Article 5 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany

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Article 5 of the German Basic Law (GG) contains numerous basic rights that protect free communication. Art. 5 paragraph 1 GG guarantees freedom of expression . This fundamental right protects the freedom to express and disseminate opinions freely. Closely related to this is the freedom of the press , radio and film, which serve to disseminate opinions. Finally, Article 5 (1) of the Basic Law guarantees freedom of information . According to this, everyone has the right to obtain information unhindered from generally accessible sources of information. Limited these rights are universal laws , as well as youth and Ehrschutz .

Finally, Article 5 paragraph 3 of the Basic Law protects the freedom of science and art . These are certain forms of communication that the law considers particularly worthy of protection. Therefore, these fundamental rights can only be restricted by conflicting constitutional law.

Normalization

Since the Basic Law came into force on May 24, 1949, Article 5 of the Basic Law has read as follows:

Article 5 of the Basic Law - a work by Dani Karavan on the glass panes on the Spree side at the Jakob-Kaiser-Haus of the German Bundestag in Berlin

(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his or her opinion in words, writing and images and to obtain information from generally accessible sources without hindrance. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting through radio and film are guaranteed. A censorship does not take place.

(2) These rights are limited in the provisions of general laws, the statutory provisions for the protection of young people and in the right to personal honor.

(3) Art and science, research and teaching are free. The freedom of teaching does not release from loyalty to the constitution.

The guarantees of Art. 5 GG aim to protect free communication. For this purpose, the constitutional norm guarantees numerous freedoms related to free communication.

As with all civil liberties, Article 5 of the Basic Law is a right of the citizen to defend himself against the state. It therefore enables the defense against sovereign interference in the protected areas of freedom. In addition, some guarantees of the standard contain design orders to the state as well as procedural and facility guarantees. This is particularly true of freedom of broadcasting. The Federal Constitutional Court learns from this how the German broadcasting system must be structured. Finally, Art. 5 GG, as constitutional law, affects subordinate norms, such as civil and criminal law . This indirect third-party effect is of great importance , for example, in the area of reporting and honor offenses .

History of origin

After the freedom of communication was suppressed in the time of feudalism and absolutism , the need for unhindered communication, especially in political terms , grew in the population through the influence of the Enlightenment .

Federal Act

In the area of ​​the German states, reform efforts were initially directed against the strong prior sovereign censorship . This meant that press products could only be published with the approval of a sovereign institution. The Federal Act of the German Confederation , an international treaty between German states from 1815, called on the states involved to guarantee freedom of the press in their legal systems. Some states incorporated such guarantees into their constitutions. The liberalization of the right of expression was again restricted by the Karlsbad resolutions of 1819, as a result of which the larger German states in particular continued to pursue extensive press censorship.

Paulskirche constitution

Constitutional protection should be given to freedom of expression and freedom of the press by § 143 of the Paulskirche constitution of 1849. According to this, every German had the right to freely express his or her opinion through word, writing, printing and graphic representation. Through § 152 WRV, the freedom of art and science also received constitutional protection. However, due to the resistance of numerous German states, this constitution did not prevail, so that its guarantees had no legal effect. Following the failure of the Paulskirche constitution, however, some later constitutions, such as the Prussian from 1850, took up some of their guarantees of freedom.

Imperial constitutions

The imperial constitution of 1871 did not contain a catalog of fundamental rights and therefore did not guarantee any freedom of communication.

Freedom of expression was guaranteed by Article 118 of the Weimar Constitution . The wording of this norm was directly linked to Section 143 of the Paulskirche constitution. The constitution also protected the freedom of art, science and teaching. In contrast, freedom of the press was not expressly protected. The legal doctrine of the time saw this, however, already covered by the freedom of expression.

The guarantee of freedom of expression in the time of National Socialism did not have any practical application . With the Emergency Ordinance for the Protection of the People and the State of February 1933 and the Enabling Act of March 1933, the National Socialists lifted the commitment to the basic rights of the Weimar Reich constitution. As a result, the press and radio were directly under the control of the state. The freedom of science and art were also suppressed. This happened, for example, through the book burning in 1933 , exhibition bans and the degradation of artists and their works.

post war period

After the capitulation of Germany and the occupation of Germany by the victorious powers, the western allies began to restore the freedom of communication. This development came to an end with the drafting of the Basic Law by the Parliamentary Council , which met between 1948 and 1949. With Article 5 of the Basic Law, this body designed a comprehensive guarantee of freedom to participate in public communication without hindrance. Compared to the provision of the Weimar Imperial Constitution, Art. 5 GG contained extended protection in that it also included non-Germans, forbade any prior censorship, ensured freedom of broadcasting and protected the right to obtain information unhindered from generally accessible sources of information.

The protection of freedom of communication developed differently in East Germany. According to its wording, the constitution of the GDR from 1949 (VerfDDR) guaranteed with Art. 27 the right to express one's own opinion freely and publicly, but this freedom had to be exercised in the sense of the constitution, i.e. in the sense of Marxism-Leninism . The same applied to artistic freedom guaranteed by Art. 34 VerfDDR.

The wording of Art. 5 GG has not been changed since the Basic Law came into force. Its guarantees were essentially shaped by the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, which Art. 5 GG regarded as a basis of the democratic community. It therefore interprets its warranties extremely broadly in its ruling practice and attaches great importance to them.

Art. 5 paragraph 1 GG

Protection area

Art. 5 GG protects the citizen against interference in his freedom to participate in the formation of public opinion. To this end, the standard guarantees a sphere of freedom that sovereigns may only intervene under certain conditions. This sphere is called the protection area . If the sovereign intervenes in this and this is not constitutionally justified, Art. 5 GG is violated.

Personally

Art. 5 GG does not restrict the group of fundamental rights holders, so that the fundamental right protects everyone. This includes natural persons , associations of persons , in particular legal persons according to Art. 19 Paragraph 3 GG, since the guarantees of freedom of Art. 5 GG are essentially applicable to them. However, this only applies to associations of persons based in Germany. Foreign legal persons are not protected by Art. 5 GG. Associations that are based in other EU countries have a special position: If they are active in Germany, they can, according to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court , invoke fundamental rights like domestic associations due to the prohibition of discrimination in Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union .

If the legal person is controlled by the state, it is not a holder of fundamental rights, as it is itself bound by the fundamental rights as part of the public sector. However, public broadcasters enjoy fundamental rights protection , as these promote the exercise of fundamental rights by citizens.

Factual

Art. 5 paragraph 1 GG guarantees freedom of expression. This provision is flanked by the freedom of the press, radio and film (freedom of the media) as well as the right to unhindered information from generally accessible sources (freedom of information). Taken together, these basic rights are also referred to as basic communication rights in jurisprudence. In a broader sense, reference is also made in this context to freedom of assembly ( Art. 8 GG) as the collective exercise of freedom of expression.

freedom of speech

The fundamental right to freedom of expression is a foundation of the democratic community, which is reflected in its high priority in the case law. The Federal Constitutional Court has called it since the fundamental Lüth judgment of 1958, which is considered to be a fundamental judgment of fundamental rights in several respects , as constitutive for the free democratic basic order .

Freedom of expression protects the right to express an opinion freely and unhindered. The Federal Constitutional Court defines the term opinion as a statement that is inherent in an element of the opinion and the belief in the context of an intellectual debate, and is therefore a subjective value judgment in the sense of opinions, judgments, evaluations, opinions, regardless of form and content. Opinions that run counter to the constitutional order are also protected by freedom of expression. The Basic Law trusts that such opinions will not prevail in public. Advertising statements and other commercial statements are covered by the scope of protection of freedom of expression insofar as they contain opinion-forming content. For example, shock advertising can be protected by freedom of expression. The Federal Constitutional Court primarily dealt with this in the Benetton decisions of 2000 and 2001.

No opinions are assertions of fact, as the judgmental component is missing. A factual assertion is characterized by the fact that proof can be raised about its truth, which is not possible with expressions of opinion. In practice, however, factual assertions are often not isolated, but are combined with expressions of opinion. In order to effectively protect the content of opinion in such cases and thereby promote the free communication process, the area of ​​protection is also extended to factual assertions, provided that they are based on the formation of opinions and detachment from one another would distort the meaning. According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, factual assertions that have been proven to be untrue, as they cannot promote the process of free opinion formation in a manner worthy of protection, cannot be protected from the outset. The same applies to assertions of fact that the utterance knows are not true.

The demarcation between factual assertion and expression of opinion is of great practical importance due to the weaker legal protection of factual assertion, but is often difficult due to the often fluid transition between the two forms of expression. The assessment is largely based on the circumstances of the individual case. For example, the case law assessed the designation of soldiers as murderers as an opinion. Although the allegation of a criminal offense is basically an assertion of fact, the wording and context of the statement suggest that the uttering soldier did not want to accuse soldiers of a criminal offense but rather criticize the soldier's profession. The statement that the CSU party is the NPD of Europe was also judged by the jurisprudence as an expression of opinion: Although it was formulated like a factual assertion, it was so poor in substance that the statement could be interpreted as a value judgment. The Federal Constitutional Court demands that, in the case of statements that can be interpreted in different ways, courts deal precisely with the respective interpretation variants and, in case of doubt, use the interpretation variant that enjoys the greatest possible protection through freedom of expression. Any other approach would run the risk of unduly curtailing the freedom of expression and thereby affecting the public communication process. However, this principle does not apply to processes that focus on future failure to make a statement, as the person making the statement can be expected to make his statement in the future.

Freedom of expression protects the expression and dissemination of opinions. This includes the right to determine in what way and where the statement takes place.

Freedom of the press

Art. 5 paragraph 1 sentence 2 GG guarantees the freedom of the press. Jurisprudence attaches great importance to this fundamental right, as the free press provides citizens with information on the basis of which they can form opinions. Therefore, freedom of the press is as central to democracy as freedom of expression.

The term press includes printed matter that is suitable and intended for distribution to an indefinite group of people. Freedom of the press supports every form of press; their seriousness is irrelevant at the level of the protected area. In addition to the informative press, the entertaining press is also protected. The advertising part of a press product can also be protected by the freedom of the press. The extent to which publications in media other than printed media, such as the Internet, count as press has not yet been conclusively clarified in law. The prevailing opinion regards the availability of a printed product as an essential feature of the press. Electronic media therefore do not fall under the protection of the press, but rather in the freedom of broadcasting.

In contrast to freedom of expression, the protection of the freedom of the press concentrates on the organizational activities of the press. While the content of press products regularly falls under the protection of freedom of expression, freedom of the press protects the lawful acquisition and distribution of information. The freedom of the press also protects the reproduction of someone else's opinion in a printed matter. Other forms of press freedom set the editorial secrecy , the tendency freedom and refuse to testify rights are journalists.

In addition to these defense rights, which protect the press from sovereign interference, the guarantee of freedom of the press also includes a guarantee for the existence of a free press. The Federal Constitutional Court recognized this in the Spiegel ruling of 1966. From the institutional guarantee of freedom of the press it follows that the press must be organized privately. The press should also be structured as free from the state as possible. The freedom of the press also results in claims by members of the press against government agencies. Such claims can be found in the state press laws in particular . Ultimately, sovereigns must behave neutrally towards press organs, i.e. they must neither favor nor discriminate.

Broadcasting freedom

Under the term broadcasting, jurisprudence understands the transmission of content by means of electromagnetic waves to an indefinite group of people. Freedom of broadcasting protects the production and distribution of content. In this respect, the basic right shows a parallel to the freedom of the press. According to the prevailing opinion, the difference between the two basic rights lies in the fact that the information that is disseminated in the case of freedom of the press is embodied in one medium.

In addition to this defensive function, the freedom of broadcasting contains a comprehensive protection mandate in favor of the free broadcasting: From Article 5, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court derives the task of the state to create a free broadcasting system that adequately represents the actual diversity of opinion in broadcasting. It regards radio as a particularly important communication medium, as it is characterized in a special way by its topicality and has a wide impact and suggestive power. In addition, broadcasting is costly to produce. After all, broadcasting could only be operated to a limited extent due to a limited number of frequencies. This special situation of broadcasting means that the legislator has the task of creating a free broadcasting regime. The Federal Constitutional Court sees the representation of social diversity as an essential prerequisite for such an order. To ensure this, broadcasters have to be organized pluralistically. State influence must be limited here. Broadcasting also had the task of providing basic media coverage with its programs.

On the one hand, private broadcasters can invoke the fundamental right to freedom of broadcasting. On the other hand, the basic right is open to public broadcasters, because despite their membership in the public sector, they exercise a right of freedom in favor of the citizens through their information activities. The basic right also grants them a right to functional financial resources.

Film freedom

The fundamental right of film freedom protects the production and distribution of films. Since films as works of art are regularly subject to artistic freedom, which guarantees more extensive protection than film freedom, this fundamental right is of little practical importance.

Freedom of information

The object of protection of the fundamental right to freedom of information is unhindered information from generally accessible sources. This basic right is intended to enable citizens to obtain comprehensive information.

Generally accessible sources are those that are suitable and intended to provide information to a group of people who cannot be individually determined. The basic right can, for example, give tenants a claim against their landlords to consent to the installation of a parabolic antenna in order to receive foreign television programs. However, freedom of information does not give rise to any entitlement to opening new sources of information. The information protection does not extend to the official area, such as inspection of files or information.

Intervention

An encroachment occurs when the guarantee content of a basic right is shortened by sovereign action.

With regard to freedom of expression, any measure constitutes an interference that makes it difficult to express or disseminate opinions. This applies, for example, to criminal convictions for libel , defamation or defamation . Interventions in the freedom of the press and broadcasting may include measures that make the activities of the press and broadcasting more difficult. This was affirmed by case law, for example, for the inclusion of a press organ in a report for the protection of the constitution . Ultimately, freedom of information is encroached upon by impairing free access to a source of information.

Justification of an Intervention

If there is a sovereign intervention, this is lawful, provided it is constitutionally justified. According to Art. 5 Paragraph 2 GG, the basic rights from Art. 5 Paragraph 1 GG may be restricted by general laws, the protection of minors and the right to personal honor. The jurisprudence regards norms as general laws which are not directed against a specific opinion and which serve to protect an important legal interest. These include, for example, libel offenses and tort law .

In contrast, Section 130 (4) of the Criminal Code does not constitute a general law , as this norm prohibits the approval of the National Socialist rule of violence and arbitrariness, i.e. it is directed against a certain opinion. In its Wunsiedel decision of 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless assumed that the norm was in conformity with the constitution: The fundamental rights of Art. 5 Paragraph 1 GG are not only subject to the provisions of Art. 5 Paragraph 2 GG, but can also be used as any fundamental right with the exception of Guarantee of human dignity ( Art. 1 Paragraph 1 GG) are limited by conflicting constitutional law. The rejection of the Nazi regime is a fundamental value decision of the Basic Law, which is why it can restrict freedom of expression as a conflicting constitutional law, detached from Art. 5, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.

Freedom of expression and freedom of the press often conflict with the protection of general personal rights . For example, the judicial prohibition of reporting or the obligation to publish a correction interferes with the freedom of the press. The basis of claims on which such measures can be based are general laws. They require a weighing of interests in individual cases .

According to Art. 5 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 GG, prior censorship is not permitted . This includes measures that oblige a work to be approved before publication.

Art. 5 paragraph 3 GG

Protection area

Art. 5 paragraph 3 GG guarantees the freedom of science, research and teaching as well as the freedom of art.

Freedom of science, research and teaching

The triad of science, research and teaching does not mean the juxtaposition of three independent basic rights. Rather, it is an expression of a uniform basic right that guarantees the freedom of science. Research and teaching are merely concretizing sub-terms of science.

Article 5 paragraph 3 GG, like Article 5 paragraph 1 GG, does not limit the group of fundamental rights holders. Therefore, the fundamental right protects everyone who wants to obtain knowledge using scientific methodology. This typically affects members of universities and research institutes, freelance scientists and students. In accordance with Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, research institutions themselves also represent fundamental rights holders, both private and state-sponsored. The fundamental rights entitlement of state agencies is an exception to the principle of Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, according to which the public sector is not the holder of fundamental rights, but is obliged to do so. It is based on the fact that the universities are largely independent in the state organization and primarily serve to enable private individuals to exercise their freedom of research.

Activities are considered to be science if their content and form are to be regarded as a serious, planned attempt to ascertain the truth. Serious efforts to obtain scientific knowledge are sufficient. The only practices excluded from the scope of protection are those that merely appear to be a scientific approach and which clearly fall short of scientific standards.

First of all, the fundamental right comprehensively protects free research. Research is defined as activities through which knowledge is to be gained in a methodical, systematic and verifiable manner. Their protection includes in particular the independence of the researcher, the free choice of research subject and methodology as well as the handling of the knowledge gained.

Freedom of teaching includes the transfer of knowledge gained through scientific research. This fundamental right protects teaching at universities in particular. On the other hand, teaching in public schools is not protected: for these, the more specific fundamental right of Article 7 of the Basic Law applies.

Finally, Article 5, Paragraph 3, Clause 1 of the Basic Law obliges the state to create and maintain the foundations of free research. This is why it has the task of providing institutions for independent scientific operations and providing them with adequate financial resources. This is done in particular through the establishment of state universities. These have a far-reaching autonomy vis-à-vis other sovereign bodies.

Freedom of art

The freedom of art guaranteed by Art. 5 Paragraph 3 Clause 1 GG protects the freedom of art. The concept of art is difficult to define legally in that art is characterized by the fact that it takes on new forms. In addition, a state judiciary, as it existed at the time of National Socialism, should be excluded. In order to roughly determine which works are protected by artistic freedom, legal scholarship developed several formulas that complement each other. In the Mephisto ruling of 1971, the Federal Constitutional Court saw as a characteristic feature of art that certain impressions, experiences and experiences of the artist are expressed through free creative design. This is called the material art concept. According to the formal concept of art, a work of art exists when it can be assigned to an artistic type of work, such as a novel, painting or film. In contrast, the open concept of art is ultimately based on the fact that works of art can be interpreted in different ways by an understanding audience.

Art freedom protects both the production of art and its distribution. In jurisprudence, the former is referred to as the work, the latter as the area of ​​activity. Thus, for example, the creation of the work of art is also protected by fundamental rights protection, as it promotes its reception by the public. In contrast, purely commercial interests, such as the trade in art, are not protected by artistic freedom. For this purpose, other basic rights, in particular the freedom of occupation ( Art. 12 GG) and the property guarantee ( Art. 14 GG) are relevant.

In addition to its function as a subjective right of defense, artistic freedom also contains an objective value decision by the legislature, which obliges the state to promote art.

Relevant fundamental rights holders are primarily artists. People who make art accessible to the public, such as publishers, film producers, record manufacturers and managing directors of a book publisher, also come into consideration. Legal persons can also be bearers of the fundamental right in accordance with Art. 19 Paragraph 3 GG. This also includes certain state institutions, such as universities of the arts or music.

Fundamental rights competitions

Freedom of research takes precedence over freedom of expression as a lex specialis . Because of the different directions of protection, it is in free competition with the freedom of occupation ( Art. 12 GG), the property guarantee ( Art. 14 GG) and freedom of belief ( Art. 4 GG)

Artistic freedom also supersedes freedom of expression if an opinion is expressed in an artistic way. It also takes precedence over the general freedom of action ( Art. 2 Paragraph 1 GG). If a work of art has a sacred background, freedom of art and freedom of belief stand side by side because of their different protective purposes.

Intervention

Measures that affect the acquisition of scientific knowledge have the character of intervention. This includes influencing individual researchers or research institutions as a whole. An evaluation of research and teaching achievements can also represent an intervention. The definition of entry requirements to research institutes, on the other hand, does not have an intrusive character. Due to the objective division of values ​​of the fundamental right, which obliges the state to guarantee access to research, the failure to support research can also encroach on fundamental rights.

Interventions in artistic freedom represent measures that hinder the free artistic activity or the spread of. This includes, for example, influencing the methods, content and tendencies of artistic activities. The promotion of individual art movements does not have an intervening character. If there is a noticeable difference in treatment among the artists, this can constitute an encroachment on fundamental rights.

justification

According to its wording, Art. 5 Paragraph 3 GG does not contain any possibility of restricting the freedom of art and science. The limitations of Art. 5, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law cannot be transferred to the guarantees of Art. 5, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law for reasons of the legal system. Therefore the justification of an interference can only result from conflicting constitutional law. This possibility of restriction is based on the fact that constitutional provisions, as rights of equal rank, do not displace one another, but are brought into a relationship of practical concordance in the event of a collision . This requires a balance between freedom of research and the conflicting good. This is intended to create a balance that is as gentle as possible and that gives each constitutional good the widest possible validity on both sides. An encroachment on the freedom of research based on the violation of a constitutional good also requires legal specification.

Restrictions on the freedom of research can result, for example, from the functionality of research institutions, which is protected by the fundamental right itself. Freedom of teaching can be restricted by the right to freely choose a training facility, which is guaranteed by Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. Various possibilities of restriction, such as the obligation to treat personal data confidentially, result from the general right of personality , which jurisprudence derives from Art. 1 Paragraph 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 2 Paragraph 1 GG. If the freedom of research violates the human dignity of Article 1 paragraph 1 GG, it is unconstitutional in any case. Interventions can also be based on animal protection , which has constitutional status through Art. 20a GG. The freedom of conscience from Article 4 (1) of the Basic Law represents a further basis for interventions . Another limitation is the doctrinal duty of faithfulness to the constitution mentioned in Article 5 (3), second sentence. This is an expression of the one based on Article 33 (5) The official's duty of loyalty to the basic democratic order.

A permissible restriction of artistic freedom is, for example, the indexing of a pornographic novel for reasons of the protection of minors. The Federal Constitutional Court also approved the ban on a novel whose author described intimate details of a relationship without the consent of the person concerned in order to protect personal rights.

The citation requirement of Article 19, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law does not apply to the fundamental rights of Article 5, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, since these have no explicit legal reservation.

literature

  • Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 . In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  • Frank Fechner: Art. 5 . In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  • Christoph Gröpl: Art. 5 . In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  • Hans Jarass: Art. 5. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  • Kerstin Odendahl: Art. 5 . In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  • Christian Stark: Art. 5 I, II . In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  • Rudolf Wendt: Art. 5 . In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 49. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  2. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 8-11. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  3. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 30a. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  4. ^ A b c d Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 25, Rn. 1.
  5. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 1-5. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  6. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 2. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  7. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 6-10. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  8. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 11-13. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  9. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 21-24. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  10. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 25-32. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  11. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 5a. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  12. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 50-51. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  13. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 10-14. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  14. ↑ Hans Jarass: Preparation before Art. 1 , marginal no. 19-23. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  15. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 6, Rn. 2.
  16. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 210.
  17. ↑ Kerstin Odendahl: Art. 5 , Rn. 10. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  18. ↑ BVerfGE 129, 78 (94) : application extension.
  19. ↑ BVerfGE 31, 314 (322) : Broadcasting decision.
  20. ^ Daniela Schroeder: Grundrechte , CF Müller, 2011, ISBN 978-3-8114-7064-4 . P. 257 .
  21. ^ Walter Frenz: Handbuch Europarecht: Volume 4: Europäische Grundrechte , Springer Science & Business Media, 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-31116-4 . P. 531 .
  22. ↑ Martin Morlok, Lothar Michael: Grundrechte . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-2366-9 , Rn. 201.
  23. ↑ BVerfGE 7, 198 (208) : Lüth.
  24. ↑ BVerfGE 62, 230 (247) : Call for a boycott.
  25. ↑ Frank Fechner: Art. 5 , Rn. 79. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  26. ↑ a b BVerfGE 61, 1 (8) : Election campaign / 'CSU: NPD Europe'.
  27. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 213.
  28. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 216.
  29. ↑ BVerfGE 124, 300 (320–321): Wunsiedel decision .
  30. ↑ BVerfGE 71, 162 (175) : Fresh cell therapy.
  31. ↑ BVerfGE 95, 173 (182) : Warning notices for tobacco products.
  32. ↑ a b BVerfGE 102, 347 : Benetton I.
  33. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 241 : Auschwitz lie.
  34. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 1 (15): War debt book.
  35. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 241 (247) : Auschwitz lie.
  36. ↑ BVerfGE 85, 1 (15) : Bayer shareholders.
  37. ↑ BVerfGE 93, 266 : Soldiers are murderers.
  38. ↑ BVerfGE 61, 1 (9) : Election campaign / 'CSU: NPD Europe'.
  39. ↑ BVerfGE 82, 43 (52) .
  40. ↑ BVerfGE 93, 266 (296) : Soldiers are murderers.
  41. ↑ BVerfGE 114, 339 : Ambiguous expressions of opinion.
  42. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 218.
  43. ↑ BVerfGE 93, 266 (289) : Soldiers are murderers.
  44. ↑ BVerfGE 10, 118 : Professional ban I.
  45. ↑ BVerfGE 20, 162 (174) : Spiegel judgment .
  46. ↑ BVerfGE 95, 28 (35) : Works newspapers.
  47. ↑ Christian Stark: Art. 5 I, II , Rn. 60. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  48. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 69. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  49. ↑ BVerfGE 34, 269 (284) : Soraya.
  50. ↑ BVerfGE 120, 180 (196) : Caroline von Monaco III.
  51. ↑ BVerfGE 102, 347 (359) : Benetton I.
  52. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 229.
  53. ↑ Kerstin Odendahl: Art. 5 , Rn. 17. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  54. ↑ BVerfGE 85, 1 (11): Bayer shareholders.
  55. ↑ Gerrit Manssen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67576-8 , Rn. 371.
  56. ↑ BVerfGE 20, 162 (192) : Spiegel.
  57. ↑ BVerfGE 52, 283 (296) : tendency operation.
  58. ↑ BVerfGE 64, 108 (114) : Show box numbers.
  59. ↑ Herbert Bethge: Art. 5 , Rn. 72. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Commentary . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  60. ↑ BVerfGE 80, 124 (134) : Postal newspaper service.
  61. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of August 28, 2000, 1 BvR 1307/91 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2001, p. 503 (504).
  62. ↑ BVerfGE 80, 124 (133) : Postal newspaper service.
  63. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 233.
  64. ↑ Gerrit Manssen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67576-8 , Rn. 379.
  65. ↑ BVerfGE 136, 9 (28) : Supervisory bodies broadcasting corporations.
  66. ↑ BVerfGE 136, 9 (37) : Supervisory bodies broadcasting corporations.
  67. ↑ BVerfGE 31, 314 (322) : 2nd broadcast decision.
  68. ↑ BVerfGE 83, 238 (298) : 6th broadcast decision.
  69. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 17, Rn. 50-52.
  70. ↑ Gerrit Manssen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67576-8 , Rn. 390
  71. ↑ BVerfGE 22, 71 (83) .
  72. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 27 (31) : Parabolic antenna I.
  73. ↑ BVerfGE 103, 44 (60) : TV recordings in courtroom II.
  74. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 8, Rn. 1.
  75. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 237.
  76. ↑ BVerfGE 113, 63 (78) : Young freedom.
  77. ↑ BVerfGE 7, 198 (209) : Lüth.
  78. ↑ Gerrit Manssen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67576-8 , Rn. 399
  79. ↑ BVerfGE 124, 300 : Wunsiedel.
  80. ↑ BVerfGE 101, 361 : Caroline of Monaco II.
  81. ↑ Martin Morlok, Lothar Michael: Grundrechte . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-2366-9 , Rn. 225
  82. ↑ BVerfGE 33, 52 : Censorship.
  83. ↑ BVerfGE 47, 198 (236) : Electoral advertising broadcasts.
  84. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 257.
  85. ↑ Christoph Gröpl: Art. 5 , Rn. 109 In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (ed.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  86. ↑ Rudolf Wendt: Art. 5 , Rn. 100. In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .
  87. ↑ BVerfGE 35, 79 (112) : University judgment.
  88. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 1 (12) : Writings harmful to young people.
  89. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 1 (13) : Writings harmful to young people.
  90. ↑ BVerfGE 35, 79 (113) : University judgment.
  91. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , § 17, Rn. 110.
  92. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , § 17, Rn. 113.
  93. ↑ Martin Morlok, Lothar Michael: Grundrechte . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-2366-9 , Rn. 244.
  94. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , § 17, Rn. 115.
  95. ↑ BVerfGE 35, 79 (114) : University judgment.
  96. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , § 17, Rn. 130-131.
  97. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , § 17, Rn. 74.
  98. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 118. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  99. ↑ BVerfGE 30, 173 (188) : Mephisto.
  100. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 17, Rn. 76.
  101. ↑ BVerfGE 67, 213 (227) : Anachronistic move.
  102. ↑ BVerfGE 77, 240 (250) : Herrnburger report.
  103. ↑ BVerfGE 31, 229 (238) : School book privilege.
  104. ↑ Martin Morlok, Lothar Michael: Grundrechte . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-2366-9 , Rn. 240.
  105. ↑ BVerfGE 81, 108 (116) .
  106. ↑ BVerfGE 119, 1 : Esra.
  107. ↑ BGHZ 130, 205 (218).
  108. ↑ BVerfGE 36, 321 (331) : records.
  109. ↑ BGHSt 37, 55 (62).
  110. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 122. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  111. ↑ Christoph Gröpl: Art. 5 , Rn. 114. In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  112. ↑ BVerfGE 47, 327 (367) : Hessian University Act.
  113. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 142. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  114. ↑ BVerfGE 111, 333 (354) : Brandenburg University Law.
  115. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 125. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  116. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 17, Rn. 90.
  117. ↑ Tristan Kalenborn: The practical concordance in case processing . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2016, p. 6 (8).
  118. ↑ a b Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 149. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  119. ↑ BVerfGE 126, 1 (15) : Fachhochschullehrer.
  120. ↑ BVerfGE 105, 73 .
  121. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 5 , Rn. 150. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  122. ↑ BVerfGE 83, 130 : Mutzenbacher judgment .
  123. ↑ BVerfGE 119, 1 : Esra.