The Concordia was a three-masted barkentine with a steel hull that was built in Poland in 1992 for West Island College in Montreal , Canada . The ship was designed by Zygmunt Choreń . Sailing training trips were carried out with her until she sank on February 17th, 2010.
On February 17, 2010, the Concordia got a strong list during a storm gust in a bad weather area (forecast wind force 7–8 with gusts, wave height 3.5–4 m) off the Brazilian east coast, capsized and sank within 20 minutes. All 64 people on board were able to get to safety in four of the eight life rafts on board . The islands were sighted from an airplane. 41 hours later, a suitably managed Japanese freighter was able to rescue the occupants of three islands. The remaining castaways in the fourth life raft were picked up by another ship. The master and the first officer later stated that the ship had fallen victim to a sudden microburst (sudden strong fall wind). On board were four German students who had booked a program from the student exchange company Stepin and who were also in mortal danger as a result of the sinking.
Based on the weather observations by the crew shortly before capsizing (wind 23 knots, no significant temperature change) and the evaluation of weather data and satellite images, there was no evidence of a typical microburst situation; the wind speed was most likely between 25 and 50 knots
When handing over the watch to the 2nd officer, the master did not give sufficient instructions on how to proceed in the event of deteriorating weather (e.g. reducing the sail area)
Although the 2nd officer noticed changes in the wind situation and observed several storm gusts and also followed them on the radar, he did not recognize any danger or any need for action
Despite an announced bad weather front, the 2nd officer steered with autopilot, which at the decisive moment delayed the change of course due to automatic limitation of the rudder deflection
the hatches of the deck superstructures fore and aft were not closed watertight according to the announced weather, which decisively reduced the ship's stability in the event of severe heeling (without the buoyancy of the deck superstructures, according to the investigation report, the maximum righting moment was already reached at approx. 38 degrees of heeling, while there would have been a second - higher - maximum at approx. 79 degrees with secured deck superstructures)
During the arrival of the shower gust, the heeling of the ship rose to at least 23 degrees for 2-3 minutes. The ship's command did not react during this time
a further slight increase in wind speed, probably with a vertical component, caused the ship to heel more than 23 degrees. The course changes (falling) initiated at this time had come too late to prevent the heeling from becoming so severe that large amounts of water ran into the ship through open doors and hatches on the leeward side.
The management of the shipping company had not worked out any procedures that would have ensured that the ship's command was aware of the information on the ship's stability in the event of severe heeling (according to the investigation, the righting ability of the ship could be determined by a slight downward wind at 30 degrees heeling 0 to be reduced)
The EPIRB radio buoy recovered by the crew had worked, but the telephone number stored for this identifier had not been in use since 2004, which delayed the location and identification of the distress at sea
After a survey of tall ship officers, the report concludes, among other things, that on many training sailing ships, knowledge of the stability parameters of their ship is insufficient in order to avoid such incidents.
