchen, union secretary.
Paul, Walter: Member of the USPD in Ronsdorf, union secretary.
Enz, Wilhelm: Member of the MSPD in Barmen, city councilor in the action committee there.
Triebel, Oskar: leading communist from Barmen, agreed to the agreement and, like Charpentier, was reprimanded by the KPD because there was no permission to participate.
literature
- Hans Spethmann : The Red Army on the Ruhr and Rhine. 3. Edition. Hobbing, Berlin 1932, pp. 101-117.
- Heinrich August Winkler : Weimar 1918–1933. The history of the first German democracy . Munich, 1993. pp. 132-134
- Thomas Alexander: Carl Severing. Social democrat from Westphalia with Prussian virtues . Bielefeld, 1992. pp. 120-126.
- Erhard Lucas: "March Revolution 1920"