Historical institutionalism

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The Historical institutionalism is a theory of integration based on the principles of neo-institutionalism in the field of political science . The approach that emerged in the USA in the 1980s tries to explain the origin, change and function of institutions and represents the basic assumption that these can be explained, among other things, on the basis of path dependency , i.e. the historical course. Policy decisions and preferences of actors were based on the foundations pre-structured by institutions.

The medium-range theory has an eclectic structure, i.e. it takes theoretical borrowings from rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism and thus forms a bridging function between the two theories. Within historical institutionalism itself, a line of rational-economic theory (represented by Paul Pierson and Mark Pollack, among others) and a sociological-culturalist approach (represented by Simon Bulmer, among others ) have developed.

Historical institutionalism serves to explain institutions in general, but is used especially in the field of European studies to explain the origins and development of the European Union .

Neo-institutionalism

In response to “old institutionalism” - under which institutions are primarily examined administratively, legally, and politically - behavioralism gained importance in US political science in the 1950s and 1960s. Behavioral researchers argued that in order to analyze politics and political outcomes, one must focus on informal practices, behavior and distributions of power rather than on formal structures. Individual behavior and collective decisions can only be explained in terms of methodological individualism.

In the opinion of critics, however, the behavioralist approach is not able to work out comparisons of different political systems in a suitable manner, since the analysis of behavior alone would fall short.

For this reason, precisely in order to be able to explain differences between different systems and recognize common challenges, a “ neo-institutionalism ” developed at the end of the 1970s / beginning of the 1980s , which above all came up with a broader concept of institutions . Under the motto “Institutions do matter” argued u. a. March and Olsen that the “institution” should not only include formal institutions, but also norms, processes and conventions that are part of the political structure and as these are indispensable for the elementary understanding of politics.

Below the approach of neo-institutionalism, three further strands developed independently of one another and without a theoretical connection, which, however, differ greatly in terms of their ontology and epistemology: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. For this reason, it seems obvious to take up Simon Bulmer's suggestion and view the term “neo-institutionalism” as a kind of umbrella term for a number of theoretical approaches.

Development of historical institutionalism

According to Peter Hall , historical institutionalism emerged as a reaction to the ( behaviorist ) group theories and the structural-functionalist approach that were widespread in the 1960s and 1970s .

Historical institutionalism borrows from these two approaches, but tries to go beyond them: From group theories it was adopted that conflicts between different population groups must be perceived as political, that is, as part of politics. Historical institutionalism also tries to better explain why, when compared across countries, similar processes produce different policy results, which group theories are unable to do, since they do not attach any importance to institutions as such.

The structural-functionalist approach adopted the assumption that institutions are an elementary component of the social order of society, but that the state does not play the role of a neutral observer, but rather represents a complex of mutually influencing institutions, conflicts, processes, collective behavior and differences in the policy results. Institutions are defined much more broadly within this approach, as mentioned above.

In addition to this institutionalist aspect, the theory of historical institutionalism emphasizes that in order to understand the policy decisions of today's actors, these must be considered in the historical course of the development of the institutions, since development steps would build on one another ( path dependency ).

This aspect, which is an important variable in the analysis of institutions in historical institutionalism, also forms the major difference to the “neighboring” theories of rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Neither theories attach any importance to the historical development of institutions. Neither theories take into account the asymmetrical distribution of power in the development and design of institutions, which would also restrict the decision-making alternatives for the actors themselves. Both theoretical approaches are characterized by a one-dimensional causal chain: either, as in rational choice institutionalism, the structure is viewed from the perspective of the actors or, as in sociological institutionalism, from the perspective of the institutions. Here historical institutionalism tries to act as an intermediary between the two, to see structure and action as mutually interacting parts.

Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes that institutions arise on the basis of aggregated, individual and conscious decisions of the actors. Historical institutionalism denies this with the reference to incalculable consequences and short time horizons for the establishment of the institutions.

Sociological institutionalism sees that individual actions are determined by institutions, which, however, happens on the basis of following conscious or unconscious norms. Decisions would therefore not be generated from long-term strategies, but would represent the results of endogenous (internalized) conventions, norms and traditions of the institutionalized environment.

Two further spin-offs have developed within historical institutionalism: on the one hand, the rationalistic-economic approach, which is mainly represented by Paul Pierson and Mark Pollack. On the other hand, there is the sociological approach, which draws on some sociological explanatory models, best known here from Simon Bulmer.

Rationalistic-economic historical institutionalism

In his essay “The Path to European Integration”, Paul Pierson describes his assumptions of a deductive , rationalistic-economic variant of historical institutionalism, starting from Andrew Moravcsik's criticism of liberal intergovernmentalism . In this case, in the case of the analysis of the European Union, only the “ grand bargains” of the treaties would be considered and not the independent existence of the supranational institutions between these treaty negotiations. Here, however, elementary policy decisions would be made without the national actors paying much attention to them.

To explain the asymmetrical power relationship Pierson uses of economics and the new institutional economics upcoming model of the principal agents (German and principal-agent problem ). In the case of the European Union, principals are the member states that delegate power under strict supervision to agents (supranational institutions). Here Pierson takes up the critical point of the freedom of choice between the two sides and deals with the theories of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism : Neo-functionalist authors point at this point to the autonomy of the institutions that has arisen, intergovernmentalists to the national actors who continue to exercise supervision. With regard to this, Pierson seeks a middle way: The transfer of power and tasks to the institutions cited by the intergovernmentalist side is understandable, but the institutions would develop a "life of their own" over time.

This independence of the institutions would result in control deficits (“gaps”), i.e. (clear) differences with regard to the institutional and political preferences of the member states on the functioning of the institutions.

These control deficits arise in the course of time between decision and implementation. As already described above, this historical aspect is the unique selling point of historical institutionalism, because, according to Pierson, political scientists usually only analyze snapshots and do not see policy decisions in a historical context.

Pierson therefore deals in detail with the question of why these control deficits would arise and why, even if the agents (member states) were aware of them, they could not be closed.

As the first control deficit, Pierson names the automatically created autonomy through the creation of supranational institutions, which is necessary so that nation states can make joint decisions and enable efficient, collective decision-making processes. These institutions, as Pierson quotes, are given an actor quality due to the resources made available, develop their own interests that differ from those of their founders, and no longer serve as passive instruments alone. The "political game" now includes more actors and more interests have to be weighed against each other.

Pierson goes on to say that once these institutions were created, they tried to increase their scope for decision-making and their autonomy. In the context of the European Union, Pierson shows this using the example of the European Commission , the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice . The Commission and the Parliament would have the property of the agenda setting and could thus significantly influence political decisions. Pierson also ascribes the privilege of process managing to the Commission, which means that it is not only able to influence the issues but also to determine the processes in the European Union system between member states and institutions, which could, for example, significantly delay decisions on directives .

As a second reason for the emergence of control deficits Pierson cites the limited time horizon of politicians. Many institutional decisions or reforms would only have long-term effects. Political decision-makers, however, are interested in short-term results and consequences and ignore long-term effects. These would only be considered by politicians if the issues were discussed by the public or if the politicians were not in danger of being punished in elections.

As a third point, Pierson explains that unforeseeable consequences could also lead to such control deficits, which is mainly due to the high issue density. This density of topics leads to two effects: on the one hand, a thematic, content-related overload and, on the other hand, transfer effects known from neo-functionalism (spill-over) .

Using the example of decision-making in the European Union, Pierson explains that, due to the growing importance and complexity of the Union, it places high demands on the member states. A lack of time and information favored the supranational actors, so that the member states could not fully fulfill their function as gatekeepers of national sovereignty. This is particularly the case in the times between the major contract negotiations, when most of the content would be achieved. Due to the high complexity and interlinking of topics, it is difficult to look at them in isolation. Decisions within a topic would often have consequences in other subject areas, so that, originally unintentionally, the founders of the institution expanded the scope for decision-making and thus spill-over effects would arise.

As the fourth reason for the emergence of control deficits, Paul Pierson names the change in preferences of the member states and thus contradicts the classic intergovernmentalist argumentation that the preferences of member states are fixed. Classically, preferences could change through a change of government, but also, for example, through new information.

Pierson explains that intergovernmentalists do not see any problems in the control deficits mentioned, since the principals can close them through learning or find other forms of decision-making in competition. Pierson replies that these arguments come from the economy and are not applicable in politics. Furthermore, he explains that the principals are well aware of these control deficits, but could not close them due to three barriers: the resistance of the supranational institutions to reforms, the institutional obstacles within the institutions and the so-called sunk costs, i.e. the expenditures already made and the associated high exit costs.

With this, Pierson closes and highlights the advantages of his interpretation of historical institutionalism, especially in relation to neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism . Historical institutionalism sees political control between principals and agents not as a zero-sum game, as in neo-functionalism, but as a growing development of rules and procedures that would impose conditions on all political actors. In contrast to intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism does not consider institutional developments selectively, but over time and can thus explain the growing autonomy of institutions much better on the basis of the control deficits. There is no doubt that the Member States are in the position of power.

In his essay "The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis", Mark Pollack complements Paul Pierson's remarks, among other things, under the aspect of why agents (member states) would also consciously advocate the development of such control deficits. Among other things, if they noticed that they ran counter to them because of other political majorities in the principals (supranational institutions) or if the agenda setting on the part of the principals agents would mostly bring advantages. Furthermore, he supplements Pierson's approach with the assumption of “lock-ins”, that is, agents would, in the course of time, close themselves off to the claims and wishes of the principals.

Melanie-Morisse Schilbach criticizes Pierson's approach for the strongly rationalistic design of the principals-agents model, with Pierson himself claiming that he would argue neither particularly “rational” nor “non-rational”. She also criticizes the fact that, according to Pierson, the preferences of agents could only change through external sources, but not through internal sources such as learning, socialization or experience.

Furthermore, it is criticized that the rationalistic-economic historical institutionalism cannot explain the change of supranational institutions, since it completely excludes the individual actors and is therefore subject to a structural determinism.

Sociological Historical Institutionalism

Simon Bulmer is considered to be one of the representatives of the sociological variant of historical institutionalism. He already described this in rudiments in his article “The Case of Merger Control” and gave further details in the article “New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market”. In contrast to Pierson, Bulmer argues much more inductively and emphasizes that historical institutionalism does not have a teleology of its own , but serves solely as an analytical model. Bulmer doubts whether the theory is universally predictable; The theory can only make prognoses in smaller subject areas, especially in the area of ​​norms and rules.

In contrast to the rationalist researchers like Pierson or Pollack, Bulmer does not understand EU member states and supranational institutions as a relationship between pro and antagonists, but rather as an "interwoven network" and understands his approach much broader. To understand this network of “EU governance”, four dimensions are helpful: systemic change, subsystemic change of governance structures, policy evolution and the role of values and norms (role of values ​​and norms).

With regard to systemic change, Bulmer writes that historical institutionalism sees member states neither as winners (intergovernmentalism) nor as outright losers (neo-functionalism), but as developments ateleologically. Historical institutionalism could thus explain the delegation of power, function and change of institutions much better, especially in the periods between the major treaty negotiations.

Historical institutionalism can also better compare subsystematic changes in institutional structures or the outcome ability before and after changes due to the historical perspective. Bulmer gives here the example of the comparison of the European Community with the European Union (after ratification of the Single European Act and the implementation of the European single market ).

With regard to policy development, historical institutionalism helps insofar as Bulmer sees policy-making as repetitive and building on one another. On the basis of the principle of the path dependence of the theory, it is easier to understand projects such as the creation of the European internal market, the basis of which was already in the Treaty of Rome. A learning process on the part of the member states could also be observed here, especially with regard to the reaction and implementation of new directives, but also on the part of the European Court of Justice, which gradually developed legal norms in the interplay between EU institutions and member states; the Cassis de Dijon decision is cited as an example . Historical institutionalism thus proves that policy development cannot be separated from public administration.

Bulmer sees a further advantage of historical institutionalism in the area of ​​policy evolution in the ability of the approach to explain why policy-making within the supranational institution does not have to be in the interests of the member states. Quoting Lindberg and Campbell, Bulmer explains that institutions are not neutral arenas per se, since not all parties involved (from the consumer to the member state as such) have equal access to these institutions and the institutions have a life of their own and thus the processes of policy- Making could affect.

Bulmer makes a fourth point by referring to the essay “Rediscovering Institutions” by James March and Johan P. Olsen , who highlight norms arising from institutions, which in turn would influence individual actors. A European culture is difficult to identify, but the institutions of the European Union shape an institutional culture through their actions and activities, which in turn gives support and stability to the very fluid political system of the European Union.

Bulmer emphasizes that historical institutionalism is not a “great theory”, but that it is useful for analyzing and evaluating both the “big treaties” and everyday politics, for example in the European Union.

Melanie Morisse-Schilbach criticizes Simon Bulmer's approach for not being able to explain macro-social change. The sociological approach shows processes rather than explaining them comprehensively.

Criticism and further developments

According to Peters, Pierre and Desmon, historical institutionalism has developed into a well-known and well-received approach to institutional analysis in comparative political science over the past two decades, and this is particularly popular in the field of European studies.

Numerous other researchers have further developed and refined the theory, so that today it offers a rich and detailed set of methods to explain institutional change. De facto, however, the empirical studies are still few in number; there are some examples of their application to institutions in Latin America, Asia and, more recently, Africa.

The criticism of the theory is multifaceted, the scientific discourse in relation to historical institutionalism is still ongoing. A common and widespread theory is that historical institutionalism is based on strongly structurally conservative political systems. Above all, the theory can explain continuity and stability using the example of the European Union and not a change in policy and polity . Nor can the theory describe any conflicts in times that superficially appear stable and path-dependent.

It is also criticized that historical institutionalism was developed on the basis of a very small number of cases and that the knowledge described is not valid for these reasons.

literature

Primary literature

  • Hans Arnum: Ideas and institutions in the European Union. The case of social regulation and its complex decision-making. Copenhagen 1999.
  • Mark D. Aspinwall, Gerald Schneider: Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration. In: European Journal of Political Research. 38, 1, 2000, pp. 1-36.
  • Mark Aspinwall, Gerald Schneider: The rules of integration. The institutionalist approach to European studies. Manchester 2000.
  • Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse: The Effect of International Institutions: From Standard Recognition to Standard Compliance. Bonn 2001.
  • Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, David Collier (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. 2008.
  • Simon J. Bulmer: Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merge Control. In: Public Administration. 72, 3, 1994, pp. 423-444.
  • Simon J. Bulmer: New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 5, 3, 1998, pp. 365-386.
  • John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Leon N. Lindberg (Eds.): Governance of the American Economy. Cambridge 1991.
  • John L. Campbell, Leon N. Lindberg, J. Rogers Hollingsworth: The evolution of governance regimes. In: John L. Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Leon N. Lindberg (Eds.): Governance of the American Economy. Cambridge 1991, pp. 319-355.
  • G. Capoccia, D. Ziblatt: The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond. In: Comparative Political Studies. 43, 8-9, 2010, pp. 931-968.
  • Giovanni Capoccia, R. Daniel Kelemen: The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. In: World Politics. 59, 03, 2007, pp. 341-369.
  • Thomas Christiansen, Gerda Falkner, Knud Erik Jørgensen: Theorizing EU treaty reform: beyond diplomacy and bargaining. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 9, 1, 2002, pp. 12-32.
  • Ruth Berins Collier, David Collier: Shaping the political arena. Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America. Notre Dame, Ind 2002.
  • Gero Erdmann, Sebastian Elischer, Alexander Stroh: Can historical institutionalism be applied to political regime development in Africa? (= GIGA working papers. 166). Hamburg 2011.
  • Gerda Falkner: Between design gaps and integrative cooperation effects: the welfare state and integration from the perspective of historical institutionalism. In: Markus Jachtenfuchs, Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.): European integration. (= Uni-Taschenbücher. 1853). Opladen 1996, pp. 475-511.
  • Barbara Geddes: How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. In: Political Analysis. 2, 1, 1990, pp. 131-150.
  • Peter A. Hall: The Role of Interests, Institutions and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations. In: Mark Irving Lichbach, Alan S. Zuckerman (Eds.): Comparative politics. Rationality, culture, and structure. Cambridge et al. 1997, pp. 174-207.
  • Peter A. Hall, Rosemary CR Taylor: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. In: Political Studies. 44, 5, 1996, pp. 3-32.
  • J. Jupille, JA Caporaso: Institutionalism and European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics. In: Annual Review of Political Science. 2, 1, 1999, pp. 429-444.
  • Mark Irving Lichbach, Alan S. Zuckerman (Eds.): Comparative politics. Rationality, culture, and structure. Cambridge et al. 1997.
  • Johannes Lindner, Berthold Rittberger: The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of Institutions - Revisiting Historical Institutionalism. In: Journal of Common Market Studies. 41, 3, 2003, pp. 445-473.
  • Shu-Yun Ma: Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism. In: International Political Science Review, Revue internationale de science politique. 28, 1, 2007, pp. 57-78.
  • James Mahoney: Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective. In: Studies in Comparative International Development. 36, 1, 2001, pp. 111-141.
  • James Mahoney, P. Larkin Terrie: Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science. In: Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, David Collier (Eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. 2008.
  • James Mahoney, Kathleen Thelen (Eds.): Explaining Institutional Change. Cambridge 2009.
  • James G. March, Johan P. Olsen: Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of politics. New York, NY 1989.
  • B. Guy Peters: Institutional theory in political science. The "new institutionalism". London et al. 2001.
  • B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, Desmond S. King: The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism. In: The Journal of Politics. 67, 4, 2005, pp. 1275-1300.
  • Paul Pierson: The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. In: Comparative Political Studies. 29, 2, 1996, pp. 123-163.
  • Paul Pierson: The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change. In: Governance. 13, 4, 2000, pp. 475-499.
  • Paul Pierson: Politics in time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton 2004.
  • Mark A. Pollack: The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis. In: Governance. 9, 4, 1996, pp. 429-458.
  • Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, John D. Stephens: Capitalist development and democracy. Chicago 1992.
  • Theda Skocpol: States and social revolutions. A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China. In: ACLS Humanities. E-book 1979.
  • Dan Slater: Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia. In: Comparative Politics. 36, 1, 2003, p. 81.
  • Dan Slater, James Mahoney, Kathleen Thelen: Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia. In: James Mahoney, Kathleen Thelen (Eds.): Explaining Institutional Change. Cambridge 2009, pp. 132-167.
  • Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen, Frank Longstreth (eds.): Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge et al. 1992.
  • Kathleen Ann Thelen, Sven Steinmo: Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. In: Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen, Frank Longstreth (eds.): Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge et al. 1992, pp. 1-32.

Secondary literature

  • Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Monika Lerch (Hrsg.): Theories of European integration. (= UTB. 2554). Wiesbaden 2005.
  • André Brodocz, Gary S. Schaal (Ed.): Political Theories of the Present. An introduction. (= UTB for Science Political Science. 2219). Wiesbaden around 2004.
  • Ludger Helms: Introduction: Political science institutional research at the intersection of political theory and government theory. In: Ludger Helms, Uwe Jun (ed.): Political theory and government theory. An introduction to political science institutional research. Frankfurt am Main / New York 2004, pp. 13–44.
  • Ludger Helms, Uwe Jun (ed.): Political theory and government theory. An introduction to political science institutional research. Frankfurt am Main / New York 2004.
  • Katharina Holzinger, Christoph Knill, Dirk Peters, Berthold Rittberger, Frank Schimmelfennig, Wolfgang Wagner: The European Union. Theories and concepts of analysis. (= UTB. 2682). Paderborn 2005.
  • Markus Jachtenfuchs, Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.): European integration. (= Uni-Taschenbücher. 1853). Opladen 1996.
  • André Kaiser: The Political Theory of Neo-Institutionalism: James March and Johan Olsen. In: André Brodocz, Gary S. Schaal (Ed.): Political Theories of the Present. An introduction. (= UTB for Science Political Science. 2219). Wiesbaden approx. 2004, pp. 313–342.
  • Melanie Morisse-Schilbach: Historical Institutionalism. In: Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Monika Lerch (Ed.): Theories of European integration. (= UTB. 2554). Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 271-292.
  • Holger Schulze: Neo-institutionalism. An analytical instrument for explaining social transformation processes. (= Working papers of the Eastern European Institute of the Free University of Berlin, focus on politics. 4). 1997.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ This view is represented by several authors, including Peter Hall in Hall, Peter A. / Taylor, Rosemary CR: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms *, in: Political Studies 44 (1996), 5, pp. 3-32, here P. 8
  2. ↑ Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie: Historischer Institutionalismus, in: Theorien der Europäische Integration, ed. von Bieling, Hans-Jürgen and Lerch, Monika, Wiesbaden 2005 (UTB, 2554), pp. 271–292, here p. 272
  3. ^ Thelen, Kathleen Ann / Steinmo, Sven: Historical institutionalism in comparative politics, in: Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis, ed. von Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen Ann and Longstreth, Frank, Cambridge [etc.] 1992, pp. 1–32, here pp. 3f.
  4. ↑ Thelen and Steinmo (see note 3), p. 5
  5. ↑ Thelen and Steinmo (see note 3), p. 2
  6. ↑ Bulmer, Simon J .: New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market, in: Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1998), 3, pp. 365-386, here p. 369
  7. ^ Hall and Taylor, Rosemary CR (see note 1), p. 6
  8. ^ Hall and Taylor, Rosemary CR (see note 1), p. 7
  9. ↑ a b Morisse-Schilbach (see note 2), p. 272f.
  10. ^ Pierson, Paul: The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, in: Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996), 2, pp. 123-163
  11. ↑ Morisse-Schilbach (see note 2), p. 276
  12. ^ Pollack, Mark A .: The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis, in: Governance 9 (1996), 4, pp. 429–458, here p. 433
  13. ↑ a b c Pierson (see note 11), p. 131
  14. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 131f.
  15. ↑ a b Pierson (see note 11), p. 133
  16. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 135
  17. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), pp. 137-139
  18. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 137
  19. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 139
  20. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 140
  21. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 142
  22. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 147
  23. ↑ Pierson (see note 11), p. 148
  24. ↑ Pollack (see note 13), p. 435f.
  25. ↑ Pollack (see note 13), p. 434ff.
  26. ↑ a b Morisse-Schilbach (see note 2), p. 284, on this see also Arnum 1999 (p. 58), Aspinwall / Schneider 2000 (p. 17); Christiansen et al 2002 (p. 24), cited from the same source.
  27. ↑ Bulmer, Simon J .: Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merge Control, in: Public Administration 72 (1994), 3, pp. 423-444
  28. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6)
  29. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 371
  30. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 382
  31. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 370
  32. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 372
  33. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 373
  34. ↑ Campbell, John L. / Lindberg, Leon N. / Hollingsworth, J. Rogers: The evolution of governance regimes, in: Governance of the American Economy, ed. by Campbell, John L., Hollingsworth, J. Rogers and Lindberg, Leon N., Cambridge 1991, pp. 319-355
  35. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 374
  36. ↑ March, James G. / Olsen, Johan P .: Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of politics, New York, NY 1989
  37. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 375f.
  38. ↑ Bulmer (see note 6), p. 376
  39. ↑ Morisse-Schilbach (see note 2), p. 287
  40. ^ Peters, B. Guy / Pierre, Jon / King, Desmond S .: The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism, in: The Journal of Politics 67 (2005), 4, pp. 1275-1300, here p 1276
  41. ↑ Mahoney / Terrie 2008 should be mentioned here; Pierson 2000, 2004; Capoccia / Kelemen 2007; Capoccia / Ziblatt 2010
  42. ↑ Collier / Collier 1991 are an example; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Skocpol 1979; Mahoney 2001; Slater 2003; Slater 2010
  43. ↑ Peters, B. Guy, Pierre and King (see note 44), p. 1277
  44. ↑ Geddes, Barbara: How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, in: Political Analysis 2 (1990), 1, pp. 131-150