Constructive realism

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The Constructive realism (CR) is one of the Austrian philosopher Friedrich Wallner developed theoretical scientific approach or a puzzle building.

His main concern is to gain insight into the relationality of scientific knowledge and, associated with this, to turn away from the classic view that science can come to binding statements about reality. Instead, science constructs realities by starting from unchecked and culturally determined assumptions. These realities represent - subject-specific - micro-worlds, within which the concept of truth as "local truth" is justified and is also binding.

"The basic insight of constructive realism is that knowledge does not lie in the construction of models or 'micro-worlds', but in the 'alienating' understanding of the connection between scientific constructs and their requirements."

The central method for uncovering hidden and not further questioned assumptions of the respective specialist discipline is that of alienation .

Purpose of the CR

'The CR sees itself as a therapeutic philosophy that aims to help the scientific community understand itself. ... Constructive realism does not claim to have an insight into the world, but an insight into how science works. ' This approach wants to prevent the normativity of science, especially the claim of sole validity of western science (“there is only one truth”), and to keep the field open for competing, alternative attempts at structuring the “world”.

The purpose of constructive realism is to bypass the normativity of science. Since norms are culture-specific (see social constructivism ), the CR suggests considering a science in its cultural dependency (lifeworld). If one has analyzed the prerequisites on which the system of norms of the researched science is based, the principle of normativity can be avoided when looking at the respective science.

Historical basics

The human striving for knowledge is directed towards reality. The natural sciences try to discover the laws that underlie natural phenomena. There are theoretical and empirical objections to the possibility of recognizing reality.

The empirical objections include the experience that, sooner or later, scientific convictions often cannot be sustained. Examples of this would be the replacement of the geocentric by the heliocentric worldview or the phlogiston theory . The theory of relativity identified Newtonian physics , which seemed so convincing, as a construct that cannot be found in reality, since there are no massless systems, and the results of quantum physics with the introduction of absolute or objective chance destroyed the concept of comprehensive determinism or the predictability of the world (see Laplace's demon ). The scientists and philosophers of the Vienna Circle dealt with the question of why it could happen that findings that were regarded as unquestionable were suddenly refuted. They suspected errors in the method as the cause of incorrect scientific sentences. Ultimately, the attempt to specify criteria that would distinguish scientific propositions - and what were meant were those that unquestionably depict reality - as such failed. Authors such as Paul Feyerabend drew the conclusion that, in short, led to the famous statement " anything goes ": 'Rain dances are just as good as weather forecasts, election forecasts are no better than astrology'.

One of the theoretical objections to the possibility of knowing reality arises from the historically proven failure of the assured gain of knowledge with regard to a "reality" located outside of the human being (objective world, presented independently by humans, preceding all knowledge), one of the theoretical objections to the possibility of knowing reality: how does one come up at all? the idea that human thinking is able to recognize structures of reality? What do human concepts, as phenomena of consciousness, have to do with those forces and laws that are postulated to (could) underlie the world? One would have to be able to relate the position of an “absolute spirit” who can observe both the content of human consciousness and the relevant section of the world without errors in order to be able to judge whether what a person thinks about reality at least partially agrees with what reality is like. The frequently made reference to the successes of science and its predictions (especially in the field of technology) cannot be taken as proof of the fundamental correctness of the laws found, since correct predictions could also be made with - from today's point of view - even completely wrong worldviews , for example the prediction of lunar eclipses in the context of a geocentric view of the world (see history of lunar observation ).

The method problem raised by the Vienna Circle was recognized as an inevitable problem inherent in science: the circle of object and method. As long as one does not know the object - if one already knew it, no scientific research would be necessary - one would have to use a method appropriate to the object in order to research it as it "really" is. Choosing the right method presupposes that you already know the subject of the investigation. Conversely, this means that the respective discipline can only find what the method used in each case provides.

The empirical findings about the failure of sentence systems believed to be true, as well as the theoretical objections to the mind, led to a departure from the view that science describes reality. One of the philosophical consequences was the birth of constructivism : science does not find laws, it invents them. Science does not talk about reality - and if it does, at most erroneously, not considering its own presuppositions - but constructs realities: micro-worlds within which the respective sentence systems are correct and can also be verified (i.e., have not yet failed because of reality) which results in what can be called “local truth”. The claim to knowledge of science is maintained by the fact that the claim to knowledge is not aimed at correspondence with reality, but rather parts of the lifeworld are systematized and micro-worlds are interpreted with regard to the lifeworld.

On the ontology of the CR

Constructive realism distinguishes between two clear world concepts, reality - that which stands opposite human consciousness - and reality - the constructed world of science. Individual (sub) disciplinary construction services are referred to as microworlds , the culture-specific background lifeworld .

reality
Before every scientific act - from the CR's point of view - the object belonging to the act is assumed to be present - this given world is called reality; the world in which we live, which "works by itself" without being able to recognize it - reality cannot therefore be an object of knowledge.
reality
Through scientific activity in a methodically controllable and verifiable way, a new object is produced, about whose relation to its prerequisite no statement is made. This area can be basically understood as it was created. "verum et factum convertuntur" ( Giambattista Vico )
Micro world
Individual scientific construction achievements, disciplinary and subdisciplinary realities
Lifeworld
Traditional systems of proven beliefs, culture-specific background

Alienation in CR

Alienation (strangification) is the central method in constructive realism. In principle, it is a matter of detaching a sentence system s1 from its (disciplinary) context k1 and viewing it in another context k2 (or several) in order to get closer to an understanding of the (implicit) prerequisites of scientific actions in context k1.

Alienation in one's own methodology using the example of mathematics

The rule of three (the final calculation ) is discussed at school. 10 workers build 1 prefabricated house in 10 days of 8 hours. How long does it take 20 workers to do the same job? An especially eager student works out how long it would take 1 million workers and comes up with 0.288 seconds. When he proudly presents the result, the teacher and class laugh. The student does not understand the laughter because he has not made a calculation error.

The result is nonsense if the framework conditions of the area in which the math is applied are not taken into account. The alienation brings out the methodological prerequisites of mathematics - for example, that equations can be multiplied by any number (non-zero or infinite) without changing their validity. These requirements are obviously different from those of the lifeworld. In this example, the alienation works with a reductio ad absurdum , which shows that mathematics cannot be applied one-to-one to the living environment.

The following joke is based on the same principle: Savings advisor to the customer: “With a monthly contribution of only 100 euros, after 1000 years you will receive 100 million euros. That's something !! "

Alienation of human relationships in statistics

How do you have the greatest chance of getting to know the person who suits you best? One could consider the following: The more potential partners you get to know, the greater the chance that the right person will be there. So you should have an affair with as many as possible. It turns out, however, that the chance of finding the best one does not increase by a factor of 100 with this strategy if one has 5000 instead of 50 affairs. By alienating human relationships in statistics, it turns out that human relationships are not quantifiable.

Alienation of human thought processes in brain functions

This example shows how a generally accepted alienation results in a consequence that is difficult to accept, if not adversarial ("self-defeating"). The starting point is the typical, naturalistic reduction : "Thinking or thoughts are nothing other than brain processes", that is, human thinking is alienated in the context of biology. Since the brain is a physical structure, it and all of its processes are subject to the laws of nature. The brain processes are thus - apart from quantum mechanical coincidences - determined . So when the brain thinks, the thoughts are determined. However, if a thought is formed with causal necessity, which is based on the biological laws of the brain (and not on insight into the facts), then these thoughts cannot express any knowledge (insight) into the true state of affairs, since the deterministically evoked thought is not recognizable semantic (content-related) relation to the subject matter. The sentence “The brain thinks” therefore, if it should actually be as the sentence claims, does not represent an insight into the true relationships, since it was itself causally determined by the natural laws underlying the brain functions. Generalized: Man is not capable of knowing if his thinking is determined by physical-chemical-biological laws of nature. This result is absurd, however, since the evidence is based on the fact that the arguments are seen as correct. It would boil down to the convincing realization: "I realize that I cannot know".

Critique of the traditional philosophy of science

According to Wallner, classical epistemology fails in that it tries to justify knowledge without presupposing knowledge. On the other hand, if it were to presuppose knowledge, it would also not be possible to justify it. This would require a position that overlooks everything possible, but which does not exist and which cannot be faked through speculation . The CR takes a different approach here, in that it does not claim normativity and descriptiveness : “... our aim is to show how insights can identify themselves as such without us having to use the given reality and the general Claim to be binding. ”In the field of philosophy of science, Wallner turns against the conception of science as a description of reality. He draws his arguments from scientific practice, where he sees a construction achievement instead of a description. This is where the terms reality and reality in constructive realism come in. Another area of ​​application of CR is the problem of interdisciplinarity . To ensure this, the respective scientists have to move away from their own discipline and meet in a different area - “neutral ground”. This is one of the possibilities offered by the central CR method, alienation .

Interdisciplinarity and CR

In Constructive Realism, Wallner differentiates between four forms of interdisciplinarity:

In instrumental interdisciplinarity , results from other disciplines are used as an instrument to deal with one's own question along the lines of one's own method. Strictly speaking, this is only an interdisciplinary approach to a limited extent, since only information - i.e. the “material” on the basis of which the research process then takes place - is adopted, but the question and methods are not in an interdisciplinary discourse.

The universalizing interdisciplinarity , on the other hand, claims to be able to come to a more general and broader understanding through to an interdisciplinary discourse, up to and including the whole. But if you leave the methods of the respective subject in order to enter into a discourse with another, the question arises as to which methods this discourse should follow. According to Wallner, however, this question has always been resolved unconsciously, as there is always a certain discipline that specifies what to ask and how to proceed. Wallner speaks of leadership science here. In the case of universalizing interdisciplinarity, neither the choice of methods nor the weighting of the question is answered.

In explanatory interdisciplinarity , a science is explained through the methods of another science; the operation of one science becomes the subject of another science. In his “Eight Lectures on Constructive Realism” Wallner plays through this approach using the example of a sociological study of physics. For example, the personal or sociocultural reasons for a physicist to develop a particular theory are interesting for the sociologist as an object, but not relevant for physics, since their objects are described independently of the private life of the respective scientist. In a sense, we are dealing here with two objects of research that are not identical to one another. Physics has therefore gained nothing. There is no insight into the methods used.

The alienating interdisciplinarity is supposed to offer this insight. In doing so, the scientist uses a different inventory of methods than his usual method to structure his research area. After this experiment, he returns to the usual procedure and to examine whether anything has changed in his assessment of the method selection and assessment of the initial questions. Of course, this does not lead to a more general knowledge of the world (a claim that has been dropped in CR anyway), but to a better understanding of one's own method.

Binding nature of science in constructive realism

However, after what has been said so far, the question of whether science is binding remains open. Success alone is not a criterion for the binding nature of a scientific method. The CR assumes that the method and the subject form a circle. In other words, it is necessary to research an object, to know it beforehand and to have an idea of ​​it. In every research process, prerequisites are assumed in advance that determine the type of method and that are not further justified. Making these prerequisites visible is the result of alienation. “He (the CR) is realism in that it relates to experience, to the fact that we really act. However, he examines these actions against the horizon of their presuppositions, ie he regards people as someone who makes his life, the world, society etc. understandable by trying out which actions are possible - therefore “constructivist”. "

Reality and reality

In contrast to traditional metaphysics , which strives for a knowledge of reality, the CR gives up this claim and examines our actions during the process of knowledge. "In other words: when we use the method of alienation, we give up the old fiction that we approach reality through knowledge." In the process of alienation, we refrain from distinguishing between reflection and reality from the start. The reflection creates reality again. The variety of constructions creates different contexts and changing contexts leads to new insights. An identity of reality and reality is explicitly not assumed, since precisely this point of contact between knowledge and the world was a haven of problems in the older epistemology.

Truth in Constructive Realism

The CR does not work with an absolute concept of truth, but emphasizes the existence of local concepts of truth. Wallner starts with the question why the concept of truth is clear in everyday life, but highly problematic in epistemology. A distinction is made between object-oriented speech and meta-speech. For one only the correct use of the terms is necessary, but the other requires understanding of them. We only fail in the correct use of the concept of truth when we also have to understand it, i.e. in the area of ​​the meta-speech. Completely giving up the concept of truth would mean that we would no longer be able to reflect on science and would reduce it to a purely instrumental level, without any claim to gain in knowledge. In the following, Wallner shows on the basis of the failure of adequation theory, coherence theory and consensus theory of truth that our understandings of truth suffer from a false basic assumption: namely that the relationship between truth and reality is that of an image. This also means that the separation of humanities and natural science falls.

Natural science and humanities

In classical philosophy of science we are dealing with two types of science (and two types of reality): the humanities, which represent ideas, and the natural sciences, which represent nature. The latter can only be understood as a mere technique if its results cannot be communicated in an understandable way beyond the technical language. Understanding, which now defines the scientific character, is the "domain of the so-called humanities". In other words: the natural sciences - as Wallner writes - produce a number of techniques to change reality. Wallner now throws in that they then do not necessarily understand themselves, but threaten to tip over into mere instrumentalism if they do not make themselves the object of their reflection. This is exactly where the humanities come in, whose field is understanding - i. H. to reflect on yourself - is. In order for natural science to still be scientific (i.e. to produce knowledge and not only make life easier), according to Wallner, it must also undergo such a reflection, which would have eliminated the strict separation of spiritual science and natural science.

Knowledge of how to handle information

Wallner does not define the CR as a doctrine, but as an "activity of relating information" to something that is usually not related. In this way we come to knowledge about information, in contrast to object knowledge. “This means that constructive realism does not increase knowledge about the world with its activity, but leads to knowledge about the handling of information, so it is a reflexive activity. Handling is intentional when it is directed at an object, reflexive when it is directed at itself. ”In this way, the CR leads to knowledge about the handling of information - e. B. the limits of their applicability. It shows what happens when a scientist applies a method. The limits of the validity of a thesis also become visible against the background of the constructivist aspect in CR. If we first construct the object in the formation of theories, another structuring is possible at any time. However, the binding nature of the respective thesis is in no way undermined. “Constructivism indicates the sense in which a statement is binding, and thus indirectly leaves the area of ​​non-binding open.” Since method and object are in a circle on which the respective structuring of the world, which is carried out in theory x, is based If (or in which they participate), a different structuring is possible at any time, which sometimes refers to another such circle, without one of them losing its commitment in the context of the respective reality - which is the result of a design achievement. The aim of the CR is now for the designer to be aware of his activity and reflect on the information he has created. For Wallner, this demand for self-reflexivity is a structural feature of human knowledge itself. Wherever work is carried out on the basis of instrumentalism, no knowledge is achieved. Only self-reflexivity is the criterion for scientific research.

Contemplation and Instrumentalism

In ancient Greece, science was understood as a mere view of the world. However, Plato already describes the cognitive process of theoria in such a way that man changes in the process. There is also a moral achievement involved. So it is an act directed towards the human being part of this understanding of science, because only through a change in oneself will human beings come from the trivialities of everyday life to knowledge. According to Wallner, this ancient concept develops along two poles in Western history: one is function-oriented and the other is based on contemplation. If these two sides are not thought of together, our picture of science breaks down into a contemplative and an instrumental technical science. A purely instrumentalist science loses its activity and its knowledge. The opposite to this would be an immediacy of knowledge, which ultimately no longer knows any difference between the knower and the known. This makes knowledge and science impossible, since both presuppose that difference. Wallner now sees the ancient concept of science as wrong, namely that it is not humans that change, but the world. Next, Wallner compares his concept of reality with that of Plato. In its concept it is assumed that reality would be unchangeable. Now she is already excluding that from experience, which can only take place where change is possible. Right here is a contradiction. Wallner's conception, on the other hand, divides the term world into the terms reality and reality. "The relationship between reality and reality is not a direct one, but one that is established through human action concepts." Here, humans act in two ways: on the one hand in the construction of reality and on the other in the fact that they differ from it Can guide constructions in problem solving. The essential change besides this demarcation of reality and reality is that the action here is a construction achievement that relates to reality. As with Plato, reality also existed in CR, but it cannot be argued for epistemology.

The meaning of contradiction in constructive realism

Neither in the immediate nor in the instrumental knowledge (see above) there is room for a reflection on the knowledge. In direct cognition because it would no longer be direct if one were to reflect on it, and in instrumental cognition, because functioning, as the primary criterion, presupposes a structural identity between thinking and being. The CR, on the other hand, says that reflexivity is a structural characteristic of knowledge. It is similar with regard to contradiction: in direct knowledge it cannot appear and in instrumental knowledge it is a sign of failure. Logic, as it is based on arbitrarily set and interchangeable basic assumptions, only applies to a limited area, according to Wallner. This includes the principle of contradiction . “This sentence has the character of an instruction.” From this point of view it should be correct: “Act in such a way that you never form a sentence system in which two sentences occur that are in direct contradiction to one another!” In this formulation, the sentence contains Contradicts its area of ​​application: the formation of sentences. Accordingly, the principle of contradiction is an instruction for language games . Since it is only an instruction to act, it is possible to disregard it. Language games of this kind can be found e.g. B. in Chinese philosophy. Knowledge arises not only through the construction of reality, but also when we encounter difficulties in the course of dealing with it. Wallner sees the role of science still in resolving the contradiction, but that of epistemology in finding possibilities of contradicting sentence systems.

Differentiation from other forms of constructivism

Constructive realism differs from radical constructivism in that radical constructivism does without the concept of truth.

The Erlangen school assumes that thinking can be standardized. The norms for this should be derived from action. Constructive realism, on the other hand, assumes that actions are too diverse to be predictable.

literature

  • Kurt Greiner : Therapy of Science. An introduction to the methodology of constructive realism. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2005, ISBN 3-6315-3821-9 .
  • Martin J. Jandl, Kurt Greiner (eds.): Science, Medicine and Culture. A Festschrift for Fritz G. Wallner . Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, ISBN 3-6315-3652-6 .
  • Gerhard Klünger (Ed.): Dictionary of Constructive Realism. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 978-3-631-61169-2 .
  • Thomas Slunecko, Fritz G. Wallner: The movement of constructive realism a Festschrift for Fritz G. Wallner on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of his appointment as professor of theory of science at the University of Vienna (= Philosophica 13). Braumüller, Vienna 1997, ISBN 3-7003-1184-2 .
  • Fritz Wallner: Eight lectures on Constructive Realism (= Cognitive Science 1). 3rd revised edition. Wiener Universitäts-Verlag, Vienna 1992, ISBN 978-3-85114-046-0 .
  • Friedrich Wallner: The transformation of science. Ed. Martin Jandl, Verlag Dr. Kovac, Hamburg 2002, ISBN 978-3-8300-0584-1 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 122
  2. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 88-89, 118-125
  3. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 67, 87-88
  4. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 64
  5. ↑ a b Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 112
  6. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 100
  7. ↑ Friedrich G. Wallner: Systems Analysis as Philosophy of Science III: The project of a culture-oriented philosophy of science in the present (= Culture and Knowledge 16). Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 978-3-631-60542-4 , from the brief description on the dust jacket
  8. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 101-103
  9. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 85
  10. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, p. 14
  11. ^ Anton Zeilinger: Einstein's veil. The new world of quantum physics. Beck, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-406-50281-4 , pp. 51-64, 99.
  12. ↑ Gerhard Klünger: freedom in the context of scientific criticism. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978-3-631-63004-4 , p. 4
  13. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 139-140
  14. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 131-132
  15. ↑ Klünger: Dictionary of Constructive Realism. 2011, pp. 14, 15, 41, 68, 107, 130
  16. ↑ Example based on Gerhard Klünger: Freedom in the context of the criticism of science . Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978-3-631-63004-4 , p. 182 .
  17. ↑ Kurt Greiner: The joke and its architecture. An example of applied alienation from everyday life. In: Fritz G. Wallner, Kurt Greiner, Martin Gostentschnig (Eds.): Verfremdung - Strangification. Multidisciplinary examples of the application and fertility of an epistemological method (=  culture and knowledge ). tape 5 . Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2006, ISBN 978-3-631-55263-6 , pp. 47 .
  18. ↑ Detailed presentation by Gerhard Klünger: Freedom in the Context of the Critique of Science . Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978-3-631-63004-4 , p. 276-280 .
  19. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight Lectures on Constructive Realism, p. 12
  20. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 17
  21. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight Lectures on Constructive Realism, p. 40
  22. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 43
  23. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 58
  24. ↑ a b Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 61
  25. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 62
  26. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 74
  27. ↑ a b Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 78
  28. ^ Friedrich Wallner: Eight lectures on constructive realism, p. 82