Henry Manne

Henry Girard Manne (born May 10, 1928 in New Orleans , † January 17, 2015 ) was an American lawyer and professor at George Mason University . He is considered to be one of the pioneers and well-known representatives of the economic analysis of law .

Career

Manne studied economics at Vanderbilt University until 1950 . He completed his studies with the academic degree of a Bachelor of Arts . In 1952 he was at the University of Chicago for Juris Doctor in 1966 at the Yale University doctorate for Doctor of Juridical Science (JSD). From 1971 Manne was professor of law and political science at the University of Rochester . In 1974 he moved to the University of Miami and in 1980 to Emory University . In 1986 he finally accepted a position at George Mason University, where he, as dean, carried out a thematic realignment of the law faculty on the economic analysis of law.

In 1987 Manne received an honorary Legum Doctor (LL.D.) degree from Seattle University and the Universidad Francesco Marroquin in Guatemala .

In 1999 Manne retired. Most recently he was Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute .

Scientific positions

The trade public outside the United States was primarily known to Manne for his stance on insider trading and for the catchphrase “ market for corporate control ”.

Manne, like Milton Friedman , Daniel Fischel and Frank H. Easterbrook , spoke out firmly against a ban on insider trading . In his opinion, securities transactions based on non-public information are beneficial to investors, as the new information would flow into the market process more quickly than if insider trading were banned, thereby increasing the information efficiency of the market.

The theory of the "market for corporate control" offers an answer to the question (which is not uncontroversial in terms of its objectives), how it can be ensured that the management of a listed stock corporation is primarily the value creation interest of the shareholders and not the own interests or interests of the employees or the Public pursued. In this context, Manne emphasized the power of the capital market , which has a disciplining effect on the management of the stock corporation: Misconduct, i.e. actions by management not committed to the interests of the shareholders, lead to the disinvestment of many shareholders and thus to a fall in the stock market price of the company's shares. This would make the company a candidate for a (hostile) takeover by another company, as a result of which the current management would be replaced. For this reason, out of a well-understood self-interest, managers are primarily concerned with running the company in the interests of investors.

Web links

• Image by Henry Manne
• Legalize Insider Trading - Interview with Henry Manne, September 24, 2004

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Archive link ( Memento of the original from January 28, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
2. ↑ Archive link ( Memento of the original from January 30, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
3. ^ Henry Manne: In Defense of Insider Trading. 44 Harvard Business Review 113 (1966); Henry Manne: Insider Trading and the Stock Market. The Free Press, New York 1966.
4. ^ Henry G. Manne: Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. 73 Journal of Political Economy 110 (1965)  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.