Megalopsychia

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Megalopsychia (Greek μεγαλοψυχία; Latin magnanimitas , German generosity, generosity; greatness of soul) is a virtue of the ancient canon of virtues.

For Aristotle ( Nicomachean Ethics IV, 7-8) it forms the middle between faint-heartedness and pompousness. Among the virtues it occupies a special position because on the one hand it presupposes the other virtues, on the other hand it represents their form of improvement. Megalopsychia shows itself in a pronounced but appropriate self-confidence and justified pride. One considers oneself worthy of great things, including honors, and rightly so. It also shows itself in the provision and return of benefits and an orientation towards the ethically good (and not towards the useful and profitable). Added to this is the moderate use of power and wealth as well as a controlled behavior in happiness and unhappiness.

Cicero treated in the first book of De officiis the magnanimitas in connection with the fortitudo (valor) as one of the cardinal virtues (I 61-92).

In his Summa Theologica (III, 129) treated Thomas Aquinas the magnanimitas as a virtue. The greatness of which man proves himself worthy is a gift from God. Thomas also tries to resolve an alleged conflict between magnanimitas and humility .

Christianity tended to propagate the virtue of modesty , which rather contrasts with megalopsychia . It demands modesty, regardless of the actual value or size of a person. From this point of view, megalopsychia becomes arrogance that is to be despised.

In his Leviathan , Thomas Hobbes characterizes magnanimity as the "contempt for small aids and obstacles". When there is a risk of death or injury, magnanimity is bravery.

In the third book, part 3 of his " Treatise of Human Nature ", Hume deals with the "greatness of mind". "Nothing (is) more praiseworthy than a sense of self that is based on valuable qualities that we really have." The greatness of mind is closely related to pride ( pride ) and self esteem (self-respect). It inspires our actions and gives us the approval and respect of others.

For Kant, the moral qualification of a person culminates in the size of his soul , which combines goodness of soul and strength of soul . It is, however, "more ideal than in reality".

Nietzsche's concept of the "greatness of the soul", which is also one of the attributes of his " superman ", shows clear traces of the Aristotelian conception of megalopsychia .

Remarks

  1. ^ Georg Picht, Plato's dialogues "Nomoi" and "Symposion" , Stuttgart 1990, p. 433
  2. Chapter 6; "contempt of little helps, and hindrances"; "Magnanimity in danger of death, or wounds, valor, fortitude".
  3. On Hobbes and other aspects of the history of ideas, see also Leo Strauss , The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis , Chicago 1961, p. 53 ff.
  4. ^ Anthropology in pragmatic terms , AA VII, p. 293
  5. cf. KSA 12,495; KSA 6, 148; 176 f., KSA 13, 531
  6. ^ Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist , Darmstadt 1982, pp. 446–448. Kaufmann's interpretation has been criticized by other researchers

literature

  • Ernst A. Schmidt, honor and virtue. On the megalopsychia of Aristotelian ethics . Archive for the history of philosophy, Vol. 49, pp. 149–168
  • Eckart Schütrumpf , Magnanimity, Mεγαλοψυχία, and the System of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics . Archive for the History of Philosophy 71 (1989)
  • Helen Cullyer, Pride and Preeminence in Classical Antiquity. The Genealogy of Megalopsychia from Homer to Cicero , Cambridge 2008
  • Otto Friedrich Bollnow , Essence and Change of Virtues , Frankfurt / M. - Berlin, 1958, p. 125 ff.
  • Ron Polansky / James Stover, Moral Virtue and Megalopsychia . Ancient Philosophy 23 (2003), pp. 351-359
  • RA Gauthier, Magnanimité, Paris 1951