Delta Air Lines Flight 1288
| Delta Air Lines Flight 1288 | |
|---|---|
 The repaired aircraft on July 17, 2008 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Uncontrolled engine damage |
| place | Pensacola Regional Airport |
| date | July 6, 1996 |
| Fatalities | 2 |
| Survivors | 140 |
| Injured | 5 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | McDonnell Douglas MD-88 |
| operator | Delta Air Lines |
| Mark | N927DA |
| Departure airport | Pensacola Regional Airport |
| Destination airport | William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport |
| Passengers | 137 |
| crew | 5 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On July 6, 1996, there was an incident on Delta Air Lines flight 1288 , a domestic scheduled flight from Pensacola to Atlanta , in which two of the 142 occupants were killed and the McDonnell Douglas MD-88 used was badly damaged.
Airplane and occupants
The eight-year-old McDonnell Douglas MD-88 with the aircraft registration number N927DA, which was equipped with two bypass turbines of the type Pratt & Whitney JT8D -219, was manufactured in April 1988 and delivered to Delta Air Lines in November 1988 . The left engine was originally from another Delta Air Lines aircraft. It was removed from it on December 21, 1995 after an oil leak in the compressor caused smoke in the cabin . After replacing a carbon seal, the repaired engine was mounted on the later affected MD-88 on January 1, 1996.
The crew consisted of a 40-year-old flight captain , a 37-year-old first officer and three flight attendants . There were 137 passengers on board.
course
The first officer boarded the aircraft at 1:30 p.m. local time and carried out a preflight check , during which he noticed an oil leak on the nose of the left engine, which he later recorded in a conversation with the flight captain who had come at 1:45 p.m. mentioned. He also noted that the oil was not dripping, the oil leak was insignificant and that 2 rivets were missing on the outer part of the left wing. Thereupon both engines started without any problems. Finally, the received pilots at 14:23 from the Tower , the start release for runway 17, after which the first officer flying at this time pilot, the thrust levers forward squeezed until it was changed at the direction of the first officer on the automatic thrust control. Meanwhile there was a "loud bang" at 2:24 pm at a speed of around 70 km / h . A left-hand engine damage associated with the escape of components had occurred. Debris broke through the fuselage in 16 places and shot into the cabin, killing a 39-year-old passenger and her 12-year-old son in seats 37A and C, and sustaining two other passengers with serious head and other injuries. This was followed by failure of the cockpit lighting and instruments. The captain took control, idled both engines , activated the handbrake, but not the thrust reverser and the ground spoilers , and brought the aircraft to a standstill. The pilots tried to contact the tower, which initially did not succeed due to the loss of electrical energy until they switched on the emergency power supply , contacted the tower at 14:25 and declared an emergency. In the absence of any signs of a fire, he instructed the L-1 flight attendant not to evacuate the aircraft, whereupon she used a megaphone to tell the passengers to remain seated, which the first officer did in a similar way via the PA system formulated. The flight attendants in the rear of the aircraft initiated an evacuation in the rear due to the non-functioning interphone , the serious injuries to the passengers and the serious structural damage. After walking through the aircraft, the first officer instructed the captain to turn off both engines, which then cut off the fuel supply. The first officer added that passengers were standing on the runway and on the wings . At 2:27 p.m., the captain contacted the tower and called for medical care and the airport fire brigade to examine the exterior of the aircraft for signs of fire. The airport fire brigade arrived shortly afterwards and saw no fire or smoke . However, a firefighter reported that he smelled smoke, and fire-fighting work began. When the first officer walked through the aircraft again, he saw that the door in the tail cone and door L-2 (rear left) were open and again instructed the passengers to remain seated as it was safer on board. He returned to the cockpit and reported to the pilot about the serious injuries and the evacuation, whereupon he activated the engine extinguishing system for the left engine, which however did not empty into the left engine. Then the L-2 flight attendant opened door L-2 and pulled the lever for the corresponding escape slide . Shortly afterwards, she saw a fire at the engine inlet, blocked the exit and directed the passengers to the bow. The L-1 flight attendant then reported the emergency situation to the flight captain and returned to help a passenger who had suffered a serious head injury and was being treated by a doctor . The damage to the aircraft made evacuation via the aircraft stairs impracticable, whereupon the captain requested mobile aircraft stairs. Suitable aircraft stairs reached the aircraft around 25 minutes after the accident, the remaining passengers were evacuated and taken to the airport terminal in an apron bus . Three passengers were slightly injured during the evacuation. After the incident, the plane was repaired and put back into service.
Accident investigations
The Lockheed model 209F flight recorder and the Fairchild model A100 voice recorder had stopped recording at the time the engine failed. During the investigations of the NTSB , both an oil line, which ran approx. 125 m from the runway threshold to the point where the aircraft stopped, as well as several pieces of debris and their notches on the runway, including the flange washer, the engine nose, the front part of a compressor disc and the whole front part of the left engine. Fire damage could be found on the outer cowling of this engine. In addition, 146 of the 154 cables were cut. Finally, by examining the parts, the cause of the engine damage was found to be the failure of the engine fan due to material fatigue. An undiscovered microstructure and crack had formed during Volvo's drilling for Pratt & Whitney . The damage pulled deeper into the side wall of the hole than Pratt & Whitney expected. After the engine fan went into operation in 1990, further fatigue cracks developed on it until it failed on the day of the accident. An additional factor cited was the failure to detect the detectable crack, either due to errors in cleaning and fluorescent penetrant testing, or the failure of the inspector to detect the crack, or a combination of both factors.
Security Recommendations
The NTSB issued a total of 19 safety recommendations to the FAA on July 29, 1996 and March 4, 1998 , 8 of which were accepted as "acceptable action" and 11 were rejected as "unacceptable action" by the FAA, including the engines and the inspections concerned.
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Aircraft accident data and report N927DA on the Aviation Safety Network (English)
Coordinates: 30 ° 16 '48 " N , 87 ° 6' 36" W.