Air raids on Chongqing

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Japanese Mitsubishi Ki-21 bomber over Chongqing, 1940 ( Asahi Shinbun )

During the air raids on Chongqing ( Chinese 重慶大轟炸 / 重庆大轰炸, Japanese 重慶 爆 撃) during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan's Imperial Army and Navy Air Force bombed the then Chinese war capital Chongqing . The Japanese military hoped the bombing would turn the war of attrition on mainland China. The scheduled air raids began in January 1939 and ended after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Due to the inferiority of their air forcethe defense efforts of the Kuomintang government were largely limited to anti-aircraft artillery , air raid shelters and evacuations. Various sources give the number of fatalities between 10,000 and 23,000.

background

Expansion of the Japanese occupation zone during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1940. Chongqing Red circle.png is located in the Sichuan Province in the southwest of the country

In 1937, Japan started the Second Sino-Japanese War in order to force territorial and economic concessions from China through a brief armed conflict. Even if the Japanese armed forces were far superior to the Chinese and won battle after battle, the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek evaded complete military defeat by retreating inland. After the then Chinese capital Nanking was occupied by the Japanese armed forces in 1937, the Kuomintang government initially moved to Wuhan . After that, it moved its headquarters to Chongqing, which is far in the mountainous inland and then functioned as the war capital. Due to its location and the surrounding terrain, the city was beyond the operational range of the Japanese ground forces. After the initial streak of victories for Japan, a stalemate developed in which the Japanese could not crush the KMT army and the KMT state. On the other hand, the Chinese national troops did not succeed in retaking any significant territory. The Japanese government and military leadership saw air strikes as a means to undermine the fighting strength of the Kuomintang and to induce them to conclude peace on Japanese terms. The Japanese Air Force initially focused on the Chinese government's main supply routes to prevent supplies from abroad. Therefore, the focus of the air operations was initially on Lanzhou , the connection point to the Soviet Union , and the bridges and traffic junctions in southern China to the Burma Road . They also tried to destroy the Chinese Air Force by bombing airfields, but this was not achieved.

On February 18, 1938, Japanese fighter planes carried out an air raid on Chongqing for the first time. The nine bomber attack was part of several feasibility studies against various Chinese cities. The attack killed three people and destroyed three buildings. On December 2, 1938, the Imperial Headquarters decided with Order No. 241 a strategic bombing campaign against the war capital. This was to be achieved indirectly by crippling the Chinese war economy and breaking the morale of the Chinese civilian population. In addition to the military leadership, the civil government under Konoe Fumimaro and the emperor supported the order. The escalation of the bombing war was the main tool used by the Japanese state in an attempt to bring the war to a victorious end in China and to establish a pro-Japanese puppet state under KMT deserter Wang Jingwei .

History of the bombing raids

Bombing raids from 1939 to 1940

Schematic representation of the bombing raids on the urban area of ​​Chongqing

The first air raids began in January 1939 and were specifically aimed at the civilian population. There were three attacks that month, killing around 100 civilians. Due to the weather over Chongqing, the Japanese air forces were unable to attack from February to April 1939. On May 3rd and 4th, 1939, there was a concentrated Japanese bombing raid from Wuhan , which had been captured in the previous battle . The attacks, which came as a surprise to the civilian population, triggered widespread fires in the city with a mixture of high explosive and incendiary bombs. The Chinese authorities counted 3,700 dead, 2,650 injured and 4,900 buildings destroyed. From May to November 1939, twenty more air strikes of various magnitudes followed. The Japanese leadership intensified the attacks with Operation 101 from May 1940 to the end of September 1940. Here, forces from both the Army and Navy Air Force were brought together, dropping around 50-100 tons of bombs per attack. The attacks took place day and night. During this period, the Chinese authorities counted 2,600 individual attacks and around 10,000 bombs dropped, as well as 4,100 dead and 5,400 injured. According to Japanese figures, a total of 27,000 bombs weighing 2,957 tons were dropped over the city in the summer of 1940. The Japanese put their own casualties in Operation 101 at 107 aircraft and 89 crew members killed. The conquest of Yichang reduced the distance for the Japanese aircraft to the target, which made the air strikes easier to carry out.

Due to its long range, the land-based naval bomber Mitsubishi G3M was primarily chosen for the long flight route between Wuhan and Chongqing . As a result, the main burden of the air strikes was borne by the Navy Air Force. The command of the air strikes lay with the chief of the combined air fleet Ōnishi Takijirō . The planning of the operations was in the hands of Inoue Narumi, the chief of staff of the Japanese fleet in China. The Army Air Force used the long-range Mitsubishi Ki-21 bomber for attacks on Chongqing. Japanese tactics did not just focus on destroying targets in major operations. The streams of bombers were directed in such a way that the city had to be kept on air alarm for as long as possible due to inconsistent arrival . From spring to late summer, the city had around 10 hours of air alarm a day, with the longest continuous air alarm lasting 96 hours. The strength of the attack formations varied and increased in the course of the operation. At the end of the campaign, associations of around 200 bombers were common. Chongqing was the most bombed Chinese city of the war. For example, the communist capital Yan'an was attacked from the air only seventeen times between 1938 and 1941. 241 fatalities were reported.

Cessation of air raids because of the Pacific War

From January 1941 to September 1941 there were only 40 attacks, as the Japanese leadership was preparing and reorienting its air forces for the Pacific war against the Western Allies. In mid-October 1941, only around 70 Japanese Army Air Force combat aircraft remained in the Chinese theater of war. The majority of around 1100 operational machines of the Army Air Force were two-thirds intended for the Southeast Asian theater of war and one-third was kept in reserve in Manchuria. With the beginning of the Pacific War by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the bombing campaign by the Japanese armed forces was almost completely stopped. In 1943, there was a last single Japanese air raid on Chongqing.

As military aid from the United States of America , the Chinese Air Force received support from the US Fourteenth Air Force , which caused the Japanese Air Force to lose air control over China from 1943 onwards. At the beginning of 1944 there were around 100 Japanese aircraft (exclusively from the Army Air Force) compared to 170 fighter planes from the Chinese Air Force and 230 US fighter planes. At the end of 1944 this ratio had shifted further from 150 Japanese aircraft in China to 800 Allied aircraft. By using the Curtiss P-40 and North American P-51 fighter aircraft, which were superior to the Japanese models , the Allied Air Forces had, in addition to their numerical superiority, a technical advantage over their Japanese opponents. This led to a restriction of the Japanese air missions to night attacks and to the limitation of the close air support operations to rare attacks with unsuitable fighters. A new strategic bombing campaign was therefore impossible from a Japanese point of view.

Air defense and air defense measures

Air defense measures

The Chinese Air Force was clearly inferior to its Japanese opponents, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Luftwaffe command only used them sparingly. Nevertheless, from 1939 the Japanese were forced to carry out their bombing raids only with a hunting escort. At the end of 1940, of around 300 Chinese Air Force fighter planes, around 160 were parked for the defense of the war capital. The Flying Tigers was envisaged when it was founded as a unit to defend the capital, for strategic reasons the Chinese military leadership it but never came in this role is used and has been used to support the standing army in the field. From 1940 the Japanese air force began using Mitsubishi A6M fighter planes , which were able to secure air superiority over Chongqing due to their technical superiority. Due to the high losses, the Chinese Air Force had only 56 aircraft ready to fly by the end of 1940. This and the low level of training of the crews ensured that the Chinese side carried out very few combat missions in the air from 1940 onwards. The Chinese Air Force consisted mainly of Soviet models until 1942. In relation to the entire theater of war, around 2,000 Soviet pilots served in the Chinese Air Force, of which around 200 men were killed.

The main load of the active air defense lay with the anti-aircraft artillery . In 1939, the city's air defense consisted of seventeen 75 mm cannons, sixteen 20–37 mm cannons and around 20 lighting batteries. The air defense also used sound measuring devices to locate the bombers. At Chiang's instigation, an unknown number of mobile anti-aircraft artillery units were used for the first time in August 1939. The training of anti-aircraft soldiers was standardized and set for one year. Both sides published unrealistic figures on the success of the air defense, which were used for their own propaganda. Internal statistics of the KMT military counted fifteen destroyed and 85 damaged bombers for the period from 1938 to 1941. Among the Japanese bomber crews, missions against Chongqing were seen as missions with low resistance and minimal losses.

Air defense measures

Civilians who were killed in a mass panic while visiting shelters.

The Chinese authorities created a Chongqing City Air Raid Command in 1937. The first steps were the establishment of protective tunnels near the Linjiiang Gate and in the Fuzichi district . By December 1937, 55 air raid shelters had been built, which could accommodate 7,000 people out of a total population of 415,000. The air raid command planned the construction of a central tunnel system, which should serve as the main air raid shelter. The four kilometer long tunnel system should extend over several parts of the city and be accessible via different entrances. Caves found in the sandstone underground of the city were also included in the construction of the shelter . However, due to a lack of resources, the plans were only partially implemented. In the further course of the war, the Chinese built many decentralized air raid shelters, which, however, were mostly of a primitive design. Often they were simple shelters consisting of a trench and a wooden cover. In 1938 a total of 166 shelters and bunkers were available, one year later there were already 800. From 1940 the air raid command tried to minimize the fire risk after Japanese bombing by building measures such as firebreaks. In 1944, the city's air raid protection reported several thousand protective structures that were supposed to house the entire indigenous population of 450,000 people.

In addition to the state protection facilities, there were also more elaborately constructed private bunkers. These offered a certain level of comfort with electric lights, refrigerators and seating. However, these were only affordable for the affluent part of the population, as the operators charged high fees for their use. In 1941 there were around 470 publicly and around 930 privately operated air raid shelters in the city. The private shelters were usually maintained by public institutions, the military or civil companies and workplaces, but often only served the leadership of the institution that built them. Tens of thousands of people fled or were evacuated from the city, bringing the population down from 475,000 in 1937 to 394,000 in 1940. After the end of the bombing, the number rose quickly and reached the million mark in 1944. However, Chinese population statistics were very sketchy, as the homeless and urban refugees were often not recorded. An investigation by the KMT youth organization in 1941 of 240 registered air raid shelters revealed very inadequate equipment and maintenance of the shelters. Only one in fortieth was equipped with electric light and only one in four was equipped with benches, and around a quarter had structural defects such as water damage, inadequate ventilation or hygienic deficiencies.

To reduce the number of civilians in the target area, the KMT government also organized temporary resettlements from 1939 onwards. Some of the residents were distributed to the surrounding area, the other part to the suburbs. The resettlements were carried out in annual campaigns that started when the weather began to improve in spring, when air strikes were expected again. The government also used funds to support the resettled people. In the course of the bombing raids, the KMT government established a well-functioning air observation and reporting system that used radios , telegraphs and telephones to transmit messages. With the help of the system, the Japanese attacks could mostly be cleared up right from the start.

In the summer of 1939, several thousand people died in an air raid in a protective cave in Shihuishi District, according to eyewitness reports. The shelter, which had become a mass grave, was cleared out by civilians who were forced to do so. On June 5, 1941, 461 to 1,527 people died in the protective tunnel in the Shibati district . Because electricity generators were not connected, neither lighting nor ventilation could be operated in the large tunnel. The occupants of the tunnel tried to leave it because of shortness of breath and the resulting rumor of a Japanese gas attack. There was a mass panic, but the refugees were forced back into the bunker by the air raid forces. Many people died of oxygen starvation or panic trying to exit the tunnel. Although the nationalist government tried to hide the incident through censorship, eyewitnesses made it known. The KMT government reacted to the accumulation of accidents in the air raid shelters in June 1941 by removing the Minister for Air Protection Liu Qiying .

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The information on the number of casualties caused by the air raids varies widely. Internal statistics from the KMT military from 1946 put this at around 15,000 dead and around 20,000 injured. In addition to the data from the Chinese authorities at the time, there are recent Chinese studies that put the deaths at 23,600 and the number of injuries at 31,000. More conservative Chinese data assume around 10,000–14,000 dead and around 10,000–12,000 injured.

For the civilian population, because of their dependence on the weather, the bombing was perceived as a season of its own , in which life was determined by the air raid alarm and the stay in protective facilities. Air defense expenditures consumed so many resources of the capital's medical service that planned health care programs could not be carried out. In addition to burns and injuries from debris and splinters, mental illness - especially anxiety disorders - increased during the attacks. An internal report by the health authorities indicated that 122 conventional medical practitioners and 310 traditional practitioners were available to care for the civilian population . The air raids in 1940 led to the extensive collapse of the city's sewage system . In 1939, however, the health authorities were able to use vaccination campaigns to ensure that not a single case of cholera occurred in the following year . 150,000 residents were vaccinated against the infectious disease and mandatory vaccination for the military was introduced. Here, too, the health system benefited from the deployment of thousands of mobilized women in the nursing professions. The stresses and strains in the air raid shelter hit the various classes of society differently. The small upper class could seek shelter in relatively comfortable and safe facilities, while the majority of the population was dependent on the public air raid protection system. The elderly and children in particular suffered from the difficult conditions in the air raid shelters. The bombing also increased the number of homeless orphans in the city. Occupational groups who work outdoors were more likely to be victims of the attacks. In September 1939, the city's 6,000 rickshaw drivers had 300 dead and 700–800 injured. The military police, which were supposed to be on the lookout for Japanese saboteurs, were forbidden to withdraw into the air raid shelters, which resulted in many deaths among the crews.

The attacks did not achieve the goal of destabilizing the capital and the Kuomintang. They also failed to isolate the city and thus the KMT government from the outside world. The land and air traffic routes could not be interrupted at any time. The attacks were ranked in line with the war crimes in the air strike on Guernica in the Western media , causing Japan to suffer a significant loss of prestige in Western public opinion.

reception

The nationalists highlighted the KMT government's protection of the civilian population and used it as a means of gaining legitimacy. However, the numerous accidents in the shelters and the way the administration dealt with them highlighted the inefficiency of the republican administration for the population. There are numerous reports that the will to resist the Japanese was strengthened by the bombing raids, which were perceived as war crimes. The American admiral and outgoing commander of the Asiatic Fleet, Thomas C. Hart, called the air strikes folly without any military use. In the People's Republic of China , the bombing was taboo, as was the nationalist side of the civil war and the anti-Japanese war. The policy of reform and opening up brought about a turning point that emphasized the narrative of a united struggle of nationalists and communists against Japan. This made research and publications about the history of Chongqing as a war capital possible.

The work of Time magazine correspondent Theodore H. White and photographer Carl Mydans , both of whom were eyewitnesses to the bombing, achieved great influence among the US public. The Oscar- winning film " Kukan " features a 17-minute sequence with original footage from Chongqing during the bombing.

In 2004 a group of survivors and relatives of the victims formed, which in 2006 sued the Japanese state for damages and an apology. The claims made by 188 people were dismissed by the Tokyo District Court in 2015.

Web links

Commons : Air Strikes on Chongqing  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

See also

literature

In English

  • Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 256-282.
  • Tetsuo Maeda: Strategic Bombing of Chongqing by Imperial Army and Naval Forces. In: Yuki Tanaka, Marylin B. Young (Eds.): Bombing Civilians - A Twentieth Century History. New York 2009, pp. 135-153.

In Chinese language

  • Li Jinrong, Yang Xiao: Fenghuo suiyue: Chongqing da hongzha. Chongqing 2005.
  • Tang Shourong: Chongqing dahongza. Chongqing 1992.
  • Zeng Xiayong, Peng Qiansheng, Wang Xiaoxum: 1938-1943: Chongqing da hongzha. Wuhan 2005.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Hagiwara Mitsuru: The Japanese Air Campaigns in China 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, p. 246.
  2. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 258 f.
  3. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 259-268.
  4. Hans van de Ven: China at War - Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. Cambridge 2018, p. 124 f.
  5. ^ Tetsuo Maeda: Strategic Bombing of Chongqing by Imperial Army and Naval Forces. In: Yuki Tanaka, Marylin B. Young: Bombing Civilians - A Twentieth Century History. New York 2009, p. 144.
  6. ^ Hagiwara Mitsuru: The Japanese Air Campaigns in China 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, p. 249.
  7. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, p. 262 f.
  8. ^ A b Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 259-268.
  9. ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London 2013, p. 191.
  10. ^ Hagiwara Mitsuru: The Japanese Air Campaigns in China 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 248-251.
  11. ^ A b c Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 268-275.
  12. ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London 2013, p. 212.
  13. Hakan Gustavsson: The Sino-Japanese Air War - The Longest Struggle. Ebook, Stroud 2017 (Chapter 8: Combat Debut of the A6M Zero) .
  14. ^ SCM Paine: The Japanese Empire - Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge 2017, p. 124.
  15. ^ SCM Paine: The Japanese Empire - Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge 2017, p. 126.
  16. Chang Jui-te: Bombs Don't Discriminate? Class, Gender and Ethnicity in the Air-Raid-Shelter Experiences of the Wartimne Chongqing Population. In: James Flath, Norman Smith: Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China. Vancouver 2011, p. 68.
  17. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, p. 271.
  18. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, p. 266.
  19. Thank you Li: Echoes of Chongqing - Women in Wartime China. Champaign 2010, p. 89.
  20. ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London 2013, p. 231 f.
  21. ^ Nicole Elizabeth Barnes: Intimate Communities - Wartime Healthcare and the Birth of Modern China, 1938-1945. Oakland 2018, p. 31.
  22. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, p. 257.
  23. ^ Zheng Wang: Never Forget National Humiliation - Historical Memory in Chinese Politics. New York 2012, p. 203.
  24. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford 2011, pp. 525n4.
  25. Nicole Elizabeth Barnes: Intimate Communities - Wartime Healthcare and the Birth of Modern China, 1938 - 1945. Oakland 2018, pp. 28 f., 38 and 48.
  26. Chang Jui-te: Bombs Don't Discriminate? Class, Gender and Ethnicity in the Air-Raid-Shelter Experiences of the Wartimne Chongqing Population. In: James Flath, Norman Smith: Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China. Vancouver 2011, pp. 70, and 73-76.
  27. ^ Edna Tow: The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945. In: Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven (eds.): The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino -Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford 2011, p. 280 f.
  28. ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London 2013, pp. 1-5.
  29. Hans van de Ven: China at War - Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. Cambridge 2018, p. 125 f.
  30. ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan. 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London 2013, p. 12.
  31. ^ Tetsuo Maeda: Strategic Bombing of Chongqing by Imperial Army and Naval Forces. In: Yuki Tanaka, Marylin B. Young: Bombing Civilians - A Twentieth Century History. New York 2009, p. 147.
  32. 陈琦: Culture - german.china.org.cn - Lost War Documentation celebrates its premiere in China. Retrieved May 21, 2017 .
  33. China Daily report from February 25, 2015 in English. Retrieved May 24, 2019 .