German-Polish liquidation agreement

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
German-Polish agreement of October 31, 1929

The German-Polish Liquidation Agreement of 31 October 1929 regulated the abandonment of mutual financial claims between Poland and the German Reich . It was one of the few agreements between the wars to normalize relations between the two states.

prehistory

After the end of the First World War and the re-establishment of the Polish state, the German-Polish relationship was difficult and full of conflict. Poland did not succeed in obtaining a guarantee of its western borders from Germany. The question of the German minority in Poland was also prone to conflict . Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and his Polish counterpart August Zaleski strove to normalize relations to a certain extent. This also applied to Stresemann's successor Julius Curtius . To this end, the negotiations on a trade agreement that had been interrupted in 1928 were resumed. Within the Reich Cabinet of the grand coalition under Hermann Müller , the minister of nutrition, for example, was opposed by Hermann Dietrich as a representative of agricultural interests. In addition, negotiations began on a "general settlement" through a so-called liquidation agreement.

negotiations

The agreement was partly negotiated parallel to the negotiations of the experts on the new regulation of the German reparations ( Young Plan ) in The Hague . However, as requested by the Polish government, the Reich government refused to accept a joint between the two treaties. On the German side, the negotiations were led by the envoy Ulrich Rauscher . Foreign Minister Zaleski represented Polish interests.

The German government, however, considered it necessary to have both agreements passed at the same time in the Reichstag . With this position she prevailed against the critics in the Reichsrat from Prussia and Saxony and against the coalition parties BVP , DVP and Zentrum .

It was not without controversy in German domestic politics. Ratification dragged on on the German side and could not be completed before the end of the Müller cabinet and the dissolution of the Reichstag. The political right in particular protested against the agreement because they saw it as a departure from the strategy of weakening Poland with economic means. The NSDAP saw this as a fundamental departure from the revision policy and the DNVP lamented the abandonment of billions. The content-related criticism was connected with personal attacks against the German negotiator Rauscher. The discussion of the agreement was mixed up with the debate on the Young Plan. Hjalmar Schacht in particular objected to the agreement in this regard.

The Reich President Paul von Hindenburg hesitated to sign the agreement. He made his approval dependent on an increase in funds for aid to the east . But he also had legal reservations. In the end, Hindenburg had five legal opinions. These came from the President of the Reichsgericht Walter Simons and from the legal scholars Heinrich Triepel , Erich Kaufmann , Carl Schmitt and Gerhard Anschütz . Some of the reports commissioned by the opposition came to the conclusion that a constitution-changing majority was required for approval in parliament. It was only when the government convinced the president that a simple majority would be enough that he signed the law.

content

In the agreement, both sides renounced all mutual claims of a financial nature that had emerged from the First World War or the Versailles Treaty . This included both claims by states among themselves and those at the expense of private individuals. Germany waived possible claims of 2 billion Reichsmarks . On the Polish side there were claims amounting to around 800 million Reichsmarks. Poland discontinued all ongoing proceedings for the liquidation of German goods. This also applied to the voting areas in Upper Silesia .

Attached to the agreement was a Polish note in which Poland waived the right of repurchase in the event of inheritance with regard to contracts between German landowners, which they had concluded with the Prussian settlement commission from 1886 until the end of the war . This legally secured the property of around 12,000 families. The value of the property in question was at least 500 million Reichsmarks.

A permanent German-Polish arbitration tribunal based in Paris was set up to resolve disputes . If necessary, the neutral chairman was appointed by the Federal President of Switzerland .

The agreement was one of the few successful attempts to clarify the German-Polish relationship in the interwar period.

References

literature

  • Martin Vogt: Introduction In: Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Müller II cabinet. June 28, 1928 - March 27, 1930 Vol. 1 Oldenbourg, Munich 1970. Online version
  • Peter Borowsky: Between revisionism and realism - German policy towards Poland 1919 to 1933 online version (PDF; 293 kB)
  • Wilfried Beutter: liquidation agreement . In: Gerhard Taddey (Hrsg.): Lexicon of German history . People, events, institutions. From the turn of the times to the end of the 2nd World War. 2nd, revised edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-520-81302-5 , p. 745.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Hans Mommsen: The Germans and the Republic of Poland. The thorny road to German-Polish understanding. In: Ernst Willi Hansen (Ed.): Political change, organized violence and national security. Munich, 1995 p. 525.
  2. ^ Hans Schneider: Legislation. A teaching and manual. Heidelberg, 2002 p. 278.