Indian Airlines Flight 113
Indian Airlines Flight 113 | |
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The unlucky machine in 1978 |
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Accident summary | |
Accident type | Controlled flight into terrain |
place | Ahmedabad , Gujarat , India |
date | October 19, 1988 |
Fatalities | 133 |
Survivors | 2 |
Injured | 2 |
Aircraft | |
Aircraft type | Boeing 737-2A8 |
operator | Indian Airlines |
Mark | VT-EAH |
Departure airport | Bombay Airport , Bombay , Maharashtra , India |
Destination airport | Ahmedabad Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport , Ahmedabad , Gujarat , India |
Passengers | 129 |
crew | 6th |
Lists of aviation accidents |
The Indian Airlines Flight 113 (flight number IC113 ) was a domestic flight of the airline Indian Airlines from Bombay airport to Ahmedabad Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport . On October 19, 1988, on this flight, a Boeing 737-2A8 with the aircraft registration VT-EAH was flown against a power pole in fog shortly before landing and fell to the ground. 133 people were killed in the accident, only two survived.
plane
The aircraft involved in the accident was a Boeing 737-2A8, which was 17 years and 11 months old at the time of the accident. The machine was assembled at Boeing's facility in Renton , Washington , and made its maiden flight on November 24, 1970, before being delivered to Indian Airlines in December of the same year. The aircraft had the factory number 20481, it was the 271st Boeing 737 from ongoing production. The machine was approved with the aircraft registration VT-EAH . The twin- engined narrow -body aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9A engines. At the time of the accident, the machine had completed 42,831 operating hours and 47,647 take-offs and landings.
Crew and passengers
There was a crew of six on board, consisting of a captain, first officer and four flight attendants. For the flight to Ahmedabad, 129 passengers were seated on board the machine, including 124 adults and 5 children.
the accident
The flight was scheduled to take off from Bombay Airport at 5:45 a.m. local time, but was delayed by 20 minutes because a passenger did not show up. The aircraft took off from Bombay at 6:05 a.m. and at 6:20 a.m. the crew contacted air traffic control in Ahmedabad. She was then informed of the weather data collected at 5:40 a.m. and at 6:25 a.m. again the weather data from 6:10 a.m., from which it emerged that visibility had decreased from 6 to 3 kilometers. At 6:32 a.m. clearance was given to descend to 15,000 feet (approx. 4,570 meters). The crew received instructions to report as soon as they passed the radio beacon in Ahmedabad. It was foggy with visibility of 2000 meters. The air traffic control gave the crew a virtual print of 1010mb, which was correctly reproduced by them.
The master decided to carry out an instrument approach on runway 23. At 6:47 am local time, he reported his position via Ahmedabad. At 6:50 a.m., he announced that he would transition from cruise to approach. This was the last radio message that air traffic control received in Ahmedabad.
The crew neither asked for permission to land, nor, in accordance with general standards, reported their flight position after every 1000 feet (approx. 305 meters) sunk. The flight speed of the machine was 160 knots, which was slightly above the prescribed speed and the captain should not have allowed the machine to drop below the minimum altitude of 500 feet (approx. 150 meters) as long as he was not in sight of the runway. The recordings of the pilots' conversations on the cockpit voice recorder later revealed that both pilots were focused on seeing the runway at the time. Worried about seeing the runway, the pilots were distracted from their task of looking at the altitude. Instead of focusing on his readings, the captain and the first officer kept an eye out for the runway, both ignoring the altimeter readings.
At 6:53 a.m., the machine brushed against trees and a high-voltage pylon and fell to the ground on the outer borders of the village of Chiloda Kotarpur. The crash site was located 2,540 meters from the runway threshold of runway 23 at Ahmedabad Airport. The accident initially killed 130 people, while 5 injured were rescued. Of these, three people died shortly afterwards, bringing the number of victims to 133.
Landing conditions at Ahmedabad Airport
Due to the special circumstances at Ahmedabad Airport, various NOTAMs had previously been published. These concerned the absence of an approach light and a glide path outside the instrument landing system, which is why the course transmitter was of elementary importance during the approach. This meant that the VASI lighting, the rotary radio beacon , the distance measuring equipment and the course transmitter were still available, which would have made a landing possible even with visibility of 1,600 meters.
The airport authority said that landing at Ahmedabad Airport would require a pilot to see the runway from 500 feet. If he can't see the runway, a pilot shouldn't drop his machine below 500 feet. The fact that the machine was flown 2.6 kilometers in front of the runway in the field suggests that the pilot did not have it in view.
The airport authorities also announced that the rotary beacon was functional at the time of the accident. This could be determined from the fact that the pilots could fly curves that were aligned with the rotary radio beacon. The course transmitter also worked, since the scene of the accident was in a line with the center line of the runway. The data from the flight recorders suggest that the pilots did not make sure that they were watching the DME and VASI lights. Since their altimeters were showing correct values, they must have either ignored them or lost awareness of the actual altitude.
It was also found that the airport staff in Ahmedabad did not collect any data about the Runway Visual Range , although they would have been able to do so without much effort and this would actually have been part of the duties of the staff. Approaching pilots accordingly lacked data that would have given them an idea of when they could expect a sighting of the runway.
Final report
In the final report, the cause of the accident was attributed to misjudgments by the two pilots, which were made in connection with poor visibility, which the crew were not informed of.
After receiving the report, the Indian government convened a committee to re-evaluate the report in collaboration with the US National Transportation Safety Board . The Indian government accepted the report after implementing a change request. The conclusion of the final report was:
"The cause of the accident is a misjudgment of the responsible pilot as well as the copilot due to non-compliance with the established approach procedures in poor visibility conditions."
swell
- Accident report in the Aviation Safety Network
- Company history on planespotters.net
- Ahmedabad crash: A sight was too much to bear , Times of India , November 15, 1988.
Coordinates: 23 ° 5 ′ 29 ″ N , 72 ° 39 ′ 9 ″ E