Brian Wynne

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Brian Wynne (born January 14, 1947 ) is a British social scientist . He is primarily concerned with the relationship between science and the public, the risks and uncertainties of scientific knowledge and the role of experts and laypeople in this context. After studying materials science , he turned to the young field of Science and Technology Studies in Edinburgh in the early 1970s and later in Lancaster .

In 1982, Wynne's first book, Rationality and Ritual, was published, which discussed the hearing on the construction of a civil reprocessing plant in Sellafield from this perspective. In addition to his research, Wynne has also served on political and expert panels in British and European politics. In 2010 he received the John Desmond Bernal Prize of the Society for the Social Study of Science for his contribution to research into science and technology in politics and the public .

biography

Youth and education

Brian Wynne grew up in rural North West England . To study natural sciences , he went to the University of Cambridge in the 1960s , where he graduated with a Master of Arts in 1968 and received his PhD in materials science in 1971 . Originally, Wynne had planned to do his postdoc at the same institute, but his research project on energy-efficient materials was unexpectedly rejected by his doctoral supervisor. Wynne attributed this to the influence of the military as a funder, which left no room for such questions in the institute's research program. He took the incident as an opportunity to reorient himself professionally and to grapple with the relationship between politics and the scientific community. Wynne enrolled in the philosophy, sociology and history of science at the University of Edinburgh , where David Bloor and Barry Barnes had recently founded the Science Studies Unit. The Edinburgh-based Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) set out in the early 1970s to question Robert K. Merton's model of science and to work out the political and ideological influences in established scientific knowledge. Unlike the Edinburgh School around Barnes and Bloor or the Bath School Harry Collins ', Wynne was less interested in how scientific truths are produced in detail, but primarily asked the question of how these truths were carried into an uninformed to negative public. While the mainstream of Science and Technology Studies (STS) shifted more and more to ethnographic laboratory studies from the late 1970s , Wynne worked to grasp the political implications of the knowledge generated there. The term Science and Technology Studies (studies, still abbreviated as STS), which is now used internationally, also addresses this additional dimension. In the STS internal debate, Wynne and Sheila Jasanoff emphasize greater involvement of the public in order to protect them from being patronized by experts, while Harry Collins and Robert Evans focus on the independent role of experts.

Lancaster, THORP, IIASA: Science in Public

After receiving a Master of Philosophy degree for a thesis on the early history of quantum theory in 1975 , Wynne left Edinburgh and moved to the University of Lancaster , where the SSK was developed into the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge in Public Arenas (SSKiPA). Influenced by Dorothy Nelkin , who had investigated a similar controversy at Lake Cayuga , he undertook an ethnography in 1977 for the new construction of the civilian reprocessing plant THORP in Windscale . Wynne had worked on the hearing on the project. He described his experiences in his first book, Rationality and Ritual (1982). He criticized the politicians responsible for presenting their decision as scientifically based and thus ignoring any political dimension.  He found a violent contradiction between the claim that a clearly understandable science-based decision had been made and the reality, which in his eyes was completely muddled. Beyond the production of nuclear weapons, the process is neither economically viable nor technically really controllable. Wynne's book and the related publications are prime examples for dealing politically with other fields of technology, such as genetic engineering and biotechnology, in which ethical, moral and political aspects are more important than science in the narrower sense.

Wynne was one of the first members of the management of the European Environment Agency , (EEA, 1994-2000) and worked in March 2000 as a consultant to the British House of Lords for its committee on science and technology. He served on the Science and Society Committee of the London Royal Society. He was in charge of the EU report on the Knowledge Society in Europe. In 2010, Wynne was awarded the John Desmond Bernal Prize by the Society for Social Studies of Science .

Experts and lay knowledge

Herdwick sheep in Cumbria

Wynne's essay May the Sheep Safely Graze? A reflexive view of the expert lay knowledge divide ( sheep can graze safely ?) In Risk, Environment and Modernity from 1996 is considered fundamental and groundbreaking work. Brynne dealt with sociological approaches to the role of experts at a high theoretical level and placed his own earlier work in a larger context. He reflects on approaches to the risk society Ulrich Becks and Anthony Giddens and their treatment or non-treatment of the legitimacy problem and their applicability to environmental problems.

Wynne names conflicts between experts and laypeople who also question the concept of experts. He leads research into the handling of the theory of evolution among British artisans and workers and conflicts between farmers and experts in the third world. He does not see the absence of public discourse on expert or scientific consensus as acceptance.

An example from Wynne's own research deals with a longstanding conflict between sheep farmers in Cumbria , environmental experts and administrative restrictions that he had investigated in the early 1990s. After the Chernobyl reactor disaster in 1986, the farmers there were imposed considerable requirements because of alleged radioactive contamination of animals and pastures, against which they fought bitterly but in vain. In his case study, Wynne highlights the sometimes grotesque interaction between the experts and the sheep farmers during the experiments and investigations. The external experts ignored the knowledge, behavior (including that of the sheep) and the practical experience of the farmers in their experiments and specifications. It turned out some time later that the radioactive particles found actually came to a large extent from the Sellafield reprocessing plant . The farmers had been aware that acidic, peaty soils on site behaved very differently when it came to absorbing nutrients and heavy metals than clayey soil layers, which the experts had ignored. The imposed conditions were also wrongly implemented. The mistrust and the difficult cooperation also had to do with the poor experience of the farmers with expert reports in the past. Wynne noticed that the farmers reflected both their own knowledge and their relationship to the experts intensively and missed such a reflection from the scientists - but this would be essential for the layperson to accept the scientific knowledge. The case exemplifies the limitations of expertise such as the importance of considering the expertise and perception of the people concerned. The differentiated judgment of laypeople should therefore not be attributed to ignorance or irrationality, the actual expertise of such laypeople, especially when it comes to their own work, should neither be underestimated nor ignored.

The failure of experts and their world views in regional contexts have meanwhile been confirmed by means of many other case studies. In addition to Funtowicz and Ravetz's concept of extended peer review and post-normal science , Wynne also proposed his own solution approaches. He also advocates broader involvement of various, not even scientific, stakeholders.

Dimensions of risk

The distinction between imponderables and calculable risks has been known in economics since Frank Knight's  "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit". Criticism of the epistemic content of risk calculations can also be found in John Maynard Keynes , a popular summary cf. Known Unknowns . Wynne expanded Knight's scheme and, as early as 1992, distinguished not only calculable risks but also uncertainties for which the essential parameters are already known, ignorance about the latter and uncertainty , for which entire causal chains cannot be assessed. Wynne limits the epistemic scope of risk assessments insofar as risks or uncertainties are only possible through the artificial freezing (cf. quenching ) of the environmental parameters of an actual situation. In this respect, the result is conditionally valid and, due to possible ongoing changes, cannot be applied arbitrarily to the future and used globally.

Regulation and Technology Assessment

The first STS studies looked at the relationship between science, expertise and politics. Political decision-making therefore always takes place long before a scientific consensus is reached, which makes the role of a scientific consensus in regulation and technology assessment seem less important.

Wynne also contributed to the second wave, which examined the involvement of experts in political controversy and decision-making and their democratic legitimacy. Wynne sees a fundamental problem with technology regulation in dealing with ignorance and uncertainty. These would have to be cushioned according to the precautionary or reactive principle, but would mostly be equated with known, predictable risks. Wynne has identified a translation of fears and apprehensions into a pseudo-scientific security, thereby strengthening the role of lay knowledge compared to the approaches of Beck and Giddens. Wynne's concept has become particularly important in the area of ​​technology assessment, namely in the so-called constructive TA (abbreviated to CTA), which is a result of the second wave. The concept, originally developed in the Netherlands, tries to influence the development of new technology through feedback from the TA and includes social or ecological consequences already in the design process. If anything is unclear, according to Wynne, it is not the probabilities that matter, but the extent of the possible consequences. The regulation of genetically modified food, for example, is less about identifiable risks than about fear of damage in a wide variety of areas. The reduction to a simple scientific picture is neither useful nor helpful. Wynne was also skeptical about one or the other application of his research insofar as the corresponding public participation concepts often tried to educate laypeople rather than actually involve them.

As part of the so-called third wave of STS science studies, Wynne's work and the underlying study were reinterpreted. The so-called third wave is increasingly about the question of who is to be regarded as an expert and for what - and to what extent some laypeople do not have expert knowledge and expert status on certain questions, similar to the way experts themselves are laypeople on most questions outside their specialist area.

Climate changes

Wynne sees the controversy over global warming as a longstanding dispute over the correctness of the assumption that human actions are responsible for serious global risks from anthropogenic climate change. However, he distances himself from the idea that, given sufficient security and unanimous consent, science will almost automatically be converted into political action. This conventional translation model ( in STS usage also often a linear model of the relationship between science and politics) is not applicable. It is less about the denial of scientific findings, which are definitely very robust, but about the still existing fundamental uncertainty in their epistemic significance. It is quite possible that the actual (climate) risks are even significantly underestimated due to the economic and social dynamics. The emphatically scientific interpretation framework would already have a massive influence on the public discussion, concealing the important (social) cross-sectional issues and influences. There is now the literally perverse effect that the emphatically scientific discourse is rather detrimental to the willingness to take political action and to take on responsibility.

swell

literature

  • Marie Antonsen, Rita Elmkvist Nilsen: Strife of Brian. Science and Reflexive Reason as a Public Project. An interview with Brian Wynne . In: Nordic Journal of Science and Technology Studies . tape 1 (1) , 2013, p. 31-40 ( online ).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cayley 2009, 4: 08-4: 11.
  2. ^ Bilyk 2014. Retrieved May 29, 2015.
  3. ↑ a b Antonsen & Nilsen 2013, p. 32.
  4. ↑ Antonsen & Nilsen 2013, pp. 32–33.
  5. ^ Brian Wynne: Public Participation in Science and Technology: Performing and Obscuring a Political - Conceptual Category Mistake - Springer . In: East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal . 2007, doi : 10.1007 / s12280-007-9004-7 .
  6. ^ Darrin Durant: Models of democracy in social studies of science . In: Social Studies of Science . tape 41 , no. 5 , October 1, 2011, p. 691–714 , doi : 10.1177 / 0306312711414759 ( online [accessed June 1, 2015]).
  7. ^ A b Brian Wynne: Rationality and Ritual, Participation and Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-making. In: First published in 1982 by the British Society for History of Science, second edition by Earthscan 2011. Archived from the original on June 23, 2015 ; accessed on May 30, 2015 .
  8. ↑ Cayley 2009, 15: 58-17: 04.
  9. ↑ a b See the forewords to the second edition of Rationality and Ritual (2011)
  10. ^ Rationality and Ritual: Participation and Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-Making, 2nd edition . In: Health, Risk & Society . tape 14 , no. 1 , February 1, 2012, p. 101-102 , doi : 10.1080 / 13698575.2011.645137 .
  11. ^ Taking European knowledge seriously. Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission Ulrike Felt (Rapporteur) Brian Wynne (Chair). In: ec.europa.eu. Retrieved May 23, 2015 .
  12. ^ Society for Social Studies of Science - The Society. In: www.4sonline.org. Retrieved May 23, 2015 .
  13. ↑ a b c d e f H. M. Collins, Robert Evans: The Third Wave of Science Studies Studies of Expertise and Experience . In: Social Studies of Science . tape 32 , no. 2 , January 4, 2002, p. 235–296 , doi : 10.1177 / 0306312702032002003 ( online [accessed May 24, 2015]).
  14. ^ Adrian Desmond: Artisan Resistance and Evolution in Britain, 1819-1848 Vol. 3 (1987), pp. 77-110 The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society, cited in Wynne, pp. 49 and 50
  15. ↑ Portela, J Agriculture: is the art de la localité back? The role and function of indigenous knowledge in rural communities. In: Dent, JB, McGregor, MJ eds. (1994) Rural and farming systems analysis: European perspectives. CABI, Oxon, pp. 269-279
  16. ↑ Mark Hobart: An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (EIDOS) (9780415079594). In: samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk. Routledge, 1993, archived from the original on May 24, 2015 ; accessed on May 24, 2015 .
  17. ↑ a b Wynne 1996, p. 62ff, first publication of the study itself see Wynne 1992
  18. ↑ a b Erik Aarden and Daniel Barben: Science and Technology Studies, in Georg Simonis (Ed.) Concepts and Methods of Technology Assessment, Springer-Verlag, 2013, p. 44
  19. ^ A b Judith A. Bradbury: Expanding the Rationale for Analysis and Deliberation: Looking Beyond Understanding Risk. In: humanecologyreview.org. Human ecology review, Vol. 5, 998, No. 1, 1998, accessed May 28, 2015 .
  20. ^ A b Brian Wynne: Misunderstood misunderstanding: social identities and public uptake of science . In: Public Understanding of Science . tape 1 , no. 3 , January 7, 1992, p. 281-304 , doi : 10.1088 / 0963-6625 / 1/3/004 ( online [accessed May 24, 2015]).
  21. ↑ a b Making systematic sense of public discontents with expert knowledge: two analytical approaches and a case study . In: Public Understanding of Science . tape 9 , no. 2 , January 4, 2000, p. 105–122 , doi : 10.1088 / 0963-6625 / 9/2/302 ( online [accessed May 28, 2015]).
  22. ↑ a b Andrea Saltelli, Pavel Stano, Philip B. Stark and William Becker .: Climate Models as Economic Guides: Scientific Challenge or Quixotic Quest? In: "Issues in Science and Technology 31, no. 3 (Spring 2015). Retrieved May 29, 2015 .
  23. ↑ Uncertainty and environmental learning: Reconceiving science and policy in the preventive paradigm. In: www.sciencedirect.com. Retrieved May 29, 2015 .
  24. ↑ a b Erik Aarden and Daniel Barben: Science and Technology Studies, in Georg Simonis (Ed.) Concepts and Procedures of Technology Assessment, Springer-Verlag, 2013, pp. 43–47
  25. ↑ a b c Harry M./ Evans, Robert (2002): The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience. in The Philosophy of Expertise Evan Selinger, Robert P. Crease, Columbia University Press, 2006, 94
  26. ^ A b Andrew Stirling: Risk, precaution and science: towards a more constructive policy debate . In: EMBO reports . tape 8 , no. 4 , April 1, 2007, pp. 309-315 , doi : 10.1038 / sj.embor.7400953 , PMID 17401403 ( online [accessed May 28, 2015]).
  27. ^ Brian Wynne: Public engagement as means of restoring trust in science? Hitting the notes, but missing the music . In: Community Genetics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 05.2006, pp. 211-220.
  28. ↑ a b Strange Weather, Again Climate Science as Political Art . In: Theory, Culture & Society . tape 27 , no. 2-3 , January 3, 2010, pp. 289-305 , doi : 10.1177 / 0263276410361499 ( online [accessed May 28, 2015]).
personal data
SURNAME Wynne, Brian
BRIEF DESCRIPTION British social scientist
DATE OF BIRTH January 14, 1947