Schihabism
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The Schihabismus (also Chehabismus of French Chéhabisme ) was a social and political reform policy in Lebanon after Lebanese President Fuad Shihab is named (President 1958-64).
overview
It was supposed to resolve the conflicts that were visible in the Lebanon war in 1958 and which endangered the social and political cohesion of the state of Lebanon, remove their causes and promote the social and economic development of Lebanon through reforms. Schihabism was a successful phase in the stabilization of Lebanese society, but was increasingly hampered by ambitious right and left politicians during the presidency of Charles Helou (President 1964-70), a confidante of Schihab, and after the election of Suleiman Frangieh (President 1970–76) ended. The breakdown of Shihabism is now considered to be one of the main causes of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) , along with the relocation of the Middle East conflict to southern Lebanon in 1970–82 .
Elements of Schihabism
Economic and social reforms
Much of the area of the Lebanese governorates Lebanonberg , Beirut and some more northern mountain regions formed an autonomous Ottoman province as early as 1860, which has since developed into a trading and banking center through French and partly British economic investments, while the other less developed regions only became the " Greater Lebanon "were affiliated. Even 40 years later, these regions, which were often predominantly Muslim and less often Christian, were mostly less developed economically and agriculturally and had higher illiteracy rates and higher population growth than central Lebanon.
In the era of Schihabism, these regions were given targeted economic and educational support. The most striking project was the construction of a reservoir of the Litani River as a sub-project for irrigation of the South Beqaa (also called West Beqaa because the Beqaa runs in a southwest-northeast direction). The reservoir was completed in 1959 and made West Beqaa a stronghold for growing vegetables, and in times of war also for growing drugs. Numerous agricultural projects and afforestation in other regions of Lebanon followed. Irrigation of the north and east Beqaa and damming of the Orontes was also planned, but was no longer implemented after Shihabism broke off. The agricultural, planning and developmental part of Schihabism was already so successful after two years of Schihab's presidency that Schihab offered to resign in 1960 because Lebanese society had been stabilized, but parliament rejected it.
The school and education system in the peripheral regions was also promoted. For liberal reasons, Lebanon does not have compulsory schooling , but the literacy rate today (2010) is around 80–88% and was significantly increased during the time of Schihabism.
The best-known part of Shihabi social reforms was a quota regulation in the civil service (military, offices, state schools and universities), according to which members of the then approximately 50% Muslim population, but also Christians from the peripheral areas, were given preference in order to ensure a fair distribution of administrative offices among the Denominations and regions to reach. However, the declared aim of the quotas was also to enable poorer and Muslim families to gain financial and social advancement in order to integrate later generations into the economically successful Lebanese upper and middle classes and thus bring about an economic balance between the religious communities. Before Shihabism, in addition to Maronites , Armenians and Druze in Lebanonberg and Beirut, almost only the predominantly Sunni , rarely Rum-Orthodox bourgeois stratum of the coastal strip were integrated into the Lebanese economic boom. In order to carry out the Shihabist reforms and to strengthen the social effect of the quota system, the proportion of those employed in the public sector was increased from 11% of the population to 23%. This emancipation policy of the population of the peripheral areas showed clear successes already in the time of Schihabism.
Finally, a Lebanese central bank was created in order to be able to better contain economic crises and inflation with the means of banknote issues and interest rate policy . Before Shihabism, a monetary policy central bank was considered superfluous in Lebanon from market-liberal views, which led to unchecked economic crises.
Limiting the influence of regional leaders ( zuʿamāʾ )
The Lebanese society of all religious communities is traditionally ruled by regional notables . Originally, they were traditional leading families within Lebanon's numerous religious communities. The established denominational proportionality from the distribution of offices in the government to the municipal administrations protected the participation rights of the religious communities and thus automatically their notables (cf. Political System of Lebanon ). They bind large families (the cohesion of which is often maintained even with a strong Lebanese diaspora - over three million Lebanese in Lebanon and around twelve million abroad) through a complicated, rarely changing clientele system and encourage them to grow in power. These notables become arab in Lebanon. zaʿīm ("leader, leader", plural: zuʿamāʾ , salutation: Emīr ), whose dignity is traditionally inherited. There have been several conflicts between the zuʿamāʾ in Lebanese history. In some cases, they developed into large landowners from the 16th century, only in the Maronite central Lebanon in 1858 a peasant revolt removed the large landowners. Often the zuʾamāʾ became leading entrepreneurs or bankers since the 19th century.
Important politicians of the time were hereditary zuʿamāʾ , such as Kamal Jumblat , Camille Chamoun , Pierre Gemayel , Suleiman Frangieh , Raymond Eddé , Raschid Karami , Saeb Salam and others. a. Fuad Schihab also came from a zaʿīm dynasty, but his biography made him more neutral. This quasi-"feudal" system had the disadvantage that growing simple sections of the population outside the clientele of the established zuʿamāʾ could neither economically nor politically emancipate themselves and Lebanese society was polarized. Corruption, election fraud and nepotism are also widespread. Shihab thought little of the zuʿamāʾ, whom he disparagingly called “fromagistes” (“cheesists”, i.e. people who cut pieces of cheese). The problem worsened when a generation of zaʿīm born between 1900 and 1920 founded partly opinion-based parties in order to expand their influence beyond religious boundaries. For example, Kamal Jumblatt founded the Progressive Socialist Party , but would never have carried out a land reform to expropriate the large landowners (like the socialist Amal movement in their territory during the civil war) because Jumblatt himself was the largest large landowner in his home region.
Schihab did not try to eliminate the power of the zuʿamāʾ, but rather to integrate them as responsible ministers into his politics and at the same time to create parallel, stately career opportunities. In order to implement his long-term economic and social reforms, a planning office, a development authority, a research council, an office for the development of the Litani river and an institute for public administration were set up, all of which came under the secretariat of the presidential office under Elias Sarkis and were independent of the ministries. Admittedly, supporters of the zuʿamā sa also sat in these offices, but only supporters of Shihabism, mostly experts, officers and employees of Schihab, had real opportunities for advancement and participation.
In return, President Schihab left the prime minister and ministers much more day-to-day political responsibility than any cabinet previously had independently of the president. Mostly the prime minister was under Shihab Raschid Karami, who tried to form a left government after the uprising of left groups in 1958, but after an armed uprising by the “right”, mostly Christian militias, set up a comprehensive cabinet of right and left zaʿīm and even an in political tactics experienced advocates of Schihabism. Within these governments, Pierre Gemayel and Kamal Dschumblat initially developed into staunch supporters of Schihab's social and economic reforms, despite ideological differences. Many Lebanese, as well as observers and experts, see this containment of the social patronage system of the zuamāʾ as the main reason for the growing resistance and ultimately the end of Shihabism.
Action against radical parties and militias
In Lebanese society, which, like many oriental regions, was not unarmed in the 19th century, a system of organized party militias based on the European model of the time had developed since the interwar period. It started with the Kata'ib party under Pierre Gemayel, which founded an armed militia in the 1930s, other parties later founded their own militias. In the Lebanon War in 1958, these right and left party militias were the conflict carriers, while Schihab, as the Commander in Chief at the time, kept the army largely neutral.
Schihab saw the militias as a threat to the state's monopoly of force and to the security of society. As early as the end of 1961, Schihab had to militarily crush an attempted coup by the Greater Syrian SSNP . Open conflicts avoided Shihab to avoid escalations, but tried the militias secret service spy on agents internally to weaken and hamper through a system of military Permits. The carrier of this weakening policy was the Deuxième Bureau ("Second Office"; Arabic المكتب الثاني, DMG al-maktab aṯ-ṯānī ), the military secret service.
Foreign policy
The 1958 Lebanon War was also fought over the question of Lebanon's accession to the United Arab Republic under Gamal Abdel Nasser , which left-wing parties such as Jumblat's PSP , the Greater Syrian SSNP , the KPL , the Nasserists and the Lebanese Baʿth supported and were therefore also supported by Nasser while right-wing and liberal, predominantly Christian parties such as the Kata'ib , Chamouns NLP and Eddés "Bloc national" rejected and fought against him.
Schihab succeeded in defusing the Lebanese antagonisms on this issue by adopting a policy of equalization with the United Arab Republic. At a meeting with Nasser on the Syrian-Lebanese border in March 1959, he assured Nasser a policy of friendship and solidarity with the Arab world, and Nasser responded with an explicit recognition of Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity. In September 1961, a coup by Syrian officers ended the rule of the United Arab Republic in Syria , which was perceived there as foreign rule by the Egyptians. Since then, pan-Arab unification projects for Lebanon have not been very specific. However, Syria also intervened in Lebanon from 1976-2005 without wanting to reunite with it.
The end of schihabism
Opposition to Schihabism and breaking off politics
There was increasing resistance to Schihabism from right-wing, liberal and left-wing groups; Christian and Muslim politicians who eventually ended the reforms. Right-wing, conservative - mostly Christian - and right-wing liberal politicians criticized the Schihabist social and quota policy with the conservative catchphrase " positive discrimination ", claimed that Muslims were increasingly dependent on the state and named the president, for example. T. polemically "Muhammad Schihab". Bourgeois politicians from Beirut and Mount Lebanon feared that their regions would be neglected. Ultimately, these fears were wrong, because in the government v. a. Ministers from Lebanonberg and Beirut for the development of their regions and the emancipation of the peripheral regions of the Muslims, initiated by Shihabism, continued even after the reforms were broken off without being dependent on the state. Three leading politicians from this camp united in 1967 with their parties to form the “Front der Drei” consisting of Eddés “Bloc National”, Chamoun's “National Liberal Party” and Gemayel's “Kata'ib” (Falange), whose number of seats in the 1968 parliamentary elections was just behind the shihabist one Groups stood. Contrary to the party names, Chamoun was seen in the “Christian” camp as a hardliner , Gemayel as a moderate and Eddé as a liberal.
Left-liberal and left-wing politicians criticized the increasing power of the military secret service in society, which they criticized as undemocratic. Leftists also feared that Shihab was working towards a military dictatorship. These fears were also exaggerated, because the “Deuxième Bureau” monitored radical and armed groups using means of espionage and psychological blocking without torture prisons or anti-constitutional institutions, while the secret services of later militias acted much more ruthlessly. Schihab showed no interest in maintaining personal power. The chehabist offices were owed to the president, not to himself. Chehab also refused, despite numerous requests, to seek a second presidential legislature that would have been contrary to the constitution. It was often assumed that the main reason for the resistance against the successful Schihabism was not the rationalizing criticism, but the limitation of the patronage possibilities of the zuamāʾ.
As an internationally respected world war general and politician from the zaʿīm family, Schihab had authority on leading notables in the country. His successors, the sociology professor Charles Hélou and the incorruptible and gifted civil servant Elias Sarkis, son of a laundress, lacked this authority. When Kamal Jumblat and his PSP unexpectedly turned away from Shihabism, Sarkis lost the controversial presidential election in August 1970 to Suleiman Frangieh, a Christian zaʿīm from the Zgharta region who started with the declared aim of ending Shihabism. The resulting equality of votes in parliament was decided in his favor with the help of Frangieh's party militia . After his election, Frangieh dissolved all the Shihabist offices that were subordinate to the President's Secretariat and the "Deuxième Bureau". In doing so, the Lebanese state initially took important means of social and economic modernization, dampening social and political contradictions and weakening radical and armed groups.
Middle East conflict and the road to civil war
Palestinian refugee camps have existed in Lebanon since the Palestine War of 1947-49 . The majority of its residents, who are Muslim (in contrast to Jordan), cannot become citizens because otherwise the majority of the population would shift in favor of the Muslim proportion of the population (contrary to the religious proportion established in the 1932 census). They often live at the subsistence level without a work permit (in some cases to this day). They too formed armed militias within the framework of the sub-parties of the PLO . Schihab had no concept for solving the Palestinian question, which he saw as a non-Lebanese matter, but favored the promotion and integration of Palestinians outside of the refugee camps supported by UNRWA , without Lebanese citizenship. For the time being, Schihab also saw no alternative to religious proportional representation. In contrast, he viewed Palestinian militias as a similar and - because of their organization and determination - greater threat to peace in Lebanon than Lebanese militias and countered them with similar military intelligence. The majority of the “left” in Lebanon expressed solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, which they saw as similar to the Algerian war, while the pro-Western “right” rejected Palestinian actions and Israeli counter-attacks. Contrary to (also Israeli) assumptions, they were not purely pro-Israeli (the supporters of the “Israeli option”, an alliance with Israel , formed a minority in the “right” camp), but rather wanted to keep the Middle East conflict away from Lebanon. After the Six Day War in 1967, Helou entered into the Cairo Agreement in November 1969 under pressure from the Arab League and the international “ New Left ” , which is still in force today. After that, all official UN-supported Palestinian refugee camps became ex-territorial areas that are not subject to Lebanese state authority and the Lebanese military, but to the PLO. Schihab clearly criticized his successor Helou for this step, which gave the Palestinian militias a legally binding base in Lebanon and thus endangered the security of Lebanon.
The situation worsened considerably when shortly after the end of Shihabism in Black September 1970, the PLO leadership and PLO militias were driven out of Jordan , but not tolerated in Syria and Egypt, and moved to Lebanon. The PLO leadership was determined to further develop southern Lebanon as a base for combat against Israel and, at the same time, to make its renewed expulsion from Lebanon impossible. For this purpose, pro-Palestinian civilians in southern Lebanon were armed and Palestinian and pro-Palestinian guerrilla fighters took control of southern Lebanon in the next few years to such an extent that it was nicknamed " Fatahland " and carried out armed commandos against northern Israel from here, which often went with them Israeli air strikes have been answered. This escalation has been classified by the Lebanese army as a threat to the security of Lebanon. An attempt to regain control of the south with a major offensive in May 1973, however, failed due to the guerrilla tactics of the PLO and was ended under pressure from the Arab states. At the same time, the PLO massively equipped the left party militias that sympathized with them in order to prevent attacks by right-wing militias and the army. Strengthened by this power, Jumblat now took the position of wanting to remove the sectarian proportional representation system (which, as a Druze, denied him the presidency). Increasingly, he also gave speeches against the Christian Maronites who demanded their expulsion or extermination, thus unleashing fears in the Christian population, which the right-wing militias responded to with a counter-armament, which now intended to expel the Palestinians. As a result, a spiral of violence of massacres and counter-massacres developed between right-wing militias on the one hand and left Lebanese and Palestinian militias on the other, which finally culminated in the Lebanese civil war in April 1975.
literature
- Theodor Hanf: Coexistence in War. State collapse and emergence of a nation in Lebanon. Baden-Baden 1990, ISBN 3-7890-1972-0 (pp. 157-166)
- William Harris: Faces of Lebanon - Sects, Wars and Global Extensions. Princeton / New Jersey 1997, ISBN 1-55876-116-0 (pp. 146–149)
- Kamal Salibi : The Modern History of Lebanon. New York 1977, ISBN 0-88206-015-5
- Kamal Salibi: Crossroads to Civil War. Lebanon 1958-1976 New York 1976, ISBN 0-88206-010-4
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c Harris p. 147
- ↑ z. B. Hemp p. 159
- ↑ Hemp p. 160
- ↑ a b Hemp p. 159
- ↑ Kamal Jumblat respectfully referred to him as an “emir disguised as a general”, cf. Hemp p. 165
- ↑ Palestinians in the refugee camps supported by the UN did not receive any Lebanese work permits in unskilled professions until 2005 until August 2010 no permits for skilled professions and vocational training cf. [1] . These restrictions applied less often to Palestinians outside the refugee camps.